MARIO WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER MARCELO RODRIGUEZ, UNKNOWN and UNNAMED CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER, and CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 06-4126
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
DECIDED DECEMBER 6, 2007
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 06 C 0157—Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.
Before POSNER, FLAUM, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. On February 15, 2005, Plaintiff Mario Williams was driving on Lake Shore Drive in Chicago, Illinois when his asthma allegedly flared up, causing him to pull his
I. Background
The facts in this section are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Mario Williams, the nonmoving party on appeal, as is required for purposes of summary judgment.
Early in the morning on February 15, 2005, Plaintiff Mario Williams and his brother Mark were driving southbound on Lake Shore Drive in Chicago, Illinois after giving a ride home to one of Mario‘s friends. Mario Williams, who was about to turn fifty, had been diagnosed in 1995 with chronic asthma, which had flared up while at work on February 14 before improving when he returned home. While driving home with his brother however, Williams did not feel well and the two decided to switch drivers.
At approximately 1:30 a.m., Williams pulled his vehicle over and put his hazards on so he and his brother could switch places. Williams stopped his vehicle in the far right southbound driving lane on Lake Shore Drive between Monroe Street and Jackson Boulevard, adjacent to Grant Park in downtown Chicago. Traffic was light on the road at that time. Defendant Marcelo Rodriguez, an on-duty City of Chicago police officer, noticed Williams‘s vehicle at the traffic light at the intersection of Monroe Street and Lake Shore Drive and then saw Williams stop the vehicle in the far right lane. Shortly after Williams stopped his vehicle, Rodriguez pulled behind Williams‘s truck. When Officer Rodriguez approached the vehicle, the driver‘s side window was already rolled down. According to Rodriguez, he observed an odor of alcohol from Williams‘s breath and noticed that Williams‘s eyes were bloodshot.1 Rodriguez asked Williams if he had been drinking, to which Williams responded “no.” Williams then informed Rodriguez that he intended to switch seats with his brother because he “wasn‘t feeling well.”
Officer Rodriguez then asked Williams to perform field sobriety tests. On the finger-to-nose test, Williams successfully
Officer Rodriguez took Williams to the police station for processing. Williams‘s property was inventoried, and although another officer performed this task, Officer Rodriguez saw Williams‘s albuterol inhaler when Williams emptied his pockets. After Williams had been at the station over an hour and after Williams‘s twenty minute observation period, Rodriguez asked Williams to blow into a breathalyzer. Williams then told Rodriguez that he had asthma, needed his medication, and could not breathe. The breathalyzer test was not administered.
Williams did not mention his medical condition at any other time during processing to Officer Rodriguez or any of the other four or five officers nearby. Additionally, Williams did not at any point request that he see a doctor. Instead, Williams was trying to control his breathing by minimizing the amount he was talking.
While Williams was being processed, his brother, Mark, and wife, Shirley Ramsey Williams, came to the station and met briefly with Officer Rodriguez. Williams‘s wife asked Officer Rodriguez if Williams had his asthma inhaler, to which Rodriguez replied “yes.” Then, just to be sure, Williams‘s wife gave Officer Rodriguez an extra albuterol inhaler and asked that it be given to Williams. Officer Rodriguez responded that he would do so. This however, did not occur. Officer Rodriguez did not give Williams his inhaler and also ignored Williams when he asked Rodriguez if his wife had brought his medicine.
After Officer Rodriguez completed his paperwork, he took Williams to the lockup area, where he left Williams with the lockup keeper, along with Williams‘s paperwork and property bag. This marked the end of Williams‘s contact with Officer Rodriguez during his detention.
While in lockup, Williams hollered for hours that he needed his inhaler and knocked on the window and walls of his cell. After approximately four to five hours, Williams was told he would be given his inhaler. When the lockup keeper gave the inhaler to Williams, he only let Williams take a couple of puffs before placing the inhaler back in the property bag. Williams then asked the lockup keeper if he could call his wife so she could bring his other asthma medication. Williams told him that if he did not receive the proper medication for his asthma he could die, and asked for his help. The lockup keeper ignored Williams and did not respond to his requests.
During this period of time, Williams‘s wife called the police station at least eight times to check in on her husband, and specifically asked about Williams‘s medical condition on the first two occasions. The woman Williams‘s wife spoke with replied that if Williams was having any medical difficulties, he would let the lockup keeper know.
On February 16, 2005, Williams‘s wife picked Williams up after his release from the station. Williams did not immediately seek medical treatment upon his release, but did go to the hospital for his asthma on February 17 or 18.2
On January 11, 2006, Williams brought this action against Officer Rodriguez, an unknown and unnamed Chicago police officer, and the City of Chicago. The complaint included two federal claims pursuant to
II. Analysis
On appeal, we review a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 2004). In doing so, we “must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party.” Conley v. Village of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000)). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
A. False Arrest
In order for Williams to prevail on his § 1983 false arrest claim, he must show that probable cause for his arrest was lacking. See Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998) (“An essential predicate to any § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest is the absence of probable cause.“). If probable cause to arrest is found to exist, it “is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest.” Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). Police officers possess probable cause to arrest when ” ‘the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed’ an offense.” Id. (quoting Kelley, 149 F.3d at 646). Probable cause is not evaluated by the court based upon “the facts as an omniscient
In his appeal of this issue, Williams primarily focuses upon whether Officer Rodriguez possessed probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence. Williams contends that the district court failed to properly construe the record in the light most favorable to him and ignored the fact that he did not display many of the factors Officer Rodriguez was trained to look for in determining whether an individual is under the influence. The probable cause analysis however, need not be limited solely to whether probable cause existed to arrest Williams for driving under the influence. Although Officer Rodriguez arrested Williams for driving under the influence, an officer‘s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). In Devenpeck, the Supreme Court rejected “[t]he rule that the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely related’ to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” Id. Instead, the Fourth Amendment‘s focus on reasonableness dictates an objective analysis, whereby, “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer‘s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)). Thus, the probable cause analysis in this case need not be limited to whether Officer Rodriguez had probable cause to arrest Williams for driving under the influence or the obstruction of traffic violations for which he was later charged. Instead, the issue is whether a reasonable officer, with the same information known to Officer Rodriguez at the time, would have had probable cause to arrest Williams for any offense. See United States v. Williams, 495 F.3d 810, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (following Devenpeck, finding that once the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant, “it is irrelevant that their investigation eventually found evidence of other crimes, that he was originally charged with those other crimes, or that the [sic] those crimes were charged based on an investigation that dragged out longer than was warranted by their original reasonable suspicion“); see also Apodaca v. City of Albuquerque, 443 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2006) (following Devenpeck, the plaintiff‘s wrongful arrest claim failed since, although officers lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for the stated reason of violating a restraining order, at the time of the arrest the officer was aware that the plaintiff‘s vehicle was being operated without insurance, a misdemeanor offense).
Illinois law provides that it is an offense to stop or park a vehicle “upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off the roadway.”
Williams first contends that it was not “practicable” for him to stop elsewhere since this was a medical emergency. Even if Williams was in fact suffering from a severe medical emergency however, this would not have been apparent to a reasonable officer on the scene. All Williams told Officer Rodriguez was that he was not “feeling well,” and he did not display any physical symptoms indicating that it was necessary to stop the vehicle on Lake Shore Drive. Furthermore, if Williams needed to stop the vehicle, he did not need to do so on Lake Shore Drive, which is part of Highway 41. Williams stopped his vehicle between two cross-streets and could have turned off on one of these roads and found an appropriate place to switch drivers.
Williams next argues that no probable cause existed to find he had violated
Williams‘s final argument is that no probable cause existed to arrest him under this statute because he was “disabled.” Illinois law provides that
Having found that a reasonable officer on the scene would have probable cause to believe Williams had violated
B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Williams complaint included a claim pursuant to § 1983 that Officer Rodriguez and an unknown and unnamed officer had violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him treatment for his asthma. At summary judgment, Williams limited his claim to one of deliberate indifference to medical needs pursuant to the standard applied under the Eighth Amendment. Although the Eighth Amendment only applies to convicted prisoners, this court has previously stated that the same standard applies to pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process clause. See Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, but as a pretrial detainee, [Plaintiff] was entitled to at least the same protection against deliberate indifference to his basic needs as is available to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.“); see also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (“when considering a pretrial detainee‘s claim of inadequate medical care, we frequently turn to the analogous standards of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence“). Under this standard, “plaintiff has the burden of showing that (1) the harm to the plaintiff was objectively serious; and (2) that the official was deliberately indifferent to [his] health or safety.” Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 620. Defendants do not address the second element of this standard in their brief and instead solely argue that Williams‘s harm was not objectively serious.
A medical condition is deemed to be objectively serious if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor‘s attention.” Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374 (7th Cir. 1997)). This court has found that “asthma can be, and frequently is, a serious medical condition, depending on the severity of the attacks.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 484 (7th Cir. 2005); see Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Asthma, depending upon its degree, can be a serious medical condition.“). Defendants’ claim for summary judgment therefore, depends upon whether Williams was suffering from a sufficiently severe asthma attack the night he was arrested. In Farnham, we found that the plaintiff‘s asthma constituted a severe medical condition for purposes of surviving summary judgment when there was testimony that the air quality in jail caused the plaintiff to be taken to the emergency room on two occasions, forced him to begin using a breathing machine, and that when deprived of his asthma medication, the plaintiff would sometimes go into an attack that would leave him, as he described it, “almost frickin’ dead” in
Williams brought this deliberate indifference claim against Officer Rodriguez and an unknown and unnamed Chicago police officer. In his complaint, Williams stated that he would seek leave to amend his complaint once he learned the identify of this unknown and unnamed defendant. Discovery was Williams‘s opportunity to identify this defendant, and he failed to do so before discovery closed on August 18, 2006. Due to Williams‘s failure to identify this defendant and the lack of any record that this individual was served with process, the district court‘s grant of summary judgment for this unknown and unnamed defendant is modified to dismiss this defendant from the case.
Officer Rodriguez then, is the only proper defendant for Williams‘s deliberate indifference claim. Therefore, the analysis for this claim is limited to determining whether Williams‘s asthma was objectively serious during the period of time he was with Officer Rodriguez. Williams concedes that there was no evidence he had a serious medical need at the scene of his arrest. Instead, the sole question is whether Williams‘s asthma was objectively serious during processing. The evidence does not reflect that Williams was suffering from a sufficiently severe asthma attack at that time. Williams‘s first mention of his asthmatic condition occurred when Officer Rodriguez asked him to take a breathalyzer test. It was at this point that Williams told Officer Rodriguez that he had asthma, “needed [his] medication,” and “can‘t breathe.” These statements, when arising in the context of a request for Williams to take a breathalyzer test, are insufficient by themselves to show that Williams was suffering from a serious asthma attack. At no other point during processing did Williams affirmatively request his inhaler or any medical attention from Officer Rodriguez or any of the other officers present. Williams responds to this, stating that his silence during processing was due to his focus on trying to control his breathing. While Williams‘s explanation for his silence is evidence that he was suffering from asthmatic symptoms, this also indicates that during processing, Williams‘s asthma was not so severe that he was unable to control his breathing without immediate medical assistance. In addition, aside from Williams‘s attempt to control his breathing, there is no evidence in the record showing that Williams was exhibiting physical symptoms reflective of an asthma attack while in processing. Furthermore, although Williams‘s wife and brother put Officer Rodriguez on additional notice of Williams‘s asthma when they gave Officer Rodriguez Williams‘s inhaler, there is no evidence that they told Officer Rodriguez that Williams was in immediate need of his inhaler due to a current asthma attack. Thus, the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Williams, fail to show that his asthma was sufficiently severe during processing to be considered objectively serious for purposes of his deliberate indifference claim against Officer Rodriguez.
Although Williams‘s deliberate indifference claim fails under the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, it is worth
Without offering any opinion as to whether Williams‘s deliberate indifference claim would have been successful under a Fourth Amendment analysis, we do note that the deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments requires a higher showing on a plaintiff‘s part than is necessary to prove an officer‘s conduct was “objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 720. What is “objectively unreasonable” in the context of a medical needs case has been further clarified by this court in Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007). In that case, the plaintiff was ordered out of his vehicle by police and made to stand against the fender of his car, which was hot, on a ninety degree day for approximately one hour. Id. at 823. This led the plaintiff to complain to the officers of dizziness, dehydration, and soreness, but the officers did not permit the plaintiff to move. Id. The reasoning underlying this court‘s determination that the officers did not violate the plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment rights implicitly identified four factors that are relevant for ascertaining whether a defendant‘s conduct was objectively unreasonable. See id. at 827-28. The first is that the officer be given notice of the arrestee‘s medical need, whether by word as occurred in Sides, or through observation of the arrestee‘s physical symptoms. Id. at 823, 828. Second, the court in Sides considered the seriousness of the medical need, in that case noting that the plaintiff‘s complaints were not accompanied by any physical symptoms. Id. at 828. The severity of the medical condition under this standard need not, on its own, rise to the level of objective seriousness required under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Fourth Amendment‘s reasonableness analysis operates on a sliding scale, balancing the seriousness of the medical need with the third factor—the scope of the requested treatment. In Sides for example, the court noted that the plaintiff was partially responsible for his lengthy detention outdoors, since he insisted that the officers not charge him at all, rather than requesting that the officers take him to the station house or write him a citation immediately. Id. Finally, police interests also factor into the reasonableness determination. This factor is wide-ranging in scope and can include administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns. Sides reflected the latter of these interests, with the court emphasizing the importance of an on-site investigation and noting that the officers did not prolong the plaintiff‘s detention once this investigation was completed. Id. Again, we offer no opinion as to whether defendants’ conduct violated Williams‘s Fourth Amendment rights under this multi-factor analysis, but for the reasons discussed above, Williams has
C. Supplemental State Claims
Having disposed of Williams‘s federal claims, we are left only with his supplemental state claims of malicious prosecution and willful and wanton denial of medical care. As a general matter, when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims. Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir. 1994); Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule however, is subject to three recognized exceptions: when the refilling of the state claims is barred by the statute of limitations; where substantial judicial resources have already been expended on the state claims; and when it is clearly apparent how the state claim is to be decided. Wright, 29 F.3d at 1251-52; Williams Electronics Games, 479 F.3d at 906-07. Although discovery in this case has been completed and thus judicial resources have already been expended to some degree, our reasoning with respect to Williams‘s federal § 1983 claims did not reach issues fully dispositive of Williams‘s pendant state claims. See Wright, 29 F.3d at 1251 (“If the district court, in deciding a federal claim, decides an issue dispositive of a pendent claim, there is no use leaving the latter to the state court.“).
With respect to Williams‘s malicious prosecution claim, it is well-established that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to such a claim. Logan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 926 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Cervantes v.Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 810-11 (7th Cir. 1999)); Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). Unlike the district court however, we have disposed of Williams‘s false arrest claim without needing to address whether probable cause existed to arrest Williams for the offenses for which he was prosecuted. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In deciding an appeal, we may affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment on a ground other than that relied upon by the district court below, so long as the alternative basis finds adequate support in the record.“). Because we have not determined whether Officer Rodriguez lacked probable cause to arrest Williams for driving under the influence or obstruction of traffic, an essential element of an Illinois malicious prosecution claim, see Reynolds v. Menard, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), we modify the district court‘s grant of summary judgment for defendants on this claim to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Williams has also brought a state claim against all defendants for failure to provide him with medical care. Illinois‘s Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act provides that as a general matter, “[n]either a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody . . .”
With respect to Williams‘s claim under
The City of Chicago‘s liability under this section is premised on its vicarious liability for the actions of its employees.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Officer Rodriguez on all claims but that for malicious prosecution, which we MODIFY to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. We also MODIFY the grant of summary judgment in favor of the unknown and unnamed Defendant on all counts to a dismissal of that party from this lawsuit. With respect to the City of Chicago, we MODIFY the grant of summary judgment in its favor on both state law claims to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, with the exception of the district court‘s grant of summary judgment for the City for its vicarious liability for Officer Rodriguez under
A true Copy:
Teste:
________________________________
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
USCA-02-C-0072—12-6-07