JOHN WHITE v. WINDY DAVIA
CASE NO. 11 HA 4
STATE OF OHIO, HARRISON COUNTY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH DISTRICT
June 22, 2012
2012-Ohio-2820
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich, Hon. Mary DeGenaro
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Harrison County, Ohio Case No. 20104007; JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
For Plaintiff-Appellee: John White, Pro se 211 East Main Street Richmond, Ohio 43944
For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Mary Corabi Corabi Law Office 424 Market Street Steubenville, Ohio 43952
{¶1} Appellant Windy Davia appeals a judgment of the Harrison County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, overruling objections to a magistrate‘s decision regarding child support. Appellee John D. White filed a parentage complaint and the case was referred to a magistrate. The parties entered into an agreed order dealing with matters of parentage and visitation, but the question of child support was left to be decided by the Harrison County Child Support Enforcement Agency (HCCSEA) and the court. The magistrate awarded child support effective as of the date of the hearing. Appellant filed objections to the magistrate‘s hearing on the grounds that child support should have been awarded retroactive to the birth of the child. The court overruled the objections because Appellant had failed to file a transcript of the magistrate‘s hearing. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and this timely appeal followed.
{¶2} Appellant contends that she was not required to file a transcript with her objections under
Background of the Case
{¶3} Appellee John White filed a parentage complaint on May 12, 2010 pursuant to
{¶4} On November 10, 2010, the parties entered into an agreed judgment entry establishing that Appellee was the father. The court set a visitation schedule and referred the matter of child support to the HCCSEA for a recommendation. The child support question was then heard by the magistrate on January 26, 2011. Although the parties had been represented by counsel prior to this date, they both chose to appear without counsel at the child support hearing. The magistrate subsequently ordered Appellee to pay child support of $494.25 per month starting on the date of the hearing, and also awarded him the tax exemption for the child. The magistrate‘s decision was filed on February 11, 2011.
{¶5} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision on February 16, 2011.
{¶6} On March 16, 2011, the court overruled the objections on the grounds that Appellant had not filed a transcript of the magistrate‘s hearing.
{¶7} On March 24, 2011, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 16, 2011 judgment entry. The trial court overruled the motion on April 7, 2011. This appeal was then filed on April 14, 2011. Although a motion for reconsideration of a valid final judgment from a court of common pleas is a nullity in Ohio and does not extend the time for filing an appeal, the record indicates that Appellant filed her appeal within 30 days of the original March 16, 2011, judgment entry, and thus, the appeal may be heard. Pitts v. Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 381, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981). No Appellee‘s brief has been filed.
{¶8} In her filings before us, Appellant has not specifically delineated an assignment of error on appeal. She has argued, however, the following as her issue on review:
The Court erred in not issuing a retroactive order of child support.
{¶9} Trial courts enjoy considerable discretion on child support issues. The standard used to review child support orders is abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989). A trial court‘s discretion in child support decisions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, i.e., the decision is arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). The standard of review of a trial court‘s decision whether or not to adopt a magistrate‘s decision in a parentage action is also abuse of discretion. Knapp v. Bayless, 9th Dist. No. 05CA008796, 2006-Ohio-4414, ¶22.
{¶10} Appellant contends that she did not need to file a transcript of the magistrate‘s hearing in order to properly object to the decision. She states, without providing any legal precedent, that a court is required to award retroactive child support in a parentage case if requested by the parties. This statement is not correct. A parentage action is filed pursuant to
(2) When a court determines whether to require a parent to pay an amount for that parent‘s failure to support a child prior to the date the court issues an order requiring that parent to pay an amount for the current support of that child, it shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, any monetary contribution either parent of the child made to the support of the child prior to the court issuing the order requiring the parent to pay an amount for the current support of the child.
{¶11} Thus, under
{¶12} In this case, the evidence regarding child support was presented to a magistrate. A magistrate‘s decision is reviewed by the trial judge, who may adopt the decision, modify it, or reject it altogether.
(iii) Objection to magistrate‘s factual finding; transcript or affidavit. An objection to a factual finding, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact under
Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii) , shall be supported by atranscript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available.
{¶13} Failure to file a transcript constitutes a waiver of any error on appeal, except for plain error, relating to factual issues determined by the magistrate.
{¶14} Appellant needed to provide a transcript of the magistrate‘s hearing in order for the trial court to review the factual basis for the magistrate‘s failure to award retroactive child support. Without that transcript, the trial court had no factual basis for modifying or rejecting the magistrate‘s evidentiary decision on this point. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion to overrule Appellant‘s objections
Vukovich, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.
