Commonwealth v. Valdez, 56 N.E.3d 183

Defendant (Dominican citizen, lawful permanent resident since 1985) pleaded guilty in 1989 to larceny of a motor vehicle and was sentenced to prison.
Defendant later sought citizenship and consulted an immigration attorney who advised the 1989 conviction likely constituted a crime involving moral turpitude and an aggravated felony, risking inadmissibility on return to the U.S. and deportability.
Defendant moved under G. L. c. 278, § 29D to vacate the plea, claiming the plea judge had not advised him that conviction "may have" the consequence of exclusion from admission to the United States.
Motion judge found Commonwealth failed to prove the exclusion-from-admission warning was given but denied relief under precedent requiring more than a hypothetical risk (Commonwealth v. Grannum).
Appeals Court affirmed on the ground that defendant had not shown a pending exclusion proceeding; Supreme Judicial Court granted further review.
SJC held § 29D requires a defendant to show (1) a bona fide desire to leave and reenter the U.S., and (2) a substantial risk that reentry would be denied because of the conviction; defendant met both and conviction was vacated.

Issue	Valdez's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
What must a defendant show under G. L. c. 278, § 29D to prove a conviction "may have" the consequence of exclusion from admission to the U.S.?	Defendant: He need only show a bona fide intent to travel and a substantial risk his conviction would render him inadmissible on return.	Commonwealth: Defendant must show a pending exclusion/deportation proceeding (i.e., actual non-hypothetical step by federal authorities).	A defendant satisfies § 29D by showing (1) a bona fide desire to leave and reenter, and (2) a substantial risk of inadmissibility on return; not limited to cases with pending federal proceedings.
Whether larceny of a motor vehicle under Mass. law likely qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude for inadmissibility purposes	Valdez: Immigration authorities likely would treat it as moral turpitude given intent to permanently deprive.	Commonwealth: (Implicit) No decisive evidence showing automatic inadmissibility without adjudication.	Court: Likely a crime involving moral turpitude because Massachusetts larceny requires intent to permanently deprive; thus substantial risk of inadmissibility.

Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128 (2010) (§ 29D relief for deportation requires more than hypothetical risk; federal steps or written policy needed)
Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797 (2002) (purpose of § 29D is to ensure plea advisements about immigration consequences)
Commonwealth v. Soto, 431 Mass. 340 (2000) (vacatur where immigration proceedings to remove defendant had been initiated)
Commonwealth v. Berthold, 441 Mass. 183 (2004) (§ 29D requires more than hypothetical risk; defendant must face prospect of occurrence)
Commonwealth v. Pryce, 429 Mass. 556 (1999) (statutory text limits postconviction attack so relief is available before the immigration consequence occurs)
Mejia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2014) (test for whether a state crime involves moral turpitude looks to the intrinsic nature of the offense as defined by the state statute)