In re Estate of Greer
{¶ 1} Appellant, Mossy Greer (“Greer”), appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Probate Court ordering her to seek a return of funds paid by the estate of Joan C. Greer or to reimburse the estate for the amounts paid.
The Decedent’s Debts and the Terms of Her Will
{¶ 2} In 2008, Joan C. Greer, the decedent, was suffering from dementia and other health problems. Because of the decedent’s inability to care for herself, Greer was granted a general power of attorney to oversee the decedent’s affairs. Pursuant to that power of attorney, the decedent was placed in Montgomery Care Center (“Montgomery”), where she remained until her death from a heart attack on December 9, 2008. While relatives were caring for the decedent’s home, they engaged Mayers Electric Company (“Mayers”) to perform work at the residence.
{¶ 3} On March 18, 2010, Montgomery filed an application for authority to administer the estate, seeking payment for its services to the decedent. On April 20, 2010, while Montgomery’s application was pending, Greer was appointed executor of the decedent’s will. Mayers filed a claim against the estate on June 2, 2010.
{¶ 4} Under the terms of the will, Greer was authorized “to compound, • compromise, settle and adjust any and all claims and demands in favor of or against [the] estate.” On September 17, 2010, the estate paid $22,000 to Montgomery and $948.93 to Mayer’s Electric.
{¶ 5} The probate court sua sponte raised the question of the propriety, under
{¶ 6} In a single assignment of error, Greer contends that the trial court erred in holding that
Applicability of
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} Despite the seemingly broad language concerning limitations on presentation, Greer contends that the restrictions apply only in cases of intestacy. According to Greer, when a will vests authority in the executor to pay the debts of the decedent, that authority supersedes the statutory limitations.
{¶ 9} We are not persuaded by this argument. First, the broad language of
Tolling and the “Relation Back” Doctrine
{¶ 10} Nonetheless, Greer suggests that because she had not been appointed executor of the will until after the six-month limitation period had elapsed, the limitation period did not begin to run until the date of appointment.
{¶ 11} The Tenth Appellate District addressed this argument in a case with facts substantially similar to those in the case at bar. See
In re Estate of Curry,
10th Dist. No. 09AP-469,
{¶ 12}
Curry
rejected the contention that because there had been no administrator appointed to process the claim, it had been impossible for the creditor to make a presentation within the six-month period. The court noted that in those cases in which an administrator is not appointed within six months of death, it is incumbent upon the creditor to procure the appointment of an administrator within the six-month period. Id. at ¶ 11, citing
Wrinkle v. Trabert
(1963),
{¶ 14}
Curry
also rejected the argument that the claim should “relate back” to the time when the administrator received actual notice of the debt. The court held that the doctrine of “relation back” applies to acts or transactions occurring previous to the appointment of an administrator only when the doctrine results in a benefit to the estate. Id. at ¶ 15, citing
Reid v. Premier Health Care Servs. Inc.
(Mar. 19, 1999), 2nd Dist. No. 17437,
{¶ 15} We find the reasoning of
Curry
to be persuasive and consistent with the general policy of assuring the “expeditious and efficient administration of the estate.”
Reid.
Although Greer cites a number of cases for the proposition that the payments to Montgomery and Mayers were authorized by statute, the cases upon which Greer relies are inapposite to the case at bar. See
In re Estate of Centorbi,
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we hold that the six-month limitation period was not tolled in the instant case. And because the claims of Montgomery and Mayers did not inure to the benefit of the estate, those parties may not reap the benefit of the “relation back” doctrine. The claims of Montgomery and Mayers were therefore not timely under
Expenses of the Decedent’s “Last Sickness”
{¶ 17} Still, Greer argues that the Montgomery debt was excepted from the six-month limitations period because it was an expense for the decedent’s “last sickness” under
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} We find no merit in Greer’s argument. We accept, for purposes of argument only, Greer’s assertion that the expenses accrued during the decedent’s entire stay at Montgomery constituted expenses of last sickness under
Constitutionality of
{¶ 21} Finally, Greer argues that the statute limiting payments to creditors violates the decedent’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, which protects the rights of citizens in “acquiring, possessing, and protecting property.”
{¶ 22} Greer’s argument is without merit. As this court has recognized, the “state has a strong interest in the administration of its citizens’ estates. It has always been considered that the legislature which created the right to dispose of property by will * * * must be held to have unlimited authority to regulate the exercise of that right, including the course of administration the testator’s property shall take when he dies testate.”
In re Emery
(1978),
Conclusion
{¶ 23} We affirm the judgment of the probate court.
Judgment affirmed.