Randy WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John/Jane DOES, Correctional Officers Responsible for Delivery of Ramadan Trays, Upstate Correctional Facility, Gerard Jones, Upstate Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-692.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 6, 2016.
The IJ‘s demeanor finding and the overall credibility determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies regarding Ram‘s party affiliation and whether his wife was harassed by a rival political party after Ram‘s departure from India. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2006); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67 & n. 3. Ram did not provide compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See Majidi, 430.F.3d at 80.
Having questioned Ram‘s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his failure to submit corroborating evidence sufficient to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007). As the agency noted, his wife‘s affidavit was inconsistent with his testimony and it was unclear who had prepared it, and he did not submit evidence that he had received medical care after allegedly being beaten.
Given the demeanor, inconsistency, and lack of corroboration findings, the agency‘s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence, and is dispositive of Ram‘s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
Randy Williams, pro se, Malone, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Zainab Chaudhry, Assistant Solicitor General, New York State Office of the Attorney General, Albany, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Randy Williams, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court‘s judgment dismissing his
We review de novo a district court‘s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which protects the free exercise of religion, extends to prisoners and includes their right to meals that comport with religious requirements. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588, 597 (2d Cir. 2003); see also McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir.2004). We have not yet decided whether a prisoner asserting a free-exercise claim must, as a threshold requirement, show that the disputed conduct substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs. Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir.2014). It is not necessary to resolve this issue here, however, because Williams does not argue that the substantial burden threshold requirement is inapplicable and instead argues that he met the requirement. See Ford, 352 F.3d at 592 (declining to address whether a prisoner must meet the substantial burden threshold requirement in a free exercise case because he did not raise the issue on appeal).
Assuming that the substantial burden requirement applies, this Court‘s precedent leads us to conclude that Williams plausibly alleged that his religious exercise was unconstitutionally burdened. See Holland, 758 F.3d at 221 (declining to address the continued viability of the substantial burden requirement where this Court‘s precedent reveals that inmate‘s religious exercise was unconstitutionally burdened); McEachin, 357 F.3d at 203 (noting that “courts have generally found that to deny prison inmates the provision of food that satisfies the dictates of their faith does unconstitutionally burden their free exercise rights,” and determining that prisoner, a practicing Muslim, stated a free exercise claim by alleging that the restrictive diet of “loaf” was not properly blessed as required by Islam); Ford, 352 F.3d at 593-94 (holding that defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on question whether prisoner‘s religious exercise was unconstitutionally burdened when he was denied an Eid ul Fitr feast, which he characterized as religiously significant to his practice of Islam). To satisfy the substantial burden requirement, a prisoner claiming a violation of his free exercise rights must show “that the disputed conduct substantially burden[ed] his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir.2006); see also Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir.1996) (“[A] substantial burden exists where the state puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED as to its dismissal of Williams‘s RLUIPA claim, VACATED as to its dismissal of Williams‘s § 1983 claim, and REMANDED for further proceedings.