*1 HUFFMAN et v. PURSUE, LTD. al. Argued No. 73-296. 10, December 1974 Decided March *2 With appellants. for the cause Clancy argued J. James se, pro S. were Lawrence him on the brief Huffman III. Bertsch, Albert S. Johnston M. Richard appellee. for With the cause argued H. Deitch Gilbert Eugene Smith* brief was Robert him on the Rehnquist opinion delivered the Me. Justice Court. our decision whether that we decide requires
This case a federal Harris, (1971), Younger 401 U. S. bars pro- state civil intervening a district court from is based ceeding this, such as when the to be court the district on a state statute believed in Gibson v. A was raised unconstitutional. similar issue required hill, were not Berry 411 U. but we proceedings enjoined there the to decide because body could not were before a biased administrative dismissal, necessary provide predicate for *3 timely have decided is, opportunity “the to raise and involved.” by competent state tribunal the federal issues a Slaton, Id., Speight in 415 U. S. Similarly, 577. probable jurisdiction to consider (1974), 333 we noted Younger cases, but applicability the of to noncriminal light subsequent remanded in of a for reconsideration Georgia Supreme which struck decision of the Today we challenged down the statute on similar facts. issue, do reach and conclude that in the circumstances the Younger presented principles applicable here the of are civil in though proceeding even the state nature.1 *Barbara Scott and James Bouras filed a brief for the Motion urging America, Inc., Picture as amicus curiae Association of affirmance. 1 raising applicability Other recent cases issues Foster, in the Mitchum 407 225 noncriminal context include U. S. Mitchum, (1972), Iowa, In and Sosna v. 419 U. 393 S. enjoin pending 42 nuisance U. S. C. 1983 action to § proceedings; had denied remanded for further the District Court solely anti-injunction, statute, 28 U. S. C. relief on the basis of the 2283, opinion specified were in Our that we no see n. § infra.
I attorney prosecuting and are the sheriff Appellants ef- from their arises This Ohio. case County, Allen Lima, Ohio. in Theatre, I Cinema the forts to close ap- tenant, its current of both management the Under William predecessor, Ltd., appellee’s and Pursue, pellee display of in I has specialized Dakota, Cinema pornographic,2 as fairly be characterized which films adjudged been have in numerous instances which hearings. adversary after obscene nuisance public invoke the Ohio sought to Appellants seq. et (1971), 3767.01 § Ann. Ohio Rev. Code statute, (C) provides 3767.01 appellee. Section against comity, equity, qualifying principles “the questioning way S., Younger. at 243. 407 U. federalism” canvassed Younger issue, address the parties to directed the In Sosna we whether (1974), reflecting our concern 415 U. S. light failure be reached Sosna’s should constitutional merits ruling through the state court’s trial adverse appeal proceed urged that we parties Because both appellate network. 396-397, S., at Sosna, 419 U. the issue. merits, did not reach we n. 3. 15, 18-19, California, n. Miller v. U. See “obscenity.” “pornography” and between discusses distinction 3 3767.01 Definitions. “§ relating to nuisances: Code Revised “As used in all sections declared defined and “(C) that which means ‘Nuisance’ *4 lewd- any upon place in or which also means to be and statutes such continued, conducted, permitted, ness, prostitution is assignation, or lascivious, lewd, indecent, any upon which place, in or exists, or or films plate negatives, positives, film or plate or or obscene films glass exhibition, films or projected on a screen for designed to be by designed for exhibition negative positive or form either in slides developed, manufactured, screen, photographed, are projection on a personal shown, the exhibited, prepared or and screened, or otherwise any maintaining such conducting and and contents used property any news- chapter shall not affect purpose. This any place for such 596 place which exhibits obscene4 films is a nuisance, 5
while requires up year § 3767.06 closure for any to a place determined to be a nuisance. The statute also paper, magazine, publication or other entered as second matter class by post-office department.” 4 interpreted by Keating As Supreme Court, the Ohio State ex rel. Av. Motion Picture “Vixen,” Film Entitled 27 278, Ohio St. 2d 272 (1971), obscenity N. E. 2d 137 the determination of is to be based on the definition contained in Ohio’s statutes, criminal Ohio Code Rev. Ann. (Supp. 1972), (1975). now On this §2905.34 §2907.01 Keating, Court’s remand of following our U. Miller California, swpra, decision in Supreme the Ohio Miller’s, comported concluded that definition statute’s con stitutional standards. 2d Ohio St. 2d N. E. judgment 3767.06 Content “§ order.
“If the existence of a nuisance is admitted or established in an provided action as 3767.11, inclusive, 3767.01 to sections of the Code, Revised or in a proceeding, criminal an order of abatement snau ue part as a judgment entered of the case, in the order shall direct the place removal from the personal of all property and used in conducting nuisance, contents already released authority under of the provided court as in section 3767.04 Code, Revised and shall direct the sale of such belong thereof as to the defendants or appearing, notified in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution. Such order shall also require year the renewal for any one bond furnished the owner of the property, real provided in section 3767.04 of the Revised Code, or, if not so furnished shall year for continue one any closing order issued at the time of granting temporary injunction, or, if no closing such order issued, then shall include an order direct- ing the closing effectual place against any its use for purpose, and keeping it period closed for a year one unless sooner released. any owner of place closed and not released may under bond then appear and obtain such release in upon the manner and fulfill- ing requirements provided in section 3767.04 of the Revised Code. The release of property under this section shall not release any judgment, from lien, penalty, liability to which it subject. Owners personal of unsold property and contents so seized must appear and claim the same days within ten after such order of abatement made and prove innocence, to the satisfaction of the *5 pending final de- provides preliminary injunctions for per- for all nuisance,6 termination of status as a sale of and nuisance,7 the property conducting sonal used in of cer- upon for release from a closure order satisfaction showing tain nuisance (including conditions the re-established) will not be .8
court, any knowledge of reasonable of said use thereof and that with Every diligence and they care not have known thereof. could knowledge presumed defendant in the action is to have had general reputation established, place. of If such innocence is the such personal property unsold and contents shall be delivered to the owner, provided otherwise it shall be in this For sold section. removing contents, selling personal property and the and the officer charge shall be entitled to he for receive the same fees as would and levying upon execution; closing selling property and like on and for place the keeping closed, and sum be allowed reasonable shall by the court.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3767.04 supra, n. 5. §3767.06 portion (1971) provides:
8 Ibid. The referenced of §3767.04 any personal property “The owner of real or closed or restrained filing or to be of appear closed or restrained between the the injunc petition hearing application permanent and the on the for a and, upon payment upon filing tion of all costs incurred and the of by property approved a bond the owner of the real with sureties to be by property the clerk in the full value of the to be ascertained court, vacation, by or, judge, the the conditioned that such owner immediately prevent being will abate the nuisance from same kept judge established or until the decision of the court or is rendered court, application on permanent injunction, for a then the or judge vacation, good if satisfied faith of the owner property part any real and of innocence on the owner of personal property any knowledge personal of the use of such property that, as a diligence, nuisance and with reasonable care and thereof, such owner could not have known shall such real or deliver personal property, both, thereof, respective to the owners discharge issuing hearing or refrain from at the time on application injunction any temporary closing for the order such real property or restraining per- the removal or interference with such
Appellants instituted a nuisance proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County against appel- lee’s predecessor, William During Dakota. course of the somewhat legal involved proceedings which fol- lowed, the Court of Common Pleas reviewed movies which had been shown at the theater. The court ren- dered a judgment that Dakota had in a engaged course of conduct of displaying obscene I, movies at Cinema and that the theater was pursuant therefore to be closed, to Ohio Rev. Ann. § Code 3767.06 “for any pur- pose period for a year of one unless sooner released Order of pursuant Court [the] defendant-owners ful- filling the requirements provided in Section 3767.04 of the Revised Code of Ohio.” judgment provided also for the seizure personal and sale of property used in the operations.9 theater’s
Appellee, Pursue, had Ltd., succeeded to William Da- kota’s leasehold interest I prior the Cinema entry of the state-court judgment. Rather than appealing judgment that within the Ohio court system, immedi- it ately filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint was based on 42 U. C. alleged § S. 1983 and that appellants’ use nuisance Ohio’s statute deprivation constituted a of con- rights stitutional under the color of sought state law. It injunctive relief and declaratory judgment a statute was unconstitutional and unenforceable.10 Since property. any sonal The release personal or property, real under section, any this shall not it lien, release from judgment, penalty, or liability subjected.” to which it 9State ex Dakota, rel. (Ct. No. CIV 0326 Com. Huffman Pleas, County, Ohio, Allen 30, 1972). Nov. 10Because the judgment primarily state-court was against directed property succeeded, to which interest Pursue had the District Court concluded that standing Pursue had challenge the nuisance statute. Similarly, argument counsel for Pursue conceded at oral that Pursue constitutionality against the directed complaint was was convened.11 court three-judge statute, a state that while the statute The District concluded re- prior overly an broad did constitute vague, it perma- rights insofar as Amendment straint on First films showing of prevented nently temporarily adversary prior adjudged been obscene which had not Olson, U. ex rel. Minnesota hearings. Near v. Cf. per- remedy to match Fashioning its en- permanently the court defect, ceived constitutional court’s of the state portion the execution of joined had I to films the Cinema closed judgment *7 opinion judgment The and obscene.12 adjudged not been considered that it no indication give of the District in stayed its hand deference have it should whether in find expression federalism principles of the Harris, (1971). U. 37 401 Younger v. Younger problem, raise the appellants appeal,
On this issues. statutory and variety of constitutional well as a Younger. of applicability only the need consider We II cases13 considered companion Younger its pending intervention of federal-court propriety Pleas judgment Court of Common appealed have could system. within the Ohio court 11 judge court, single three-judge convening of Pending the of of the Court stayed judgment of Ohio District Northern films judgment applied that Pleas, insofar as except Common adversary hearing. The prior in a declared obscene which had been day filed, one day the action that stay entered on order was Pleas. Common by entry the Court judgment after 12 20, 1973). Ohio, Apr. (ND No. C 72-432 13 Landry, Boyle 401 (1971); v. Mackell, 66 401 U. S. Samuels v. Dyson (1971); v. Ledesma, 82 401 U. S. (1971); Perez v. U. 77S. Karalexis, Byrne U. S. (1971); Stein, 401 U. S. prosecutions. criminal issue was not a one, novel and the Court relied Fenner heavily Boykin, on U. S. 240 subsequent cases14 which endorsed its holding injunctions against the state criminal law enforcement process could only be issued “under extraordinary circumstances where the danger irreparable loss is both great Id., and immediate.” 243. itself involved a challenge prosecu- ato Act, tion under Syndicalism California Criminal which allegedly was unconstitutional on its face. In an opinion for the Court Justice Black, Mr. we observed that “it perfectly been has natural for our repeat cases to time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal courts enjoin are asked to pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions.” U. at 45. S., only We noted had a congressional statute manifested an interest state courts permitting try state cases,15 but there had also long existed strong policy against federal interference with state criminal proceedings. recognized We judi- that this policy cial part is based in on the traditional doctrine that a court equity stay should its hand when a movant
14See,
Spielman
g.,
e.
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
Central which system in though anxious Government, National
“the federal and rights federal protect and vindicate be to that ways so in do endeavors always interests, activi- legitimate unduly interfere not will Ibid. of the States.” ties that Boykin Fenner requirement reaffirmed We justify present be must extraordinary circumstances prosecu- criminal against relief injunctive movant that Fenner, stated we Echoing tions. injury” “irreparable merely must show but injunction, an for prerequisite normal “ ‘great be would injury show must also ” also opinion 46. S.,U. immediate.’ and could extraordinary situations only in suggested con- was prosecution if the shown injury necessary harass. intent an without faith good ducted “cost, noted particularly It Id., at 54. against to defend having inconvenience anxiety, *9 a single prosecution” criminal was not the type of injury that could justify federal Id., interference. 46.16 at
In Younger we also considered whether policy noninterference had been by modified our decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. (1965), least insofar as First Amendment attacks on statutes thought to be facially invalid are concerned. We observed that the arrests and prosecutions threatened in Dombrowski were alleged to have been in bad faith and employed as a means of harassing the federal-court plaintiffs. That case was thus within the traditional narrow exceptions to the doctrine that federal courts should not interfere with prosecutions. We acknowledged “ that it is ‘of course conceivable that a might statute flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort ” might be made to apply and that such a situation it/ might justify federal intervention, 401 U. at 53-54. S., But we unequivocally held that facial invalidity of a statute is not itself an exceptional circumstance justify- ing federal interference with state criminal proceedings.
In
v.
16While these standards governing federal interference were largely shaped in the context of prayers for injunctions against state proceedings, it is clear that respect pending prosecutions the same standards apply to interference in the form of declaratory relief. See v. Mackell, Samuels 401 U. S. 66 *10 absence in the little force 'have federalism and comity, ” We Id., 462. at proceeding.' state pending of a explained: at pending proceeding criminal
“When no state inter- federal filed, complaint federal time the proceed- legal duplicative in not result vention does justice criminal the state disruption ings circum- intervention, federal nor can system; upon negatively reflecting interpreted stance, be constitutional enforce ability to court’s the state Ibid. principles.” pro- consider we background this against
It is nui- Ohio with the intervention priety federal-court case. in this at issue sance Ill with interference judicial of federal seriousness by this recognized long been civil functions has state that when consistently required haveWe Court. they relief, for such requests with confronted are courts well go of restraint abide standards should For jurisprudence. private equity those beyond Benton, 272 Grange State Massachusetts example, opera- enjoin the an effort (1926), involved U. S. 525 Court, Writing for act. savings daylight of a tion state supra, Boykin, Fenner v. Holmes cited Mr. Justice very strictly observed,” “should a rule that emphasized against to issue injunction ought “that no S., at 272 U. enforce authority to clothed with aof officers State free from reasonably in a case unless question, law irrepara- prevent great and necessary to doubt when Id., 527. injury.” ble confronted Holmes Mr.
Although Justice executive state against seeking injunction an a bill proceedings, judicial than officers, against rather we think that the relevant considerations of fed- eralism are of no weight less in the latter setting. If anything, they counsel more heavily toward federal restraint, since interference with a proceed- ing prevents the state only from effectuating its substantive but also policies, from continuing perform the separate function of providing a forum competent any vindicate objections constitutional interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be in- *11 terpreted “as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.” Cf. Stefiel v. Thompson, supra, at 462. The component of Younger which upon rests the threat to our system federal is thus applicable ato pro- civil
ceeding such as this quite as much as it is to a criminal proceeding. Younger, however, also upon rests the tra- ditional reluctance of courts of equity, even within a uni- tary system, to interfere with a criminal prosecution. Strictly speaking, this element of Younger is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil cases. But what- ever may be the weight attached to this factor in civil litigation involving private parties, we deal here with a state proceeding which in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases. The State is a party to the Court of Common Pleas proceeding, and the proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials. Thus, an offense to the State’s interest in the nuisance litiga- tion is likely to every bit great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding. Cf. Younger Harris, U. S., at 55 n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Simi- larly, while in this case the District injunc- Court’s tion has not directly disrupted Ohio’s justice criminal protect efforts disrupted State’s has system, laws criminal its underlie which very interests are the standards precisely compliance obtain laws.17 its criminal embodied
IV a criminal between critical similarities spite In appellee proceedings, nuisance and Ohio prosecution critical difference also a there urges nonetheless limit cause us to should the two which between says appellee, difference, This proceedings. criminal may, criminal defendant state-court whereas his consti- present remedies, his after exhaustion through habeas courts the federal claims to tutional like to one, remedy is available analogous no corpus, in- been may have rights constitutional whose appellee, result which cannot in a state fringed criminal sanction. or other detention custodial in this review seek course, litigant may, A civil re- in and asserted any properly claim a final decision Moreover, where by state courts. jected *12 stat- validity of a state court has sustained aof ap- an grounds, constitutional on federal challenged ute U. C. 28 of right. matter lies as a this Court peal to assured in this case appellee Thus, 1257 § But by this Court. claim consideration its eventual it re- appeal had right appellee’s from apart quite it should not court, we conclude in state mained pre- litigation of issues luxury of federal permitted luxury which, proceedings, by ongoing state sented nominally “civil” to is proceeding of a relation in re on lower federal courts has been relied laws criminal State’s Baxley, MTM, Supp. Younger Inc. F. problems. See solving noted, U. S. jurisdiction 1973), probable Ala. (ND 1972). McAulifie, (CA5 2d 1230 Palaio 466 F. (1974); as we have already explained, quite costly in terms of the interests which protect. seeks to
Appellee's argument, that because there may be no civil counterpart to federal habeas it should have con- temporaneous access to a federal forum for its federal claim, apparently depends on the unarticulated major premise that every litigant who asserts a federal claim is entitled to have decided on the merits by a federal, rather than a state, court. We need not consider the validity of this premise in order to reject the result which appellee seeks. Even assuming, arguendo, that litigants are entitled to a federal forum for the resolution of all federal issues, that entitlement is most appropriately as- serted by a state litigant when he seeks to relitigate a federal issue adversely determined in completed state court proceedings.18 We do not understand why the fed- eral forum must be prior available to completion of the state proceedings in which the federal issue arises, and the considerations canvassed in Younger militate against such a result. The issue of whether courts should be
able to interfere with ongoing state proceedings quite distinct and separate from the issue of whether lit- igants are entitled to subsequent federal review of state- court dispositions of federal questions. Younger turned on considerations of comity and federalism peculiar to the fact that state proceedings were pending; it did not turn on the fact that in any event a criminal defendant 18We in way no intend suggest there right is a of access to a federal forum for the disposition of aE federal issues, or that the normal judicata rules of res estoppel operate do not to bar relitigation U; in actions under 42 S. C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceedings. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. *13 475, 497 (1973). Our assumption is solely made as a means of disposing of appellee’s contentions without confronting issues which have not been briefed argued in this case. considera- habeas eventually have obtained
could of federal-court propriety claims. tion of his federal like- must proceeding nuisance an Ohio interference with considera- those same of by application wise be controlled comity and federalism. tions of fed comity and of principles by the relevant Informed applied have Appeals Courts least three eralism, at civil were proceedings state Younger pending when the (CA5 F. 2d 244 Texas, 477 Duke in nature. See 1973); Cous (CA4 472 F. 2d Snepp, 1973); Lynch pur 1972). For oda, (CA7 Wig 463 F. 2d ins v. no make need however, we us, the case before poses of applicability upon general pronouncements for say that to It suffices litigation. civil Younger to all Dis that the out, we set conclude the reasons heretofore laid down the tests applied have trict Court should merits to the determining proceed whether Younger in civil Ohio this against for relief appellee’s prayer proceeding. nuisance applicable if contends that even
Appellee does it nonetheless sort, this civil proceedings District Court at the time govern this case because pro- state court “pending longer no acted there Younger and Younger. üsed as that term is ceeding” term used the have such as subsequent cases Steffel proceedings state distinguish “pending proceeding” are those which from already commenced have Here, course, merely incipient or threatened. sought appellee long had proceeding begun before state appellee’s point, But by Court. the District intervention had not begun, not that it, we take com- District Court the time its it had ended but that filed.19 plaint was problem, ordinarily difficult to consider this would It entry Younger’s of a trial restrictions after
of the duration of
Appellee apparently relies on the facts that the Allen County Court of Common Pleas had already issued its judgment and permanent injunction when this action filed, and that no appeal from that judgment has ever been taken to appellate Ohio’s courts. As a matter of state procedure, judgment presumably became final, in the sense of being nonappealable, at some point after the District Court filing, possibly prior to entry of the District Court’s own judgment, but surely after single judge stayed the state court’s judgment. We need not, however, engage in such inquiry. For regardless of when the Court of Common Pleas’ judg- ment became final, we believe that a necessary concomi- tant of Younger is that a party in appellee’s posture must exhaust his appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court, unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions specified in Younger.
Virtually all of the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal prior intervention completion of state appellate just proceedings, as surely as they would if such intervention occurred at or before trial. In- tervention at the later stage if is anything more highly duplicative, since an entire trial has already taken place, and it is also a direct aspersion on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts. Nor, in these state- initiated nuisance proceedings, federal intervention at the appellate stage any the less a disruption of the State’s efforts protect interests which it deems im- portant. Indeed, likely to be even more disruptive and offensive because the State has already won a nisi court judgment, without also considering judicata the res implica tions of such a judgment. However, appellants plead did res judicata in the District Court, and it "is therefore not available to them here. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (c); v. Iowa, Sosna U. at 396-397, n. 3. being vio- are policies its valid determination prius abatement. justifies fashion in a lated designed ain fashion post-trial intervention, Federal deprives the also trial, aof results to annul is left legitimately which quite aof function States of con- dispositions court *15 trial overseeing that of them, which over litigation in civil arise issues which stitutional consideration think this We they jurisdiction.20 have judicial a typically it is because importance of some to be a nature by their are which appellate courts system’s resolution for the appropriate forum most litigant’s when, this true Especially is contentions. constitutional involves statute a issue the constitutional here, not In we do short, narrowing. judicial capable fairly system would judicial a that State’s believe arising issues to resolve federal opportunity accorded permitted court were district if a federal in its courts We courts. appellate for the State’s itself substitute be met must Younger standards hold therefore judicial state in a intervention federal justify his state not has exhausted losing litigant which a as to remedies.21 appellate 20 jurisdiction system retain undisturbed a state That of constitutional disposition court trial despite possibly erroneous Pfister, 484- 380 U. Dombrowski v. recognized in issues was possibility of erroneous mere stated: where we “[T]he usually amount will not standards application of constitutional initial orderly necessary justify disruption a injury irreparable to the proceedings.” for appellate remedies By of state requiring exhaustion way Monroe Younger, in no undermine we applying purposes of seeking redress held one we There Pape, U. S. rights need deprivation of for U. S. C. 1983 under § based on related proceedings causes first initiate state Pape nothing to do had S., Monroe 183. 365 U. action. to be accorded us, of the deference presently before problem
At
the time appellee filed its action in the United
States District Court,
it had available the remedy appeal
to the Ohio appellate courts. Appellee none-
theless contends that exhaustion of state appellate reme-
dies should not be required because an appeal would
have been “futile.” This claim is based on the decision
of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Keating v.
A Motion Picture Film
“Vixen,”
Entitled
27 Ohio St. 2d
278,
More importantly, we are of
opinion
the
that
the
of
considerations
comity and federalism which underlie
Younger permit no truncation of the exhaustion require-
ment merely because the losing party in the state court
of general jurisdiction believes that his
chances
success
on appeal are not auspicious. Appellee obviously be-
state proceedings which
already
have
been initiated and which afford
a competent
tribunal
for the resolution of federal issues.
Our
requirement
exhaustion
is likewise not inconsistent with such
City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader,
lieves District in the litigate to assiduously seek not so would Constitution States United the ofVI Yet, Art. Court. be bound” shall every State in Judges “the that declares Appel- treaties. and laws, Constitution, Federal by the assumption the on a rule base us to urging truth in lee is constitu their to faithful be not will judges state Dis do. refuse we This responsibilities. tional seek action, this entertained have not should Court trict proceed awith interference preappeal ing early intervention established appellee unless ing, in recognized exceptions the one under justified was ounger.22 Y
VI
apply
we
counterpart
civil
its
and
Younger,
cases
in those
intervention
allow
course
do of
today,
finds
properly
Court
District
where
is con-
or
harass
desire
by a
motivated
statute
challenged
where
faith,
bad
in
ducted
“
constitu-
express
violative
patently
and
'flagrantly
para-
and
sentence
clause,
every
prohibitions
tional
whomever
against
and
manner
in whatever
graph,
”
have
weAs
it/
apply
be made
might
effort
an
on
rule
not
did
this case
District
noted,
con-
has
apparently
thus
issue,
by one
justified
intervention
its
whether
sidered
Court’s
District
if the
Even
exceptions.
narrow
these
determina-
silentio
a sub
interpreted
can
opinion
courts
in state
appeal
option to
had
appellee
While
such
whether
certain
for
know
we do not
action,
this
it filed
time
*17
its
issued
Court
the District
time
at
available
remedy remained
any
In
now.
available
it remains
whether
injunction, or
permanent
simply
standards
avoid
may not
event, appellee
appeal within
its
perfecting
procedures
comply
failing to
system.
judicial
Ohio
tion that
the case fits within the exception for statutes
“
which are
'flagrantly and patently violative of express
”
constitutional prohibitions/
such a characterization of
the statute
possible
is not
after the subsequent decision
of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Ewing A Motion Picture Film Entitled “Without a Stitch,” Ohio St. 2d 95,
We therefore think that this case is appropriate for remand so that the District may Court consider whether irreparable injury can be shown in light of “Without a Stitch,” and if so, whether that injury is of such a nature that the District may jurisdiction assume under an exception to the policy against interfer- ence with state court proceedings of this kind. The judg- ment of the District Court is vacated and the cause is
23In “Without a Stitch” it was decided that the closure provisions of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (1971) 3767.06 § applicable were even if a theater had only shown one film which was adjudged to be obscene. However; Supreme Ohio Court was concerned with the constitutional im plications prior restraint of films which had not been adjudged. so In narrowing the statute the court noted that 3767.04 specifies § conditions under which a release be obtained from the closure order; the property owner appear must in court, pay the in cost action, curred file a bond in the full value of the property, and demonstrate to the court prevent that he will the nuisance from be ing re-established. The court then made this critical clarification: “The nuisance is the exhibition particular film declared obscene. provisions The release not, do appellants contend, re quire the owner to show that no film to be exhibited during the one- year period will be obscene. requirement Such a would only impossible, practical as a matter, but also would be an unconstitu prior tional restraint . .” . . 37 Ohio St. 2d, 307 N. 2d, E. at 918.
613 this with consistent proceedings for further remanded opinion. ordered.
It is so Doug- whom Mr. Justice Brennan, with Me. Justice dissenting. join, Marshall las Mr. Justice civil of the state The treatment I dissent. statutes” to criminal closely related aid of and “in as one state extending to toward step first obviously only the is Younger of holding the generally proceedings civil should courts that Harris, 37 401 U. S. proceedings criminal pending state not interfere Similarly, extraordinary circumstances.1 under except 42 under action an in plaintiff today’s holding that exhaust first without maintain it not 1983 §C. U. S. an adverse of for review procedures appellate state ing step first an but obvious decision court trial such actions law settled of heretofore discard toward exhausting state first without maintained may be remedies. basically application, an was
Younger v. Harris
pending
courts to
of federal
relation
context
equity
basic doctrine
prosecutions,
“the
criminal
. particularly
.
.
equity
courts
jurisprudence
prosecution.”
a criminal
act to restrain
not
should
enjoin
will not
equity
maxim that
43. “The
at
U. S.,
weighty
centuries
summarizes
prosecution
a criminal
Minard,
law.”
experience Anglo-American
Stefanelli
Younger v. Harris
But
(1951).
S.U.
although appellants did
Younger issue
Court
reaches
implies
Yet
Court.
plead
in the District
not
matter,
we allowed
jurisdictional
since
Younger Ante,
Iowa,
Thus the resuscitation again once portends clock back Act— Anti-Injunction command the literal interference from be free should courts the state *20 not This cases. in civil even injunction federal Court’s of this 18 decades some only overrule would evi- Congress’ flout heedlessly but would jurisprudence 1948 amendment the enacting purpose dent jurisprudence. in that acquiesce to the prejudice threatens serious also The extension when the present plaintiff not federal-court potential That prosecution. is a criminal proceeding pending completion until into existence not does come prosecution prose- against spurious him designed safeguard steps In or indictment. information, charge, arrest, cution — into case, this comes as in proceeding, civil contrast, whether complaint, a merely upon filing existence this deny by fiat of To founded. well circum- forum that plaintiff a federal federal potential public adversary (here the obviously to arm his stance him of strip easily weapon an wielded authorities) with statutes enacted remedy that federal were forum escape this conse- does not him. The Court to assure in- civil characterizing by quence volved here as “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.” The nuisance action was brought into being by the mere filing of the complaint in state court, and untoward consequences for the plaintiff federal were thereby set in train regard without to the connection, if any, of the proceeding to the State’s criminal laws.
Even if the extension of Younger v. Harris to pending state civil proceedings can be appropriate in any case, I do not think it can be,2 it is plainly improper in the case of an action by a federal plaintiff, as in this case, grounded upon 42 U. S. C. § 1983.3 That statute serves a particular congressional objective long recognized and enforced by the Court. Today’s extension will defeat that objective. After the War Between the States, “nationalism dominated political thought and brought with it congressional investiture of the federal judiciary with enormously increased powers.” Zwickler Koota, 2Abstention where authoritative by resolution state courts of ambiguities in a state statute is sufficiently likely to sig avoid or nificantly modify questions federal by raised the statute is another matter. justified Abstention is in such cases primarily by policy of avoidance premature adjudication. constitutional The federal plaintiff is therefore not dismissed from federal court as he is in Younger cases. On the contrary, he reserve ques his federal tions for by decision the federal district court and not submit them to the state England courts. v. Louisiana State Board Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 Accordingly, retention federal jurisdiction court of complaint pending state- *21 decision, court not dismissal of complaint, is practice. the correct Lake Carriers’ Assn. MacMullan, v. 498, 406 U. S. (1972). 512-513 3Title 42 U. S. C. provides: 1983 § “Every person who, any under color of statute, ordinance, regula- tion, custom, usage, or any of State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or person other jurisdiction within the thereof to deprivation any of rights, privileges, or by immunities secured the Constitution and laws, shall be liable injured the party in an action law, at suit equity, in proper other proceeding for redress.”
617 (1967). 246 enacted at 241, U. S. Section 1983 was 1 of the Rights 1871, § that time as Civil Act of Stat. S., Act, Judiciary 13. 389 U. 247. That Act at 1875, the federal granted general courts federal- question completely pre- altered jurisdiction, Congress' policy Civil on relying War courts to vindicate rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws. 389 U. at S., 245-246. These statutes constituted the “ primary lower federal 'the and powerful courts reliances every for vindicating right by given Constitution, ” laws, and treaties of United States.' Steffel Thompson, (1974). 415 U. 452, fact, stand- ing alone, protect that state courts also must federal can rights never justify refusal of federal courts to jurisdiction. supra, exercise that Zwickler v. Koota, 248. This is true notwithstanding possibility by review this Court of state for, decisions “even when available appeal by discretionary rather than only writ of possibility] an certiorari, inadequate is sub- [that for stitute the initial District Court determination ... which the in litigant entitled the federal courts.” England Examiners, v. Louisiana State Board Medical U. S. 411,
Consistently objective with this congressional 1871 and 1875 we in Acts held Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 183 (1961), that a plaintiff federal suing under
§ need not exhaust state administrative or remedies before filing his action under § 1983 district court. remedy “The federal supplementary the state remedy, and the latter need sought not be first and refused before the federal one is invoked.” Ibid. today The extension v. Harris to require exhaustion an action under drastically § 1983 under- cuts Monroe Pape and its numerous progeny —the mere filing of a complaint against potential § 1983 litigant forces him to exhaust state remedies. *22 Foster,
Mitchum v. supra, holding actions under § are excepted operation from the anti-injunction 28 U. C. statute, S. § 2283, is also by today’s undercut Younger. extension of Mit- chum history canvassed the of 1983 and § concluded that it extended power “federal in an attempt remedy state courts’ failure to rights.” secure federal S.,U. at 241. prompted Mitchum comment that if v. Harris were extended to civil “much cases, of the rigid- ity of section 2283 would be reintroduced, significance of Mitchum for those relief seeking from state pro- civil ceedings would largely be destroyed, and the recognition of section 1983 as an exception Anti-Injunction to the Statute would have Pyrrhic been a victory.” Today’s decision fulfills that gloomy prophecy. I therefore dis- sent from the remand and would reach the merits.
Mr. Justice Douglas, while joining opinion Justice Brennan, wishes to make clear that he Mr. adheres to the view he expressed Harris, in Younger v. 401 U. 37, 58-65 (1971) (dissenting opinion), that fed- eral abstention from interference with pros- state criminal ecutions is inconsistent with demands our federalism important where and overriding civil rights (such as those involved in the First Amendment) are about to be sacrificed. 4 Note, Supreme Court, Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 217-