WAYNE PRATER, Appellant v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PA D.O.C.; BARRY SMITH, Superintendent at SCI Houtzdale; KENNETH HOLLIBAUGH, Deputy Superintendent at SCI Houtzdale; DAVID CLOSE, Deputy Superintendent at SCI Houtzdale; REBECCA REIFER, Superintendent Assistant at SCI Houtzdale; MICHELLE IVICIC, Corrections Classifications & Program Manager (CCPM); JANET PEARSON, Corrections Health Care Administrator (CHCA); DR. MUHAMMAD NAJI, Medical Director at SCI Houtzdale; JOSEPH H. DUPONT, Chief Hearing Examiner; JOSEPH J. SILVA, Director Health Bureau Care Services; ADREN SMITH, Director Health Care Services; FREDDY NUNEZ, Hearing Examiner; DORINA VARNER, Chief Grievance Officer; KERI MOORE, Grievance Officer; JOEL BARROWS, Major at SCI Houtzdale; K. SHEA, Security Captain at SCI Houtzdale; T. KNOWLES, Captain at SCI Houtzdale; CO 1 MOONEY, Lieutenant (Lt.) SCI Houtzdale; C.O. KELLY, Lieutenant (Lt.) at SCI Houtzdale; CHIEF JAMES, Lieutenant (Lt.) SCI Houtzdale; PEGGY BARNS, Physician Assistant (P/A) at SCI Houtzdale; ELIZABETH JURY, Nurse at SCI Houtzdale; RICHARD or RICH, Male Nurse at SCI Houtzdale; DAREN GINTER, Unit Manager at SCI Houtzdale; WILLIAM NORVELL, Maintenance Supervisor at SCI Houtzdale; POBORSKI, Sergeant (Sgt.) at SCI Houtzdale; LARUE, Sergeant (Sgt.) at SCI Houtzdale; G. Cogan, Counselor at SCI Houtzdale; DUFORE, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI Houtzdale; FLORA, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI Houtzdale; MR. MAINES, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI Houtzdale; LONG, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI Houtzdale
AARON VAUGHN, Appellant v. CORRECTION OFFICER IMOHOFF, (Pod Officer of F-B Pod from 11/10/16 - 3/15/17); SERGEANT TIKEY, (Sgt. of F-B Pod 6 to 2am shift); CORRECTION OFFICER GILL; CORRECTION OFFICER CARTER, (Pod Officer of F-B Pod from 11/10/16 - 3/15/17); LIEUTENANT SCHAMP, (RHU Lt. 2-10pm shift); CORRECTION OFFICER STECKLY, (Pod Officer of F-B Pod 2-10pm shift); CORRECTION OFFICER TUSCANO, (Pod Officer of F-B Pod 2-10pm shift); JOHN DOE, (Co-worker with CO Gill on 11/10/16); CORRECTION OFFICER W. PEREZ-RAMOS
ISAAC RAY VAUGHAN, JR., Appellant v. ALBION SCI; C.O. BOYD, Guard; C.O. WOODS; C.O. CAMRON; C.O. MCINTOSH; C.O. W. CHRISTOPHER; C.O. ARNOLD; MR. LANCE, Unit Man.; MS. NORTIN, Counselor; MS. HERMAN; MS. SNOW, Psych; MS. RICHARDS, Psych; SUPERINTENDENT MICHAEL CLARK; C.O. MAKENEY; C.O. SEVERO
Nos. 19-1732, 20-2254, 20-2897
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
August 2, 2023
PRECEDENTIAL
PRECEDENTIAL
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3-19-cv-00019) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Keith A. Pesto
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 1-18-cv-00116) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo
Argued on April 20, 2023
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 2, 2023)
Wayne Prater
#KV-1019
Houtzdale SCI
P.O Box 1000
209 Institution Drive
Houtzdale, PA 16698
Pro Se, Case No. 19-1732
Aaron Vaughn
#KW-3603
Huntingdon SCI
1100 Pike Street
Huntingdon, PA 16654
Pro Se, Case No. 20-2254
Isaac Ray Vaughan, Jr.
#JF-0037
Albion SCI
10745 Route 18
Albion, PA 16475
Pro Se, Case No. 20-2897
Michelle Henry, Attorney
Sean A. Kirkpatrick ARGUED
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square 15th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Case No. 19-1732
James S. Ballenger
Samuel Gerstemeier ARGUED
Tristan Locke ARGUED
University of Virginia School of Law
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Appellant Case Nos. 19-1732, 20-2254 and 20-2897
Michelle Henry, Attorney General
Howard G. Hopkirk
Michael J. Scarinci
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square 15th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Daniel B. Mullen ARGUED
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1251 Waterfront Place
Mezzanine Level
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellees Case Nos. 20-2254 and 20-2897
OPINION OF THE COURT
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Wayne Prater, Isaac Vaughan, Jr., and Aaron Vaughn each challenge an order entered by a magistrate judge in their
Primarily at issue on appeal is whether the magistrate judges acted within the scope of their statutorily granted jurisdiction under
Thus, the magistrate judges’ jurisdiction to enter final orders in each of these three cases turns on the parties’ consent. We will dismiss Prater‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because all parties did not consent and, therefore, the magistrate judge lacked the power to involuntarily dismiss the case. When a magistrate judge lacks jurisdiction, so do we. By contrast, the magistrate judges were empowered to enter summary judgment in Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s cases because all parties either expressly or impliedly consented. Therefore, we have jurisdiction and will affirm summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
I.
A. Factual and Procedural History
This consolidated case concerns three appeals from orders entered by magistrate judges in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
a. Wayne Prater
Wayne Prater, a prisoner at State Correctional Institution Houtzdale, tore his
The Western District assigned the case to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge denied Prater‘s IFP motion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which does not permit inmates to proceed IFP if they have three strikes—i.e., three actions or appeals dismissed because they are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
b. Isaac Vaughan, Jr.
Isaac Vaughan, Jr., a prisoner at SCI Albion, filed a complaint against the institution in April 2018, alleging that he was assaulted on two separate occasions by prison officials. Isaac followed up with an amended complaint, naming SCI Albion and fourteen individuals. He alleged officials subjected him to excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment right when he was pepper-sprayed, beaten, shackled, placed on suicide watch, restrained, drugged, and shocked while guards ripped off his clothes. In support of his complaint, Isaac stated that he had properly exhausted administrative remedies because he “talk[ed] to everyone [he] could” about the incidents and filed a formal grievance. JA Isaac 67. In his formal grievance, Isaac offered several reasons why it “took so long” for him to file one. JA Isaac 237. Even so, his grievance was rejected as untimely. He did not seek further administrative review.
Along with his complaint, Isaac filed an IFP motion and a “consent to jurisdiction” by a magistrate judge under
All defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued SCI Albion was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and, among other things, Isaac‘s claims against the fourteen officials were not properly exhausted under
c. Aaron Vaughn
Aaron Vaughn, a prisoner at SCI Dallas, filed a complaint against SCI Greene, over thirty officers, and several groups of John/Jane Doe defendants in April 2017. He alleged a variety of violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He filed several amended complaints. But over time, various claims and defendants fell out of the case. The main claim at issue on appeal is Aaron‘s excessive force claim that CO Gill and a John Doe co-worker (later identified as CO Johnston) beat him while transporting him from one housing unit to another. In support of his complaint, Aaron stated that he properly exhausted administrative remedies. Aaron filed a formal grievance about the incident. DOC initiated an investigation pursuant to policy and then denied the grievance. Aaron unsuccessfully appealed once but did not seek final administrative review. Aaron also detailed the alleged abuse in a “Request to Staff Member” form. JA Aaron 484.
Along with his complaint, Aaron filed an IFP motion. After his IFP motion was granted, Aaron filed a “consent to jurisdiction” by a magistrate judge under
Throughout the litigation, the Office of Attorney General—acting through several deputy AGs who successively staffed the case—appeared on behalf of all defendants and waived service of process. The initial deputy AG on the case filed a form consenting to magistrate judge jurisdiction under
The defendants deposed Aaron and moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge entered summary judgment for CO Gill and CO Johnston, concluding that Aaron failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not taking a final administrative appeal. The magistrate judge noted that DOC maintains two policies for reporting abuse: ADM 001 and ADM 804. However, she reasoned that only the latter—which sets forth the formal grievance procedures, including the final administrative appeal satisfies the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirements. The magistrate judge also noted that Aaron failed to substitute and serve CO Johnston as the John Doe co-worker from his complaint. Nevertheless, she entered summary judgment in
B. The Appeals
On appeal, Prater, Isaac, and Aaron argue that the magistrate judges lacked jurisdiction to enter final judgment orders in their respective cases. Given the similar jurisdictional issues posed by each of their cases, we consolidated the three appeals and appointed amicus curiae on behalf of the three prisoners.3 Meanwhile, the Commonwealth participated in all of the cases but in different capacities. It provided its views by way of special appearance in Prater‘s case—essentially similar to the role of amicus curiae—and represented the defendants in Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s cases.
II.
The magistrate judges’ jurisdiction and our jurisdiction are the central issues on appeal. The district courts had jurisdiction under
A.
In 1968, Congress passed the Federal Magistrate Act,
Under the Act, district court judges may “delegate certain matters to magistrate judges.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm‘n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 2017). However, because magistrate judges derive their power from Article I of the Constitution (establishing the legislative branch), not Article III (establishing the judicial branch), the Act “limit[s] the circumstances” in which a magistrate judge exercises final adjudicatory authority. See Burton, 25 F.4th at 206; see generally
The Act permits a district court judge to “designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter,” without the parties’ consent, save eight exceptions, including “a motion ... for summary judgment, . . . and to involuntarily dismiss an action.”
In matters a magistrate judge does not have the power to “determine” without the parties’ consent—pretrial motions excepted under
see also
In addition, the Act provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties,” a magistrate judge “may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.”
So absent party consent, a magistrate judge‘s jurisdiction extends only to nondispositive pretrial matters. Outside those nondispositive pretrial matters, the magistrate judge makes findings of fact and provides the district court with non-final recommendations. But when there is party consent, the magistrate judge‘s jurisdiction is coextensive with the district
B.
With that background in mind, we first address Prater‘s challenge to a magistrate judge‘s authority to deny IFP motions.6 Though the Commonwealth purports to concede the issue, the magistrate judge‘s jurisdiction is a predicate of our own, and subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited for failure of the parties to object to it. See Burton, 25 F.4th at 207.
Based on the statute, Federal Rules, and caselaw, we conclude that magistrate judges maintain jurisdiction to decide IFP motions. Starting with the plain text,
Even so, other textual clues suggest IFP motions are nondispositive pretrial matters. Take
The Federal Rules implementing
IFP motions are “not of the same genre” as the exceptions to a magistrate
Though the parties cite other Circuits that have concluded otherwise, we do not find those cases persuasive. Taking each case in turn, Donaldson v. Ducote concerned the right to proceed IFP on appeal. 373 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2004). Obviously, a decision regarding that right does not pertain to pretrial authority. Meanwhile, Tripati v. Rison held a magistrate judge‘s jurisdiction over IFP motions derived only from a referral and parties’ consent under
It is not clear that simply denying an IFP motion without prejudice is the “functional equivalent” of an involuntary dismissal under
The Commonwealth warns that finding magistrate judge jurisdiction over IFP motions
We can be sure that a magistrate judge‘s decision under
Putting it all together, because an IFP motion is a nondispositive pretrial matter, a magistrate judge‘s denial does not become final and appealable to our Court within the meaning of
becomes final under
Treating IFP motions as nondispositive honors the statutory grant of power to magistrate judges to resolve “any pretrial matter,” protects an inmate‘s right of review by a district court judge, and mitigates premature appeals of non-final decisions. Applying those principles here, the magistrate judge‘s power to deny Prater‘s IFP motion derived from his pretrial authority pursuant to
C.
Prater, Isaac, and Aaron also challenge the magistrate judges’ jurisdiction to enter final judgments in their respective cases. A magistrate judge dismissed Prater‘s case for “failure to prosecute (failure to pay the filing fee).” JA Prater 6. And the magistrate judges in Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s cases entered summary judgment orders in favor of all defendants. A magistrate judge may “hear and determine any pretrial matter . . . except a motion for,” among other things, “summary judgment . . . and to involuntarily dismiss an action.”
Under
The parties agree, as do we, that not all named defendants in Prater‘s case provided express or implied consent. Specifically, there is no evidence that the Commonwealth ever consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. In fact, the Commonwealth concedes it was not even aware of Prater‘s suit prior to dismissal. Absent consent, “the magistrate judge, as an Article I judge, simply d[id] not have jurisdiction to decide the matter” and dismiss Prater‘s case for failure to prosecute. See Burton, 25 F.4th at 206. His authority was restricted by the limits of
The same is not true in Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s cases. The parties agree that plaintiffs Isaac and Aaron expressly consented, as did the initially named and served defendants in each suit. However, they dispute whether later-added defendants, who did not file consent forms, consented.7
Though later-added defendants did not expressly consent, we can infer consent based on their “conduct during litigation.” Roell, 538 U.S. at 582. In Roell, the plaintiff alleged that prison officials disregarded his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Once the plaintiff consented to a magistrate judge‘s jurisdiction, the district court referred the case, with the caveat that the referral “would be vacated if any of the defendants did not consent.” Id. at 583. The clerk subsequently sent the referral order to the defendants
All defendants in Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s cases cleared Roell‘s implied consent bar. Counsel common to all defendants in each case filed a consent form on behalf of some or all of the initially named defendants. In doing so, counsel was “made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it.” Id. at 590. And by signing the form, counsel “voluntarily consent[ed] to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all further proceedings in the case” pursuant to “the provisions of [§] 636(c)(1),” and forewent the “option” of having the case “assigned to a United States District Judge.” JA Isaac 56; JA Aaron 151. And because in both cases, later-named or later-served defendants were represented by the same counsel—OAG—we can infer their voluntary consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.
Amicus argues consent was not effective because later-added defendants as opposed to their counsel did not consent. The Commonwealth responds that the decision to proceed before a magistrate judge belongs exclusively to counsel and cites Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008), for support. We agree with Amicus that the Commonwealth overreads Gonzalez, which merely permitted counsel to choose whether to proceed before a magistrate judge during voir dire under a different subsection of the Act, not
In any event, we need not wade into the constitutional thicket of what rights may or may not be waived by counsel alone. Compare id. at 248–52 (suggesting some “fundamental” rights may be waived only by the client), with id. at 255–58 (Scalia, J., concurring) (reasoning “all waivable rights (except, of course, the right to counsel) can be waived by counsel“). There is no indication that any defendant would not have consented.
This case fits comfortably within Roell‘s rule, which permits us to infer a defendant‘s consent from counsel‘s conduct, so long as consent is knowing and voluntary. See 538 U.S. at 589–90; see also Wellness Int‘l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 685 (2015) (“a litigant‘s consent—whether express or implied—must still be knowing and voluntary“). There is no indication that defense counsel in either Isaac‘s or Aaron‘s case acted contrary to the wishes of their clients. Nor does Amicus
In cases like this, Roell‘s rule makes practical sense. In his amended complaint, Isaac sued the prison and fourteen individual officials. Aaron sued the prison and over thirty individual officials, some named, some unnamed, and some improperly named. As the pro se cases proceeded through the pleading and discovery phases, numerous officials were added, dropped, re-added, re-dropped, and renamed. Amicus‘s proposed rule—that to comply with Roell the Commonwealth‘s attorney needed to round up the new, added, renamed, or re-added defendants and obtain their consent with each new iteration of the suit—is hardly a workable solution in cases where numerous member-defendants of an institutional group are being sued.
We are also unpersuaded by Amicus‘s attempts to narrow Roell to avoid its import. First, Amicus draws unwarranted distinctions between consent based on defendants’ knowledge and consent based on counsel‘s knowledge. Roell explicitly permits either. 538 U.S. at 590 (“litigant or counsel was made aware” (emphasis added)).
Second, Amicus claims Roell‘s rule applies only when “the litigants [have] repeated verbal notice, throughout lengthy proceedings, that the magistrate judge [is] operating on the understanding that they consented.” Amicus Br. 24. But Roell is not so fact bound. Though the Court supposed implied consent would be “the exception, not the rule,” it nevertheless reasoned that so long as a party is “notified of the availability of a district judge, . . . a litigant‘s general appearance before the magistrate judge will usually indicate the necessary consent.” Roell, 538 U.S. at 591 n.7. It may be true that a general appearance, on its own, is not particularly illuminating and equally suggests parties intend to proceed under
Third, Amicus is wrong that Burton narrowed Roell‘s reach. In Burton, we declined to find implied consent for three defendants who shared common counsel. 25 F.4th at 204, 210. From that, Amicus concludes that filing a consent form for one defendant cannot “automatically transfer[]” consent to “subsequent defendants represented by the same counsel.” Amicus Br. 27. But Amicus ducks a key distinction. Unlike here, none of the Burton defendants filed a consent form prior to final disposition. 25 F.4th at 210–11 & n.59. Absent a form, or any other evidence, we could not infer that defense counsel knew of the need for consent and the right to refuse it. See id. at 210. Even more, the practical implications of Amicus‘s reading of Burton would create strange results: the happenstance of staffing decisions at a law firm or government office related to particularly complex cases could nullify consent. Contrary to Amicus‘s argument, by finding implied consent here, we are not transforming
Therefore, we conclude all required parties in Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s cases either expressly or impliedly consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, permitting the magistrate judges to enter summary judgment orders. When counsel filed consent forms early in each case related to initially named defendants, counsel became aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily continued to appear on behalf of all defendants before the magistrate judges.
III.
Because the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to involuntarily dismiss Prater‘s case, we must determine what that means for our jurisdiction on appeal.
It is settled law that “[i]f the requirements of [§] 636(c)(1) are not satisfied, the ‘magistrate judge [is deprived] of jurisdiction over the case‘” and may not enter final orders; concomitantly, “we are statutorily deprived of appellate jurisdiction over the magistrate judge‘s orders.” Burton, 25 F.4th at 205 (citation omitted). Despite Burton‘s clear language, Amicus contends that we have statutory appellate jurisdiction to vacate and remand jurisdictionally defective magistrate judge orders pursuant to
We disagree. Consent, not referral, allows the magistrate judge “to direct the entry of a judgment of the district court.”
We need not choose between adopting Amicus‘s novel theory of quasi-subject-matter jurisdiction to review jurisdictional issues under
Statutory appellate jurisdiction aside, both parties argue that we may vacate and remand jurisdictionally defective magistrate judge orders pursuant to our supervisory authority. We will not shoehorn into our supervisory authority a power to vacate and remand absent jurisdiction. We have consistently described our supervisory authority as empowering the Court to “mandate procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice.” United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 204 (3rd Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 142. This process-related oversight power is an insufficient stand-in for statutory appellate jurisdiction. Further, invoking our supervisory authority to vacate and remand jurisdictionally defective magistrate judge orders would be invalid because we would be contravening the clear text of a statute, see United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980), which grants us jurisdiction only over a judgment entered upon the consent of the parties.
Admittedly, there is not perfect consistency in our disposition of cases when we lack jurisdiction to review an order entered by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Burton, 25 F.4th at 212 (vacating and remanding); Siers, 700 F.2d at 116 (dismissing). Despite our inconsistent history and the parties’ consensus that vacatur and remand is proper, we will dismiss Prater‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Dismissal is more appropriate because when jurisdiction “ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868); see also, e.g., Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from a magistrate judge‘s discovery order that had not been reviewed by the district court); Geaney v. Carlson, 776 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because “magistrate‘s dismissal is a nonappealable order“); McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 472 (6th Cir. 2006) (same). But see Allen v. Meyer, 755 F.3d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2014) (vacating and remanding jurisdictionally defective magistrate
The somewhat antiquated cases the parties cite in support of a roving “supervisory appellate power,” Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 676 (1944), to justify vacatur do not change our conclusion. Walling and its progeny have been narrowly interpreted to permit a court to “make such disposition of the whole case as justice may require” when “mootness prevents us from reviewing [a judgment] that has prospective effects.” See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 714 n.11 (2011) (citation omitted). No mootness issue exists here. And a court‘s power to issue a “corrective order” even when “the merits cannot be reviewed,” see Gully v. Interstate Nat. Gas Co., 292 U.S. 16, 18 (1934), has similarly been narrowly construed, see, e.g., Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Okla. Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 392 (1934) (vacating and remanding because the correct appeals procedure was not “more definitely settled” and dismissal would cause appellants to “los[e] their opportunity” for merits review); United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 436, 440 (1936) (vacating and remanding “merely for the purpose of correcting” an erroneously entered injunctive order against the Secretary of Agriculture and others that prevented them from prosecuting corporations who violated rate schedules); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 34 (1962) (vacating and remanding order from improperly convened three-judge district court). In fact, the cases cited by the parties adhere to the “general rule” of dismissing an appeal in the absence of jurisdiction so long as our dismissal does not give the deficient order “full effect . . . in violation of [a] legal or constitutional right.” Stickney v. Wilt, 90 U.S. 150, 162 (1874); see United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414, 435 (1872) (calling dismissal “the correct practice” where “a court has no jurisdiction“). Here, dismissal simply means Prater must seek review of the magistrate judge‘s non-final, non-binding order in the district court, where his claim will be finally adjudicated by an Article III official.
IV.
While we will dismiss Prater‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we have the power to review Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s appeals under
Under the PLRA, prisoners who seek to challenge their conditions of confinement must exhaust all available administrative remedies.
ADM 804 creates the three-step Inmate Grievance System. First, an inmate must submit a grievance to the Facility Grievance
ADM 804 clearly states when it does not apply—for example, when an inmate alleges sexual abuse, or his claim concerns an “incident[] of an urgent or emergency nature” or misconduct charges. ADM 804 § 1(A)(2), (7). When one of those exceptions applies, a plaintiff is excused from satisfying ADM 804‘s exhaustion requirement. See Downey v. Pa. Dep‘t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2020). But Isaac and Aaron do not argue that they satisfy an existing exception; rather, they ask that we read into the text of DOC policy a new exception—exhaustion under ADM 001. Just as we refrain from rewriting statutes, we will not amend DOC policy from the bench and add a new avenue for administrative exhaustion. See id. at 306 (applying principles of statutory interpretation to DOC policy).
While ADM 804 creates a formal procedure to resolve problems or other issues of concern arising during confinement, ADM 001 aims to ensure that staff do not subject an inmate to corporal or unusual punishment, or personal abuse or injury. ADM 001 speaks to all who may be privy to inmate abuse—inmates, employees, and all persons and entities who maintain contact with inmates. The policy permits an inmate who is the victim of abuse to report it verbally or in writing to a staff member, complain directly to DOC‘s Central Office, or file a formal grievance pursuant to ADM 804. The fact that ADM 001 does not require a formal grievance to trigger an investigation shows the policy mitigates and provides relief for alleged abuse even when it does not violate legal rights. By contrast, ADM 804 requires an inmate to specify in his grievance any alleged violation of department regulations or other law as well as specify the compensation or legal relief the inmate desires. ADM 001 contains no similar requirements, all of which would be necessary to afford an inmate meaningful relief in court.
The interrelatedness of the policies does not suggest the two are interchangeable. ADM 804‘s cross reference to ADM 001 reveals that the two policies work in tandem, not in place of one another. When an inmate brings an abuse grievance, the normal ADM 804 review does not proceed until an investigation occurs in accordance with ADM 001. The Grievance Officer does not provide an initial response to an abuse-related grievance until he receives and reviews the documentation from the ADM 001 investigation. But that does not change the fact that ADM 804 is the sole procedure for obtaining an adjudicatory decision subject to appeal. A different conclusion would nullify the grievance review process outlined by ADM 804. While ADM 001 produces investigative reports that may help the ADM 804 process along, among other purposes, it does not replace ADM 804.
We conclude that ADM 804 is the exclusive means of exhaustion. And, having failed to follow the full administrative review process under ADM 804, Isaac and Aaron necessarily failed to properly exhaust their claims under the PLRA.
V.
Finally, we address Amicus‘s argument that we should exercise our supervisory authority to review the Western District of
While “courts of appeals are authorized to ‘mandate procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice,‘” Wecht, 484 F.3d at 204 (citation omitted), “our supervisory power should not be invoked lightly,” Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991). The consent procedures for the Western District ensure voluntary consent by litigants, adhere to
Amicus attacks the Local Rules from several angles, but its arguments are not persuasive. First, even though all prisoner civil cases and non-death-penalty habeas cases are automatically assigned to a magistrate judge, the Local Rules specify that the magistrate judge‘s decision-making authority is constrained by the jurisdictional limits of
In short, the Western District‘s Local Rules provide adequate safeguards. Jurisdictions may vary how they implement
VI.
For these reasons, we will dismiss Prater‘s appeal challenging the magistrate judge‘s involuntary dismissal of his case because we lack jurisdiction. And we will affirm the magistrate judges’ summary judgment orders in Isaac‘s and Aaron‘s cases for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.