SHIRLEY WEATHINGTON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. RALPH HILL, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 9-11-16
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
November 14, 2011
2011-Ohio-5875
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 10 CIV 52422 Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
J. C. Ratliff and Jeff Ratliff for Appellant
Laura C. Blumenstiel and James B. Blumenstiel for Appellees
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Ralph E. Hill, Jr. (“Ralph“), appeals the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, finding in favor of his six brothers and sisters, Plaintiffs-Appellees1 (“the Siblings” or “Appellees“), in their declaratory judgment action to determine the parties’ interests in the real property that was owned by their mother prior to her death in 1966. On appeal, Ralph contends that the trial court erred in finding that his affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, adverse possession and laches were without merit, and that the probate court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is reversed.
{¶2} On July 29, 2010, the Siblings filed a complaint (Case No. 10 CIV 52422) requesting the probate court to make a declaratory judgment regarding the parties’ respective ownership interests in real estate located at 608 Jefferson Street, Marion, Ohio (hereinafter, “the Property“), that was previously owned by the parties’ deceased parents, Ralph E. Hill, Sr. (“Father“) and Ida Loree Hill (“Mother“). The primary issue to be decided concerned what interests, if any, the
{¶3} On December 4, 1966, the parties’ Mother died intestate, survived by her husband and the seven children. At that time, the Mother and the Father each owned a one-half interest in the Property, as tenants in common. Since the Mother died intestate, her one-half ownership interest in each lot was subject to the statute of descent and distribution in effect in at that time. Therefore,
{¶4} According to the statute that was in effect in 1966, the Father was entitled to a one-third interest of the Mother‘s half interest (resulting in a 2/3 interest in the total Property), and the seven children were entitled to inherit a two-thirds interest of the Mother‘s half interest (resulting in a 1/3 interest in the total Property). Therefore, each of the seven children was entitled to inherit a 1/21st interest (1/3 interest divided by 7) in the Property. No estate was opened at the time of the Mother‘s death and the Father continued to live on the Property. The children, except for Ralph, eventually moved out of state.
{¶5} In 1984 or 1985, the Father became ill and was hospitalized for more than a month. In an affidavit, Ralph stated that he made and helped pay for improvements to the property so that his Father could return to the home after his hospitalization. Ralph further stated that he and his wife assumed full, round-the-clock care for his Father from the time of his release from the hospital until his Father‘s death in 1989.
{¶6} On November 24, 1987, the Father signed a General Warranty Deed transferring his ownership interest in the Property to Ralph, although the General Warranty Deed was not recorded at that time. In January of 1988, Ralph opened an estate for his Mother in the Probate Court of Marion County (Case No. 40592). At that time, four of the Siblings (Deborah, Earl, Shirley and Marilyn) signed waivers agreeing to have Ralph administer the estate of their Mother. On January 11, 1988, the probate court issued a Certificate of Transfer transferring the Mother‘s half interest in Lot 1 to the Father, as her surviving spouse. The estate was released from administration, pursuant to
{¶7} On January 12, 1988, the Father and Ralph entered into a Land Installment Contract for the purchase of Lot 1 and Lot 2, and the contract was recorded. On March 2, 1988, a release of the Land Installment Contract was
{¶8} On December 16, 1989, the Father died. There is nothing in the record pertaining to the administration of the Father‘s estate. Ralph claims he has resided on the Property from at least March 2, 1988, through the current court proceedings. In his affidavit, Ralph represents that at the time of their Father‘s death in 1989, all family members agreed Ralph was the owner of the Property with full, 100% ownership interests. (Affid. of Ralph Hill, Jr., Feb. 11, 2011.)
{¶9} On May 1, 1996, Ralph filed an Affidavit for Transfer concerning the transfer his Mother‘s interest in Lot 2 because the original Certificate of Transfer issued in January of 1988 only pertained to Lot 1. Ralph did not re-open his Mother‘s estate when he filed the Affidavit for Transfer. The Affidavit set forth the Mother‘s interest in the lot; attested to the Father‘s transfer of his interest to Ralph by General Warranty Deed on March 2, 1988; and stated that at the time that the Father conveyed the Property to Ralph, the Father “was seized in fee simple to title” to both of the Lots. (Ex. C to Plaintiff‘s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment.)
{¶10} In 2009, the Siblings contacted an attorney to investigate their potential ownership interests in the Property. On July 17, 2009, the Siblings filed an “Affidavit Relating to Title” per
{¶11} On July 29, 2010, the Siblings filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against Ralph in the probate court seeking judgment in their favor on the matters set forth in their Affidavit Relating to Title. They contend that the Father could not have transferred a greater interest than he possessed to Ralph, and that the Father‘s only interest in the Property was his original half-interest and the one-third interest that he inherited upon his wife‘s death. Therefore, they maintain that
{¶12} Ralph filed an Answer generally denying the allegations in the Complaint. Ralph further asserted several affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the doctrines of unclean hands, estoppel, waiver, and laches. Ralph also claimed that the Siblings had failed to mitigate or minimize their damages and that their claims, if any, were barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
{¶13} The probate court advised counsel for the parties that it would decide the matter based upon written arguments to be submitted according to a briefing schedule established at a pre-trial conference in December of 2010. Accordingly, Ralph submitted a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint, pursuant to
{¶14} The Siblings submitted a Memorandum Contra to the Motion to Dismiss, and Ralph submitted a Reply to this. The probate court considered the contested issues and arguments made by the parties and found that: the Mother‘s interests in the Property would pass according to the version of
{¶15} The probate court also held:
This Court finds it lacks jurisdiction to consider the respective financial interests of each party in the subject real estate and directs resolution of these issues pursuant to
[R.C.] 5303.01 , through an Action to Quiet Title in the Marion County Common Pleas Court, General Division.This Court further finds that [Ralph‘s] arguments regarding lapse of any Statute of Limitations, Adverse Possession and Doctrine of Laches are without merit in this Declaratory
Judgment Proceeding, and [Ralph] is free to assert same in the Action to Quiet Title proceeding.
(Apr. 8, 2011 J.E., p. 3.) Accordingly, the trial court found Ralph‘s Motion to Dismiss was “over-ruled in part, as to the declaratory relief requested, and sustained in part, as to the parties’ equitable interests in the real estate in question.” (Id.)
{¶16} It is from this judgment that Ralph now appeals, raising the following two assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in ruling that [Ralph‘s] arguments of statute of limitations, adverse possession and laches were without merit in an action for declaratory judgment.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by failing to dismiss [the Siblings‘] Complaint for Declaratory Judgment as the declaratory judgment action was incidental to an action for recovery of real estate or a quiet title action, both actions which the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶17} We will review the second assignment of error first, as it is dispositive of this appeal. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, subject to the de novo standard of review. Groza-Vance v. Vance, 162 Ohio App.3d 510, 2005-Ohio-3815, 834 N.E.2d 15, ¶13.
{¶18} On appeal, Ralph maintains that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to settle the controversy because the declaratory judgment action was merely incidental to an action for recovery of real estate or a quiet title action, which is not normally within a probate court‘s jurisdiction. Ralph contends that the Siblings filed the declaratory judgment action in order to circumvent the twenty-one year statute of limitations on an action to recover title to property pursuant to
{¶19} Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and probate proceedings are restricted to those actions permitted by statute and by the Ohio Constitution. Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d 708, paragraph one of the syllabus. The jurisdiction of a probate court is defined by
(A)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction:
* * *
(b) To grant and revoke letters testamentary and of administration;
(c) To direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators and order the distribution of estates;
* * *
(l) To render declaratory judgments, including, but not limited to, those rendered pursuant to
section 2107.084 3 of the Revised Code;* * *
{¶20} The Declaratory Judgment Act is codified in
(A) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin, or others;
(B) To direct the executors, administrators, trustees, or other fiduciaries to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity;
(C) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.
{¶21} The Siblings argue that these two statutes give a probate court the jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions brought “to determine any questions arising out of the administration of an estate.” (Appellees Brief, p. 3, emphasis added.) They also claim that “countless courts” have ruled that jurisdiction is properly with the probate court “on matters concerning the same issues present in this case,” and provide numerous citations. (Id. at p. 4.)
{¶22} However, we find that the Siblings’ reasoning is incorrect on both grounds. First, the Siblings have misquoted and misinterpreted the statute, thereby changing its meaning. Second, the facts and circumstances in all of the cases cited by the Siblings are distinguishable and inapplicable to this case.
{¶23} In examining questions concerning when probate courts have jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the only time when the Probate Court does have the power to declare rights and status and the legal relations of the parties interested as heirs, executors, etc. in an estate is after the administration of the estate has been commenced and while it is still pending.” (Emphasis added.) Radaszewski v. Keating (1943), 141 Ohio St.489, 499, 49 N.E.2d 167, 172.4 In dicta, the Supreme Court further commented that “[c]ertainly the Probate Court would not have jurisdiction to determine the matters at issue after the administration had been fully settled and the estate closed.” Id.
{¶24} The questions involved in this declaratory judgment action did not arise “in the administration” of any estate. The Mother died forty-four years earlier, and her estate was opened and then released from administration in 1988, twenty-two years before the Siblings filed their cause of action. The Siblings did not object to any of the claimed irregularities in the administration at that time and they did not file a timely appeal. The parties have not reopened the estate, so the questions posed in this cause of action did not arise in the administration of any
{¶25} The cases cited by the Siblings in support of jurisdiction all involved declaratory actions to determine the validity of inter vivos property transfers that the probate court determined during the administration of an estate. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 1995-Ohio-96, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (the allegations in the complaint for declaratory judgment concerning the propriety of inter vivos transfers were filed by the plaintiff, in her capacities as executor and administrator of the decedents’ estates); Grimes v. Grimes, 173 Ohio App.3d 537, 2007-Ohio-5653, 879 N.E.2d 247 (the brother, as executor, brought claims during the administration of the estate challenging the father‘s inter vivos transfer of property just prior to his death); Bobko v. Sagen (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 397, 406-07, 572 N.E.2d 823 (a party responsible for the administration of an estate may bring a declaratory judgment action in the probate court to determine the validity of inter vivos transfers of property that would revert back to the estate if the transfers were to be found invalid). In all of the cases cited by the Siblings, it was necessary for the probate court to ascertain what assets were actually in the estate before making a final distribution. The determinations were necessary so that the probate court could properly administer and settle the estate. None of these cases involved the
{¶26} The facts in the case before us did not involve any inter vivos transfer made by the Mother prior to her death. Furthermore, there was no “estate” for the property to revert back to, because the estate had been released from administration decades earlier. The cases cited by the Siblings are completely distinguishable and are not relevant.
{¶27} The Declaratory Judgment Act does not enlarge the jurisdiction of courts over subject matter. Ryan v. Tracy (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 363, 364, 453 N.E.2d 661. Instead, it extends the power of courts to grant the additional remedy of declaratory relief within their respective jurisdictions. Id. A court may grant declaratory relief if it finds that the action is within the spirit of the Declaratory Judgments Act (
{¶28} The only matters that were actually decided by the probate court were not the questions that were the crux of the controversy between the parties. There was no actual controversy among the parties as to what statute applied to their Mother‘s estate or as to what the parties were originally entitled to receive under the law. The issues that required resolution involved the current status of the title to the Property and how title to the Property may have been affected by the affirmative defenses raised by Ralph. And, after waiting more than four decades to raise these issues, the Siblings cannot claim that this is a matter that requires “speedy relief.” And finally, the decision clearly did not terminate the uncertainty or controversy as the key issues still remain to be decided by the general division of the court of common pleas.
{¶29} In determining whether a declaratory judgment action is properly before the probate court, the primary question is whether the matter is related to the administration of the estate. Zuendel v. Zuendel (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 733, 736, 590 N.E.2d 1260; Radaszewski, 141 Ohio St.489. The issues
{¶30} Having found error prejudicial to the Appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
ROGERS, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
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