Angel Mendez v. County of Los Angeles
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3847
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- In October 2010, LA County deputies Conley and Pederson, as part of a multi-officer response looking for a parolee (Ronnie O’Dell), went to the backyard of a third-party (Hughes) property and encountered a 7'x7' wooden shack in the curtilage.
- Officers had no search warrant for Hughes’s property or the shack; some officers had banged on Hughes’s front door and detained her after forcing entry; the backyard team was told a man named Angel lived in the backyard.
- Conley opened the shack door without knocking or announcing; he pulled back a blanket and saw a silhouette holding what looked like a rifle; Conley yelled “Gun!” and Conley and Pederson fired (15 shots total).
- The silhouette was a BB gun; Mr. Mendez lost his leg below the knee and Ms. Mendez was shot in the back.
- The district court held the entry into the shack violated the Fourth Amendment (no exigent circumstances), the deputies violated the knock-and-announce rule, denied qualified immunity, and awarded roughly $4M for the shooting plus nominal damages for other violations.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit: affirmed liability and damages for the unconstitutional entry and the shooting (provocation/proximate-cause theories), reversed qualified-immunity denial on the knock-and-announce claim (vacating nominal damages), and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Mendez's Argument | Deputies' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether opening the shack door was a Fourth Amendment search | The shack was in the curtilage of Hughes’s home and thus protected; entry and opening the door was a search | Shack was a dilapidated outbuilding; not every officer would view it as a dwelling | Held: It was a search—shack in curtilage; deputies violated clearly established law |
| Whether exigent circumstances (including hot pursuit or officer safety) justified the warrantless entry | No exigency; officers lacked specific, articulable facts showing imminent danger or continuous pursuit | Officers had probable cause to believe fugitive O’Dell was on the property and he was classified armed/dangerous | Held: No exigent circumstances; hot pursuit/Welsh and Steagald control; qualified immunity denied on entry claim |
| Whether officers reasonably relied on consent or protective-sweep authority to enter/search the shack | N/A (Mendez argues no valid consent and no lawful sweep) | Officers could have reasonably believed Hughes or other officers consented or conducted a protective sweep for officer safety | Held: No valid consent established; protective-sweep/exigent rationale fails for lack of specific articulable facts—entry unlawful |
| Whether failure to knock-and-announce at the shack violated clearly established law | Officers should have announced at the separate backyard residence; violation was clearly established | Officers announced at the front door; not clear they had to re-announce at the shack in curtilage—no clearly established law | Held: Knock-and-announce violated, but law was not clearly established in 2010—qualified immunity applies; nominal damages vacated |
| Whether deputies are liable for the shooting despite Graham reasonableness finding | The unlawful entry proximately caused the shooting; provocation doctrine and proximate-cause principles make deputies liable | Shooting was objectively reasonable under Graham; no provocation because Mendez did not intend to threaten | Held: Deputies liable under provocation doctrine and proximate-cause analysis; damages for shooting affirmed |
| Whether Pederson is liable though she did not physically open the shack door | She participated in, approved, and covered the yard search and stood armed behind Conley | She didn’t open the door; therefore not the principal actor | Held: Pederson was an "integral participant" and liable |
Key Cases Cited
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (establishes reasonable expectation of privacy test for Fourth Amendment searches)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (curtilage factors for Fourth Amendment protection)
- United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731 (9th Cir.) (backyard/curtilage protection confirmed)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (warrantless entry to find fugitive in third-party home not justified absent exigency)
- Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (hot pursuit requires immediate or continuous pursuit from scene)
- United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. en banc) (Welsh applied to searches of third-party property; forbids delayed warrantless backyard entries)
- Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (knock-and-announce rule requirement)
- Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (exceptions to knock-and-announce where threat of physical violence exists)
- Buie v. United States, 494 U.S. 325 (protective sweep doctrine requires specific and articulable facts)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective-reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir.) (provocation doctrine—liability when officers provoke confrontation)
- Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir.) (provocation liability framework)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (standard for clearly established law and qualified immunity)