William Findling, et al., Appellants, vs. Group Health Plan, Inc., d/b/a Health Partners and Regions Hospital, Respondent (A21-1518), Essentia Health, et al., Respondents (A21-1527), Fairview Health Services, et al., Respondents (A21-1528), Allina Health Systems, Respondent (A21-1530).
A21-1518, A21-1527, A21-1528, A21-1530
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
December 6, 2023
Thissen, J.; Anderson, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part); Chutich, Procaccini, JJ. (took no part)
Court of Appeals
Anthony J. Novak, Patrick H. O’Neill III, Larson King, LLP, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondents Group Health Plan, Inc. d/b/a Health Partners and Regions Hospital.
David A. Schooler, Gordon & Rees, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Andrew McCarty, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, New York, for respondents Essentia Health and Innovis Health, LLC.
Gregory E. Karpenko, Anupama D. Sreekanth, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondents Fairview Health Services and HealthEast Care System.
Mark R. Bradford, Bradford, Andresen, Norrie & Camarotto, Bloomington, Minnesota, for respondent Allina Health System.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Adam Welle, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae State of Minnesota, by its Attorney General.
Patrick Stoneking, Jeff Anderson & Associates PA, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.
- An individual may bring a private action under the Minnesota private attorney general statute,
Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2022), to compel a healthcare provider to disclose that individual’s medical records as required by the Minnesota Health Records Act underMinn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 5 (2022). - An individual does not have a private right of action under the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights,
Minn. Stat. § 144.651 (2022), to compel a healthcare providerto disclose an individual’s medical records as required by the Minnesota Health Records Act under Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 5 .
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
Appellants in these consolidated appeals are four individual patients (the Patients) who made written requests for medical records from their healthcare providers, the respondents in this case (the Providers). The Minnesota Health Records Act requires that, upon a patient’s written request, a healthcare provider “shall furnish” a patient’s medical records to the patient within 30 calendar days of receiving the written request.
The Patients sued the Providers under the Minnesota private attorney general statute,
We are asked to decide a very narrow issue: May an individual bring a private right of action under the private attorney general statute,
FACTS
This case comes to us following the district court’s decision granting the Providers’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we accept the allegations set forth in the Patients’ complaint, as well as all inferences to be drawn from those allegations, in the light most favorable to the Patients. Hanson v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 934 N.W.2d 319, 325 (Minn. 2019).
The Patients each alleged that they suffered serious medical complications following procedures by their Provider and suspected malpractice. Each Patient requested medical records from their Providers. The Patients allege that the individual Providers
The Patients each brought a lawsuit as individuals and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated patients, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Patients claim that the Providers improperly withheld their medical records and, as part of their failure to disclose the records, the Providers made false representations to the Patients to justify their non-compliance with the requests. Further, each of the Patients’ complaints allege that each Provider’s failure to timely disclose patient records in accordance with the Minnesota Health Records Act is a widespread, pervasive, or systematic practice.
The Patients asserted that they could sue the Providers under the private attorney general provision of
ANALYSIS
I.
We first address the Patients’ claim that the Minnesota private attorney general statute,
A.
Section 8.31 provides the Attorney General with broad enforcement authority concerning “violations of the law of this state respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade.”
The attorney general shall investigate violations of the law of this state respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade, and specifically, but not exclusively, the Nonprofit Corporation Act (sections 317A.001 to 317A.909), the Act Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition (sections 325D.01 to 325D.07), the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (sections 325D.09 to 325D.16), the Antitrust Act (sections 325D.49 to 325D.66), section 325F.67 and other laws against false or fraudulent advertising, the antidiscrimination acts contained in section 325D.67, the act against monopolization of food products (section 325D.68), the act regulating telephone advertising services (section 325E.39), the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (sections 325F.68 to 325F.70), and chapter 53A regulating currency exchanges and assist in the enforcement of those laws as in this section provided.
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.
Minnesotans rely on and pay healthcare providers to provide them necessary and sometimes critical healthcare services, often at times when those Minnesotans are most vulnerable and have no other choice but to seek medical care. Further, the relationship between healthcare providers and patients is not one of equals because the providers have knowledge and expertise that ordinary individuals lack. And patients must share intimate and private information with their healthcare provider as part of seeking treatment. A
The Minnesota Health Records Act regulates the relationship between patients and healthcare providers to level the playing field between the two regarding healthcare records. Healthcare records often are the sole documentation of the providers’ provision of healthcare services and, consequently, patients’ ability to timely access healthcare records is crucial to patients’ autonomy over their medical care. The statute limits to whom, under what circumstances, and for what purpose the healthcare provider may share healthcare records with other persons and entities,5 and it provides patients with various rights to access their own healthcare records.
[U]pon a patient’s written request, a provider, at a reasonable cost to the patient, shall furnish to the patient within 30 calendar days of receiving a written request for medical records: (1) copies of the patient’s health record, including but not limited to laboratory reports, x-rays, prescriptions, and other technical information used in assessing the patient’s health conditions.
The Minnesota Health Records Act provision governing disclosure of, and patient access to, healthcare records is a law prohibiting unfair practices in trade, business, or
One definition of “unfair” that is core to section 8.31 is “[i]nequitable in business dealings.” Unfair, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see State v. Johnson, 995 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. 2023) (stating that “we may look to dictionary definitions to determine the common and ordinary meanings of these terms” and “[i]n determining which dictionary definitions apply, we consider the statutory context” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 760 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (stating that we may use dictionary definitions to help us understand the meaning of a word if applying that definition makes sense in context). The statutory context makes it clear that the point of the patient’s rights provisions in section 144.292 is precisely to balance the equities between vulnerable patients who rely on providers for necessary services—and who must provide personal and private healthcare information to do so—and the knowledgeable and expert providers and systems who need the records to properly provide and memorialize those services. If a provider shares a patient’s private information with others not entitled to see it or fails, after a request, to provide patients with their information in a timely manner, the provider abuses its power over the patients and their information, acting inequitably and unfairly. Thus, the Patients’ allegations that the Providers did not furnish their records within 30 days and that the Providers, as a practice, systematically failed to timely provide health
Moreover, section 8.31, subdivisions 1 and 3a, authorize the Attorney General to investigate, and a private party to bring a civil action when injured by, violations of laws respecting not only unfair and discriminatory business, commerce, or trade practices but also “other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade.” Failure to timely provide the records is an unlawful practice: it violates the affirmative legal obligation placed on a healthcare provider. Thus, the failure of the Providers in this case to comply with the timely disclosure requirements of the Minnesota Health Records Act is an “unlawful practice[] in business, commerce, or trade” under section 8.31, subdivision 1.
Accordingly, the Patients are persons injured by a violation of the laws referred to in section 8.31, subdivision 1. Therefore, they may bring a private action for equitable relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, to require the Providers to comply with their timely disclosure obligations under the Minnesota Health Records Act. See
B.
The Providers disagree with this conclusion and advance an alternative interpretation of the statute.7 First, the Providers contend that the scope of the Attorney
We conclude that this argument is counter to the language and the substance of section 8.31, subdivision 1. First, the words fraud or fraudulent are not used to qualify or limit the broad general description of the laws that the Attorney General may investigate and enforce under section 8.31: “law[s] of this state respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade.”
Moreover, the Providers’ argument that all the specific statutes in section 8.31, subdivision 1, are “centered on fraud” is factually incorrect. For example, section 8.31,
Subdivision 1. Definition.
For purposes of this section, “telephone advertising service” means a service that enables advertisers to make recorded personal or other advertisements available to respondents by means of voice mail or another messaging device accessed by telephone. “Telephone advertising service” does not mean advertisements for telephone services or a newspaper or other medium of mass communication that publishes an advertisement for a telephone advertising service.Subdivision 2. Verification and identification.
A person who operates a telephone advertising service in this state shall:
(1) verify the placement of an advertisement that includes the advertiser’s telephone number or other information that enables respondents to identify and communicate directly with the advertiser by calling the listed number or otherwise communicating with the person identified as the advertiser to ensure that the person placed or consented to the placement of the advertisement; and
(2) in any advertising for the telephone advertising service, provide a business mailing address or business telephone number sufficient to enable persons to communicate with the business operation of the service.
In any event, we do not agree that the phrase “other unlawful practices” is limited to practices that are unfair or discriminatory. The Providers assert that the ejusdem generis canon compels that reading of the statutory language. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199 (2012) (explaining that the ejusdem generis canon states that when a general “catchall” phrase follows a list of two or more specific examples, the general phrase is read to be limited “only to persons or things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned”). But we do not find that the ejusdem generis canon is helpful in this case.
The canon properly applies where the specific items in a list share a characteristic that unites the specific items in a particular category and the category is broader than (includes items other than) the specific items mentioned in the list. The Providers do not identify the characteristic that unites the concepts of terms “unfair” and “discriminatory” nor do they identify the other types of laws that fit that shared characteristic but that are
The Providers also assert that a broad interpretation of “other unlawful practices” runs afoul of the surplusage canon. They reason that a broad interpretation of “other unlawful practices” would swallow the terms “unfair practices” and “discriminatory practices.” Even if that is true, it is not clear how the argument helps the Providers. The canon does not give us any guidance on what meaning we should give to the phrase “other unlawful practices” that is both less broad than a meaning that would cover the timely disclosure provision of the Minnesota Health Records Act and that is different than unfair or discriminatory practices.
A person who does any of the following is liable to the patient for compensatory damages caused by an unauthorized release or an intentional, unauthorized access, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees:
(1) negligently or intentionally requests or releases a health record in violation of sections 144.291 to 144.297;
(2) forges a signature on a consent form or materially alters the consent form of another person without the person’s consent;
(3) obtains a consent form or the health records of another person under false pretenses; or
(4) intentionally violates sections 144.291 to 144.297 by intentionally accessing a record locator or patient information service without authorization.
Failure to timely disclose a healthcare record under section 144.292, subdivision 5, is not one of the acts described in section 144.298, subdivision 2. Violations of other obligations of the Minnesota Health Records Act “may be grounds for disciplinary action against a provider by the appropriate licensing board or agency.”
Second, the remedy provided in section 144.298 is compensation for the harm suffered by an individual due to violations of the specific provisions of the Minnesota Health Records Act. Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, in contrast, provides both compensatory damages remedies and equitable remedies (like an injunction) for systematic practices that violate the Minnesota Health Records Act and affect more than just the individual bringing the claim. The statutes provide different remedies that serve different purposes. Essentially, a person who brings a claim under section 8.31, subdivision 3a, is stepping into the shoes of the Attorney General and seeking relief on behalf of the broader public. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs who bring claims under the private attorney general statute must also “demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public”).10 We refuse to read into section 144.298 implicit exclusive
Finally, the Providers contend that our decision in Morris v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986), compels that we read section 8.31, subdivision 3a, more narrowly than the plain language indicates. Again, we disagree.
In Morris, the court evaluated whether an individual could bring a claim under section 8.31, subdivision 3a, for violations of the Unfair Claims Practices Act,
Nevertheless, we stated that “it is uncertain whether Chapter 72A was ever contemplated by the legislature as subject to the private civil action provision of section 8.31, subd. 3a” due to the unique history of the interrelation between chapter 72A and section 8.31. Id. at 236 (emphasis added). We noted that before 1983, section 8.31 specifically provided that violations of chapter 72A were not subject to enforcement by either the Attorney General or a private individual under section 8.31. Id.;
The commissioner may, in accordance chapter 14, adopt rules to insure the prompt, fair, and honest processing of claims and complaints. The commissioner may, in accordance with sections 72A.22 to 72A.25, seek and impose appropriate administrative remedies, including fines, for (1) a violation of this subdivision or the rules adopted pursuant to this subdivision; or (2) a violation of section 72A.20, subdivision 12. The commissioner need not show a general business practice in taking an administrative action for these violations.
No individual violation constitutes an unfair, discriminatory, or unlawful practice in business, commerce, or trade for purposes of section 8.31.
We were also swayed by the fact that Minnesota common law (1) prevented an injured third-party claimant from directly suing the insurer of the person that injured the third-party claimant; and (2) did not allow conversion of a bad faith breach of contract claim into a tort and, consequently, a first party insured cannot recover punitive damages in a breach of contract action against her insurer in the absence of some independent tort. Id. at 237. We concluded that allowing a private plaintiff to bring a claim for individual harm resulting in violation of
Morris does not control the outcome of this case. The confluence of unique historical factors that influenced our decision in Morris do not exist here: the Minnesota Health Records Act was never excluded from the scope of
C.
Finally, the Providers claim that the Patients cannot bring their claims under
The Patients also argue that
But the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights does not have a single provision that expressly authorizes a patient whose rights are violated to sue the provider to enforce the patient rights set forth in the statute. The Patients argue, however, that a combination of statutory language in
A.
We first address the Patients’ claim that
Many Minnesota statutes include a provision that expressly creates a private right of action to enforce the rights set forth in the statute. Cf.
We turn first to
It is the intent of the legislature and the purpose of this section to promote the interests and well being of the patients and residents of health care facilities. No health care facility may require a patient or resident to waive these rights as a condition of admission to the facility. Any guardian or conservator of a patient or resident or, in the absence of a guardian or conservator, an interested person, may seek enforcement of these rights on behalf of a patient or resident. An interested person may also seek enforcement of these rights on behalf of a patient or resident who has a guardian or conservator through administrative agencies or in district court having jurisdiction over guardianships and conservatorships. Pending the outcome of an enforcement proceeding the health care facility may, in good faith, comply with the instructions of a guardian or conservator. It is the intent of this section that every patient‘s civil and religious liberties, including the right to independent personal decisions and knowledge of available choices, shall not be infringed and that the facility shall encourage and assist in the fullest possible exercise of these rights.
We agree with the court of appeals that the highlighted segment of the provision does not give a broad right to every patient to file a lawsuit to enforce the rights set forth in
The structure of the sentence demonstrates the error in the Patients’ argument. The sentence upon which the Patients rely states, in full, that, “Any guardian or conservator of a patient or resident or, in the absence of a guardian or conservator, an interested person, may seek enforcement of these rights on behalf of a patient or resident.” The primary gist of the sentence is to authorize a “guardian or conservator of a patient or resident” to “seek enforcement of these rights on behalf of a patient or resident.”
Embedded in that sentence is a qualifying phrase that clarifies that ”in the absence of a guardian or conservator, an interested person, may seek enforcement of these rights on behalf of a patient or resident.”
This interpretation is bolstered by the next sentence: “An interested person may also seek enforcement of these rights on behalf of a patient or resident who has a guardian or conservator through administrative agencies or in district court having jurisdiction over guardianships and conservatorships.”
None of the Patients allege that they are subject to the appointment of a guardian or conservator. The language upon which they rely in
Indeed, if the Legislature intended to give a broad right to every patient to file a lawsuit to enforce the rights set forth in
We now turn to the other part of the Patients’ two-part argument that the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights expressly creates a private right of action to enforce the rights set forth in the statute. We conclude that even if the language in
Moreover, when there is “[a] substantial violation of the rights of any patient or resident as defined in section 144.651,”
The Patients, however, assert that
Correction order; emergencies. A substantial violation of the rights of any patient or resident as defined in section 144.651, shall be grounds for issuance of a correction order pursuant to section 144.653 or 144A.10. The issuance or nonissuance of a correction order shall not preclude, diminish, enlarge, or otherwise alter private action by or on behalf of a patient or resident to enforce any unreasonable violation of the patient‘s or resident‘s rights. Compliance with the provisions of section 144.651 shall not be required whenever emergency conditions, as documented by the attending physician, advanced practice registered nurse, or physician assistant in a patient‘s medical record or a resident‘s care record, indicate immediate medical treatment, including but not limited to surgical procedures, is necessary and it is impossible or impractical to comply with the provisions of section 144.651 because delay would endanger the patient‘s or resident‘s life, health, or safety.
Contrary to the Patients’ position, this language does not expressly state that a patient has the right to bring a private action under the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights. It merely says that, to the extent that the patient may bring an action to enforce the Patients’ rights under some theory (for instance, a claim sounding in tort or breach of contract or under section 8.31), the state Commissioner of Health‘s decision to issue or not issue a corrective order does not affect that private right.18 In other words, the language does not affirmatively establish a private right of action to sue for violations of the statute;
In conclusion, the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights does not explicitly provide a civil cause of action to enforce the provisions of the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights.
B.
The Patients alternatively argue that the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights gives rise to a private cause of action by clear implication. We have cautioned, however, that “[w]e are generally reluctant to recognize causes of action when the language of the statute does not expressly provide one.” Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on our review of the statutory language in the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights, we perceive little support for the conclusion that the Legislature implicitly intended to create a private right of action for individuals claiming violations of their rights set forth in the statute. See Graphic Commc‘ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 691 (Minn. 2014) (“In determining whether a private cause of action is clearly implied, we look to the language of the statute in question and its related sections.“).
One textual indicator that the Legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action is that the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights provides alternative mechanisms—other than a private lawsuit by a patient against a provider—to uphold the statute‘s goals of protecting patient rights. See
As discussed above, the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights requires providers to create internal grievance procedures to address claims that a patient‘s rights were violated.
We are not convinced that the mere fact that the language of the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights is framed in terms of the rights owed to individual patients by providers instead of broad regulations on providers enacted for the protection of the public good changes our conclusion. We acknowledge that in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the United States Supreme Court noted that “the right- or duty-creating language of the statute” is one accurate indicator that the legislative body intended to create a cause of action. 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979). But we have never adopted the interpretive principle that the stand-alone fact that a statute expressly identifies the class that the Legislature intended to benefit, or uses the term “right,” means that the Legislature implicitly intended to create a private right of action to secure that right, especially where the Legislature created alternative ways to enforce the right.19 Indeed, in Graphic Communications, we concluded that a statute that expressly provided protections to purchasers of prescription drugs did not
For these reasons, we conclude that the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights does not a create a private right of action for patients claiming that a provider failed to furnish the patients with their records within 30 days after a request for those records in violation of
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CHUTICH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
PROCACCINI, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
CONCURRENCE & DISSENT
ANDERSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Because I would affirm the court of appeals on both issues, I concur in part and dissent in part.
In 2014, we held that the Minnesota Health Records Act did not create a private right of action for the under-disclosure of medical records. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 2014). The Legislature adopted the Minnesota Health Records Act in 20071 and as we recognized in Larson, the Legislature provided specific causes of action for some violations but not others. 855 N.W.2d at 301–02. Today, the court explains that a different healthcare statute, the Minnesota Patients’ Bill of Rights, similarly does not provide a private right of action to enforce a provision under the Minnesota Health Records Act as it relies on the State Commissioner of Health to enforce violations of the Act, not private causes of action.
A.
It is first important to examine the alleged right appellants seek to assert. Appellants rely on the Minnesota Health Records Act,
In Larson, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy sued the healthcare provider‘s medical records contractor for failing to disclose all the insured‘s health records to the insurer. Id. at 296–97. In evaluating whether the records contractor could be held liable, we explained that the “Minnesota Health Records Act,
Thus, we recognized that the Minnesota Health Records Act expressly creates a private right of action for certain conduct resulting in “an unauthorized release or an intentional, unauthorized access” under
A person who does any of the following is liable to the patient for compensatory damages caused by an unauthorized release or an intentional, unauthorized access, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees:
(1) negligently or intentionally requests or releases a health record in violation of sections 144.291 to 144.297;
(2) forges a signature on a consent form or materially alters the consent form of another person without the person‘s consent; (3) obtains a consent form or the health records of another person under false pretenses; or
(4) intentionally violates sections 144.291 to 144.297 by intentionally accessing a record locator or patient information service without authorization.
Our review of the Minnesota Health Records Act in Larson showed that the Legislature expressly chose to provide a private civil cause of action for certain violations. 855 N.W.2d 293. This demonstrated that “the Legislature expressly creates civil liability when it intends to do so.” Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. 2007). For “‘it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.‘” Id. at 207 (quoting Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)). Although, the year after our decision in Larson, the Legislature modified parts of the Minnesota Health Records Act—including
Appellants attempt to distinguish Larson by arguing that they seek declaratory and injunctive relief rather than compensatory damages and that here, the medical providers
B.
Having examined the right claimed by appellants to a private cause of action, I turn to the vehicle appellants chose to enforce the Minnesota Health Records Act—the private attorney general statute,
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements,
Although the Minnesota Health Records Act is not one of the laws specifically enumerated in subdivision 1, appellants argue the Act need not be specifically enumerated because subdivision 1 provides a nonexclusive list of laws that may be privately enforced. Id. Respondents do not contest that “the laws referred to in subdivision 1” may include statutes not specifically listed in subdivision 1. Id., subd. 3a. And, in Morris v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986), we acknowledged that “the list of laws set out in subdivision 1 is not intended to be exclusive.” Id. at 236.
Subdivision 1 defines the scope of the Attorney General‘s enforcement authority as follows:
The attorney general shall investigate violations of the law of this state respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade, and specifically, but not exclusively, the
Nonprofit Corporation Act (sections 317A.001 to 317A.909 ), theAct Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition (sections 325D.01 to 325D.07 ), theUnlawful Trade Practices Act (sections 325D.09 to 325D.16 ), theAntitrust Act (sections 325D.49 to 325D.66 ),section 325F.67 and other laws against false or fraudulent advertising, the antidiscrimination acts contained insection 325D.67 , the act against monopolization of food products (section 325D.68 ), the act regulating telephone advertising services (section 325E.39 ), thePrevention of Consumer Fraud Act (sections 325F.68 to 325F.70 ), andchapter 53A regulating currency exchanges and assist in the enforcement of those laws as in this section provided.
Appellants argue that subdivision 1 covers the Minnesota Health Records Act because it is a law “respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade.”
We have addressed whether a statute not specifically enumerated under subdivision 1 can be privately enforced via the private attorney general statute only once. Morris, 386 N.W.2d 233. In Morris, we evaluated whether the
We explained that legislative history made “clear” that the private attorney general statute was originally intended to be inapplicable to
In examining the consequences of implying a private cause of action, we noted that “Chapter 72A‘s comprehensive scheme of administrative enforcement would seem more appropriate to investigating and regulating an insurer‘s general business practices.” Id. at 237. Lastly, we explained that “a private cause of action would result in significant changes
After Morris, we analyzed the private attorney general statute again when evaluating a claim based on a statute specifically listed in subdivision 1. Church of Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1992). In Church of Nativity, we allowed the recovery of attorney fees under the private attorney general statute because a party violated the
In Ly, we reasoned “that the sweep of the statute can be no broader than the source of its authority–that of the attorney general–whose duties are to protect public rights in the interest of the state.” Id. at 313. We analyzed the legislative history of the private attorney general statute and determined that it “advances the legislature‘s intent to prevent fraudulent representations and deceptive practices with regard to consumer products by
In 2012, we reaffirmed the public-benefit requirement and explained that construing the private attorney general statute to have a public-benefit requirement “guides us in resolving disputes over the meaning of the statute.” Curtis v. Altria Grp., Inc., 813 N.W.2d 891, 900 (Minn. 2012). We also noted that “[t]he rights of a private litigant under subdivision 3a are not as broad as those of the State AG.” Id. at 899.
Our previous interpretations of the private attorney general statute control the outcome of this dispute. The private attorney general statute is unique given that it allows private individuals to step into the shoes of the Attorney General in certain circumstances.2 See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it Matters, 57 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 2129, 2133 (“Private attorney general is an awkward expression, qualifying the public lawyer, the attorney general, with the contradictory appellation, private.“).
First, the Minnesota Health Records Act provides for administrative enforcement. See
It has been 50 years since the Legislature enacted the private attorney general statute, and 40 years since our decision in Morris; subsequent to those decisions, the Legislature has taken no action to reject our narrow interpretation of the private attorney general statute. “Once we have interpreted a statute, that prior interpretation guides us in reviewing subsequent disputes over the meaning of the statute.” Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the Legislature leaves our judicial interpretation undisturbed, the interpretation “becomes part of the terms of the statute itself.” Wynkoop v. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1998). This is so because “[w]e are extremely reluctant to overrule our precedent absent ‘a compelling reason.‘” Schuette v. City of Hutchinson, 843 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009)). And “stare decisis has special force in the area of statutory interpretation because the Legislature is free to alter what we have done.” Id.
We are thus guided by our prior interpretations and the principles that contextualize the broad language used by the Legislature in the private attorney general statute. Relevant here, Morris directs us to examine the act sought to be enforced in search of legislative intent to allow the private enforcement of a law under the private attorney general statute,
C.
With these principles in mind, I turn to whether the Minnesota Health Records Act is covered by the private attorney general statute.
Here, appellants cannot point to any affirmative indication of legislative intent that demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the Minnesota Health Records Act may be enforced by the private attorney general statute. In contrast, the Legislature has expressly provided for enforcement by the private attorney general statute in other laws. Cf.
Thus, I dissent because appellants fail to show that the Legislature intended the Minnesota Health Records Act to be enforced by the private attorney general statute.3
Notes
Subdivision 20 of
Patients and residents shall be encouraged and assisted, throughout their stay in a facility or their course of treatment, to understand and exercise their rights as patients, residents, and citizens. Patients and residents may voice grievances and recommend changes in policies and services to facility staff and others of their choice, free from restraint, interference, coercion, discrimination, or reprisal, including threat of discharge. Notice of the grievance procedure of the facility or program, as well as addresses and telephone numbers for the Office of Health Facility Complaints and the area nursing home ombudsman pursuant to the Older Americans Act, section 307(a)(12) shall be posted in a conspicuous place.
Every acute care inpatient facility, every residential program as defined in section 253C.01, every nonacute care facility, and every facility employing more than two people that provides outpatient mental health services shall have a written internal grievance procedure that, at a minimum, sets forth the process to be followed; specifies time limits, including time limits for facility response; provides for the patient or resident to have the assistance of an advocate; requires a written response to written grievances; and provides for a timely decision by an impartial decision maker if the grievance is not otherwise resolved. Compliance by hospitals, residential programs as defined in section 253C.01 which are hospital-based primary treatment programs, and outpatient surgery centers with section 144.691 and compliance by health maintenance organizations with section 62D.11 is deemed to be compliance with the requirement for a written internal grievance procedure.