Brown v. City of Houston, 538 F.Supp.3d 725

Alfred Brown was convicted in 2005 of murdering a police officer, sentenced to death, and spent nearly a decade incarcerated while maintaining his innocence.
Habeas litigation uncovered exculpatory evidence; Brown’s conviction was vacated, the state dismissed charges, and he was released.
Brown filed a § 1983 suit against the City of Houston and Homicide Division officers in 2017 and separately sought compensation under the Tim Cole Act (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 103).
The Comptroller initially denied Brown’s claim; after an independent DA investigation and a Texas Supreme Court decision (In re Brown), the State paid Brown $980,000 under the Tim Cole Act.
The City defendants moved for summary judgment arguing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §103.153(b) bars further suits by a person who receives Tim Cole Act compensation, even where the federal suit was filed before payment.
The district court held §103.153(b) bars Brown’s remaining §1983 claims once he accepted state compensation and that the statutory bar does not violate the Supremacy Clause; summary judgment for defendants was granted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §103.153(b) bars a §1983 suit filed before but continued after receipt of Tim Cole Act compensation	§103.153(b) applies only to suits filed after compensation is received	The statute bars any action involving the same subject matter once the claimant receives compensation, regardless of filing date	The court followed Texas Supreme Court guidance (Oakley, In re Brown) and held the bar applies upon receipt of compensation, so Brown’s suit is barred
Whether §103.153(b) is preempted by §1983 or violates the Supremacy Clause	The statute conflicts with federal §1983 and is therefore preempted	The statute is a voluntary statutory ‘‘offer’’ of compensation in exchange for waiver of other claims (analogous to Leaman/Town of Newton) and does not forbid §1983 generally	The court held §103.153(b) does not violate the Supremacy Clause; accepting state compensation is a voluntary waiver and does not impermissibly restrict §1983

In re Brown, 614 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2020) (Texas Supreme Court construing Tim Cole Act and Comptroller authority)
State v. Oakley, 227 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. 2007) (Tim Cole Act bars suits by those who have received state compensation)
Leaman v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (state statutory offer of recovery in exchange for waiver of claims against employees does not violate §1983)
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009) (state law that effectively immunizes §1983 defendants can violate the Supremacy Clause)
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (state notice requirements that frustrate §1983 remedies may be preempted)
Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (state statutes cannot immunize conduct actionable under §1983)
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (voluntary plea/waiver arrangements can be constitutionally permissible)