ERIC L. WIGGINS, et al. v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF INDIANA, et al.
Appellate Case No. 28163
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
February 1, 2019
2019-Ohio-312
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
ERIC L. WIGGINS, et al.
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF
INDIANA, et al.
Defendant-Appellee
Appellate Case No. 28163
Trial Court Case No. 2018-MSC-193
(Civil Appeal from
Probate Court)
. . . . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 1st day of February, 2019.
. . . . . . . . . . .
WORRELL A. REID, Atty. Reg. No. 0059620, 6718 Loop Road, # 2, Centerville, Ohio 45459
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, Eric L. Wiggins, et al.
DAVID E. WILLIAMSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0071270, 312 Elm Street, Suite 1850, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana and Liberty Mutual Group, Inc.
THOMAS L. ROSENBERG, Atty. Reg. No. 0024898 and ANDREW S. GOOD, Atty. Reg. No. 0088653, 41 S. High Street, Huntington Center, 41st Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Praetorian Insurance Company
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
{¶ 1} Eric Wiggins appeals from the judgment of the probate court that dismissed his complaint for declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The question is whether the probate court had jurisdiction to address issues relating to defendant Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana’s obligations to Wiggins under his homeowner’s insurance policy. We conclude that these issues were not within the probate court’s jurisdiction, and we affirm.
I. Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On November 29, 2016, Wiggins’s wife, Leola Wiggins, died intestate. The following January, Wiggins was appointed the administrator of her estate. Later that year, in June, while the estate was being probated, fire damaged the Dayton, Ohio, house in which they had resided together and in which Wiggins continued to reside. The house had been titled only in Leola’s name. Two homeowner’s insurance policies covered the losses. Praetorian Insurance had issued a policy before Leola’s death under which she was the named insured and the mortgage company, defendant Seterus, Inc., was identified as an additional insured. After being appointed the administrator of his wife’s estate, Wiggins purchased a policy in his individual capacity from Safeco that provided the same coverages and similar coverage amounts as the Praetorian policy. Under the Safeco policy, Wiggins was the sole named insured.
{¶ 3} Wiggins submitted loss claims to Safeco. While it was processing his claims, Safeco learned about the Praetorian policy. The Safeco policy contained an “other insurance” clause stating that if a loss covered by the policy were also covered by another policy, Safeco would pay only its proportionate share of the loss, based on the total
{¶ 4} Wiggins filed a declaratory-judgment action in the probate court in June 2018, individually and as administrator of his wife’s estate, against Safeco, Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. (Safeco’s parent company, it appears), Praetorian, Seterus, Federal National Mortgage Association, and the City of Dayton. All of Wiggins’s claims related to the Safeco insurance policy and his belief that, under that policy, Safeco was obligated to fully pay for his losses from the fire and to pay all the proceeds to him. Against Safeco and Liberty Mutual, Wiggins asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and declaratory judgment. Wiggins’s sole claim against Praetorian, Seterus, and Federal National asked the probate court to rule that they had “no claim to the insurance proceeds, and that the same may be paid over to the Plaintiff, as the named beneficiary.” The claim against Dayton asked the court to declare that the house “be properly stabilized, including proper demolition, using funds from insurance proceeds, as provided in the [Safeco] policy,” which included “Land Stabilization” coverage.
{¶ 5} Safeco and Praetorian each moved to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), arguing that the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The probate court agreed. The court found that the central dispute in Wiggins’s action concerned the construction and interpretation of a contract—the Safeco insurance policy—to which the only parties were Wiggins and Safeco. The court found that Wiggins’s claims in the action were unrelated
{¶ 6} Wiggins appeals.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} The sole assignment of error alleges:
The Entry And Order Of Dismissal was contrary to law because the declaratory judgment action filed by the fiduciary properly invoked the exclusive, and or concurrent jurisdiction of the probate court to direct and control the actions of the fiduciary, order the distribution of assets belonging to the estate, and to determine the rights of creditors and other parties to the action.
(Emphasis sic.).
Standard of review
{¶ 8} We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Zimmerman v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Health Dept., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26816, 2016-Ohio-1423, ¶ 13. The question is “whether the complaint contains allegations of a cause of action that the trial court has authority to decide.” Vinson v. Diamond Triumph Auto Glass, Inc., 149 Ohio App.3d 605, 2002-Ohio-5596, 778 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.); see also Zimmerman at ¶ 13 (quoting the same). When determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), a court “ ‘is not confined to the allegations of the complaint.’ ” Zimmerman at ¶ 13, quoting Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 211, 358 N.E.2d 526 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 9} “The probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. The court has only that jurisdiction which is granted by statute and by Constitution.” Zuendel v. Zuendel, 63 Ohio St.3d 733, 735, 590 N.E.2d 1260 (1992).
(c) To direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators and order the distribution of estates;
* * *
(l) To render declaratory judgments * * *; [and]
(m) To direct and control the conduct of fiduciaries and settle their accounts[.]
Furthermore, Wiggins argues that the probate court had concurrent jurisdiction under
{¶ 10} We agree with the probate court that it had neither exclusive nor concurrent jurisdiction over Wiggins’s action.
No exclusive jurisdiction
{¶ 12} Nor did the probate court have exclusive jurisdiction under
{¶ 13} The matters raised in Wiggins’s declaratory-judgment action were not directly related to the administration of his wife’s estate. As we said, Wiggins’s claims do not relate to directing and controlling his conduct, settling his account, or distributing his wife’s estate,
{¶ 14} Lastly,
No concurrent jurisdiction
{¶ 16}
III. Conclusion
{¶ 17} The probate court correctly concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Consequently it did not err when it sustained the motions to dismiss on that basis. Wiggins’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The probate court’s judgment is affirmed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
WELBAUM, P. J. and TUCKER, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Worrell A. Reid
David E. Williamson
Thomas L. Rosenberg
Andrew S. Good
Martin W. Gehres
Hon. Alice O. McCollum