45 Cal.App.5th 225
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In November 2016 California voters adopted Proposition 57 (art. I, § 32), which provides that any person convicted of a nonviolent felony and sentenced to state prison "shall be eligible for parole consideration" after completing the full term of the primary offense, and directs the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to adopt regulations and for the Secretary to certify they "protect and enhance public safety."
- CDCR issued emergency and then final regulations defining "nonviolent offender" but categorically excluded inmates convicted of sexual offenses requiring registration under Penal Code § 290 from early parole consideration.
- Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws (with John Doe) challenged the exclusion as inconsistent with Proposition 57; the trial court granted writ relief and invalidated the regulatory exclusion.
- CDCR defended the exclusion as permissible under Proposition 57’s public-safety purpose and the Secretary’s certification power to adopt regulations enhancing public safety.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the regulations conflict with the plain text of art. I, § 32 and that the Secretary’s certification requirement does not authorize regulations that contradict § 32(a)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CDCR may categorically exclude inmates required to register under Penal Code § 290 from early parole consideration when their current convictions are nonviolent | Alliance: § 32(a)(1) unambiguously makes all persons convicted of a nonviolent felony eligible for parole consideration; categorical exclusion conflicts with the text | CDCR: Proposition 57’s purpose to "enhance public safety" and its regulatory authority permit excluding registrable sex offenders as posing unreasonable public-safety risk | Court: Invalidated the exclusion; plain language of § 32(a)(1) grants eligibility and does not authorize categorical exclusions based on public-safety judgments |
| Whether the Secretary’s certification requirement in § 32(b) authorizes regulations that contradict § 32(a)(1) | Alliance: Certification does not allow regulations that alter or limit the clear eligibility grant in § 32(a)(1) | CDCR: Certification would be meaningless if it could not be used to limit eligibility to protect public safety | Court: Rejected CDCR; certification requires regulations to further § 32(a)(1), not to contradict it; agency may not promulgate regulations inconsistent with statute |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Edwards, 26 Cal.App.5th 1181 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (struck down CDCR regulation excluding certain third‑strike life inmates from Prop. 57 relief)
- In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (addressed CDCR’s conditioning of eligibility on "nonviolent offender" status)
- In re Gadlin, 31 Cal.App.5th 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (held prior registrable convictions cannot be used to bar early parole consideration under Prop. 57)
- In re McGhee, 34 Cal.App.5th 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (invalidated CDCR’s pre‑screening process that kept otherwise eligible inmates from board consideration)
- People v. Valencia, 3 Cal.5th 347 (Cal. 2017) (principles of statutory and initiative construction; give effect to all words)
- People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal.3d 1002 (Cal. 1987) (avoid statutory constructions that render words surplusage)