S13G1133. WILLIAMSON v. THE STATE.
S13G1133
Supreme Court of Georgia
May 19, 2014
(758 SE2d 790)
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the denial of the defendant‘s motion for discharge and acquittal under
On July 27, 2011, the Fulton County Solicitor-General‘s Office filed accusations against
On January 25, 2012, Williamson filed a motion for discharge and acquittal pursuant to
1. OCGA § 17-7-170 (b) and the Terms to Be Counted
Pursuant to
[i]f the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation.
“When we consider the meaning of a statute, ‘we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.‘” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). “When a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, such language will be given its plain meaning and will be applied accordingly.” Opensided MRI of Atlanta, LLC v. Chandler, 287 Ga. 406, 407 (696 SE2d 640) (2010).
Pursuant to the plain meaning of the language of
A term or a remainder of a term in which no juries are impaneled and qualified to try the case is not counted for purposes of
OCGA § 17-7-170 . If jurors have been dismissed and are not subject to recall when the demand is filed, the term in which the demand is filed does not count for computation of the two-term requirement ofOCGA § 17-7-170 (b) .
Union v. State, 273 Ga. 666, 666 (543 SE2d 683) (2001) (citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted).
Fulton County has six annual terms of court beginning on the first Monday of January, March, May, July, September, and November.
Williamson has the burden to establish that there were qualified juries impaneled during the relevant court terms. Union, 273 Ga. at 667. At the hearing on Williamson‘s motion for discharge
The Court of Appeals found that there were only five jurors available on November 3, which was insufficient for a criminal trial. The court determined that out of the 37 jurors who appeared, 14 had been sent to a courtroom for a trial, and 18 were “committed to other courtrooms that day,” leaving five remaining. Williamson, 321 Ga. App. at 29-30. Yet, the statute does not require that courts examine how many jurors were serving on other trials or had been committed for other trials. Nor does the statute require an analysis of whether the trial court had time to try the defendant, an examination of the court‘s calendar, or even whether there were enough criminal trial weeks scheduled during the term. See Kerese, 10 Ga. at 97-98 (the statute makes no allowance for circumstances where the court might not have had time to try the defendant); Campbell v. State, 199 Ga. App. 25, 26 (403 SE2d 882) (1991) (“the convenience of a set calendar must give way to the clear mandate of statutory law“); Birts v. State, 192 Ga. App. 476, 478 (385 SE2d 120) (1989) (the statute “does not condition itself on there being enough juries impaneled and qualified, or how many juries there were, . . . whether there were ‘enough’ criminal trial weeks scheduled in the two terms,” if a trial can be “squeezed in,” or if there were enough judges). If we were to require the defendant to wait for the time and convenience of the court — that is, whether there are enough jurors remaining after all of the other jurors have been assigned to courtrooms or trials for each day — the statute could well be rendered meaningless. Kerese, 10 Ga. at 97-98; Birts, 192 Ga. App. at 478.
Instead, juries must merely be qualified and impaneled for that term to count.
To the extent that our courts have held otherwise, those cases are overruled. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 305 Ga. App. 528, 530 (699 SE2d 754) (2010) (no jury was qualified and impaneled during the remainder of the first term in which the defendant filed his speedy trial demand, where 37 jurors came to court and 32 “of those jurors were called to courtrooms for other trials“); MacInnis v. State, 235 Ga. App. 732, 734 (510 SE2d 557) (1998) (jurors in the courthouse were not counted because they “would have been actively sitting as jurors on the trial of another case and would not be available to the jury clerk for placement on a jury panel“).
As for the second term in this case, it is undisputed that juries were impaneled and qualified during the November term, and therefore, the November term counts as the second term during which the State had to try Williamson. Thus, the State had two terms — September and November — within which to try Williamson. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ finding that the September term did not count and that the State had the November and January terms to try Williamson.
2. Waiver
Before we can find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court‘s dismissal of Williamson‘s motion for discharge and acquittal, the issue of whether Williamson or his counsel waived his right to a speedy trial must be addressed. The trial court found that when Williamson‘s case was called for trial in December, defense counsel requested that another case on the calendar, in which his firm was also appearing as counsel, be taken up first and that defendant never objected to his case being placed on the backup calendar. The trial court concluded that “[a]lthough this conduct did not constitute a waiver of [Williamson‘s] right to a speedy trial, it did impact the ability to try [Williamson‘s] case” during the November term. Though the parties briefed the issue of waiver in the Court of Appeals, the court had no need to reach this issue because it found that the State had the November and January terms during which to try Williamson. The parties have not fully briefed the issue of waiver in this Court. Accordingly, having found that the September term counts as the first time during which the State had to try Williamson, such that the State was required to try Williamson before the end of the November term, the Court remands this case to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether Williamson waived his right to assert a speedy trial violation.
Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED MAY 19, 2014.
Robert W. Chestney, for appellant.
Carmen D. Smith, Solicitor-General, R. Leon Benham, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee.