CHESTER WIDOMSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (SUNY) AT ORANGE, AKA ORANGE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 13-1367-cv
United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
April 8, 2014
STRAUB, SACK, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.
August Term, 2013. Submitted: March 20, 2014. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. No. 09-cv-7517 — Kenneth M. Karas, Judge.
Appeal from an order of the United Stаtes District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge). We hold that Appellant failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Appellee perceived him as being substantially limited in the major life activity of working, and failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Appellee‘s explanation for bringing disciplinary proceedings against him was pretext for retаliation.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
PER CURIAM:
Chester Widomski appeals from the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Apрellee the State University of New York (SUNY) at Orange, also known as Orange County Community College (“OCCC“), on his claims of discrimination on the basis of a “perceived disability” and retaliation in violation of Title II of thе Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA“),
BACKGROUND
Widomski enrolled as a full-time student in OCCC‘s two-year Medical Laboratory Technology (“MLT“) program in the fall of 2007 in order to become a licensed medical laboratory tеchnician. In fall 2008, Widomski began the clinical portion of the program, a course called Clinical Training I. Widomski was assigned to the Catskill Regional Medical Center, where Rebecca Sander, an employee of the Center (and not OCCC), served as his proctor. As part of the course, students were required to submit weekly clinical summary reports signed by their proctors accompanied by wеekly narratives relating to the work performed.
On his third day at the Center, Sander told Widomski that he would not be allowed to draw blood from patients because his hands shook too much. She expressed this viеw to Rosamaria Contarino, the chair of OCCC‘s Laboratory Technology Department, and Contarino agreed. Although Widomski admits that his hands sometimes shake when he is nervous, he denies any physical impairment or disability of the hands.
On October 7, 2008, Contarino met with Widomski to discuss the fact that Widomski had not submitted the required weekly summary reports and narratives. At the meeting, Contarino and Widomski executed an agreement providing that Widomski would submit the required reports and narratives by October 9, 2008, to avoid receiving an “F” in the course. Contarino also informed Widomski that he would not be permitted to participate in the рhlebotomy portion of the course because of his shaky hands. Contarino informed Widomski that he remained qualified to graduate from the MLT program and thereafter obtain employment as a laboratory technician, but he would not be permitted to receive a MLT license that would permit him to work in a hospital or in any other setting where he would need to draw blood from patients. On Octоber 8, 2008, Widomski submitted hematology and urinalysis summary reports to Contarino in accordance with their agreement of the previous day.
On October 27, 2008, Widomski‘s counsel sent a letter to Contarino asking that she allow Widomski to complete the phlebotomy rotation and denying that he had a disability of the hands.
On the same day, Contarino again reminded Widomski to submit outstanding summary reports. Widomski sent additional hematolоgy and urinalysis forms on November 4, 2008. These forms were almost identical to the forms Widomski submitted on October 8. Widomski‘s explanation for the similarity is that “Sander . . . refuse[d] to sign new forms, so [he] changed the date of his prеviously-submitted . . . forms to October 29, 2008, which is the date Sander filled ‘yes’ and ‘Y’ in the
On November 5, 2008, Contarino initiated disciplinary proceedings against Widomski by referring charges of document falsification to the Vice President of Student Services, Paul Broadie, II. Broadie rеferred the matter to a Board of Inquiry. Following a formal hearing before the Board of Inquiry, and its determination that he had falsified the documents, Widomski was expelled from the MLT program.
Widomski then brought this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court granted summary judgment to OCCC. It concluded that Widomski had failed to establish that OCCC perceived his shaking hands to substantially limit a major life activity, and granted thе motion for summary judgment as to the ADA discrimination claim. Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y. (SUNY) at Orange, 933 F. Supp. 2d 534, 543-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 490-91, 493 (1999)).
Regarding his retaliation claim, Widomski characterized the protected activity as his attorney‘s October 27, 2008, letter, and the retaliation as Contarino‘s referral of the disciplinary matter to Broadie. Id. at 545. The District Court concluded that Widomski established his prima facie case, but that Contarino‘s good faith belief that he had falsified documents was а legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the disciplinary referral. Id. at 549-50. Because Widomski had not presented any evidence that OCCC‘s “explanation [wa]s a false pretext for a retaliatory mоtive,” the court granted summary judgment for OCCC on the retaliation claim as well. Id. at 553.
Widomski appeals.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). We conclude that the definition of “disability” in
I. The definition of “disability” set forth in Section 12102 of the ADA applies to all Titles of the ADA.
The District Court‘s holding that the definition of “disability” in the ADA applies to Title II of the ADA is correct.
The “[a]s used in this chаpter” language unambiguously incorporates the definition of disability into all Titles of the ADA.
As the District Court noted in its opinion below, a line of cases from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York holds that the definition of “disability” in
(adopting without comment narrower definition of “disability” from Farid), adopted by 2012 WL 1898947 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); Silvagnoli v. Fischer, No. 9:07-CV-561 (NAM/GJD), 2010 WL 1063849, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (same), adopted by 2010 WL 1063840 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010). The District Court rejected the suggestion that the definition of disability applies only to Title I of the ADA, as do we.
II. Widomski failed to demonstrate that OCCC perceived him as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life aсtivity.
To establish discrimination based on a perceived disability under the version of the ADA in effect during the period at issue in this case, a plaintiff must show that he is regarded as having an impairment that “substantially limits” a mаjor life activity. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), superseded by statute,
There is no record evidencе that Contarino or any other OCCC employee believed that Widomski‘s shaky hands excluded him from a broad class of jobs. To the contrary, Contarino told Widomski that he would still be employable as a medical
III. Widomski failed to demonstrate that OCCC‘s explanation for its decision to bring disciplinary proceedings against him was pretext for retaliation.
“Claims for retaliation [under the ADA] are analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework established for Title VII cases.” Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002). For substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court‘s Opiniоn and Order entered March 21, 2013, we agree that Widomski has not produced evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the initiation of disciplinary proceеdings against him was a pretext for retaliation. Contarino‘s good faith belief that Widomski fabricated two assignments constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for bringing a disciplinary action against him. The burden having shifted back to Widomski to provide competent
evidence of pretext, Widomski fails to raise a genuine factual dispute as to whether this explanation is false or otherwise рretextual. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Widomski‘s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.