This petition requires us to consider the appropriate basis for an adverse credibility determination under the REAL ID Act, Pub L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). We write to clarify that the Act, which permits an IJ to base an adverse credibility finding on,
inter alia,
a lack of consistency “between the applicant’s ... written and oral statements!,] ... the [in-Iconsistency of such statements with other evidence of record ... and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim,” see
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)
2
(emphasis added), abrogated our holding in
Secaida-Rosales v. INS
that “[ijnconsistencies of less than substantial importance for which a plausible explanation is offered cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility finding ... especially ... when the inconsistencies ... concern ... matters collateral or ancillary to the [applicant’s]
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claim” for relief,
BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural History
Xiu Xia Lin, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States in January 2005 without inspection and shortly thereafter was served with a Notice to Appear charging her with being removable. In July 2005, Lin filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, based on persecution she allegedly faced in China on account of her practice of Falun Gong. Lin’s claims of persecution rest on two alleged incidents with Chinese officials. She alleges that in June 2000, upon discovering that she had criticized the government’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners, officials at her school beat her and forced her to sign a statement promising that she would discontinue her involvement with Falun Gong. A second incident occurred in July 2004, when she was allegedly detained and physically abused by government officials after they discovered Falun Gong literature in her room at home. According to Lin, her family attempted to rescue her from detention and was able to save her only by bribing a guard. Sometime thereafter, she allegedly left China for the United States. In support of her application, Lin submitted several documents, including (1) a notarial birth certificate issued in February 2005; (2) photos of her practicing Falun Gong; (3) a letter from her father; and (4) a letter from the friend Lin claims introduced her to Falun Gong and who Lin alleges was later persecuted for practicing Falun Gong. Lin also testified in support of her application.
At a March 2005 removal hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found that Lin was removable as charged. A subsequent hearing was held on December 16, 2005 to determine Lin’s eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. At the conclusion of that hearing, the IJ found Lin lacking in credibility and denied her application for asylum. Specifically, the IJ based his adverse credibility determination on certain inconsistencies and omissions between her testimony and her documentary submissions: (1) the absence in both Lin’s asylum application and her friend’s letter of any indication that Lin’s friend was in hiding to avoid persecution associated with the friend’s own Falun Gong activities; (2) the omission in both Lin’s asylum application and her father’s letter of Lin’s allegation that she was detained for twelve hours in 2004; (3) the omission in both Lin’s asylum application and her father’s letter of the purported bribe that her family had paid to secure her release. The IJ also found it implausible that the government would have issued a birth certificate to Lin during the time Lin claimed that the government was looking for her, noting that “this does raise some doubt about the legitimacy of [Lin’s] story.” On this basis, the IJ gave the birth certificate “reduced weight.” On the other hand, the IJ rejected the government’s argument that it was implausible that Lin was able to leave Beijing while the government was looking for her, noting that it was “conceivable that someone could leave a country despite the fact that other government officials are looking for the person.” Turning to her application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention *165 Against Torture, the IJ concluded that Lin had failed to establish her eligibility for either form of relief.
Lin filed a timely appeal of the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). In its October 2007 decision, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and dismissed Lin’s appeal. In re Xiu Xia Lin, No. A 98 718 133 (B.I.A. Oct. 31, 2007), aff'g No. A 98 718 133 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 16, 2005). She then sought review in our Court.
In her petition before our Court, Lin argues that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was flawed because: (1) the “discrepancies [and] omissions” relied upon by the IJ are “minimal”; (2) the IJ improperly relied on omissions in her documentary submissions as compared to her testimony; and (3) the IJ relied upon his own speculation in concluding that it was implausible that the government would have given her a birth certificate. Because Lin filed her asylum application after May 11, 2005, her claim is governed by the amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) by the passage of the REAL ID Act, Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
See
Title I, § 101(a)(3) of the Act, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158);
see also Liang Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
B. The Real ID Act
Prior to the passage of the REAL ID Act, courts of appeals had developed different rules governing the proper basis for an IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The law of our circuit provided that when an IJ based an adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s testimony or between the testimony and the documents the applicant submitted, the IJ was required (1) to demonstrate a nexus between inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s testimony and the applicant’s claims; and (2) to establish that the inconsistencies were material to the applicant’s claims for asylum.
See Secaida-Rosales,
In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which, inter alia, amended the INA in order to “creat[e] ... a uniform standard for credibility” determinations. See H.R. Rep. 109-72, at 166-67 (2005); see also In re J-Y-C- 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 262 (B.I.A.2007) (relating the legislative history of the amendment). The REAL ID Act freed an IJ from the nexus and materiality requirements by explicitly stating that an IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on any inconsistencies, “inaccuracies or falsehoods ... without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). Under the standard established by the REAL ID Act, an IJ is required to evaluate inconsistencies in light of the “totality of the circumstances.” Id.
DISCUSSION
We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
see also Shu Wen Sun v. BIA,
In the instant case, each of three inconsistencies or omissions
3
on which the IJ relied in finding Lin not credible were ancillary or collateral to Lin’s claims of past persecution. First, because Lin’s submissions reveal no inconsistency as to the fact of her detention in 2004, the omission — from both Lin’s asylum application and her father’s letter — of the fact that she was detained for twelve hours is not material to Lin’s claims of past persecution.
Cf. Secaida-Rosales,
As noted above, our Court determined in
Secaidar-Rosales
that it constitutes legal error for an IJ to base an adverse credibility determination on omissions and inconsistencies that are not material to an applicant’s claims of persecution.
See
page 165
ante.
Although we have questioned the continuing relevance of the
Secaidar-Ro-sales
fine of cases since the passage of the REAL ID Act, we have not directly addressed the conflict between those cases and the statute.
See Liang Chen,
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Now squarely presented with the question, we conclude that our previous holding that an IJ may not base an adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies and omissions that are “collateral or ancillary” to an applicant’s claims, see,
e.g., Secaida-Rosales,
in the present case, the inconsistencies and omissions relied upon by the IJ were not directly material to Lin’s claims, yet the cumulative effect of those inconsistencies reasonably could have affected the IJ’s evaluation of Lin’s credibility. Lin’s failure to include the length of her detention in her asylum application and the omission of that fact from her father’s letter could have reasonably convinced the IJ that her story of persecution was fabricated. Similarly, the failure of Lin’s friend to mention that the friend was in hiding from Chinese authorities contradicted Lin’s testimony that her friend feared further persecution. Because Lin gave no plausible explanation for this omission from her friend’s letter, the omission reasonably raised doubts as to the accuracy of Lin’s account of her own persecution. These questions about Lin’s credibility were further compounded by the omission from her father’s letter of the fact that he paid a bribe to have Lin released from detention by government officials. Because we conclude that the cumulative effect of these inconsistencies could have led a reasonable fact-finder to find that Lin was not credible, we must affirm the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
Lin also challenges as impermissible speculation the IJ’s suggestion that it was implausible that Lin was able to obtain a copy of her birth certificate during a time she claims that government officials were looking for her. Although we have previ
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ously held that an IJ’s opinion as to the plausibility of a petitioner’s account could not serve as the basis for an adverse credibility determination,
see Secaida-Rosales,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is denied. Any pending motion to stay removal is dismissed as moot.
Notes
. The full text of this provision reads as follows:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant's or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of
each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim, or any other relevant factor. There is no presumption of credibility!.] [Hlowever, if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal.
.
An inconsistency and an omission are, for these purposes, functionally equivalent.
See, e.g., Secaida-Rosales,
. Other courts of appeals have indicated that the REAL ID Act would abrogate similar rules
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about credibility determinations.
See, e.g., Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales,