REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.
No. 99-536
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 21, 2000—Decided June 12, 2000
530 U.S. 133
Jim Waide argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David A. Chandler, Victor I. Fleitas, Eric Schnapper, and Alan B. Morrison.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Matthew D. Roberts, C. Gregory Stewart, and Philip B. Sklover.
Taylor B. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Berkley N. Huskison.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the AARP by Thomas W. Osborne, Laurie A. McCann, Sally Dunaway, and Melvin Radowitz; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for the Hispanic National Bar Association by Seth J. Benezra, Luis Perez, and Gilbert M. Roman; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Daniel F. Kolb, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Elainy R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Charles Stephen Ralston, Dennis C. Hayes, Antonia Hernandez, Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, Marcia D. Greenberger, Judith C. Appelbaum, Martha F. Davis, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Steven R. Shapiro; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Paul W. Mollica and Paula A. Brantner.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Alabama Retail Association by John J. Coleman III and Marcel L. Debruge; for the Chamber of Commercе of the United States by Marshall B. Babson, Stan
JUSTICE O‘CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the kind and amount of evidence necessary to sustain a jury‘s verdict that an employer unlawfully discriminated on the basis of age. Specifically, we must resolve whether a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff‘s casе consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant‘s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. We must also decide whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the particular circumstances presented here.
I
In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. 197 F. 3d 688, 690 (CA5 1999). Petitioner worked in a department known as the “Hinge Room,” where he supervised the “regular line.” Ibid. Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge Room‘s “spеcial line,” and Russell Caldwell, the manager of the Hinge Room and age 45, supervised both petitioner and Oswalt. Ibid. Petitioner‘s responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours of those under his supervision, and reviewing a weekly report that listed the hours worked by each employee. 3 Record 38-40.
In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the director of manufacturing and the husband of company president Sandra Sanderson, that “production was down” in
In June 1996, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, contending that he had been fired because of his age in violation оf the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
During the trial, the District Court twice denied oral motions by respondent for judgment as a matter of law undеr
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that petitioner had not introduced sufficient evidence to sustain the jury‘s finding of unlawful discrimination. 197 F. 3d, at 694. After noting respondent‘s proffered justification for petitioner‘s discharge, the court acknowledged that petitioner “very well may” have offered sufficient evidence for “a reasonable jury [to] have found that [respondent‘s] explanation for its employment decision was pretextual.” Id., at 693. The court explained, however, that this was “not dispositive” of the ultimate issue—namely, “whether Reeves presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated [respondent‘s] employment decision.” Ibid. Addressing this question, the court weighed petitioner‘s additional evidence of discrimination against other circumstances surrounding his discharge. See id., at 693-694. Specifically, the court noted that Chesnut‘s age-based comments “were not made in the direct context of Reeves‘s termination“; there was no allegation that the two other individuals who had recommended that petitioner be fired (Jester and Whitaker) were motivated by age; two of the decisionmakers involved in petitioner‘s discharge (Jester and Sanderson) were over the age of 50; all three of the Hinge Room supervisors were
We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 985 (1999), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff‘s prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973)), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer‘s nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination. Compare Kline v. TVA, 128 F. 3d 337 (CA6 1997) (prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence to disbelieve employer‘s explanation always creates jury issue of whether employer intentionally discriminated); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F. 3d 1519 (CA11 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 1045 (1998); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F. 3d 1061 (CA3 1996) (same) (en banc), cert. denied, 521 U. S. 1129 (1997); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F. 3d 1104 (CA8) (same), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 946 (1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F. 3d 1120 (CA7 1994) (same); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F. 3d 1421 (CA9 1993) (same), with Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d 1284 (CADC 1998) (en banc) (plaintiff‘s discrediting of employer‘s explanation is entitled to considerable weight, such that plaintiff should not be routinely required to submit evidence over and above proof of pretext), and with Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F. 3d 1332 (CA2 1997) (en banc) (plaintiff must introduce sufficient evidence for jury to find both that employer‘s reason was false and that real reason was discrimination), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 1075 (1998); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F. 3d 989 (CA5 1996) (same); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F. 3d 676 (CA4 1995) (same); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F. 3d 255 (CA1 1994) (same).
II
Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual‘s age.”
McDonnell Douglas аnd subsequent decisions have “established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases.” St. Mary‘s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 506 (1993). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Ibid.; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252-253 (1981). It is undisputed that petitioner satisfied this burden here: (i) at the time he was fired, he was a member of the class protected by the ADEA (“individuals who are at least 40 years of age,”
Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. And in attempting to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff—оnce the employer produces sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision—must be afforded the “opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Ibid.; see also St. Mary‘s Honor Center, supra, at 507-508. That is, the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination “by showing that the employer‘s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, supra, at 256. Moreover, although the presumption of discrimination “drops out of the picture” once the defendant meets its burden of production, St. Mary‘s Honor Center, supra, at 511, the trier of fact may still cоnsider the evidence establishing the plaintiff‘s prima facie case “and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant‘s explanation is pretextual,” Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 10.
In this case, the evidence supporting respondent‘s explanation for petitioner‘s discharge consisted primarily of testimony by Chesnut and Sanderson and documentation of petitioner‘s alleged “shoddy record keeping.” 197 F. 3d, at 692. Chesnut testified that a 1993 audit of Hinge Room operations revealed “a very lax assembly line” where employees were not adhering to general work rules. 4 Record 197-199. As a result of that audit, petitioner was placed on 90 days’ probation for unsatisfactory perfоrmance. 197 F. 3d, at 690. In 1995, Chesnut ordered another investi
Petitioner, however, made a substantial showing that respondent‘s explanation was false. First, petitioner offered evidence that he had properly maintained the attendance records. Most of the timekeeping errors cited by respondent involved employees who were not marked late but who were recorded as having arrived at the plant at 7 a.m. for the 7 a.m. shift. 3 id., at 118-123; 4 id., at 240-247, 283-285, 291, 293-294. Respondent contended that employees arriving at 7 a.m. could not have been at their workstations by 7 a.m., and therefore must have been late. 3 id., at 119-120; 4 id., at 241, 245. But both petitioner and Oswalt testified that the company‘s automated timeclock often failed to scan employees’ timecards, so that the timesheets would not record any time of arrival. 3 id., at 6, 85; 4 id., at 334-335. On these occasions, petitioner and Oswalt would visually check the workstations and record whether the employees were present at the start of the shift. 3 id., at 6, 85-87;
Petitioner similarly cast doubt on whether he was responsible for any failure to discipline late and absent employees. Petitioner testified that his job only inсluded reviewing the daily and weekly attendance reports, and that disciplinary writeups were based on the monthly reports, which were reviewed by Caldwell. 3 Record 20-22; 4 id., at 335. Sanderson admitted that Caldwell, and not petitioner, was responsible for citing employees for violations of the company‘s attendance policy. 3 id., at 20-21, 137-138. Further, Chesnut conceded that there had never been a union grievance or employee complaint arising from petitioner‘s recordkeeping, and that the company had never calculated the amount of overpayments allegedly attributable to petitioner‘s errors. 4 id., at 267, 301. Petitioner also testified that, on the day he was fired, Chesnut sаid that his discharge was due to his failure to report as absent one employee, Gina Mae Coley, on two days in September 1995. 3 id., at 23, 70; 4 id., at 335-336. But petitioner explained that he had spent those days in the hospital, and that Caldwell was therefore responsible for any overpayment of Coley. 3 id., at 17, 22. Finally, petitioner stated that on previous occasions that employees were paid for hours they had not worked, the company had simply adjusted those employees’ next paychecks to correct the errors. 3 id., at 72-73.
In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attemрt to prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. This much is evident from our decision in St. Mary‘s Honor Center. There we held that the factfinder‘s rejection of the employer‘s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. 509 U. S., at 511. The ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated, and proof that “the employer‘s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff‘s prof
In reaching this conclusion, however, we reasoned that it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer‘s explanation. Specifically, we stated:
“The factfinder‘s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant‘s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.” Id., at 511.
Proof that the defendant‘s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See id., at 517 (“[P]roving the employer‘s reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination“). In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party‘s dishonesty about a material fact as “affirmative evidence of guilt.” Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296 (1992); see also Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 620-621 (1896); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 278(2), p. 133 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979). Moreover, once the employer‘s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer‘s actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration“). Thus, a plaintiff‘s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer‘s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury‘s finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant‘s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer‘s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer‘s reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. See Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d, at 1291-1292; see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F. 3d, at 1338 (“[I]f the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent“). To hold otherwise would be effectively to insulate an entire category of employment discrimination cases from review under Rule 50, and we have reiterated that trial courts should not “treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.” St. Mary‘s Honor Center, supra, at 524 (quoting Aikens, 460 U. S., at 716).
Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors. Those include the strength of the plaintiff‘s prima facie
III
A
The remaining question is whether, despite the Court of Appeals’ misconception of petitioner‘s evidentiary burden, respondent was nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.”
On closer examination, this conflict seems more semantic than real. Those decisions holding that review under Rule 50 should be limited to evidence favorable to the nonmovant appear to have their genesis in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 (1949). See 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529, pp. 297-301 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). In Wilkerson, we stated that “in passing upon whether there is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to the evidence and rеasonable inferences which tend to support the case of” the nonmoving party. 336 U. S., at 57. But subsequent decisions have clarified that this passage was referring to the evidence to which the trial court should give credence, not the evidence that the court should review. In the analogous context of summary judgment under Rule 56, we have stated that the court must review the record “taken as a whole.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986). And the standard for granting summary judgment “mirrors” the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that “the inquiry under each is the same.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 250-251 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 323 (1986). It therefore follows that, in entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record.
In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonаble inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 554-555 (1990); Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254; Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 696, n. 6 (1962). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Liberty
B
Applying this standard here, it is apparent that respondent was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, in addition to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and creating a jury issue as to the falsity of the employer‘s explanation, petitioner introduced additional evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for petitioner‘s firing. Petitioner testified that Chesnut had told him that he “was so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower” and, on one occasion when petitioner was having difficulty starting a machine, that he “was too damn old to do [his] job.” 3 Record 26. According to petitioner, Chesnut would rеgularly “cuss at me and shake his finger in my face.” 3 id., at 26-27. Oswalt, roughly 24 years younger than petitioner, corroborated that there was an “obvious difference” in how Chesnut treated them. 3 id., at 82. He stated that, although he and Chesnut “had [their] differences,” “it was nothing compared to the way [Chesnut] treated Roger.” Ibid. Oswalt explained that Chesnut “tolerated quite a bit” from him even though he “defied” Chesnut “quite often,” but that Chesnut treated petitioner “[i]n a manner, as you would . . . treat . . . a child when . . . you‘re angry with [him].” 3 id., at 82-83. Petitioner also demonstrated that, according to company records, he and Oswalt had nearly identical rates of productivity in 1993. 3 id., at 163-167; 4 id., at 225-226. Yet respondent conducted an efficiency study of only the
Further, petitioner introduced evidence that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker behind his firing. Chesnut was married to Sanderson, who made the formal decision to discharge petitioner. 3 id., at 90, 152. Although Sanderson testified that she fired petitioner because he had “intentionally falsif[ied] company pay records,” 3 id., at 100, respondent only introduced evidence concerning the inaccuracy of the records, not their falsification. A 1994 letter authored by Chesnut indicated that he berated other company directors, who were supposedly his coequals, about how to do their jobs. Pl. Exh. 7, 3 Record 108-112. Moreover, Oswalt testified that all of respondent‘s employees feared Chesnut, and that Chesnut had exercised “absolute power” within the company for “[a]s long as [he] can remember.” 3 id., at 80.
In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence to sustain the jury‘s verdict, the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review dictated by Rule 50. Again, the court disregarded critical evidence favorable to petitioner—namely, the evidence supporting petitioner‘s prima facie case and undermining respondent‘s nondiscriminatory explanation. See 197 F. 3d, at 693-694. The court also failed to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of petitioner. For instance, while acknowledging “the potentially damning nature” of Chesnut‘s age-related comments, the court discounted them on the ground that they “were not made in the direct context of Reeves‘s termination.” Id., at 693. And the court discredited petitioner‘s evidence that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that
The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination. Given the evidence in the record supporting petitioner, we see no reason to subject the parties to an additional round of litigation before the Court of Appeals rather than to resolve the matter here. The District Court plainly informed the jury that petitioner was required to show “by a preponderance of the evidence that his age was a determining and motivating factor in the decision of [respondent] to terminate him.” Tr. 7 (Jury Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997). The court instructed the jury that, to show thаt respondent‘s explanation was a pretext for discrimination, petitioner had to demonstrate “1, that the stated reasons were not the real reasons for [petitioner‘s] discharge; and 2, that age discrimination was the real reason for [petitioner‘s] discharge.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Given that petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination, introduced enough evidence for the jury to reject respondent‘s explanation, and produced additional evidence of age-based animus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that respondent had
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
The Court today holds that an employment discrimination plaintiff may survive judgment as a matter of law by submitting two categories of evidence: first, evidence establishing a “prima facie case,” as that term is used in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973); and second, evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that the employer‘s proffered explanation for its actions was false. Because the Court of Appeals in this case plainly, and erroneously, required the plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond those two categories, no broader holding is necessary to suрport reversal.
I write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate case, to define more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. I anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon. As the Court notes, it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to treat a party‘s dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability. Ante, at 147. Under this commonsense principle, evidence suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal discrimination has chosen to give a false explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational inference that the defendant could be masking its actual, illegal motivation. Ibid. Whether the defendant was in fact motivated by discrimination is of course for the finder of fact to decide; that is the lesson of St. Mary‘s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502 (1993). But the inference remains—unless it is conclusively