Convent Corporation v. City of North Little RockConvent Corporation v. City of North Little Rock
Last, Miller contends that the ALJ erred by stating that “[a]n individual‘s residual functional capacity is not a medical issue regarding the nature and severity of an individual‘s impairments but an administrative finding that is disрositive of a case.” As evidence of an error, Miller directs us to our statement that a “claimant‘s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2000)). Plucked from the context in which it was made, the ALJ‘s above-quoted statement may seem concerning. But viewed in сontext, the ALJ simply was explaining that a claimant‘s residual functional capacity is “ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619-20 (8th Cir. 2007). Indeed, immediately after the statement to which Miller now objects, the ALJ explained that “[t]he regulations provide that the final responsibility for deciding [a claimant‘s residual functional capacity] is reserved to the Commissioner.” This explanation of the process for determining a claimant‘s residual functional capacity is consistent with our conclusions that “a statement by a medical source that a claimant is disabled does not necessarily mean the Commissioner will find the claimant disabled,” Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004), and that the ALJ bears “the primary responsibility for assessing a claimant‘s residual functional capacity based on all relevant evidence,” Wildman, 596 F.3d at 969 (quoting Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000)).
III. Conclusion
We affirm.
Mickey Stevens, Benton, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Daniel Ladd McFaddеn, Assistant City Attorney, North Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellees.
Before SMITH, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
Convent Corporation (“Convent“) appeals the district court‘s1 denial of its motion for attorneys’ fees for improper removal against the City of North Little Rock (“City“) and City officials2 (collectively, “defendants“). Becаuse we conclude that removal was not improper, we affirm.
Convent filed suit against the defendants in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking to appeal a resolution that the North Little Rock City Council passed declaring Convent‘s property a nuisance and condemning the property. In the same complaint, Convent also brought claims against defendants pursuant to
3. Plaintiff has appealed the decision of the North Little Rock City Council while simultaneously filing suit against the Defendants alleging numerous federal constitutional and Arkansas state tort claims.
4. However, each member of the City Council, as well as the Mayor, is entitled to absolute legislative immunity from Plaintiff‘s allegations. 5. Further, at this time, Plaintiff‘s prescribed statutory remedy is its appeal of the City Council‘s decision.
6. Thеre has been no final determination of Plaintiff‘s appeal of the North Little Rock City Council‘s decision.
7. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies as mandated by
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 and Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9.8. Plaintiff is not permitted to collaterally attack the Council‘s decision with a complaint citing numerous federal civil rights violations while its appeal has yet to be adjudicated.
9. Additionally, dispositive issues of law demonstrate Plaintiff has failed to state facts upon which relief may be granted concerning its allegations of federal constitutional violations, as well as state tort claims.
The district court did not grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint but instead found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Convent‘s claims based on Convent‘s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies; as a result, the court remanded the case to state court. Thereafter, Convent “moved the federal district court to enter an order requiring defendants and their counsel to compensate plaintiff for all costs, fees, and expenses incurred by defendants’ improper removal” pursuant to
II. Discussion
On appeаl, Convent argues that it filed and perfected its appeal of the City‘s condemnation action in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, in compliance with Arkansas District Court Rule 9. According to Convent, the defendants thereafter improperly removed the action to federal court and “immediately argued that the federal court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.” Convent asserts that “where the sole purpose of removal to federal court is to have the federal court dismiss the claims for want of jurisdiction, the removal is improper,” and that it is entitled to an award of fees pursuant to
“It is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending. For example, district courts may award сosts after an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (citing
Generally, “[a] civil case commenced in state court may . . . be removed by the defendant to federal district court, if the case could have been brought there originally.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134 (2005) (citing
In determining whether the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal, “the district court ‘do[es] not consider the motive of the removing defendant.‘” Diaz v. Cameron Cnty. Tex., 300 Fed. Appx. 280, 281 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 2000)). “Rather, the court must consider the objective merits of removal at the time of removal, irrespective of the ultimate remand.” Id. (citing Valdes, 199 F.3d at 292-93).
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts оf the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
In the present case, Convent‘s complaint brought claims against defendants pursuant to
Nevertheless, Convent argues that “[w]here the sole purpose of removal to federal court is to have the federal court dismiss the claims for want of jurisdiction, the removal is improper.” (Citing Baas v. Elliot, 71 F.R.D. 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Johnson v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Cal. 1986).) In Baas, the district court held that wherе the defendant “concede[d] that the sole purpose of removal to federal court was to have the federal court dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction,” “[s]uch a frivolous, self-defeating invocation of federal procedure [would not] be countenаnced.” 71 F.R.D. at 694. As a result, the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff‘s costs in connection with the federal court proceedings, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees. Id. In Johnson, the “defendants removed th[e] action asserting that it presented issues to be resolved under federal law,” but when the court asked the defendants to provide an explanation for “the basis for federal jurisdiction in the present action, defendants argued against jurisdiction, asserting that the only possible basis for federal jurisdiction (
Both Baas and Johnson were decided prior to the Supreme Court‘s Martin decision setting forth the “objectively reasonable” stаndard. In any event, both cases are distinguishable from the present case. Here, following removal, the defendants did not move to dismiss the complaint solely because Convent failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, which would require dismissal for want of jurisdiction. In addition to arguing thаt Convent failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the defendants’ primary argument was that the district court should dismiss the complaint on the basis of the city officials’ absolute legislative immunity. And, the defendants argued that “dispositive issues of law demonstrate [p]laintiff has failed to state fаcts upon which relief may be granted concerning its allegations of federal constitutional violations, as well as state tort claims.”
Furthermore, Convent never requested remand to the state court; instead, it filed numerous pleadings, including a motion for class certificаtion and a motion for partial summary judgment. Convent‘s failure to seek remand further supports the district court‘s denial of fees under § 1447(c). See Martin, 546 U.S. at 141.
Because the defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal of this action to federal court, we neсessarily hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying fees and costs to Convent pursuant to
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.