UNITED STATES v. HAGER
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Hager‘s final contention is the sentence imposed violates his Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 710 (8th Cir. 2001), Hager asserts his sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense committed because his prior criminal history was minimal—an offense for attempted drug possession for which he served only four days in jail and a conviction for driving under the influence—and he was caught selling heroin on only one occasion in regard to his current conspiracy offense.
“The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a narrow proportionality principle that applies to noncapital sentences.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Amendment, however, “does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is exceedingly rare for an offense that does not have a capital sentence to violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. We review an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence de novo. Id.
We disagree that Hager‘s sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense he committed. Unlike the defendant in Henderson, who received a life sentence without the possibility of parole for selling a total of .238 grams of cocaine base for a total of $20, the defendant‘s first ever conviction, 258 F.3d at 710, Hager was the leader of a multi-state drug conspiracy which distributed more than 78,613 kilograms of marijuana-equivalent drugs and spanned approximately ten years. Hager‘s attempt to minimize his criminal history is not persuasive, and we find his sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Weis, 487 F.3d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir. 2007) (“It is rare for a term of years within the author-ized statutory range to violate the Eighth Amendment.“).
III
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
William G. MORSE; Tanya L. Morse, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. OZARK COUNTY, MISSOURI; Gareth Heidi; Betty Heidi; Heather Heidi, Trustee; Heather Rooney-McBride; Darrin Reed, Sheriff, Ozark County Sheriff Department; Heath Hathcock, Deputy Sheriff, Ozark County Sheriff Department; Sgt. Collins, Ozark County Sheriff Department; Kenny Hannaford, Deputy Sheriff, Ozark County Sheriff Department; Thomas Cline, Ozark County Prosecuting Attorney; Becky Strong, Ozark County Circuit Court Clerk; Craig Fox, Ozark County Health Department; Rex Donley, Gainesville Livestock Auction; David Haskins, Ozark 4 U Realty; Heath Humphries; Dr. David Rybolt, Missouri Department of Agriculture (Division of Animal Health); John Does, 6-7, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-3805.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: July 1, 2015. Filed: July 8, 2015.
William G. and Tanya L. Morse appeal the district court‘s1 dismissal of their civil rights action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We find that the Morses did not preserve any challenge to the district court‘s conclusion that their action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2 In response to the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, they offered no argument in support of jurisdiction, see Nucor Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs bear burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction); and in their opening brief on appeal, they do not explain why the district court was wrong in applying the doctrine, see Blakley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 648 F.3d 921, 931-32 (8th Cir. 2011) (where appellant did not actually challenge district court‘s conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, any argument to this effect on appeal is waived); see also McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 761 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2014) (where
Alice M. LEA, Plaintiff-Appellant v. METHODIST FAMILY HEALTH, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-1377.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: July 9, 2015. Filed: July 15, 2015.
PER CURIAM.
Alice Lea appeals the adverse judgment the district court1 entered following a bench trial on her Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims. She asserts that her trial was an “ambush,” and she essentially argues that the district court mishandled pretrial discovery matters, and improperly convinced her to proceed without a jury. Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on any pretrial discovery matter, see In re Mo. Dep‘t of Natural Res., 105 F.3d 434, 435 (8th Cir. 1997) (management of discovery is committed to sound discretion of trial court; scope of review of discovery orders is both narrow and deferential), and that Lea waived her right to a jury trial, cf. Allen v. Barnes Hosp., 721 F.2d 643, 644 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (failure to object to submission of case to judge instead of jury usually waives right to jury trial). In addition, to the extent Lea suggests that the district court made any improper rulings at trial, her failure to order a trial transcript precludes this court from conducting a meaningful review of such issues. See