WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE.
S24A1024
Supreme Court of Georgia
March 4, 2025
321 Ga. 125
PINSON, Justice.
FINAL COPY
In 2020, the people of Georgia ratified an amendment to
1.
The subparagraph that follows this waiver of sovereign immunity then imposes a procedural requirement. Subparagraph (b) (2) declares that “[a]ctions filed pursuant to this Paragraph against” any of the entities whose sovereign immunity was waived in subparagraph (b) (1) “shall be brought exclusively against the state and in
2. In July 2021, Warbler sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members. The complaint named the mayor and each of the City Council members in their individual capacities, and it alleged that those defendants unlawfully rezoned a property that Warbler owned and sought to develop. According to the complaint, this rezoning removed the property from a “Planned
In August 2021, the defendants moved to dismiss all the claims other than one under the Open Records Act because they sought declaratory relief against and named “individual members of the city council in their individual capacity” in violation of
As promised, Warbler moved under
While Warbler‘s amended complaint against the City was still pending, however, this Court issued its decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893 (885 SE2d 761) (2023). There, we held that
In light of SASS Group, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The City argued that under SASS Group, “naming individuals is a fatal flaw that cannot be amended and cannot be waived,” and so the entire action had to be dismissed.
After more briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted the City‘s renewed motion and dismissed the case. The trial court concluded that Warbler‘s claims for declaratory relief “f[e]ll under” Paragraph V, and that naming the individual defendants in the initial complaint violated the naming requirement of
We granted Warbler‘s application for discretionary appeal to consider whether failing to comply with the naming requirement of subparagraph (b) (2) requires immediate dismissal of the action, or if that procedural defect may be cured by dropping from the complaint the defendants who should not have been named.3
3. To answer this question, we start with the provision of the Civil Practice Act that Warbler relied on to amend its complaint. That provision,
Because the Civil Practice Act makes its procedure for adding or dropping parties available in every civil action, the question here is whether something unique to Paragraph V conflicts with the General Assembly‘s broad grant of that procedure in a way that prevents a plaintiff or court from using it to cure a failure to comply with Paragraph V‘s naming requirement. After all, Paragraph V waives sovereign immunity for actions for declaratory relief (and later, injunctive relief): civil actions to which the Civil Practice Act, including
(a) One of those arguments has to do with Paragraph V‘s grant of a waiver of sovereign immunity. We have held that if sovereign immunity bars an action, the court in which that action has been filed lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning that the court has no power to reach the merits of the action. McConnell v. Dep‘t of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017) (“[T]he applicability of sovereign immunity is a threshold determination, and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred.“) (footnote omitted). Thus, if failing to comply with the naming requirement of Paragraph V means that sovereign immunity bars an action brought pursuant to that paragraph, then a court might simply lack the power to do anything but dismiss the action.
This argument fails at its premise. Putting aside the separate question whether a court without subject-matter jurisdiction can do
For this same reason, we must reject the trial court‘s basis for dismissing Warbler‘s action. The trial court reasoned that Warbler‘s amended complaint could not cure the alleged naming defect in its original complaint because the City had consented to Warbler‘s request to amend its complaint to drop the individual defendants, but “sovereign immunity can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly.” As we have just explained, however, that premise — that failure to comply with that subparagraph‘s naming requirement meant the action was barred by sovereign immunity — is mistaken, and so the trial court‘s basis for dismissing the complaint was too.
(b) The other arguments that Paragraph V prevents adding or dropping parties to cure a failure to comply with its naming requirement are arguments that Paragraph V‘s language conflicts with and thus displaces
(i) The first of these arguments depends on the words “filed” and “brought.” Subparagraph (b) (2) says that “[a]ctions filed pursuant to this Paragraph . . . shall be brought exclusively” against the relevant governmental entity, and actions that do not comply with this naming requirement “shall be dismissed.”
The problem with this argument is that the supposed timing requirement — that an action must be immediately dismissed if it
(ii) The other argument that the language of Paragraph V dis-
But even assuming that the dismissal language of subparagraph (b) (2) conflicts with that sentence of
Were this conclusion in any doubt, “basic” canons of construction tell us to read our laws (statutes and constitutional provisions alike) (1) together, and (2) in harmony whenever possible. Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (2) (b) (883 SE2d 827) (2023) (“It is a basic rule of construction that a statute or constitutional provision should be construed to make all its parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part, as it is not presumed that the drafters intended that any part would be without meaning.“) (cleaned up). So even if it were possible to read the dismissal language of subparagraph (b) (2) to conflict with
The City contends that our decision in SASS Group, 315 Ga. 893, supports the contrary view that an action that does not comply
(c) In light of this conclusion, the trial court erred in dismissing this action on the basis that it was barred by sovereign immunity. Warbler‘s failure to comply with the naming requirement of subparagraph (b) (2) did not affect the waiver of sovereign immunity granted by Paragraph V. And once Warbler filed its amended complaint, which complied with the naming requirement, dismissal was
Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur, except Ellington, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ, who dissent.
COLVIN, Justice, dissenting.
Because the plain language of Paragraph V (b) (2) requires that “[a]ctions” that fail to comply with its requirements at the time of filing “shall be dismissed,” noncompliance with these requirements may not be cured by amendment, as the majority opinion holds.
1. (a) Paragraph V (b) (2) contains naming requirements, as expressed in its first two sentences, and a dismissal provision, as expressed in its third and final sentence. See
The phrase “as expressly authorized” links Paragraph V (b) (2)‘s naming requirements with its dismissal provision.
(b) The majority opinion challenges this reading of Paragraph V (b) (2) with two arguments. First, it argues that a party who files an action naming an unauthorized defendant may cure this defect by moving to drop the party under
(i) First, the majority opinion argues that a party who files an action pursuant to Paragraph V that was not “brought exclusively” against an authorized defendant may avoid dismissal by moving under
The majority opinion‘s argument is flawed, however. As explained above,
(ii) In its second argument, the majority opinion claims that the timing requirement I contend Paragraph V (b) (2) contains is not found in its text. In support of its argument, the majority opinion cites numerous statutory provisions containing express timing requirements and argues that because similar language is not found in Paragraph V (b) (2), Paragraph V (b) (2) lacks such a timing requirement. See
But this is simply not so. As we have already explained, the phrase “as expressly authorized” links
It follows that a Paragraph V action against a State or local government which improperly names other defendants cannot be cured by amendment. Though an amendment could drop the improperly joined parties, it could never change the fact that the action was not “brought exclusively” against the State or local government. And because the suit was not brought exclusively in this manner, the State or local government is not named as expressly authorized by
2. Warbler Investments, LLC (“Warbler“), initially filed suit against the City of Social Circle (the “City“) as well as the City‘s mayor and three members of its City council. As noted by the
Because my views would compel me to affirm the trial court‘s dismissal, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.10 I am authorized to state that Justice Ellington and Justice LaGrua join this dissent.
Sovereign immunity; constitutional question. Walton Superior Court. Before Judge Morris.
Holt Ney Zatcoff & Wasserman, J. Scott Jacobson, Scott E. Morris, for appellant.
Powell & Edwards, Anthony O. L. Powell, Wesley C. Ross, John J. Crowley, for appellee.
Notes
in any event, the provisions of [the Civil Practice Act] governing the sufficiency of pleadings, defenses, amendments, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party practice, joinder of parties and causes, making parties, discovery and depositions, interpleader, intervention, evidence, motions, summary judgment, relief from judgments, and the effect of judgments shall apply to all such proceedings.