Commonwealth v. Roney
622 Pa. 1
| Pa. | 2013Background
- In January 1996 three men robbed a PNC Bank in Philadelphia; Officer Lauretha Vaird was fatally shot when she responded. Christopher Roney was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death; this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2005.
- Co-defendants Mark Canty and Warren McGlone were also tried; statements, firearms, and other investigative evidence were introduced at trial; no physical evidence directly linked Roney to the shooting at trial.
- Roney filed a timely PCRA petition raising multiple claims (mostly ineffective assistance and Brady claims). The PCRA court granted an evidentiary hearing only on counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and present mitigation at penalty phase and denied relief in a 74-page opinion; Roney appealed.
- Major contested themes on collateral review: (1) alternative-perpetrator theory (Travis Hall); (2) alleged Brady nondisclosures about Hall, surveillance videotape, fingerprint and impeachment material; (3) alleged false or misleading testimony; (4) Batson and Bruton claims; (5) ineffectiveness for penalty-phase mitigation investigation; and (6) sufficiency/vagueness of the grave-risk aggravator and related argument errors.
- The PCRA court rejected most claims as waived, speculative, unsupported by the record, or without prejudice; it conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing on mitigation and credited the Commonwealth’s expert; this Court affirmed the PCRA denial.
Issues
| Issue | Roney’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate/present evidence that Travis Hall was the shooter | Hall was an available alternative perpetrator (similar appearance, supplied getaway van, had prior robberies); counsel should have investigated and presented this to create reasonable doubt | Evidence tying Hall to the shooting was weak; Hall’s other crimes were not sufficiently distinctive to be admissible; Roney offered no affidavit or proof of what counsel did not investigate | Denied — claim speculative, counsel strategy reasonable, witnesses at trial identified Roney; Hall evidence not admissible or persuasive |
| Brady re: Hall (undisclosed deals or cooperation) | Prosecutor withheld information about Hall’s assistance, federal plea deals, and favorable treatment that could impeach or exculpate | Commonwealth disclosed Hall’s September 1996 statement; federal plea materials concerned federal prosecutors (not Commonwealth); no proof PA prosecutors withheld material Brady evidence | Denied as waived and meritless; no evidence Commonwealth suppressed material favorable information |
| Brady and discovery re: bank surveillance videotape (alteration/chain of custody) | Videotape was allegedly altered/enhanced; Commonwealth failed to disclose processing, so counsel was ineffective for not uncovering it | Claims were not presented below (waived); Roney had copies and offered no objective proof of alteration; speculative allegations do not establish good cause for discovery | Denied — claim waived and speculative; PCRA court did not abuse discretion in denying discovery |
| False/impeachment evidence re: Officer Williams (May 3, 1995 stop) | Post-conviction declarations/hospital records show passengers were different persons (Ennis, Hunter), so Williams’ trial testimony was false and Commonwealth withheld impeachment | Material was available or discoverable by defense; issue was raised late in PCRA process (untimely/waived); not proven that Commonwealth suppressed exculpatory info | Denied — claim waived/untimely; PCRA court did not accept late amendments and no Brady violation shown |
| Brady re: fingerprint reports | Defense entitled to reports showing fingerprint testing and non-matches or other identities | No evidence reports withheld; trial record already showed fingerprints found did not match defendants; claim not raised at trial/direct appeal (waived) | Denied — waived and meritless; PCRA court properly denied discovery |
| Batson (race/gender discrimination in peremptory strikes) and appellate counsel ineffectiveness | Prosecutor used strikes disproportionately against African-Americans and women; McMahon training tape and statistics show systemic discriminatory practice; appellate counsel ineffective for not raising preserved objection on appeal | Trial judge accepted race-neutral reasons for particular strikes; statistics and McMahon tape are temporally/factually remote; defense did not show purposeful discrimination on the record | Denied — trial court credited race-neutral reasons; no proof of purposeful discrimination; appellate counsel not ineffective for failing to raise meritless claim |
| Bruton (admission of co-defendant statements) and related prosecutor conduct | Testimony by co-defendant’s wife and some prosecutor remarks allowed jury to infer Canty’s unredacted confession implicated Roney, violating Bruton; counsel ineffective for not seeking mistrial | Canty’s written confession was redacted and read in; Medley’s testimony corroborated that detectives wanted her to corroborate Canty’s statement but did not state its contents; linkage by inference falls outside Bruton per Richardson and Gray | Denied — no Bruton violation because Canty’s redacted statement was not facially incriminating as to Roney; statements/inferences were contextual and allowable; derivative ineffectiveness claims fail |
| Ineffective assistance at penalty phase for failing to investigate/present mitigation (childhood trauma, substance abuse, depression) | Counsel failed to investigate and present readily available, significant mitigation evidence (depression, drug use, family abuse) that could have tipped jury to life | PCRA hearing developed mitigation testimony but court found family background not unusually mitigating, expert opinions on depression were time-uncertain or not credible; Commonwealth expert contradicted defense experts; no prejudice shown | Denied — PCRA court held there was arguable merit but no prejudice; extensive hearing supported credibility findings and refusal to disturb verdict |
| Sufficiency/vagueness of grave-risk aggravator and related argument error | Evidence and jury instruction did not properly limit 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(7); prosecutor improperly focused on flight and other witnesses outside immediate danger | Trial gave an instruction that explained statutory text and narrowed grave risk; record showed manager was in proximity and could have been endangered; prosecutor’s argument is not evidence and jury presumed to follow instructions | Denied — aggravator supported by testimony (manager near shooting); instruction adequate; no prejudice from prosecutor’s brief comments |
Key Cases Cited
- Spotz v. Commonwealth, 18 A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011) (standard of appellate review of PCRA denials and deference to credibility findings)
- Hanible v. Commonwealth, 30 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2011) (Strickland/Pierce standard for ineffectiveness; counsel presumed effective)
- Pierce (Commonwealth v. Pierce), 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987) (adopted Strickland standard in Pennsylvania)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (federal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose materially favorable evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (materiality standard for Brady — reasonable probability undermining confidence)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes and three-step framework)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1968) (rule barring admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s confession incriminating codefendant)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1987) (Bruton limited: redacted confessions that are incriminating only by linkage do not trigger Bruton)
- Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (U.S. 1998) (Bruton applies when redactions are obvious blanks or deletions)
- Commonwealth v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351 (Pa. 2005) (this Court’s direct-appeal opinion affirming conviction and sentences)