History
  • No items yet
midpage
Nucor Corporation v. Nebraska Public Power District
891 F.2d 1343
8th Cir.
1990
Check Treatment

*2 Before JOHN R. GIBSON and WOLLMAN, Judges, Circuit HEANEY, Senior Judge. Circuit GIBSON, Judge. JOHN R. Circuit Nebraska appeals Public Power District from judgment Corpo- favor of Nucor ration on a against breach of contract claim Nebraska Power based on electric rate overcharges. panel A of this court heard argument and then remanded for additional findings on the issue of whether the John- Act, (1982), son U.S.C. 1342 us to hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this action. The district court1 tried the issue and certified findings its to this court. We affirm the district court’s determination that the John- son Act did deprive jurisdiction, and we affirm on the merits. public corporation Power is a provides wholesale and retail electric throughout service Nebraska. It owns and operates generation, electric transmission, and distribution facilities. Nebraska Pow- largest customer, er’s as measured elec- usage, Nucor, trical corpora- Delaware principal tion with its place of business Charlotte, North operates Carolina. Nucor Norfolk, a steel mill Nebraska, near uses electric arc scrap furnaces to melt metal. Nebraska Power and Nu- cor entered into a contract for Nebraska Power to fulfill Nucor’s electrical needs at plant. Norfolk The contract contained schedule, a rate designated HTS-2, which is only available to industrial or man- ufacturing customers which meet minimum requirements demand and receive service directly high from voltage facilities. Nu- cor is the qualify customer to for the HTS-2 rate.

Nebraska Power establishes its electric through rates resolutions enacted board directors. No state administrative agency in Nebraska is authorized to review Strom, Lyle The Honorable E. Judge United States District for the District of Nebraska. Nucor s Nucor, to show the extent rather, rates; rates Power’s Ne- instructed that damage. in state review judicial subject to direct 70-655, law, section as embodied in requires that law court. Nebraska directors to estab- authorized the board and nondiscrimi- rates such rates be required that (Reissue lish 70-655 natory. Neb.Rev.Stat. § *3 nondiscriminatory. reasonable, and a contained 1986).2 in issue The contract that this sec- jury also instructed The was required also provision which review rate statutes should be fair, reasonable, non- tion of the Nebraska and the rate be that contract part of the between pro- considered further discriminatory. The contract Special inter- “sufficient, Power. Nucor and Nebraska but the rate must be vided jury, the and rogatories submitted to sufficient, expense the and only collect year rate for each jury found that the the requirements associ- net revenue estimated fair, rea- through 1986 was not from 1974 Primary Power Large Industrial with ated sonable, nondiscriminatory. jury The and year During 1973 and at two Service.” damages sus- specified the amount of thereafter, also Power was intervals year, an amount study by tained Nucor for each prepare a by the contract to required $7,492,340. court entered totalling The expenses and estimated operating of occurring service, damages after judgment for for this requirements revenue net $4,403,- August determined to be based on rates were and 546.70, of it found that the statute because the studies. of results applicable to contracts written limitations against Ne- brought action damages recovery for before barred claiming Pow- that Nebraska Power braska date. agree- continuously had breached er unreasonable, appealed unfair, Nebraska Power by charging ment ratemaking is a court, arguing that using by discriminatory to Nucor rates and exer- which cannot be legislative function methods to incorrect, improper, and unfair courts, district court by the that the costs; for cised failing grant credits allocate in the legislative power vested usurped the failing to follow power; and hydroelectric directors, and of Power board consultant of own recommendations provision nei- rate the contract review prayed It charged Nucor. action of cause of the nature re- ther alters injunctive damages and appropriate for damages. Ne- award of permits nor lief. further asserts dis- on a trial, instructed jury At permitting erred trict court theory required contract which of breach statutory and contractual construe the by preponderance a establish Nucor to admitting evidence. certain terms and had that Nebraska evidence heard this of this court panel obligations When of its one or more breached be- jurisdiction arose question of appeal, a provision, review the rate under Act3 that the Johnson concern damage to cause of caused proximately breaches the business of operation and conduct able provides: The statute the district. any orga- district board of The directors 70-655. Neb.Rev.Stat. subject Chapter article under or nized fix, power and be have the shall establish, provides: Act 3. The Johnson rates, tolls, adequate collect and suspend enjoin, shall not rents, energy, district courts charges electrical for and other of, compliance operation or service, any storage, or for and restrain water water by with, chargeable ethanol, affecting commodities, any order including ser- other all by adminis- furnished, utility a State sold, public and made vices, supplied or or facilities ratemaking body rents, a State rates, tolls, agency district, or a trative political by the subdivision, where: charges nondiscrimi- shall be diversity solely (1) on is based eq- Jurisdiction adjusted natory, as in a fair and and so repugnance the order to citizenship or confer and distribute manner to uitable Constitution; and, the Federal among consumers of commodi- the users and with inter- not order does interfere by or sold ties and services furnished and, commerce; profit- state of a district the benefits successful applied. prohibits The Johnson Act lyzed requirement the fourth of the John- interfering courts from ratemaking Act, plain, speedy, son that there exists a public if utilities the four criteria of the Act and efficient in the state courts. are met. The was then case remanded to The court found that the state court reme- the district court for findings additional on which, dy, cases, in most would be to re- jurisdictional issue. The district court mand to the board of directors to establish began by noting that Nebraska Power is a rates, inadequate. Accordingly, new publicly-owned utility regulates it- the court determined that the Johnson Act self, ratemaking and that its decisions are deprive did not jurisdic- federal courts of subject any independent review case, tion in this findings certified its regulatory body. Although the court ex- to this court. pressed serious reservations about whether *4 applied Johnson Act in such circum- stances, it did not resolve the issue. I. Assuming that the Act apply, did the We first consider issue of federal recognized court statutory that all four cri jurisdiction. It is well-settled that teria must in be satisfied order to bar fed plaintiff bears the establishing burden of jurisdiction, citing

eral our decision in Ar subject jurisdiction. matter Nebraska Light kansas Power & Co. v. Missouri Power asserts that the district court erred Commission, Public Service 829 F.2d by improperly requiring it to bear the bur- (8th Cir.1987). subject Since den of establishing jurisdiction that federal jurisdiction matter federal court is based lacking was rather than requiring Nucor to solely upon diversity citizenship, par establish jurisdiction that present. ties conceded that the first element had reading record, Our however, re- element, been satisfied. As to the second veals that properly placed the court requiring that the order not interfere with Nucor, burden establish jur- federal commerce, interstate the court noted that Furthermore, isdiction. we believe the parties had not addressed this issue but fully record supports the court’s conclusion nevertheless concluded that the order could the Johnson preclude Act does not potentially interfere with interstate com jurisdiction federal in this case. merce. This conclusion was based on evi dence that Nebraska Power sold Nucor court, The district in its order determin- electricity generated states, in other ing that the Act Johnson did not bar its products distributed in other jurisdiction, expressed serious doubts that states, corporate and that Nucor’s head the Act preclude intended federal quarters were located outside of Nebraska. jurisdiction one, in cases as this where rates are public established utility not

The court then turned to the third re- regulated by independent quirement agency. state Act, of the Johnson which re- Nebraska quires argues that since rate order be made after applies Johnson Act ratemaking to all hearing. notice and a bod- political subdivisions, ies of examined process both the due this necessarily clause of statutes, the Constitution and includes the board Nebraska of directors of the Ne- and found that Nebraska Power did not Public Power District. As the dis- provide reasonable notice to trict Nucor under court did not rest decision on this either standard. Finally, the ground, court ana- it is not necessary that we do so.4 (3) Also, The order charged by has been made after public reason- during utilities. discus- and, hearing; able notice and bill, sponsor, sion of the son, the bill’s Senator John- plain, speedy A efficient independent regulation referred to the may be had in the courts of such State. public importance utilities and the of the bill to 28 U.S.C. 1342. every public state that has a service commis- (1934). Cong.Rec. sion. 28 legislative history passed, of the Act as version, previous well as specifically express that of a We serious as to reservations whether referred to the apply existence of state commissions Act was intended to in this situation. authorized to review and only determine rates argument Nebraska Power's about a issue, dents, agreement pursuant to an jurisdictional may resolve the We however, addition, holding that the Johnson Nebraska Power has without towns. inapplicable here we are given proposed Act is because rate increases to notice of correctly the district court satisfied that approximately 200 retail towns as an infor- requirements are determined that the Act’s courtesy. mational federal courts are not not met and thus monthly billing Nebraska Power mailed jurisdiction by the Act. deprived of has never statements to all customers but require We turn first to the notice meetings with these included notices recite the ment of the Johnson Act and has, however, mailings. findings is court’s of fact on this advertising occasionally included inserts single sue. Nucor was Nebraska Power’s billing with the statements. Advertise- cus largest retail customer and routinely placed many ments are also under the qualified tomer to receive service newspapers. rate schedule. Nebraska Power’s HTS-2 Nebraska Power makes no effort to ar- utility by adopt of directors set board findings by gue that these the district court during meetings ing rate resolutions board Rather, clearly argues it erroneous. general Power’s office Co at Nebraska rates in is irrelevant view Nucor’s lumbus, approxi Columbus is Nebraska. vacuum, a factual or to hold that Nucor Norfolk, *5 mately miles from which is 45 special just entitled to notice was because steel mill. Advance notice close to Nucor’s other customers in other situations have in meeting published was of each board received individualized notice. Nebraska has a cir Telegram which The Columbios inquired neither Power stresses that Nucor 10,000 12,000 Nor of readers. culation anticipated future costs or rate about coverage Telegram’s not within the folk is changes, requested specific no- nor advance Nucor nor its officers sub area. Neither Furthermore, tice. each time there was a fact, and, in Telegram, scribed change, rates and rate Nebraska Power’s in newspaper had one subscriber Stan manager gener- met with Nucor’s contracts county Nucor’s steel mill is lo ton where manager change and an- al to review Nucor officials testified that cated. Nucor questions. swer rate received advance notice of had never increases, knowledge no of their and had points out that the Ne- Nebraska Power hearings inquire right appear at about Law, Meetings Public Neb.Rev.Stat. braska rate increases. (Reissue 1987),does not 84-1408 to -1414 § notice, publication of specify a method for situations, notice of In certain additional requires “reasonable advance but instead changes giv- meetings and rate board place of notice of the time and publicized Every Power customers. en to Nebraska designated by meeting by a method each conducted a years, two Nebraska Power In com- public body.” Id. 84-1411. each § by mail study and notified wholesale rate mandate, Power this Nebraska pliance with right to customers of their all 97 wholesale adopted a resolution that notice would had hearing changes. Ne- request a on Telegram, in as- published held or six rate Power has five notify any mem- secretary would sistant hearings and between 50 since requesting media notifica- of the news bers meeting. people have attended each agenda of board tion, a current and that Also, given routinely has Nebraska Power public kept available for meetings would be “retail proposed rate action to notice of office. towns,” inspection at its Columbus electricity to their resi- which sell regulatory As 2,096 by commission. a state publicly-owned utili- reviewed electric third of by subject regulation of set the board in the United States are us were ties by before Power, agencies light danger not on the state does shed there is no of Nebraska directors Congress passing the Johnson Act. intent of in regulatory independent interfering with primary Act is We believe that the thrust of the such agency's rates because no review of these public having prevent utilities from access to agency exists here. previously a federal forum to redetermine rates duty Power asserts that its commerce. Nebraska Nebraska Power asserts that provide hearing finding notice and a is to be deter- the district court erred in in- law, terference only by mined reference to state because Nucor failed to estab- directly lish that the rate process a due standard. The district burdensome discriminatory. recognize or rejected argument, recognizing We the tenta- comments, tive nature of the hearing requirement court’s but the notice nevertheless conclude interpreted requiring the Act the court did had been not err. minimum There was evidence that process that the standards of due Nebras- wrongfully ka deprived be met. The court examined Nucor of Western Area Power case to determine constitutes Administration bene- law what fits and that required by pro- approximately notice” as this resulted in “reasonable due million overcharges cess in $7 and noted that “notice can be con- Nucor. Nucor presented adequate only testimony sidered if it is in transmitted affected the which, minimum, goods cost of a manner at a for sale in ‘has a interstate certainty resulting’ Considering commerce. reasonable in actual this and the other Waara, notice.” Gruenewald v. court, factors identified the district we believe (quot- 428 N.W.2d that the court did not err assess- (Second) ing ing impact on Judgments Restatement interstate commerce. 2(l)(b), (1982)). at 34 We conclude that the district court did not err in fully supports determining The evidence the district that the Johnson Act finding given deprive jurisdiction court’s did not notice to consider did not the merits of certainty giv- have this case. ing publication Nucor actual notice. The appears suggest Telegram, The Columbus newspaper that abstention under v. Sun Oil Burford very limited city circulation of Co., 319 U.S. 63 S.Ct. 87 L.Ed. *6 Norfolk, did not fulfill Nebraska Power’s (1943), appropriate would be in this obligation. The notice did not state that case. We believe that the justifying facts ratemaking purpose was the of the board abstention in that case lacking here. meetings, but stated little more than that Burford, In authority the for the chal agenda general an was available at the lenged decisionmaking had delegated been Further, regular- office. Nebraska Power independent commission, to an and the

ly performed analyses cost for wholesale developed state had a scheme to centralize rates and based yearly Nucor’s rate in- direct review of the commission’s decisions creases, in part, analyses. on these in state single courts of a Texas county. wholesale given customers were notice of us, In however, the case before the chal changes the analyses based on the lenges are not directed at the decisions of Nucor, customer, while a retail not. independent regulatory commission, nor The district court did not err in its determi- is there a judicial centralized state review nation that notice lacking place. addition, scheme in In the fact that here. Nebraska Power delayed has raising the abstention issue until after a full trial on

It is well-established that all four the merits shows a respect lack of for the criteria of the Johnson Act must be satis comity considerations of underlying Bur- preclude fied jurisdiction, to federal the failure satisfy require the notice ford. ment is sufficient to end our examination. II. Light

Arkansas Power & Co. v. Missouri Comm’n, Pub. Serv. 829 F.2d The essence of Nucor’s breach of con- (8th Cir.1987). satisfied, however, areWe tract claim is that Nebraska Power failed that correctly the district court determined to fulfill its obligations contractual that another criterion is not met here ei charge reasonable, and nondiscrimina- ther. requires rates, The Johnson Act tory that perform and to study cost rate order not interfere with every years. interstate Specifically, two Nucor ar- that this tion, for the fact not proper- were it failed to gues that Nebraska the contract language present both is regularly costs and ly demand allocate require rates to be Both and the service statute. fully-allocated cost of perform a nondiscriminatory,” “fair, Nucor, caused According study. this that section jury was instructed and the disproportionate share pay a Nucor to part considered a 70-655 was power dis- costs of demand-related Thus, to determine order through 1986. contract. during years 1974 trict Power had breached whether Nebraska various undisclosed argues also Nucor contract, to determine determining jury had wheth- mishandled charges were fair, reasonable, and (1) allocating carrying, er Nucor’s rates rate: nondiscriminatory. The court’s instruc- charges associ- and maintenance operation, line; jury were not erroneous in transmission tions a 230 kilovolts ated with regard. allotment of (2) of its full depriving bene- Power Administration Area

Western support arguments, of its production incorrect fits; using an certain Supreme Power identifies factor for Nucor. adjustment cost decisions, particularly McGinley v. Court District, 214 Belt Public Wheat argu substantive Nebraska Power’s (1983),and York 332 N.W.2d 915 around how the essentially revolve ments County Rural Public Power District characterized, asserting that this action O’Connor, 111 N.W.2d 172 Neb. as accurately characterized case more (1961), ratemaking defining the authori- con ratemaking than as a breach of rather ty of directors and the court’s of the board ratemaking is a It asserts tract claim. reviewing such rates. York estab- role in may be exer function which legislative authority to have the lished courts courts, the court’s submission cised by public power districts. rates set review usurped legisla jury case McGinley, at 379. at 111 N.W.2d Id. directors, power vested in the board tive argues, stands for the Nebraska Power provision nei rate review that the contract available proposition nor the nature action ther alters for a court to remand upon review is damages, that it permits an award of directors exercise case to board to construe permit was error ratemaking is ratemaking function. Since contract and statute. the terms of the function, judicial, Ne- legislative, not a deter- this action must be nature submitting concludes that braska Power *7 and the sub- pleadings the issues mined legislative usurped the jury to a this case complaint, Nucor jury. the In its mitted to im- board and constituted an power of the one for of action as framed cause ratemaking. attempt at permissible upon breach contract based breach of Power’s re contract, We believe of the provision rate review misplaced. is McGinley Ne- liance on requiring of section 70-655 violation proper “the ac held that McGinley court charge are rates that braska Power nature, of this to take in a case absent reasonable, tion nondiscriminatory, use damages, costs, individual specific evidence practices to allocate improper directors ... require the board of contrary is practices recommen- use of 214 at McGinley, rate.” proper set a The case was own consultant. dation of its added). (emphasis 189, 921 at 332 N.W.2d a of con- jury breach submitted presented suggests that a court This claim, given special jury and the tract damages, as was of individual specifi- evidence required it interrogatories which mone below, to award empowered is had set the board cally decide whether remanding to the damages rather than tary and non- which addition, underly by board of directors. discriminatory. We would troubled argu Power’s assumption of Nebraska ing interrogatories, which language this in the on action based findings ment is that jury make rates, as was discriminatory allegedly func- arguably regulatory related to 1350 McGinley.

case in This mischaracterizes testimony, erence to this and to receive us, the nature of the suit before which is a testimony concerning evidence and overcharges claim to recover based on a making methodology. McGinley

breach of contract. dealt with The crux of Nebraska ar charged the difference in rates Power’s customers gument similar circumstances. The that the court should have de focus here is “fair,” charged only customer, jury the rate one fined for the the terms “rea Moreover, jury sonable,” Nucor. verdict and the “non-discriminatory,” rather entered the court did not permitting de- than experts testify as to termine what rates Nebraska Power must meanings instructing their jury charge future, rather, in the merely but experts’ that it could consider the defini past determined the amount of over- tions. These terms are not technical in charges.5 nature, argues, Nebraska Power and thus expert testimony necessary. is not It relies Nebraska Power asserts that the district Club, Inc., on Marx & Co. v. Diners’ 550 permitting court erred in the jury to con- (2d Cir.), denied, F.2d 505 cert. 434 U.S. strue the terms of the contract and the 861, (1977), 98 S.Ct. 134 L.Ed.2d issue, 70-655, statute in Neb.Rev.Stat. § which the court improper held that it was because the terms in issue ambig- were not expert to allow a testify securities as to uous. We believe there was no error. The meaning of the term “best efforts” in a contract, incorporated language dispute. contract at Id. 508-09. statute, of the used words that were am- biguous in they the sense that were of a We believe the court did not err in admit- sufficiently technical nature to be the sub- ting expert testimony. Courts have ject expert testimony. parties Both frequently recognized expert the value of presented expert testimony which offered testimony defining terms of a technical na- jury differing views terminology. of the ture and testifying as to whether such circumstances, Under the proper for acquired terms have well-recognized jury, by expert aided testimony, to con- meaning in the industry. business or See terminology sider the in issue here. The Energy Co., Oils v. Montana Power role jury in such circumstances has (9th Cir.1980). F.2d 736-37 We note recognized by been Nebraska cases. Olds experts that Nebraska Power also testified Jamison, 388, 392, 195 Neb. 238 N.W.2d as to meanings of terms of art and (1976); Ely Constr. Co. v. S & S whether Nebraska ratemaking Power’s Corp., 184 Neb. 165 N.W.2d methods were used elsewhere in the indus- (1969). parties raise numerous try. Finally, we observe that the admis- points in arguments their which we believe sion of largely evidence is left to the discre- lack justify sufficient merit to further dis- tion of the trial court. We conclude that cussion of this issue. there was no abuse of discretion in admit- ting testimony and no error of law in III. instructing as to the use of such *8 Nebraska Power asserts error in the dis- testimony. trict court’s resolution of certain evidentia- ry argues issues. It that it improper erred, was The court according also for the court to testimony Power, receive from admitting Nebraska in an exhibit Nucor's experts regarding prepared terms of art and by Nucor which utilized a four- standards, industry permit jury the peak to month coincident cost allocation meth construe the contract and statute with parties ref- od. Both vigorously argue, in ex- argues allocation, accept above, The dissent that we Nucor’s cost of cost par- outlined that the fair, reasonable, only allocation method as the charged reasonable, ticular rate was not nondiscriminatory and, and method. nondiscriminatory, This mischar- upon being holding. simply acterizes our presented specific We hold that a evidence of individual find, jury properly could damages, based properly evidence could determine the amount of Nebraska Power's past overcharges. treatment of several items of

1351 (1) Power theory: that detail, this evi- ment whether technical haustive acts of fraudulent committed affirmative properly admitted. dence was concealment, inducing Nu- which included court that the persuaded not We are area with aware- cor to locate its service that first observe respect. We erred parties’ the disparity between ness an exhibit also introduced ratemaking methodology, knowledge of computa- of cost demonstrating a method studies, com- withholding cost various case revolves importantly, this More tion. regarding municating incorrect information resulting from overcharges alleged around allocation; if there that even cost allocation, and resolution of improper cost of fraudulent not affirmative acts determining whether issues these concealment, fiduciary relation- there is a and nondis- rates were parties such that mere ship between this exhibit criminatory. believe that We con- part on the of Nebraska Power silence essence, to such issues. was relevant will stitutes fraudulent concealment simple attempt parties escalate the statute of toll limitations. into admissibility of an exhibit question to address opportunity additional Ne Addressing first the claim that this case. merits affirmative acts braska Power committed argument Nebraska Power's final concealment which warrant of fraudulent sup not judgment are the verdict that limitations, we are not tolling the statute of argument This ported by the evidence. court erred in that persuaded dam amount of addressed to the primarily jury. issue to the refusing to submit this awarded, that an assertion ages based on of fraudu recognize issues we While relationship no jury award bears total relating to a statute concealment lent damages. This is Nucor’s evidence normally questions defense are limitations proven it has been merit. Where without Arendt, 119 jury, Vrbsky v. fact for the sustained, and the damage has been 337, (1930), 448-49, 443, 339 229 N.W. Neb. exact uncertainty concerns only room for a no the evidence leaves when evidence from amount, need there opinion, the dis difference of ascer damages can be the amount of mat the issue as a may resolve trict certainty. Nebras with reasonable tained Chemical, Inc. v. X of law. Trace ter Power, 773 v. Austin Pub. Power Dist. ka 261, Indus., Ltd., F.2d 265 738 Canadian Laier, Delp v. Cir.1985); (8th F.2d 969 denied, Cir.1984), 469 U.S. cert. (8th 269-70 288 N.W.2d (1985). More 911, L.Ed.2d 925 105 S.Ct. Daniel, Stephen expert, (1980). Nucor’s is insuf over, evidence mere scintilla of “a cross-examined, testi vigorously who jury.” question for present a ficient overcharges the total amount fied Shoemaker, 763 F.2d Indus. J.E.K. $15,744,844. there is suffi We believe Cir.1985). (8th jury’s deter support cient evidence court did mination. We also believe refusing to submit err in IV. relationship fiduciary claim that Ne parties between court erred existed argues that Nucor disclose, and duty to had a damages only for sus- entering judgment fraudulent its silence constituted 1986, excluding therefore years in the tained Supreme The Nebraska by the statute concealment. years as barred earlier decide had occasion has not that it was Court of limitations. contends *9 fiduciary rela of a existence of whether whether to a determination entitled from of action a tionship prevents cause by Ne- fraudulent concealment there was if limitations of by the statute being barred conduct whether acts no affirmative commits defendant of limi- operation the statute of defeats Nor merely silent. is but argu- concealment two of essentially offers tations. ruled Supreme Court the Nebraska conceal- has support of its fraudulent ments 1352 public utility obligations permit integrated approach a owes of to rate fiduciary In Moreover, customers. the ab regulation. power of a Ne- guiding precedent,

sence of “we accord determining only braska court is limited to to the substantial deference district court’s question whether the rate schedule in interpretation of state law.” Kansas State fair, nondiscriminatory. reasonable and Bank in Holton v. Citizens Bank See, e.g., McGinley of v. Wheat Belt Public 1490, Windsor, (8th F.2d 1496 737 Cir. District, 178, 214 Neb. 332 N.W.2d 1984). (1983). 915 Finally, argu we address Nucor’s Fixing compensation public ser- failing ment that the district court erred in corporations may charge vice for servic- prejudgment to award interest. Nucor’s es to by legislating; be rendered them is argument is without merit. The court cor lawmaking. power it that, rectly recognized under Nebraska declaring courts is limited to what the law, prejudgment may only interest re is, they precluded by law are liquidated. covered on claims functions; legislative Constitution from acknowledged design The court of ... know of no court which has [W]e rates is not an exact science and concluded authority ever claimed it had the to de- liquidated. that Nucor’s claim was not It compensation termine what would abe possible compute was not the amount of reasonable one per- for a service to be damages here with exactness without re by corporation. formed such a upon opinion liance or discretion. See Hill State, Telephone Co. v. 55 Neb. Lincoln, 221 City v. Neb. 380 627, 171, (1898). also, 76 N.W. 174 See (1986). N.W.2d Metropolitan City Utilities Dist. v. sum, require- In we hold that because the Omaha, 171 Neb. 107 N.W.2d 397 satisfied, ments of the Johnson Act are not (“It appear would there are several preclude jurisdic- Act does not federal formulas, approved accounting under meth tion in this case. We also hold that Nucor ods, by which the board of directors of the $4,403,546.70 judgment is entitled to its [sewage] district could determine the on its breach contract claim but is not cost_ However, it should be remem- prejudgment entitled to interest. Accord- bered that city is not for the or the ingly, we affirm the of the dis- courts to determine what the formula is to trict court. be, but it is a matter for the board of decide_”). directors of the district to HEANEY, Judge, Senior Circuit Thus, I unwilling accept, am as the ma- concurring part dissenting done, jority appears to have that Nucor’s part. methodology fair, cost allocation is the I, I concur in Parts III and IV of the nondiscriminatory reasonable and method. majority opinion necessary as far as it is damages supported reach is not those issues. I from dissent Part II. McGinley Nebraska case law. accept While I that the Power District District, Belt Wheat Public Power may duty charge have breached its (1983); Neb. 332 N.W.2d 915 York rates, nondiscriminatory reasonable and I County Rural Public Power District v. believe that it was error for the district O’Connor, N.W.2d 376 question damages to submit the (1961); jury. Damages speculative. are too County, Supreme York This Court lacks both wherewithal plaintiff power Court held that the legislative authority to determine could in damages recover the difference damages in this instance because more paid plaintiff by amount than one between reasonable and nondiscrimi- natory defendant consumer and amount may schedule exist. do Courts expertise have the adopted by or resources neces- a new rate schedule sary to proper determine plaintiff power rate schedules or district that the court held *10 fair, L.Ed.2d and nondiscriminato- 94 S.Ct. to be reasonable (“To particular method of ry. declare that regulation is so sanctified as to make Supreme McGinley, In the Nebraska any other method highly unlikely damages though it Court denied even is inconsistent with could be sustained” unfair, charged plaintiffs found the rate Supreme prece- clearly articulated Court discriminatory. unreasonable and McGin dent). Thus, damages speculative. are District, Belt Public Power ley v. Wheat at 921. N.W.2d contract exists The fact that written Nucor and the District does Having therefore found the rate inval- between id, scope review, expand judicial with determin- not we are now confronted terms, “fair, granted. ing proper relief to be since the contract reasonable nondiscriminatory,” subject asked and Members of Rate Class 766 have provisions court to render for the of Neb.Rev.Stat. 70-655. The language entirely of Rate Class 76 in an amount contract is consistent members statutory language, and the mean- equal to the difference between what with same, ing paid Rate 75 of each is the controlled members of the what holding A paid. of Rate 76 Were we to statute. that the Power District members that, . granting by charg- in its contract do we would be effect breached unfair, ing Rate Class 76 the same an unreasonable and discrimina- to members of arbitrary tory nothing rate schedule is more or unjust and rate which was noth- ing holding granted of Rate Class 75 and less than a the Power to members statutory duty. now declared invalid. District breached its The which we have in distinction for a appropriate relief is not a case of between action breach Such of contract and an action for a this nature.... breach duty, may statutory whatever that inbe While there are cases be found instance, no has relevance as to the damages requested by where such as question damages of whether can be awarded, they plaintiffs herein have been awarded or calculated. generally are cases where both a statute damages such and the evi- authorizes appropriate in this circum- supports damages. dence stance is to remand the matter to the Board of Directors of the Power District Id. prompt hearing and order it to hold a as to majority argues that the instant case years question. rates for the All classes distinguishable McGinley from because consumers, Nucor, including the farmers damages” “specific evidence of individual power irrigation, who use for and the (quoting McGinley, exists. Ante at 1349 power homeowners who use for air condi- First, 921). disagree. 332 N.W.2d at I tioning, given adequate must be notice and though charged by even the rate the Power opportunity participate hearing. at this unfair, and dis District was unreasonable done, the Once this is Power District can criminatory, there exists no basis and nondis- determine the reasonable determine which a court could criminatory charge it intends to all nondiscriminatory cost allo determination, From that consumers. methodology cation that the Power District must, time, Power District at that rebate Second, ultimately prac will choose. overcharges all that have resulted. granting damages in the tical effect practical instant case is similar to ef granting damages in McGinley.

fect of cases, validity paid

both of amount

questionable. Federal Power Com See Texaco, Inc.,

mission v. 417 U.S. charged receiving McGinley customers service before 6. involved different rates included all energy exactly Rate Class 76 included consumers who used the same a certain date 1975. they signed receiving service after that date in manner but for the date on as cus- all customers tomers of the Power District. Rate Class 75

Case Details

Case Name: Nucor Corporation v. Nebraska Public Power District
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 16, 1990
Citation: 891 F.2d 1343
Docket Number: 87-1963, 87-2046
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.