Back v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23

Background

In 2007 Danna Back was charged in a homicide; a jury convicted her of second-degree manslaughter though she did not possess or fire the weapon. She served time.
This court reversed her conviction on sufficiency grounds, concluding as a matter of law she was not culpably negligent because she had no duty to control the shooter or protect the victim (State v. Back).
After the 2014 Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act (Minn. Stat. § 590.11) was enacted, Back sought a district-court order declaring her “exonerated” and therefore eligible to petition for compensation.
Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1 defines “exonerated” to require (1) a court vacating/reversing a conviction on grounds consistent with innocence AND the prosecutor dismissed the charges (or (2) a court ordering a new trial on grounds consistent with innocence and prosecutor dismissal or acquittal).
The prosecutor took no action after this court’s reversal. The State argued Back was not “exonerated” because the prosecutor never dismissed charges; Back argued the prosecutorial-dismissal clause is irrational as applied and violates equal protection. The court of appeals severed the dismissal requirement; the Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

Issue	Back's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether an appellate reversal alone qualifies as "exonerated" under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(l)(i)	The reversal satisfies the statute; dismissal is a meaningless or impossible additional requirement	The statute requires both reversal/vacatur and prosecutorial dismissal; no relief absent dismissal	Reversal alone does not satisfy § 590.11(1)(i); statute requires prosecutorial dismissal in addition to reversal
Whether the prosecutorial-dismissal requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied	The requirement is irrational because dismissal after an outright reversal is legally impossible; it arbitrarily excludes similarly situated persons	The dismissal requirement reflects legislative intent to involve prosecutors and can be rationally related to legitimate state interests; dismissal could be symbolic or procedural	The dismissal requirement, as applied to Back, violates equal protection under rational-basis review because it conditions eligibility on a legally impossible act
Remedy: if unconstitutional, whether to sever only the dismissal phrase or larger text	Sever only the words “and the prosecutor dismissed the charges” so reversal alone suffices (narrow severance)	The Court should not rewrite the statute; the prosecutor plays a central role throughout the Act and the conjunctive structure suggests the provisions are inseparable; broader severance or legislative fix is appropriate	The Court reverses the court of appeals but severs subsection 1(i) from § 590.11 (broader severance than requested by Back or dissent), leaving the legislature able to amend statute if desired

Key Cases Cited

State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 2009) (prior reversal of Back’s manslaughter conviction)
State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 2014) (conjunctive "and" read as requiring both conditions)
Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709 (U.S. 2016) (conjunctive language can add elements)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection tiers and rational-basis standard)
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (presumption of validity under rational-basis review; challenger must negate conceivable bases)
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (law irrational if it penalizes those for doing the impossible)
State v. Pass, 832 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 2013) (once an acquittal occurs prosecution is over)
State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 2011) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. 2014) (severance principles; retain as much statute as possible)