Bowler v. AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC
123 F. Supp. 3d 1152
E.D. Mo.2015Background
- Five Missouri-based security officers sued AlliedBarton in Missouri state court alleging unpaid straight-time and overtime wages, breach of contract (employee handbook), and quantum meruit; they sought class certification and statutory liquidated damages under Missouri law.
- AlliedBarton removed the case to federal court asserting federal-question jurisdiction based on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and related federal issues.
- Plaintiffs moved to remand the action to state court and sought attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for allegedly improper removal.
- The central factual contention is that AlliedBarton required officers to remain at posts during unpaid 30-minute meal breaks and failed to pay for that time.
- The magistrate judge applied the well-pleaded complaint rule and Eighth Circuit precedent to evaluate whether federal law (including FLSA or other federal statutes) preempted or converted the state-law claims into federal claims.
- The court granted remand, denied plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees (finding AlliedBarton’s removal was objectively reasonable), and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists under the well-pleaded complaint rule | Plaintiffs alleged only state-law claims; no federal cause of action appears on the face of the complaint | Removal was proper because the FLSA (or federal law) preempts or converts the state claims into federal ones | No federal-question jurisdiction; remand granted |
| Whether FLSA preempts Missouri claims and creates removal jurisdiction | State claims governed by Missouri statutes; FLSA reference does not federalize claims | FLSA has sufficient preemptive force to make claims federal or at least raise a substantial federal issue | FLSA does not provide requisite preemptive force here; duplication does not equal preemption |
| Whether reliance on an employee handbook invokes LMRA § 301 preemption | Handbook creates contractual rights under Missouri law | Handbook-based contract claim is effectively a § 301/labor claim requiring federal jurisdiction | Handbook claims are individual employment contract claims not § 301 preempted; no LMRA preemption |
| Whether plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) | Removal was objectively unreasonable; fees should be awarded | Removal had an objectively reasonable basis; fees should be denied | Fees denied; court found removal objectively reasonable and exercised discretion not to award fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (establishes the well-pleaded complaint rule for federal-question jurisdiction)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1987) (ERISA § 502 can completely preempt state-law claims, making them removable)
- Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1968) (LMRA § 301 federal jurisdiction for collective-bargaining agreement disputes)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2003) (national bank preemption examples where federal cause of action converts state claims)
- Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (U.S. 1986) (presence of a federal issue in a state claim does not automatically create federal jurisdiction)
- Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (U.S. 2005) (standards for awarding attorney’s fees on remand under § 1447(c): fees only where removal lacked an objectively reasonable basis)
- Convent Corp. v. City of North Little Rock, 784 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2015) (discusses awarding fees on remand; applies the Martin standard)
- Business Men’s Assur. Co. of Am. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1993) (resolve doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand)