JAMES A. WILSON v. WILLIAM LAWRENCE, EXECUTOR, ET AL.
No. 102585
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2015
[Cite as Wilson v. Lawrence, 2015-Ohio-4677.]
BEFORE: Keough, P.J., Boyle, J., and Laster Mays, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-13-817159
Joseph J. Triscaro
Demarco & Triscaro, Ltd.
30505 Bainbridge Road, Suite 110
Solon, Ohio 44139
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Matthew T. Wholey
James A. Goldsmith
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P.
Skylight Office Tower
1660 W. 2nd Street, Suite 1100
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, James A. Wilson (“Wilson“), appeals the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, William Lawrence, Executor for the Estate of Joseph T. Gorman. Wilson also appeals the trial court‘s decision denying his motion for summary judgment against the estate. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
{¶2} In September 2011, Wilson and Gorman entered into a contract where Gorman agreed to purchase a 15 percent interest in Marine 1, L.L.C. for $300,000. The contract provided for payment in two phases: an initial payment of $100,000 at or near the time of the closing and quarterly payments of $50,000 for two years thereafter. Thus, the full purchase price was due on September 2, 2012. The first $100,000 was paid in full. Gorman did not make quarterly payments as specified in the contract, but sent monthly installments instead, with the last payment made on December 27, 2012. A total of $113,000 was paid by Gorman under the contract prior to his death on January 20, 2013. A balance of $187,000 plus interest remained unpaid.
{¶3} In November 2013, Wilson filed a breach of contract action against Lawrence, as executor of Gorman‘s estate, and Moxahela Enterprises, L.L.C. for monies due from Gorman on the unpaid contract.1 Lawrence moved to dismiss the action pursuant to
{¶5} In January 2015, the trial court granted Lawrence‘s motion for summary judgment. In its written decision, the court stated,
[Plaintiff] brings his action against the executor of an estate. The undisputed evidence is that [plaintiff] did not satisfy the requirements of
R.C. 2117.06 for presenting claims against an estate within the applicable time period. Specifically, plaintiff‘s 7/11/13 letter giving notice of his claim against the decedent and his estate which letter was addressed and delivered to two individuals who were not in fact personal representatives of the decedent‘s estate was not legally sufficient as a matter of law underR.C. 2117.06 . The letter does not factually or legally amount to notice of a claim to the executor in writing. Upon the undisputed material evidence, although that evidence is construed most strongly in favor of [plaintiff], a reasonable trier of fact could come to but one conclusion. Judgment is entered in favor of [defendant] Lawrence and against [plaintiff] as a matter of law upon all claims of [plaintiff‘s] complaint.
{¶6} Within this same ruling, the trial court denied Wilson‘s cross motion for summary judgment “since the undisputed evidence in the record shows [plaintiff] is not entitled to judgment in his favor.”
{¶8} An appellate court reviews a decision granting summary judgment on a de novo basis. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Summary judgment is properly granted when (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.
{¶9} Lawrence moved for summary judgment contending that Wilson did not comply with
{¶10}
A) All creditors having claims against an estate, including claims arising out of contract, out of tort, on cognovit notes, or on judgments, whether due or not due, secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated, shall present their claims in one of the following manners:
(1) After the appointment of an executor or administrator and prior to the filing of a final account or a certificate of termination, in one of the following manners:
(a) To the executor or administrator in a writing * * *.
{¶12} On July 11, 2013, Wilson sent a letter addressed to both Randall S. Myeroff, Trustee, and Pat Clark. Myeroff was an accountant with Cohen and Company that handled Gorman‘s account during the time Gorman and Wilson entered into the contract at issue. He was also the Successor Trustee for Gorman‘s Revocable Trust. Clark was Gorman‘s executive assistant who Wilson communicated with about payment under the contract. While the letter was addressed to both Myeroff and Clark, the salutation of the letter was directed to “[t]o the heirs, administrators or executors of the Estate of; and the trustees or beneficiaries of the trust of; or any other creditors or interested persons in the proceeds of the Trust and/or Estate of Joseph T. Gorman, deceased * * *.”
{¶13} Myeroff and Clark each testified at deposition that they received the letter. Myeroff testified that he received the letter on July 12, 2013, and forwarded the letter to Lawrence and the attorney for the estate, James A. Goldsmith “at or about the same time [he] received it * * * probably within a week.” (Deposition Randall Myeroff, p. 10-11.) Clark testified that she forwarded the letter on to Attorney Goldsmith “on the day [she] received it.” (Deposition Patricia Clark, p. 34.)
{¶14} In a letter dated September 24, 2013, to Wilson‘s attorney, Attorney Goldsmith rejected the claim Wilson made against the Gorman‘s Estate because “it was not presented to the
{¶15} The issue before this court is whether Wilson “presented” his claim against Gorman‘s estate prior to the six-month deadline pursuant to
{¶16} The presentation requirement of
{¶17} However, in Fortelka, the Supreme Court considered whether the filing of an action without an allegation of prior presentment constitutes a valid presentment of the creditor‘s claim to the administrator and meets the requirements of
“Since the law does not require a claimant or litigant to do a vain thing, the mandatory provisions of the statute requiring presentation in writing to the personal representative of claims against the estate he represents, are said to be quite uniformly softened and not enjoined when the application of such provisions would run contrary to reason and common sense.”
Id., quoting 22 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), 653, Section 293.
{¶18} Clearly, the presentment of the claim in Fortelka was not prior to filing suit, but the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the manner of presentment is not to be strictly considered when considering the facts of the case.
{¶19} Recognizing this “softened” consideration, this court has determined that a claim is “presented” under
{¶20} The Second District reached the same conclusion in Peoples Natl. Bank v. Treon, 16 Ohio App.3d 410, 476 N.E.2d 372 (2d Dist.1984). The court held that a claim presented to the executor‘s attorney satisfies the statutory presentment requirements under
{¶21} Additionally, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the decedent‘s accountant could satisfy the presentment requirement under
{¶22} Accordingly, Lawrence‘s strict interpretation of
{¶23} Applying the softened standard to the presentment requirements to the facts of this case, and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Wilson, we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists that would defeat Lawrence‘s motion for summary judgment.
{¶25} Accordingly, a genuine issue of material facts exists that would defeat Lawrence‘s motion for summary judgment. Wilson‘s first assignment of error is sustained. In so holding, we further find that the trial court did not err in denying Wilson‘s motion for summary judgment, albeit we find for a different reason — a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the claim was timely presented. Wilson‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶26} Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCURS;
MARY J. BOYLE, J., DISSENTS (SEE SEPARATE OPINION)
MARY J. BOYLE, J., DISSENTING:
{¶27} I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court‘s decision in its entirety.
{¶28} I disagree with the majority‘s application of the presentation requirement under
{¶29} Recognizing the agency relationship between an attorney and his or her clients, Ohio courts have held that the presentation requirement may also be satisfied when creditors present their claims to an executor‘s attorney. See Peoples Natl. Bank v. Treon, 16 Ohio App.3d 410, 476 N.E.2d 372 (2d Dist.1984).
{¶31} I find the Fourth District decision in Jackson v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Scioto No. CA 1231, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 12905 (Jan. 24, 1980), to be right on point and persuasive. In Jackson, the court held that there was no presented claim where a plaintiff sent a written notice of his claim to a third party who then forwarded it to the executor within the six-month deadline. In finding that the plaintiff failed to properly present his claim, the court emphasized that the statute requires presentment “to the executor or administrator,” and therefore, presentment to a person other than the fiduciary fails to satisfy the statute.
{¶32} The majority‘s broad application of the statute defeats the intent of the law, “which is to assure expeditious and efficient administration of an estate by requiring prompt presentation of claims to the administrator.” Reid v. Premier Health Care Servs., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17437, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 999, * 14 (Mar. 19, 1999). By allowing a creditor to present a claim to anyone other than the fiduciary, the expeditious and efficient administration of an estate will be defeated by scenarios such as the instant case. Here, the majority‘s holding essentially shifts the standard from presentment to one of knowledge. This shift contravenes well-established precedent. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greer, 197 Ohio App.3d 542, 2011-Ohio-6721, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (executrix‘s actual knowledge of claims within the six-month period did not render claims timely presented); In re Estate of Curry, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-469, 2009-Ohio-6571, ¶ 12-15 (rejecting plaintiff‘s contention that because the eventual
{¶33} Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court‘s decision and overrule Wilson‘s two assignments of error because he failed to timely present his claim to the executor.