45 N.E.3d 539
Mass.2016Background
- On Feb. 18, 1994 Wakime Woods and Derek Gibbs were shot while walking; Woods died and Gibbs became quadriplegic. Defendant Jermaine Celester was tried for 1st‑degree murder (premeditation and extreme atrocity) and armed assault with intent to murder; convicted in Sept. 1995.
- At the scene Marlene Scott heard Woods say “the kid I was with” shot him; police and a doctor also questioned Woods (who later died). The Commonwealth offered Scott’s out‑of‑court remark as a spontaneous utterance.
- Gibbs later identified Celester in a photo array. Police obtained a murder warrant and, on Feb. 20, 1994, Celester went to the station accompanied by retained attorney James Gilden; Celester signed Miranda waivers and gave a recorded statement with Gilden present.
- Years later Celester filed two motions for a new trial claiming (inter alia) erroneous admission of Woods’s statement, ineffective assistance by Gilden leading to admission of Celester’s statement, prosecutorial misconduct in closing, and violation of the public‑trial right during jury empanelment. The trial convictions were appealed and motions for new trial were litigated.
- The SJC affirmed the convictions and the denial of the second (public‑trial) motion, but vacated the denial of the first motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to decide whether Gilden’s pre‑arraignment advice was constitutionally ineffective and whether that advice caused Celester to give his custodial statement.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Celester's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Woods’s out‑of‑court statement (to Scott) | Statement was a spontaneous utterance/non‑testimonial and admissible | Statement unreliable and testimonial; violated due process and Confrontation Clause | Statement admissible: non‑testimonial and sufficiently reliable; no Confrontation or due process violation |
| Whether right to counsel at prearraignment custodial interrogation includes right to effective assistance (art. 12) | N/A (Commonwealth relied on waiver and voluntariness) | Art. 12 requires effective assistance at pre‑arraignment custodial interrogations; Gilden’s advice was deficient | Court holds art. 12 includes a right to effective assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation |
| Whether Gilden’s advice was constitutionally ineffective and caused Celester’s statement (warranting new trial) | Statement was knowingly and voluntarily waived; no suppression warranted | Gilden advised Celester to “tell the truth” without investigating or explaining risks; that advice caused the inculpatory statement | Remanded for evidentiary hearing to determine if Gilden’s deficient advice directly caused Celester’s statement; if so, new trial warranted; if not, denial stands |
| Public‑trial claim for courtroom closure during empanelment | Closure did not taint verdict; issue waived by failure to raise earlier | Waiver ineffective because counsel ignorant of law; ineffective assistance caused forfeiture | Claim waived; ineffective‑assistance challenge fails for lack of prejudice; denial of second motion affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (statements are testimonial only if declarant reasonably would anticipate use at prosecution)
- Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422 (out‑of‑court statements to nonlaw‑enforcement not automatically testimonial)
- Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1 (test for testimonial in fact)
- Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236 (excited/dying utterance analysis and testimonial expectations)
- Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848 (art. 12 requires substance to counsel right)
- Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (standard for ineffective assistance when statute grants counsel)
- Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477 (pre‑arraignment counsel present; effectiveness inquiry)
- Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280 (attorney presence plus consultation can substitute for Miranda warnings)
- Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652 (public‑trial Violation structural error; waiver consequences)
- Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854 (procedural waiver of public‑trial claim and Strickland prejudice requirement)
- Wright v. Commonwealth, 411 Mass. 678 (§ 33E review and reversal standard for claims of unfair trial affecting verdict)
- Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (attorney ignorance of controlling law can be quintessential unreasonable performance)