*1 DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRAINOR, AID, al. v. HERNANDEZ PUBLIC et et ux. January 18, 1977 May Argued 31, 1977 No. 75-1407. Decided *2 Bargiel, Paul J. Attorney. Assistant of Illinois, General argued the cause for appellants. him the With on briefs were Scott, William J. Attorney General, Stephen Swofford, B. Attorney Assistant General.
John III Dienner argued the cause for et appellees Finley support appellants. al. With him on briefs were Carey Biebel, Bernard and Paul P. Jr.
Fred Lieb argued appellees L. the cause for et Hernandez Dockterman, ux. With him the brief were Alan James Latturner, Sheldon Roodman.
Mr. opinion delivered the the Court. White Justice Department Public filed a (IDPA) The Illinois Aid law County, Court of Cook on Octo Ill., suit the Circuit Maria 1974, against appellees Hernandez, ber Juan and fraudulently they had concealed assets while alleging that public receiving assistance. Such conduct applying for c. law, Stat., 11-21 23, § under Illinois Ill. Rev. is a crime proceeded civilly however, sought (1973). IDPA, alleged to money wrongfully been only return of the have IDPA simultaneously received. The instituted an attach against appellees’ proceeding ment property. Pursuant Act, the Illinois Attachment Ill. Rev. c. 11 Stat., (1973) IDPA filed an (Act), setting affidavit forth the nature underlying and amount of the claim and alleging that money from IDPA appellees had obtained fraud.1 automatically2 by The writ of attachment was issued of this upon receipt clerk of the court affidavit.3 The writ Act, only upon allegation 1 of the a writ will issue in the аffi Under § grounds: following davit of one of nine the debtor is not a resident of this State. “First: Where the debtor conceals himself or stands defiance of “Second: When officer, process upon be served so that cannot him. *3 departed from this State with inten-
“Third: debtor has the Where the having from this tion of his effects State. removed depart “Fourth: the debtor is about from this State with the Where to having from this intention of his effects removed State. property
“Fifth: the to remove his from Where debtor about injury State to the of such creditor. years preceding 2 filing
“Sixth: the debtor has within the Where the fraudulently conveyed required, assigned effects, part affidavit or his or a delay thereof, or his so as to creditors. hinder has, years prior filing “Seventh: Where the debtor within to the fraudulently affidavit, disposed such property concealed or of his as to so delay hinder or his creditors.
“Eighth: fraudulently conceal, assign, the debtor is about Where to or effects, dispose property delay of his or otherwise so as to hinder or his creditors. fraudulently
“Ninth: the debt sued Where for was contracted on the part Provided, of the debtor, agent debtor: the statements of the his or attorney, fraud, writing, which constitute shall have the been reduced signature thereto, by agent attorney.” himself, his attached or Act, sounding Under in eases in tort the writ is.not issued § judge plaintiff until a has examined the under and determined oath damages suffered exceed amount of the attachment. provides the Act in part: Section “2. under Affidavit—Statement—Examination oath. 2. To entitle a § agent attorney creditor attachment, to such a writ of he or his or shall court, setting make and file with the clerk of the circuit forth affidavit executed on given it, 5, was then to the sheriff who November in money belonging appellees a credit union. 1974, attachment, freezing notice of the their Appellees received they when money union, 8, 1974, in the credit on November in support and the affidavit writ, complaint, received the date for the of the The writ indicated a return attach- writ. Appellees appeared 1974.4 proceeding ment November informed that 18, 1974, in court on November were Ap- until December matter would be continued or an answer either to the attachment pellees never filed They hear- underlying complaint.5 prompt did not seek a claim, allowing practicable, so far after and amount of the nature set-offs, just one or more of the causes mentioned credits all defendants, stating place if and also residence section inquiry known, upon diligent the affiant not known, not has and if statement, either together with a written able to ascertain the same been by the separately writing, executed affidavit or embodied in such attorney attorneys representing creditor, or to the effect does or does not sound invoked such affidavit attachment action day to be tort, designation of the return for the summons issued also a said action.” requirement party, plaintiff was a the normal
Since the State equal for, post the amount sued did a bond an amount to twice apply posted. 4a of and no was See the Act. bond provides: 6 of the Act Section required preceding
“The in the section shall be writ of (and, summons, purpose of service of directed to sheriff *4 summons), in person to serve writs of or case the sheriff authorized disqualified prevented acting, interested, or from to the or otherwise county commenced, the which the suit and shall be made coroner of by day designated plaintiff, day on a return the which shall returnable days sixty days or more than date.” be less than ten after its provides: 27 of the Act Section may answer, traversing the stated in the “The defendant facts affidavit by upon issued, attachment which answer shall be verified the thereon, affidavit; if, upon the trial the issue shall be found for the may complaint defendant the or file a motion plaintiff, the directed answer defendant, if cases, in other but found for the the thereto as attachment against quashed, adjudged and the costs of attachment shall be shall be ing, they nor did to attempt quash on the the attachment ground procedures that the surrounding its rendered issuance it and the Act appellees uncоnstitutional. Instead filed the instant lawsuit the United for the States District Northern District of seeking, Illinois December 2, 1974, alia, inter return of the money. attached The federal com- plaint alleged that the appellees’ property had attached been pursuant to Act and that the Act was unconstitutional in that provided it for the deprivation property of debtors’ process without due of Appellees plaintiffs sought law. as represent a class of those “who had their may have or have property attached hearing upon without notice or creditor’s allegation mere of fraudulent pursuant conduct Illinois Attachment Act.” 6-7. App. They named as defendants appellants Trainor and O’Malley, IDPA, officials sought declaration of a' up made all the defendant class court clerks Circuit Courts another Illinois, defendant class of all They sought sheriffs in Illinois. an injunction against O’Malley Trainor and forbidding them to seek attachments injunction under the Act and an clerks forbidding and sheriffs them issue or serve writs of under Appellees sought attachment preliminary Act. also relief in form directing of an order the Sheriff Cook County to release property which had been attached. Finally, appellees sought the convening three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. 2284. S. C.
The District Court request pre- declined to rule on the liminary parties agreed relief because had onе-half money of the A the credit union would be returned. court three-judge was convened. It certified the suit as plaintiff appellees requested. and defendant class action as had App. In opinion dated December one almost year after the return date state court, plaintiff, proceed judgment final though but the suit shall commenced summons.” *5 to Younger
declined
dismiss the case under the doctrine of
Ltd.,
Harris,
Pursue,
401 U. S.
and
v.
(1971),
Huffman
stating:
“In statute proceeded under a the State Ohio By gave an exclusive of action the state. right to contrast, provides Act a cause the Illinois Attachment hap- action for mere any person, public private. or It is penstance petitioner was the State of Illinois It coincidental proceeding. attachment is likewise arguably be may proceedings quasi-criminal nature; the Illinois Attachment under pre- they major need not be. These distinctions Act, Younger, principles clude this from extending comity federalism, equity, based considerations set forth in beyond quasi-criminal situation Huffman.” Danaher, 757, (1975). Supp. Hernandez 405 F. it Proceeding 6, 8, 10, held merits, 2a, §§ to the the due to violative of patently the Act be “on [their face] United Amendment clause of the Fourteenth process Supp., F. at 762. It ordered Constitution.” States County to return to and the of Cook clerk of court Sheriff all enjoined their it property; the rest of attached appеllees serving from writs all or attachment issuing clerks and sheriffs currently any Act and ordered them to release pursuant appel- owner; enjoined property attached its held O’Malley authorizing applications Trainor from lants App. Appel- Act. pursuant writs 65-66. U. C. claiming to this Court under 28 appealed lants principles District Court Younger and under Huffman consti- passing on the suit without have dismissed should Act is in constitu- that the event tionality of the Act and agree appellants with we tional.6 Since perfected clerks have their the sheriffs and Appellees argue that .not litigate cannot connection with IDPA officials appeals and that *6 principles apply here, do we do not reach their sec- Huffman ond claim.
Because our legal systems federal and state have over- lapping jurisdiction responsibilities, and we frequently have inquired the proper into court, pend- role a federal in case ing before it and otherwise within its when jurisdiction, liti- gation parties between the raising same and issues the same (cid:127) is or apparently soon will be in a More state court. precisely, when a challenging suit filed in a court the federal constitutionality of a state law under the Constitution Federal and seeking to enforcing have state enjoined it, officers from should the federal proceed judgment appears court when it the already State hаs proceedings instituted in the state court to enforce the challenged against federal statute the plaintiff the latter and his could tender have federal claims decided the court?
Younger Harris, supra, Mackell, Samuels v. addressed, 66 (1971), questions already pend- these where the ing state proceeding prosecution was criminal and the fed- plaintiff sought eral to invalidate the under which statute the prosecution brought. was In these circumstances, Court ruled that the Federal District should issue Court declaratory neither a judgment injunction nor an but should justification dismiss the case. The first gave the Court simply equity rule was “basic doctrine jurispru- equity dence that courts of should not act, particularly should not act to criminal when the prosecution, restrain remedy moving party adequate will has an law and not injunction validity directing appeals their clerk the court property appellees’ argument to return credit union. The is merit- parties below; directing less. The IDPA officials were order property for the attached benefit of IDPA clerk return the affects their ability way; interests their to obtain in a vital review of an order such clerk —over depend whether the whom IDPA cannot no control— has perfect appeal. his chooses to irreparable injury
suffer if denied relief.” equitable Harris, supra, at 43-44. ordinarily Beyond accepted rule that will equity enjoin prosecution voiced a of a crime, however, in a “more vital consideration,” 44, namely, U. atS., Union where Government both Federal States are sovereign of federalism entities, there are basic concerns through courts, counsel interference *7 injunctions functions, par- or legitimate with state otherwise, ticularly operation Relying with cases the of state courts. “scrupulous give that declared that of equity courts should regard rightful independence governments,” of state [to] Co., (1941), Missouri Beal v. 45, R. Pacific two held, intergovernmental context, as- preconditions equity jurisdiction for classic the exercise of an ade- new existence of Although sumed dimensions. normally remedy would quate barring equitable at law relief in the by into remedies available inquiring determined Co. Lakes courts, Great federal rather than inquiry was here the Huffman, (1943), v. 319 U. S. 293, in the the remedies available be broadened focus on “ up first set 'The should proceeding. accused though this rely upon courts, in the state even his defense unless validity statute, challenge of some involves adequate not afford plainly appears that this course would ” 45, Fenner Younger quoting at Harris, supra, v. protection.’ Dismissal (1926). 240, 243-244 Boykin, 271 U. S. v. opportunity “naturally presupposes federal suit tribunal competent state timely by have decided raise and hill, 411 U. S. Berry Gibson v. involved.” the federal issues ... restraint equitable (1973). policy “The 564, prose pending state ordinarily a premise founded on the opportunity sufficient a fair and the accused provides cution Kugler rights.” v. constitutional of federal for vindication (1975). 117, 124 421 U. S. Helfant, The Court also concluded that the other precondition for equitable irreparable injury not be satisfied relief — —would unless the injury threatened was both great and immediate. The burden of conducting a defense in prosecu- the criminal tion was not by sufficient to warrant interference the federal legitimate courts with state efforts laws; to enforce state only extraordinary circumstances would As suffice.7 Kugler Helfant, 117, (1975): See v. 421 U. S. 124-125 cost,
“Although anxiety, having and inconvenience of to defend single prosecution criminal ‘irreparable alone do not constitute injury’ ‘special legal term,’ [Younger Harris, in the sense of that S.,] 46, equitable U. at Court in left room inter in a showing vention state criminal trial where there is a of ‘bad faith’ or by responsible id., prosecution, ‘harassment’ state officials for the at ' applied where the proceeding “flagrantly state law to be in the criminal express patently id., prohibitions,”’ violative constitutional or ‘extraordinary where there exist other circumstances which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the the usual absence of prerequisites of bad faith harassment.’ Ibid. companion In the casе Ledesma, Perez 401 U. explained ‘[o]nly the Court in cases proven prosecutions harassment or undertaken state officials in bad *8 hope obtaining faith without a valid perhaps conviction other extraordinary irreparable injury circumstances where be can shown is injunctive against federal pending prosecutions relief appropriate.’ state Id., Foster, Mitchum at 85. See v. 230-231. equitable policy “The expressed Younger restraint Harris, v. short, premise ordinarily is founded on the prosecu- pending a provides tion the accused a fair opportunity and sufficient for vindication rights. federal constitutional Thompson, See v. S.U. Steffel Only ‘extraordinary 460. if incapable circumstances’ render the state court fairly fully adjudicating it, the federal issues before can there be any relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the state criminal process. very The ‘extraordinary nature of circumstances,’ course, makes it impossible anticipate to every might define situation that create a sufficient great, threat of immediate, such irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in proceedings. state criminal [Footnote But required, whatever else is omitted.] such circumstances must ‘extraordinary’ in creating the sense of an 'extraordinarily pressing need equitable immediate relief, federal merely not in the presenting sense of highly a unusual factual situation.” later explained, proceeding to a state restrain vindicating plain-
afforded an adequate vehicle for the federal unseemly tiff’s rights constitutional “would entail failure give principle to effect to the state courts have the solemn responsibility equally safeguard with federal to courts” rights negatively upon constitutional and would “reflec[t] ability” state court’s do so. Thompson, to v. U. Steffel 452, 460-461, (1974). prevented would be State only from but “effectuating policies, not its substantive also continuing perform separate providing from function of competent objections a forum constitutional vindicate against Pursue, Ltd., interposed policies.” those Huffman S., at U. injunction of a federal propriety involved the Huffman pending of a in a judgment execution entered a nuisance to enforce brought suit state-court State than a civil rather Although statute. the state suit was require were held proceeding, principles criminal was a Noting that dismissal of the federal State suit. nuisance proceeding to the nuisance and that party statutes,” criminal closely “in related to statute was aid of and be “an injunction would concluded that the Court litigation in the nuisance interest offense to the State’s be were every as would likely great bit as to be [which] while Thus, at 604. proceeding.” S.,“ criminal U. this a enjoin a criminal will equity maxim traditional nuisance apply did not strictly speaking prosecution ” “ 'more vital Huffman, consideration’ proceeding S., id., Younger Harris, 401 U. quoting at 601, comity, pending in the context of strongly restraint as counseled in the context of action as civil enforcement *9 proper it was circumstances, In these proceeding. criminal stay its hand. federal court the that pro- to analysis of the recently applied have We Huffman judicial civil enforcement similar to state ceedings actions — contempt Vail, proceedings. Juidice v. 430 U. 327 (1977). The Court again stressed “more vital consideration” comity underlying doctrine and held that regular state interest in vindicating operation ju- of its system through contempt process dicial —whether process was labeled civil, quasi-criminal or suf- criminal, —was ficiently important preclude injunctive federal relief unless Younger standards were met. An
These cases control appellees here. action against was they state court when filed their suit. state action by was a suit State to recover from appellees payments welfare had allegedly fraudulently been ob- tained. The writ of part attachment issued as of that action. The District thought Younger policies irrele- were money vant because suits to recover and writs attachment private were parties available well as as the it was Statе; only because of the coincidence that was party State a that the suit was “arguably” aid the criminal law. But fact remains that party State was to the suit its role of administering public-assistance programs. its Both the suit and the accompanying writ brought were to vindicate important policies such as safeguarding the integrity fiscal programs. those The state authorities also option had the of vindicating policies through these criminal prosecutions. supra, Juidice, See at 435. Although, as in State’s “[pjerhaps interest here is . . quite important not as . as the State’s in the interest enforcement of its criminal or laws ... even its interest the maintenance of quasi- criminal proceeding S., 430 U. principles of Younger and enough are broad to apply inter- Huffman ference ongoing federal court with an civil enforcement such as this, brought by action sovereign State its capacity.8 provides 8 Title 28 U. S. C. court of the §2283 “[a] United States injunction stay
may grant proceedings except in a State court
445
proceed
For a federal court to
its
with
case rather than to
appellees
remit
to their remedies in a pending state enforce-
ment suit would confront the State with a choice
engaging
litigation,
thereby risking
in
duplicative
temporary federal
interrupting
proceedings
or
its enforcement
injunction,
pending decision of the federal court at some unknown time
opportunity
It would also foreclosе the
future.
challenged
face of the
to construe the
statute
state court
challenges
would also
actual
federal constitutional
wholly
not
shared
it,
privilege
before
for decision
pending
us the
Of
in the case before
course,
by the federal courts.
necessary
its
Congress,
in aid of
by Act
or where
expressly authorized
not
judgments.”
its
The section
or effectuate
jurisdiction,
protect
or to
express stat-
C.
is an
this 42 U. S.
1983 action
here because
applicable
§
(1972);
Foster,
Mitchum
No extraordinary warranting equitable circumstances relief present were here. suggestion pending There no state brought action was in purpose bad faith or for the harassing appellees. It is urged that case comes this within excеption Younger might that we said exist where a
9 injunction Appellees argue way in no issued below interfered They point with state case. to the fact that the attach proceeding underlying may ment was interfered with —the fraud action unimpeded continue proceeding claim that the attachment is not a —and Younger proceeding court within the In doctrine Huffman. regard they Lynch rely Corp., Household Finance 538 v. Shevin, (1972); (1972); Pugh, Fuentes v. 407 U. and Gerstein v. S. (1975). 420 U. None of S. these cases control here. very In this case the attachment a court much was issued clerk and part underlying Moreover, action for fraud. the attachment parties this case contained- appear a return date on were court and appellees opportunity at which time the would have had an validity proceeding contest the of the attachment. Thus the attachment “pending” was in the state courts within the doc- Huffman trine at the time the federal suit. “ ‘flagrantly patently statute is express violative of every prohibitions para constitutional sentence and clause, graph, in whatever manner whomever ” might effort be made to it.’ apply S., quot 401 U. at 53-54, Buck, Watson ing (1941). 313 U. if such S. Even finding (see supra, 439), was made which'we doubt below, it would not have been our Com warranted cases. light Di-Chem, pare Georgia Finishing, Inc., North Inc. 419 U. Co., (1975), with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant 416 U. S. (1974).
As for appellees presented whether could their federal have process challenge pend- in the due to the attachment statute if was ing proceeding, question, presented below, *12 rejection by Court, placed not which its addressed District The issue Younger and on broader grounds. Huffman rule on it here heavily local we do not law, laden with and the first instance.10 apply refused which the District Court grounds
The on it was infirm; were Younger and principles Huffman on action grounds, on entertain therefore those error, and plaintiffs the unnamed of either the named or behalf attach- Illinois constitutionality of the reach issue of ment statute.11 remanded case is is therefore reversed,
The judgment squarely as issue, the State disagreement on this parties are in The claim process due denying, the federal appellees serting, and the proceed pending presented and decided have been could relied reasons —not Stevens, dissent, offers additional ing. Mr. Justice concluding that by the addressed State —for by appellees and not claim. litigating federal adequate forum for did not offer state suit conflicting views. these not resolve doWe other in favor granted the relief argued here Appellees have cases Younger because not barred members is class Huffman never should the class them. Since some were argument. certified, address need not we been have to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It sois ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart substantially agrees with the views expressed in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stevens. Accordingly, respectfully he dis- from sents opinion judgment of the Court.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion write stress that the substantiality of the State’s interest its proceeding has been an important factor in abstention cases under Harris, 401 U. 37 (1971), beginning. from discussing In comity, in Younger clearly indicated both federal and state interests had to be into taken account:
‘‘The concept does not mean blind deference to ‘States’ Rights’ any more it than means centralization of control every
over important in our issue National Government and its rejected courts. Framers both these courses. the concept system What does is a represent there sensitivity legitimate to the interests both State and National and in which the Na- Governments, tional may Government, anxious though to vindicate protect rights always and federal interests, *13 to ways unduly endeavors do so in that will not interfere with legitimate Id., the activities the States.” at 44. Consistently requirement balancing with this the federal previous Younger state the Court in interests, has cases imposed requirement that the must State show that has important interest to vindicate in its own courts before exercising the federal must refrain from proper court otherwise jurisdiction. Younger federal In itself, the Court relied the in the administration State’s vital concern of its criminal Pursue, Inc., In laws. 420 592 v. (1975), Huffman
449 quasi-criminal state Court the fact it dealt with a stressed proceeding The proceeding party. was a State closely was in to criminal statutes. both aid of related litigation underlying policy interest in the Thus, State’s great Younger. in was deemed be as the interest found as Vail, in 327 the Court Similarly, (1977), Juidice v. U. S. contempt procedures was found that interest its State’s substantial. attenuated,
In cases where the State’s interest been more has Thus, Younger has refused to order abstention. in which state Thompson, (1974), 415 U. S. Steffel merely court was prosecution the federal threatened, was declaratory judg- merits the claim for a free to reach the Id., opportunity In for ad- at such a “the case, ment. as rights forum, in a judication of constitutional para- by Declaratory Judgment becomes Act, authorized (1975). See Dyson, Ellis U. mount.” Law Issues Civil Deciding Federal generally Kanowitz, Hastings Courts, Federal Trial Proceedings: Versus State Q. (1976). L. Const. leads me instant case principles these to the
Application reversing remanding order with the Court’s agree proceeding I a state satisfied that Court, Like the am case. significant find Ante, too, I, n. 9. at pending. was capacity to' sovereign party was its the fact that the State Ante, 444. Here, the federal suit. state suit and both the in- the state fact importance I emphasize In was substantial. рroceeding in the terest option of had the my fact State view, criminally impose sanc- civilly or proceeding either ap- one while of assets concealment for a fraudulent tions demonstrates public assistance plies for and receives importance order of is of the same interest underlying propriety interests Huffman. to vindi- choice on the State’s depend should not abstention more lenient, perhaps drastic, a less cate interests its *14 In addition, pro- route. as the Court the state-court notes, ceeding played important in safeguarding role fiscal of integrity public programs. assistance Since benefits recovery fraudulently of by enjoyed obtained funds are taxpayers of all the the State, it is reasonable to recognize between the distinction State’s status as creditor and private parties using of status the same procedures. me,
For the existence the foregoing factors brings squarely case within prior Younger the Court’s abstention rulings. Justice
Mr. with Brennan, whom Mr. Justice Marshall dissenting. joins,
The Court continues on, me, wholly improper course of extending principles deny a federal forum plaintiffs invoking 42 U. C. 1983 for the decision meritorious federal constitutional civil claims when a action might entertain such claims is in a state court. Because am of I the view that the patently decision disregards Congress’ purpose enacting open § 1983—to federal courts to the decision of such regard claims without pendency to the of such state civil actions —and because the decision inde- fensibly departs prior from I decisions this Court, respectfully dissent.
I An proceeding against appellees’ credit union was savings instituted Department Illinois of Public Aid under (IDPA) the Illinois Attachment Act simultane- ously with filing civil lawsuit court recovery public welfare funds allegedly ob- fraudulently tained. The attachment was initiated when IDPÁ filled the blanks on a standard-form “Affidavit for Attachment” stating:
“The defendants Juan and Maria Hernandez within years two preceding the filing this affidavit fraudu-
451 lently or disposed concealed of property so as to hinder delay or their (Italics creditors.” indicate matter inserted by IDPA.) blanks App. 18. of the wording repeats affidavit almost verbatim the language of the Act,1 provides Illinois and underlying no allegations upon factual which a determination can made whether conclusion of disposi- fraudulent concealment or justified.2 tion of property The writ of attachment was issued as a matter of by upon course clerk of court receipt of the and the writ executed on was Novem- affidavit, 5, ber 1974.
Appellees appeared in state court on the return date, November 18, 1974, and were informed that on hearing Stat., 11, (1973), provides: Illinois c. Rev. § any competent jurisdiction, having money “In court of a creditor may property claim . . . have an attachment of his instituting . . . either at the time of debtor suit or thereafter ... following of one cases: has, years prior filing of
“Seventh: the debtor within to the such Where affidavit, fraudulently disposed property concealed or of his as to so delay hinder or his creditors.” fact, appears appellees disposed In had not “concealed it or allegations property delay so as to hinder or their creditors” even if the complaint complaint the unsworn are taken true. The they fraudulently personal alleges property concealed in order to public assistance, obtain was undertaken to this concealment payment any part applicable If form affidavit is avoid creditors. appellees, appears (i), Stat., to be which tracks Ill. Rev. c. § (Ninth) (1973): §1 fraudulently part “The debt sued for was contracted on the of the of-agent-or defendant-and statements attorney, fraud, writing which constitute the have been reduced to - - - signature thereto, attached -agent-or attorney-.” App. 18. sel[f] However, portion form, IDPA did not fill in the blanks of this seeking rely it in did not writ attachment. Decem- until validity of attachment was continued appellees deprived In
ber the meantime — repair bills, car rent savings use their —faced On Decem- telephone bills. past due electricity, gas, 1983 in C. 2, appellees complaint filed a under ber declaratory and an judgment seeking Federal District Court of the Illinois Attachment injunction against enforcement continued state- On two weeks before the Act. December *16 order restraining sought temporary court hearing, appellees custody of the savings union from the to their credit release between agreement The District Court effected sheriff. IDPA release one-half of parties whereby agreed the to the motion not act on the accordingly the and did funds, attached order.3 temporary restraining for the A was The District three-judge District Court convened. deciding required found it was not to abstain from Court that enjoined appellees’ challenge, the constitutional merits of the Act ground of the Act the the enforcement “patently was' violative constitution.” flagrantly (ND Danaher, 1975). Ill. Supp. 757, v. F. Hernandez should District Court This Court and holds the reverses initiated suit, continuing thus course have dismissed Pursue, Ltd., (1975), S. 592 in v. U. Huffman Vail, in (1977), this Term Juidice v. furthered to civil Younger principles actions. extending agreement to release half of the attached funds precise date of The appear in does not the record. opinion points did not its
The out that the District Court issue year appellees could in until after the date on this case about one validity of challenge the hearing their in state court to have had continued motion for Ante, 438-439. This irrelevant since the attachment. at hearing order, restraining filed two before continued temporary weeks savings. agreement court, appellees' half resulted in release important in the matter, Thus, practical appellees relief as a received highly was at a relief in state court District Court time when Federal speculative.
II I already length have set out at for my some the reasons disagreement with the Court’s extension of absten- principles tion particularly civil actions under 42 cases, U. Pursue, S. C. Ltd., supra, at 613 Huffman (dissenting Juidice opinion), Vail, supra, at 341 (dissenting and will opinion), repeat suggests them here. The Court that this case, Huffman, like involves a statute aid enacted of the criminal In Huffman, brought law. the State of Ohio statutory nuisance suit state court to theater that close a previously had adjudged been films. to have shown obscene stated, quoted by today, words the Court Huffman nuisance proceeding closely “was ‘in related to aid of ” Ante, criminal pre- statutes.’ Court states question cise this case be:
“[Sjhould proceed judgment the federal court when it appears already proceed- State has instituted ings challenged in the court to statute enforce plaintiff latter could tender *17 and have his federal court?” claims decided the state at Ante, 440.
Emphasizing “vindicate State sued in court to important pоlicies,” prin- “the Court concludes that ciples Younger enough apply broad are Huffman interference enforce- ongoing federal court with civil this, brought by sovereign ment action such as in its State Ante, at capacity.” framing
In question this narrowly, its answer apparently day” once to leave “for desires more another question applicability Younger prin- abstention Ante, Juidice, ciples supra, suits generally. 8; to civil at 445 n. Huffman, supra, see J., at 345 at dissenting); n. (Brennan, comity 607. But Court’s insistence that “the interests of Younger federalism on which Samuels Mackell primarily apply ante, rest in full force here,” is the “merely signal announcement being post- formal Juidice, poned,” supra, n. (Brennan, at 345 dissenting). J., Younger Mackell, and Samuels v. dis- (1971), missed plaintiffs injunc- federal-court suits because the sought against pending prosecutions. tions I agreed criminal with “[p] those results because ending state criminal proceedings always have been viewed paradigm as cases involving para- mount Juidice, state interests.” supra, at 345 (Brennan, J., principles But dissenting). developed abstention to avoid interfering prosecutions with state criminal are manifestly inapplicable here.
In plaintiffs this case the federal injunction seek an only the use of statutory attachment proceedings which, properly part are not speaking, of the pending civil suit at all. granted The relief in no wаy here with interfered or prevented the proceeding State from with its suit in state merely enjoined court. It the use of an unconstitutional mechanism for attaching from assets which the hoped State satisfy prevailed its if judgment on the merits of the underlying say To lawsuit. the interest of the State in continuing to use an unconstitutional attachment mechanism payment to insure yet of a liability not established brings play into “in full force” comity “all the interests of fed present eralism” prosecution a state criminal simply wrong. Fuentes Shevin, U. S. 67 (1972), §a 1983 suit challenging a prejudgment replevin pre addressed statute, cisely point. plaintiffs Since the had sought “an injunction against any or future court proceeding such . . . challenged summary [but rather] extra judicial process prejudgment of property,” seizure Fuentes concluded principles posed no bar to a federal *18 granting court’s sought. the relief S., at n. 3. U. See Lynch also v. Household Corp., Finance 405 U. S. 554- 555 (1972), Pugh, and Gerstein U. 103 (1975). application Younger
The principles is inappro- here also priate even in underlying because lawsuit the State seeks only a civil recovery money allegedly fraudulently received. The relies on plain- the State’s presence fortuitous as a tiff the state-court suit to conclude closely that suit is I related to a criminal suit, pressed but am hard to understand why the “mere F. happenstance,” at Supp., of Illinois State rather than private party invoked Act this on Attachment makes so. The Court’s reliance presence of may the State here it view suggest might differently an attachment under same Act at the instance private of a no is party, why but reason the State advanced plaintiff should such courts enjoy an its own advantage the ordinary plaintiff.4 over analysis, citizen Under seems to me for State’s solicitousness use an ancillary unconstitutional proceeding to a lawsuit civil hardly compelled by great principles comity, federalism, respect and mutual between federal and state courts that Younger account its progeny. principles do give strength Younger simply
support enjoining rule against inflexible federal courts’ justified primarily was proceedings. state civil . . . longstanding equity the basis of the rule that “courts prosecution.” particularly should not act restrain a criminal 43. A comparably against enjoining 401 U. at rule S., rigid proceedings Huffman, for suggested civil was never until presence plaintiff pro Even if the of the State as a state-court ceeding significance, why I is held to be fail see the federal of some greater here courts should accord deference to State’s fiscal interest my collecting than to the As far more basic function of state taxes. demonstrates, post, 464-466, conclusively Brother Stevens the standard today statutory аpplied goes beyond well the Court standard for a enjoining taxes, predicated only federal court’s the collection of finding speedy remedy” upon “plain, no and efficient under state law. S.U. C. *19 of interests assumed that state it cannot be proceedings civil litigants of the interests importance outweigh compelling particu- of federal rights vindication federal seeking court, provide by Congress larly expressly statute enacted under fed- assuming that purpose. forum for that Even a federal in some conceivably appropriate might eral abstention I think can civil of what must cases, transformation the line between exception be an an absolute rule crosses into abstention and abdication. competing 1983, Congress weighed it §
When enacted consciously decided Federalism,” demands of “Our As we have protect federal forum. rights the federal express previously for the § was enacted recognized, had purpose judicial of balance that altering federal-state remedy existed, “offering uniquely and of federal theretofore law authority of state incursions under the claimed upon rights by the Constitution and the laws secured Foster, (1972). Mitchum v. 407 U. Nation.” Con- courts to follow the Federal course, State bound are, clearly equally courts, Congress stitution with federal but has courts constitutionally the federal may, ordained, “primary powerful are to be the reliances” for vindicat- ing rights Thompson, federal under § Steffel If (1974) (emphasis original). U. federal S. 452, courts circum- flatly prohibited, regardless are to be stances of the individual rights, claim violation federal remedy” from because of implementing “uniquely purported state interests in the maintenance deference “effectively cripple[d] state civil the Court has suits, Vail, 430 congressional scheme enacted in 1983.” Juidice dissenting). S., J., U. (Brennan,
Ill arguendo, applicability Even assuming, I with the District Court Illinois agree principles, Act falls one of Attachment within the established exceptions principles. example those As an of an “extraordinary cir- cumstance” might justify intervention, federal-court *20 “ to referred a that ‘might flagrantly statute be and patently violative of in express prohibitions constitutional every sentence clause, and and in whatever paragraph, manner ” whomever an might apply effort be made it.’ 401 S.,U. Buck, at 53-54, quoting Watson 313 v. S.U. (1941). Explicitly relying exception on this Younger, the District Court held that Act is Illinois “patently flagrantly violative of the constitution.” F. Supp., at 760. The Court holds that finding this insuf- ficient to bring case within the Younger exception because exception “might exist where a ‘flagrantly state statute is patently express prohibitions violative of in constitutional every clause, sentence and paragraph, and whatever manner and аgainst whomever might apply an effort made to' it.’ be Buck, atS., 53-54, U. Watson quoting v. 402 (1941). Even if finding such a was made which below, we , doubt light would not have been ... warranted Ante, our I cases.” disagree. 446-447. requirement Buck that the Watson v. formula
Obviously, tion must literally exception be renders satisfied mean my ingless, and, as Brother Stevens post, at demonstrates, 461-464, elevates a literalistic definitional status what was only obviously meant to be illustrative and nonexhaustive. The human mind possess clairvoyance does not that can “every foresee whether clause, paragraph” sentence and of a statute will be “in unconstitutional whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be it.” made to apply only construction “every sensible of the test is to treat clause, etc.,” wording at least when redundant, decisions this Court clear make that the challenged statute is “patently flagrantly violative of the I thought Constitution.” ant, H 421 U. S. Kugler much decided as had the Court elf “Younger room for federal left stating (1975), . . where criminal trial . intervention in a state equitable ‘flagrantly proceeding the criminal applied state law to be ” prohibitions.’ constitutional express violative patently supplied.) (Emphasis fla “patently and Illinois Attachment Act is Clearly the under prohibitions” grantly express violative of constitutional Georgia Finish North of this the relevant decisions Court. struck down ing, Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U. 601 (1975), Inc., issuance permitted Gеorgia garnishment statute upon filing court clerk garnishment a writ and under containing conclusory allegations, affidavit provision early hearing “no for an at which there was prob required the creditor would at least demonstrate *21 cause for the 607. The Illinois garnishment.” able at Id., constitutionally Attachment Act is from the indistinguishable Finishing. Georgia Georgia statute struck down in North As conclusory case, the affidavit filed here contained preprinted this case taken from a allegations, were form requiring only that the fill-in of the affiant the names persons property Upon filing whose he wished to attach. the of this form the court clerk issued the writ of attach affidavit, ment as “early a of course. Far from requiring matter hearing” challenge validity at which to the of the attach ment, provided the Illinois Act party the seeking unilaterally attachment could set the return date of the writ at from days time 10 to 60 from the date of its execution. quotation, S., 4, complete in 421 U. at 125 n. Buck sentence of the Kugler carefully merely was identified in as example type “one of the of justify circumstances could Curiously, intervention. . . Court, ante, quotes Kugler’s at 442 n. abridged formulation, but attempt explain makes no finally applies reference when it “every clause, paragraph” sentence and test the basis for its decision. Ante, at 446-447. this case (1973). And, as demon §6 Rev. c. Stat.,
Ill. necessarily 60-day represent does not strates, interval court hearing for the Illinois the actual date, limit for outer date beyond grant 30-day continuance willing was here though appellees the writ even attachment, provided forward go date wished to proper in court on the appeared time. hearing at that with Act even contend Illinois seriously
No could one Grant T. remotely Mitchell W. resembles that sustained exception thus within the Co., 416 falls U. (1974), (1969), U. S. 337 Family Corp., 395 Finance Sniadach Georgia Shevin, North (1972), Fuentes v. upheld W. T. Grant Finishing, carved out that case. supra, seques- which writ sequestration statute under a Louisiana in which of an affidavit only after the filing tration was issued “ clearly of the writ relied issuance grounds upon 'the ” 605. The show- specific S., at appear[ed] facts,’ from U. was before a for the the writ made grounds issuance ing id., and the debtor was clerk, at judge rather than court matter “immediately hearing have a full entitled [to] id., writ,” at 610. execution of the possession following the Illinois provided by procedural safeguards of those None cor- unanimously and three-judge District Act. The patently Act “is on violative rectly concluded that the its face Amendment.” Fourteenth process due clause F. Supp., North Finish- Georgia bare citations to *22 gives only The Court Grant, or ante, discuss ing 447, T. at and declines to and W. de- cursory These analyze in even the most manner. them holding under clearly support the District Court’s cisions so exception that Younger of the any sensible construction compliance upon insistence with the its silence, Court’s Buck, my v. confirms convic- wording of Watson literal civil determined to extend “state is tion Younger,” holding v. proceedings generally Huffman Pursue, Ltd., S., exceptions 420 U. and to 613, give at its possible narrowest I reach. dissent. respectfully Justice Stevens, dissenting. Mr.
Today the Court four complexities adds new to a doctrine that has bewildered years.1 other federal several courts for First, Court finds a meaningful difference between a state procedure which is “patently flagrantly violative Constitution” and patently one is vio- “flagrantly express lative of prohibitions every clause, constitutional in sentence and in paragraph, and whatever manner whomever an might Second, effort be it.” apply made to the Court holds that an procedure unconstitutional collection may by used a state agency, though by because others, there “a distinction between the as creditor State’s status private using procedures.” the status of parties the same Third, application Court’s in of the abstention doctrine provides this case even greater protection to a when it is State proceeding as ordinary statutory protec- an creditor than tion by Congress capacity mandated for the as a State its tax collector. withоut Fourth, disagreeing with the District procedure Court’s conclusion the Illinois attachment the Court unconstitutional, remands order enable procedure pro- District Court to decide whether that invalid adequate remedy vides for appellees’ the vindication of A rights. complexities may on each comment of these light shed the character abstention doctrine nowas viewed the Court. Judge
1 See, example, synthesizing Pell's search principle for article, by Any Name, Path his Abstention —A Primrose Other 21 DePaul (1972). L. Rev. 926 ante, Buck, quotes excerpt from Watson Court, quoted Harris, turn was 401 U. 37, 53-54. ante, Mr. Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion, See at 450.
I procedure The District Court the Illinois found “patently flagrantly and constitution.” Her violative Danaher, nandez Supp. (ND 1975). v. 405 F. Ill. Court, This hand, the other writes:
“It urged exception is comes case within Younger might that we said in exist where a state statute is ‘flagrantly patently express violative constitu- prohibitions every tional clause, para- sentence and graph, whatever manner and whomever might an effort apply 53-54, made to it.’ 401 atS.,U. Buck, quoting (1941). Watson U. S. Even , if . finding such a was made we doubt . . below, been in light it would have warranted our cases.” Ante, (emphasis added).4 at 446-447 there is no doubt District Since whatsoever as to what the actually said, expression Court this Court’s of doubt can uncertainty crux finding refer to its as to whether patently flagrantly of the statute unconstitutional satisfy pat- requirement sufficient to the statute be ently flagrantly every clause, unconstitutional “in sentence It paragraph is, therefore, appropriate . . . .” consider exception is left of this doctrine after what today’s decision. exception passage
The source of this is the Mr. Justice Buck, years some earlier in Watson Black had written complicated a case which involved a state anti- 387, 402, Act. On basis of conclusion certain sections its trust three-judge District had en- unconstitutional, were unconstitutionally finding of that a obvious The cavalier statement by prior simply ignores eases the careful not have been warranted would opinion statute identified in the analysis defects in the Illinois of the serious Supp., 760-762, Justice Court, and Mr. Bren 405 F. District dissenting opinion. nan’s *24 the entire Act.5 enforcement of This
joined reversed, invalidity part of a holding: first, that of a statute would injunction against Act; second, an entire justify not and in eight question sections in event were valid. branch explanation In of the first of the hold- his Court’s pointed Mr. out that there are if few, any, Justice Black ing, totally every unconstitutional in part.6 that are statutes involved a new statute which had not been con- Watson Since might by any state and since such construction court, strued Mr. Justice Black’s com- constitutionality, affected its have point an untried state emphasized ment statute by a federal court before the state not be invalidаted should to construe This consideration opportunity court has an it. involving an' attack on a state statute present in a case in century. Nothing been in use for more than a that has against injunction an invalid implies that a limited Watson improper. long standing would be portion of a statute of Harris, opinion in he the Court’s When wrote foregoing excerpt quoted Black Justice S. Mr. U. of a situation which it example case as an from the Watson enjoin a for a federal court to appropriate would Buck regulated the busi Watson legislation The Florida involved copyrights declared certain combinations holding music persons ness of three-judge A persons illegal of trade. District restraint of such with the federal 8 sections of that statute conflicted Court held that remaining validity and, considering without copyright laws sections, enjoined all 21 sections. enforcement of provisions “Passing possible significance of the manifold upon the apply separate provisions of efforts to statute in advance broad advisory opinion upon a or a de rendering statute analogous It is of course claratory judgment upon hypothetical case. conceivable express flagrantly patently con might be violative that a statute every clause, paragraph, sentence prohibitions stitutional might apply be made to an effоrt manner and whomever whatever S.,U. it.” prosecution.7 criminal He did not, however, imply
his earlier language rigidly defined the boundaries of one kind of exception from equitable rationale underlying Younger decision itself.
Today the Court seems be saying “patently that the flagrantly exception unconstitutional” Fowler-type ab- stention is unavailable legitimate whenever a statute has title, legitimate or a severability equally or some other clause, provision. innocuous If this is a fair of the Court's reading *25 opinion, the Court has given Justice Black's illustrative Mr. language significance. definitional In effect, this treatment preserves flexibility an illusion of application in the Founger-type actually but of the abstention, it one eliminates exceptions from typical the doctrine. For the constitutional attack on a statute fea- one, objectionable focuses on or a few, Watson, tures. Black indicated in it Although, Mr. Justice totally stat- is conceivable that there are some unconstitutional utes, possibility quite importantly, More remote. must any explained why has all sections of statute never against justify injunction in be considered invalid order to Even unconstitutional. portion flagrantly itself did than less clear if the constitutional issue this Court finds governmental I what do not understand Court, the District extraordinary in which course, may, be circumstances “There usual of the in the absenсe necessary injury can be even irreparable shown long ago as example, as faith and harassment. For prerequisites of bad case, supra, we indicated: the Buck “ patently might flagrantly and be that a statute 'It is of course conceivable clause, every sentence in prohibitions express constitutional violative an effort whomever manner paragraph, and whatever S., at 402. might apply it.’ 313 U. made arise, might also intervention calling for federal “Other unusual situations they might specify what attempting now point in our there is no but S., 53-54. 401 U. at be.” by refusing
interest is served at this to address merits stage proceedings.
II explicitly The Court “whether does not decide Ante, 445 n. principles apply litigation.” to all civil holding Its in this case therefore on the fact squarely rests State, litigant, that the rather than other is the creditor some procedure. invoked the Illinois ra- This principles tionale cannot be tenable of federalism re- unless quire greater collecting its deference to the interest State’s providing own claims than to its a forum for interest community. other creditors It would seem rather money obvious to me that involved in amount is a concern to the particular dispute matter of° far less sovereign integrity procedures. than the of its own Con- the fact sequently, party that a State is a should proceeding objectionable make it less to have the if adjudicated constitutional issue in a federal forum than I litigants find hard private were involved. therefore contrary ap- accept principled the Court’s evaluation as a majestic plication language Mr. Justice Black’s *26 Younger opinion.
III
or other
collecting
has
in
taxes
The
a valid interest
State
in
desire to
recognition
In
of
need and
a
obligations.
Congress has
matters,
minimize federal interference with
may
enjoin
court
not
the collection
provided that a federal
speedy and efficient
taxpayer
“plain,
taxes if the
has a
of state
placed
remedy”
Congress
not, however,
has
under state law.8
of a federal court
to decide
power
restriction on the
remedy
fact, plain, speedy,
taxpayer’s
is,
whether
by qualifying
prohibition
Quite
contrary,
efficient.9
8 28
C.
U. S.
§ 1341.
9
business in a federal court.
Indeed,
kind
determination is routine
of
g., Tully Griffin,Inc.,
465 against enjoining Congress collection state taxes, has actually directed the federal courts to review adequacy taxpayer’s a remedies.
Moreover, repeatedly the Court has held a that when remedy uncertain, court provide federal must relief. Mr. put ought As Justice Holmes “we leave the it, to might to plaintiffs speculation upon what State Hines, 253 say brought.” if an action at law were Wallace v. 66, 68.10 U. S. equi- from Younger developed
The the same doctrine 28 S. C. principles applied interpret table that have been to U. In confronted Court has been 1341.11 cases which this 400; Hopkins 393, Mountain Co., Cal. 275 U. S. Southern Tel. See v. Montana, 299 S. Power Co. Public Service Comm’n U. States v. remedy’ upon predicated cannot be (“A 'plain, speedy, and efficient Spector consideration”); Service, Motor future problematical outcome of Douglas wrote: McLaughlin, 106. As Mr. Justice Inc. U. S. v. remedy as to make it uncertainty concerning the is such [state] '‘[T]here protection to . . . the State affords speculative whether federal full Cromwell, added), Hillsborough (emphasis rights." 326 U. v. supra, Tully Inc., Griffin, at 76. approval just Term in v. with this cited Hillsborough, the state in the first Court decided instance In this Finally, being inadequate. were extent remedies uncertain though state 37, 48, even Carter, this Court held that 252 U. S. Shaffer question as to the adequate remedy might the federal procedures be wrong procedures remedy validity no tax, there were ground this “Hence, on procedures. with the tax-collection in connection relief; equity a court and since least, properly had to resort was possible, prevent, if by halves,’ and will equity justice not 'do does of all jurisdiction disposition multiplicity suits, extends questions Ibid. raised the bill.” vintage. equitable upon principles relied are of ancient equity Congress Judiciary first Act of directed that In the adequate may complete remedy be had at “plain, if a withheld Neely, 106, 110, In Scott Court noted that law.” *27 Congress’ prohibition was obtaining controlling equity proceedings
“declaratory of the rule country. England, always in And so period from the earliest statutory it has been reluctant to restriction, with that not remedy adequate. in the instance whether is decide first a inter- provided special protection has no from federal Congress agency suing obligations. a state nontax ference for collect comity Equitable (as well as considerations of considerations with federalism) preclude arid do unwarranted interference surely agency litigation brought by such an but agency, collec- greater protection to no than the state tax entitled nonstatutory fashioning tor. the Court now Nevertheless, requires greater deference abstention doctrine which even ordinary litigant Congress regarded the State as an than appropriate for the State’s more basic fiscal needs.
IV the Dis- litigation to The Court’s decision to remand this pro- Illinois whether trict Court to decide violated, whenever, any right adjudged respecting often it has been affording plain, judgment ade- competent to render a a court of law is remedy in remedy, party aggrieved his quate complete must seek right to court, the defendant has a constitutional not because such Congress to prohibition, the act of by jury, but because trial equity.” remedy a court оf pursue in such cases his Court, major upon Great Lakes eases relied One of 293, 299, Huffman, although Dredge held that Dock & Co. declaratory judgments prohibited specifically had Congress in 1341 § statutes, nonetheless, equitable principles validity concerning required the same result. unnecessary inquire statute whether the words of the find it “[W]e by federal con-
may prohibit a declaration courts so construed as to opinion invalidity state tax. For we are of cerning the of a equity to refuse to led federal courts of considerations which have those cases, require taxes, exceptional a like save enjoin the collection of state declaratory judgment procedure.” S.,U. in the use of the restraint 299. declaratory judgments prohibiting read as pronouncement has been This Illinois R. Co. injunctive suits under Central extent as same (CA7 1975) (Sprecher, J.). Howlett, 525 F. 2d
467 provides cedure a debtor forum in appropriate with an which challenge constitutionality to the of attachment the Illinois procedure among is ironic. For its procedure includes effectively undesirable features foreclose a set of rules any challenge constitutionality its Illinois courts. in the Act, 27
Although is true that of the Illinois Attachment § file a 27 the Stat., 11, Ill. Rev. allows defendant (1973), § c. of such a motion quash motion to the the purpose attachment, the sufficiency alleged of the is to test and truth fаcts 28 adequacy affidavit or the attachment bond. Section Even precludes any other issues.12 of the Act consideration might construed contrary reading to a fair statute if— —the a motion challenge on allow consideration of a constitutional challenge reject judge may summarily a trial such quash, a motion denying such reversal; without fear of order ruling interlocutory nonappealable.13 final validity not become until of an attachment does time At or is resolved. tort contract claim underlying be moot because course, issue will, the attachment regard property entitled to the party will then be prevailing validity of the attachment. less pending in proceeding so clear that Because it is ade- in this case an appellees did not afford court 12 writ (1973), Stat., provides that 11, 28 “[n]o Ill. Rev. c. Section § re taken thereon quashed, property nor shall be of attachment legal sufficient plaintiff . shall cause a affidavit if . . stored, ... amended, . and in filed, . . to be to be or writ bond attachment or originally been proceedings had proceed if such shall the cause event proceeding question raised in Thus, 28 the valid under sufficient.” affidavit or pleaded in the the facts concerning the whether any improperly And, course, amendment allows writ were true. 28§ pleaded or writ affidavit. 13 Brignall (1958); v. Hodge, 2d 793 N. E. Ill. Smith v. 2d Oak, Live (1938); Rabits Merkle, E. 2d App. 16 N. Ill. Mortgage Corp. (1927); Americаn Co., Perry App. & Ill. R. Gulf (CA7 1965). 527, 528 Corp., Mortgage 2d First 345 F. National remedy quate for the violation their federal constitutional disposition points larger rights,14 up problem the Court’s challenge confronting litigants pro- who seek to *29 14 present case, appellees appeared In the the the of the on return date attachment, (10 days 18, property of 1974 had writ November after their attached), been that the be “were informed matter would continued ante, days 19, 1974,” 437, opinion until December at 31 later. As the points out, person below the sues the who out writ of attachment has Act, Stat., 11, (1973), discretion under of 6 to absolute 6 the Ill. c. Rev. § § anywhere days set the return of the of 10 date writ from to 60 property Supp., after the has been 405 F. at 762. return attached. The appears date be challenged; to the first chance an attachment be and as can points up, proceedings summarily case the on this the return date can be longer. continued at if Thus, property may for least a month not bewell longer attached for three months or before even a 27 motion will be § entertained. noted, give
As the court below 27 also . . does defend . not “[s]eetion right hearing immediately an to ant absolute a on the attachment issue Supp., Indeed, after seizure.” F. at Attachment the Act con provision prompt validity tains hearing no a for the on of the attachment. compаred Stat., should Act, 11, This be with 29 of the Ill. Rev. c. § § (1973), requires immediately jury which . “the court . . to be direct [to] a inquire impaneled right property” to into the in cases in a which person than being other the property claims an interest the defendant attached. This deference prompt response to the needs for action to interpleading signifies general an claimant the lax the attitude Act takes regard rights persons property with of whose has been attached. (who appellees appeared The Court that the states return date month) “and were informed that the matter would continued” for a prompt hearing, “did seek a quash nor did attempt to the attach- they ground ment on procedures surrounding its issuance rendered it and Act Ante, suggests unconstitutional.” The State 437-438. Act, 26 of the Stat., 11, (1973), 111.Rev. c. appellees § allows § appropriate make an motion that attachment statute unconstitu- However, provides tional. “provisions of the Civil Practice §26 . apply Act . . shall proceedings hereunder, except all as otherwise provided in this (Emphasis added.) Act.’’ As we note in our discussion supra, the statute does raising not authorize unconstitutionality § a an defense to attachment. Sup.
The State provides cites Ill. Rule party also Ct. that a Four- Process Clause of the violative the Due cedure as teenth Amendment. Vail, my separate opinion I in Juidice suggested
As principled application the rationale 327, 339, Harris, in cases 401 U. S. abstention forecloses constitutionality is to challenge in which the federal plaintiff raised procedure itself.15 Since disposition may or for its up a before after” time “call motion hearing; it This, provide prompt disposition. however, does not normal request may not be appellees may ask for or one. allows Neither 26 nor Rule 184 assures granted of the court. discretion § hearing, the fact prompt and neither overrides appellees a attacking unconstitutionality in appears to foreclose defense attachment. procedure affords no unless should be abstention There indeed, remedy wrong; plain, for the federal speedy, and efficient *30 Younger equity basing principles its ac opinion decision basic requirement application the ab as fundamental knowledges this majority opinion question in this case states the doctrine. The stention already presented proper abstention is when a “State has as whether [appellees] proceedings . . . could tender and have instituted Ante, decided in then federal claims the state court.” at 440. It [their] quote adequate requiring cases an state proceeds to from numerous Younger Harris, remedy application for abstention doctrine. Boykin, 37, 45, quoting 240, 271 Fenner v. U. S. 243-244 U. S. up rely (requiring plaintiff “first set on his defense the federal courts, though challenge this a state even involves appears validity statute, plainly unless it course would of some Berry hill, adequate protection”); not Gibson v. U. S. afford “naturally (dismissal presuppos[ing] as of the federal suit timely competent opportunity to and have decided a raise Kugler involved”); Helfant, federal issues U. S. tribunal ordinarily (abstention premise “on the founded opportunity fair and for prosecution provides the accused a sufficient my rights”). Ante, judg 441. constitutional In vindication of federal challenged, ment, procedure adequate is must be a state forum when alleged sufficiently independent proce one is unconstitutional provide judge impartially prompt procedure relief if dure wanting. procedure pointed providing Illinois has found No been remedy “uncertain,” jurisdiction relief, such exists. where question a serious about the the Illinois fairness procedure, and since procedure does afford plain, speedy, remedy efficient federal claim, his it neces- sarily that follows abstention is inappropriate.
Thirty years ago Mr. Rutledge Justice characterized a series procedures Illinois which effectively foreclosed considera tion of the merits of federal constitutional claims as “pro labyrinth cedural . . up entirely . made of blind alleys.” Ragen, Marino v. Today Illinois litigants may appropriately apply that characterization to the Court’s increasingly Daedalian doctrine of abstention.
I respectfully dissent.