979 F.3d 732
9th Cir.2020Background
- Hawaii Attorney General sued Bristol-Myers Squibb and Sanofi entities in state court (2014) under Hawaii’s consumer-protection statute for allegedly concealing that Plavix is less effective in persons with a certain genetic variation common in Hawaii.
- Two private law firms led the investigation and litigate the state case on a contingency-fee basis, but the action was filed in the name of the State and seeks civil penalties, injunctive relief, and damages.
- Nearly six years into the state litigation, the pharmaceutical companies filed a federal suit seeking an injunction, alleging First Amendment violations and challenging the state action.
- The State moved to dismiss under Younger abstention; the district court granted the motion.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and considered whether the state suit is a quasi-criminal civil enforcement proceeding within Younger/Sprint.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: the state enforcement action is the type of civil enforcement proceeding that warrants Younger abstention; challenges based on private counsel, case-specific inquiry, and First Amendment interests did not overcome abstention.
Issues
| Issue | Bristol-Myers' Argument | Hawaii/Connors' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Younger abstention applies to the state suit | Younger does not apply because the action is not a state-initiated civil enforcement proceeding | The suit is a civil enforcement action brought by the State and Younger applies | Younger applies; state suit is a civil enforcement proceeding warranting abstention |
| Whether the State is a real party in interest when private counsel prosecutes the case | Use of private counsel makes the State only a nominal plaintiff, so Younger should not apply | Litigation was brought by the Attorney General in sovereign capacity; choice of counsel does not change that | State is a genuine sovereign party; use of outside counsel does not defeat Younger |
| Whether courts must perform a case-specific, rigorous inquiry into the state action’s character | Court should scrutinize the specific facts (investigation by private firms, profit motive) before applying Younger | Younger focuses on the general class of proceedings; no case-specific checklist required | No heightened case-specific inquiry; classify by the general class of proceedings |
| Whether First Amendment claims or extraordinary circumstances defeat Younger | First Amendment chilling from high penalties requires heightened review and injunction | First Amendment claims alone do not negate Younger absent narrow extraordinary circumstances | First Amendment concerns insufficient to overcome Younger; no bad-faith/harassment exception shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (establishes federal abstention from interfering with pending state criminal prosecutions and related comity principles)
- Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013) (limits Younger to three categories, including certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions)
- New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (extends Younger to certain civil enforcement proceedings)
- Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (abstention principles where federal relief would interfere with pending state proceedings)
- Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (focus on the importance of the generic class of state proceedings for Younger analysis)
- Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (federal courts generally obliged to exercise jurisdiction except in limited abstention doctrines)
- Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (actions brought by a State in its sovereign capacity are distinct and implicate Younger principles)
