WANDA JOHNSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND; BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 25-1124
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
January 6, 2026
PUBLISHED. Argued: October 23, 2025.
Argued: October 23, 2025 Decided: January 6, 2026
Before WILKINSON, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion in which Judge King joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Dionna Maria Lewis, DISTRICT LEGAL GROUP, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Christine Ellen White, CITY OF BALTIMORE LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen L. Fowler, DISTRICT LEGAL GROUP, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Ebony M. Thompson, Baltimore City Solicitor, Michael Redmond, Director, Appellate Practice Group, Kara K. Lynch, Chief Solicitor, Natalie R. Amato, Chief Counsel for Consent Decree, CITY OF BALTIMORE LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Wanda Johnson (”Appellant”) alleges that her former employer, the Baltimore Police Department (”Appellee”), discriminated against her on the basis of race and later retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII of the
Because Appellant has alleged that multiple white or non-black comparators engaged in similar conduct to her own but received disparate treatment, we conclude Appellant has sufficiently alleged a racial discrimination claim. However, because the chain of events leading to Appellant’s termination began long before Appellant engaged in any protected activity, we conclude Appellant’s retaliation claim was properly dismissed. As to Appellant’s Monell claim, we conclude the complaint lacks specific factual allegations of a widespread pattern or practice.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This case began on August 26, 2018, when Appellant, an African American police officer employed by Appellee, was at a nightclub celebrating her bachelorette party. An altercation occurred outside of the nightclub between a member of Appellant’s party and an on duty Baltimore police officer, Sergeant Marlon Koushall, during which Koushall struck Appellant’s friend, a woman, in the face. A security guard present at the scene testified that Koushall ”pulled back his fist all the way and then hit [Appellant’s friend].” Koushall v. State, 246 A.3d 764, 768 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021).
Following the incident, Appellee’s Internal Affairs Division (”Internal Affairs”) interviewed all parties present, including Appellant. When the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City (”State’s Attorney”) received the case and reviewed the evidence, it ”decided to . . . pursue charges against Mr. Koushall.” Koushall, 246 A.3d at 768. And, as detailed below, Koushall was ultimately indicted and convicted for this conduct.
A grand jury was convened and, in January 2019, Appellant testified before the grand jury against Koushall regarding the nightclub incident. According to Appellant’s Complaint, following her grand jury testimony, Appellant was told by Lieutenant Mark Walrath that ”she was being ’blackballed’ by [Appellee] and that ’Internal Affairs is up your a**.’” J.A. 48.3 In February 2019, Koushall was indicted for second degree assault and misconduct in office.
The State’s Attorney proceeded to trial against Koushall. During the bench trial, which took place in September and October 2019, Appellant testified against Koushall for the prosecution. Following her testimony, Assistant State’s Attorney Steve Trostle told Appellant, ”I feel bad for you; just be prepared that the shit storm is coming because [Internal Affairs] is coming for you.” J.A. 48–49. Koushall was found guilty of second degree assault and misconduct in office. As a result of his conviction, Koushall was suspended and placed on supervised probation pending the appeal of his conviction. But, of note, Appellee never pursued Koushall’s removal from employment. His conviction was twice affirmed on appeal; first, by the Appellate Court of Maryland and then by the Maryland Supreme Court.4 See Koushall v. State, 246 A.3d 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021); Koushall v. State, 277 A.3d 403 (Md. 2022). Yet, Koushall continues to remain employed by Appellee. Oral Argument at 2:37:12–2:37:29, Wanda Johnson v. Baltimore City, Maryland: Baltimore Police Dep’t, No. 25-1124 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 2025),
On June 4, 2020, Internal Affairs interviewed Appellant as part of the investigation against her. And on June 11, 2020, Internal Affairs filed disciplinary charges against Appellant for ”committing an assault on August 26, 2018, failing to notify her supervisors of the assault on August 26, 2018, making false statements in her interview on August 26, 2018, and making false statements in her interview on June 4, 2020.” J.A. 83–84. Following these charges, Appellant was suspended with pay.
Thereafter, on February 16, 2021, Appellant filed a claim with the United States Equal Opportunity Commission (the ”EEOC Complaint”), alleging she was subjected to ”unequal terms and conditions of employment when [she] was informed that [Appellee] was seeking to keep [her] on suspension while seeking termination for allegedly making false statements during the investigation.” J.A. 6. In contrast, Appellant alleged, multiple white Baltimore Police Department officers who had made false statements during investigations were suspended but not terminated. As a result, Appellant averred that she was ”discriminated against . . . based on [her] race (Black) and in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity in violation of Title VII of the
On May 31, 2022, Appellant filed an internal complaint with the Police Integrity Bureau against Officer Nelson and Detective Gertz alleging unfair and disparate treatment. Appellant was forced by Appellee to submit her resignation in lieu of termination the next day, June 1, 2022.
The following year, ”[b]ecause over 180 days had elapsed since the EEOC assumed jurisdiction over [Appellant’s] complaint, on August 22, 2022, [Appellant] requested the
Appellant filed an Amended Complaint on June 14, 2024, and she brought the same five claims: race discrimination pursuant to Title VII (Count I); hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII (Count II); retaliation pursuant to Title VII (Count III); municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Count IV); and violations of Maryland’s Fair Employment Practices Act (Count V).
But, the district court again dismissed Appellant’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, this time with prejudice.
This appeal timely followed. Appellant appeals only the dismissal of Counts I, III, and IV.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to
III.
Appellant contends that the district court erred by dismissing her Title VII racial discrimination and retaliation claims, along with her Monell claim. We agree as to the race discrimination claim, but we conclude the district court did not err in dismissing the retaliation and Monell claims.
A.
Race Discrimination Claim
Title VII prohibits an employer from ”discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.”
A plaintiff can establish a claim of racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII by employing one of two methods of proof: (1) demonstrating through direct evidence that her race was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment action; or (2) relying on the burden shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi Inc., 126 F.4th 244, 255 (4th Cir. 2025).
Here, Appellant does not argue that she plausibly demonstrated her race was a motivating factor in Appellee’s adverse employment action. She instead frames her race discrimination argument on the burden shifting scheme in McDonnell Douglas. Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, a prima facie case of discrimination requires a showing of: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred ”under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Wannamaker-Amos, 126 F.4th at 255; see also Noonan v. Consolidated Shoe Co., Inc., 84 F.4th 566, 572 (4th Cir. 2023). Courts frequently reframe the fourth element of a race discrimination claim
Here, the parties agree that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged the first and second elements, that is, Appellant’s membership in a protected class and her satisfactory job performance. The district court further determined that Appellant’s ”allegation that she was forced to resign satisfies the adverse action requirement of Plaintiff’s disparate treatment under Title VII.” J.A. 29. That conclusion is unchallenged by Appellee. Accordingly, the only element at issue is whether Appellant sufficiently alleged in her Amended Complaint that ”similarly situated [comparators] outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.” White, 375 F.3d at 295.
”A claim of discrimination in the enforcement of employee disciplinary measures by reference to a comparator requires that the plaintiff’s prohibited conduct was comparable in seriousness to the misconduct of employees outside the protected class, and the disciplinary measures enforced against the plaintiff were more severe than those enforced against other employees.” Seabrook v. Driscoll, 148 F.4th 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). ”The similarity between comparators and the seriousness of their respective offenses must be clearly established in order to be meaningful.” Lightner v. City of Wilmington, N.C., 545 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008).
In Haynes v. Waste Connections, the plaintiff, an African American employee, filed suit pursuant to Title VII and
Here, Appellant identified thirteen ”similarly situated comparators” for her Title VII disparate treatment claim. These include:
- A white male police officer who used the ”n-slur,” and in response was given the opportunity to retire without reprimand;
- A white male police officer with several DUI charges and a fleeing and eluding charge who was ultimately suspended but later reinstated at the same rank;
- A white male police officer who was charged with ”use of force” against a man suffering from a mental health crisis but was not suspended;
- A white female police officer charged with multiple uses of force and false statement charges but who was not suspended and has since been promoted in rank;
- A white female police officer involved in a domestic assault and charged with making false statements who was initially suspended, but the suspension was later dismissed along with the charge, and she was later promoted to Sergeant;
A white male police officer, the counterpart to the above domestic assault and false statement charge, similarly had his charges and suspensions dropped and was promoted to Lieutenant; - A white male police officer who physically assaulted another officer but no charges were filed;
- A white female police officer charged with disorderly conduct and misconduct who was suspended but later retained and promoted to Major;
- A non-black female police officer who made a false statement but was not charged;
- Detective Gertz, a white male police officer involved in Appellant’s disciplinary hearing, who made a false statement but ”never faced any consequence[s]” J.A. 52;
- A white male police officer who breached protocol by failing to report his crashing of a Baltimore Police Department vehicle and was suspended and demoted but not terminated nor forced to resign;
- A white male police officer charged with tampering with an internal investigation and making false statements was neither terminated nor forced to resign; and
- Sgt. Koushall, who the complaint alleges is a ”non-black” male police officer, was found guilty of assault and misconduct and allegedly made false statements during his trial, but was neither terminated nor forced to resign.6
J.A. 50–54.
At this stage of litigation, viewing the facts in the light favorable to Appellant, we conclude that Appellant has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate similar comparators so as to allow for a reasonable inference as to their similarities to Appellant. First, Appellant and all the proposed comparators are Baltimore police officers, and, therefore, subject to the same standards. Second, while no single comparator perfectly aligns with every incident of Appellant’s conduct, the analysis does not require a perfect one on one fit. See Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223 (”[A] comparison between similar employees will never involve precisely the same set of work-related offenses occurring over the same period of time and under the same sets of circumstances.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the analysis focuses on the ”similarity between [the] comparators” and their conduct such that a jury could reach an inference of discrimination, so long as the comparison is ”meaningful.” See Lightner, 545 F.3d at 265. The comparators here fit within those parameters.
Appellant was charged with misconduct for assault, failing to notify her supervisors of assault, and making false statements. Many of the comparators Appellant points to
And then, of course, there is Koushall, who ”pulled back his fist all the way and then hit” a woman in the face. Koushall v. State, 249 Md. App 717, 724 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.). Based on this conduct, stemming from the exact 2018 nightclub incident in which Appellant was involved, Koushall was found guilty of assault and misconduct following a bench trial. And according to Appellant, Koushall also ”made multiple false
Taking all the allegations together, Appellant has provided multiple white or non black comparators who allegedly engaged in similar conduct to Appellant but received disparate treatment. The dissent contends, however, that the proffered comparators must be similar ”in all respects.” Post at 28. But this is only partially accurate. Instead, what our case law requires are comparators that are similar ”in all relevant respects.” Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 382 (emphasis supplied); Haynes, 922 F.3d at 225. For each comparator, Appellant details their position, race, conduct, and the consequences, if any, for the conduct – that is, the relevant facts for a comparator analysis for someone in Appellant’s position. Appellant alleged sufficiently similar comparators for a jury to reasonably infer their similarity because the comparators: (1) engaged in similar conduct; (2) held the same position; and (3) were assumingly subject to the same set of standards. Consequently, the complaint alleges sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state ”a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The dissent points to Cosby v. S.C. Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 93 F.4th 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2024) for the argument that the comparators here are distinguishable from Appellant because she was ”more strictly disciplin[ed]” as an employee ”who [was] proven – not just rumored – to be a bad apple.” Post at 33. And while it is true that some of the comparators that Appellant points to were not ”proven” to have engaged in the misconduct, this does not doom her claim. We need only look to the very case the dissent cites to see why. The dissent posits that in Cosby, this court found that the comparator was not valid
Of course, we take no issue with Appellee’s attempt to ”assure accountability for misdeeds within their ranks.” Post at 37. But, the point is that we want to ensure Appellee does so in a nondiscriminatory manner. See Smith v. Univ. of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 346 (4th Cir. 1980) (”[T]he law does not require, in the first instance, that employment be rational, wise, or well-considered – only that it be nondiscriminatory.”); see also Balderson v. Lincare Inc., 62 F.4th 156, 166 (4th Cir. 2023) (holding that ”the question for the court [is] not whether [the employer] had made a good, equitable, or even fair decision,” rather it is whether the actual reason for the disparate treatment was discriminatory in nature).
Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of Count I and remand for further proceedings.
Retaliation Claim
Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for complaining about prior discrimination or retaliation.
It is uncontested on appeal that Appellant engaged in a protected activity by filing her EEOC Complaint on February 16, 2021, and by filing a complaint with Internal Affairs on May 31, 2022. It is further uncontested that Appellant experienced an adverse employment action through her forced resignation on June 1, 2022. This leaves only the ”causal link” element at issue on appeal.
A plaintiff may demonstrate that a protected activity caused an adverse action through either one of two routes: (1) by establishing a ”temporal proximity between the
On February 16, 2021, Appellant filed her EEOC Complaint, and on May 31, 2022, she filed an internal complaint with Appellee -- both protected activities. On June 1, 2022, Appellant was forced to resign -- an adverse action. This one day temporal proximity between Appellant’s protected activity and the adverse action could satisfy the ”but-for connection” required for the causal link element in a retaliation claim. However, temporal proximity also requires the relevant decisionmaker to have been ”actually aware of the protected activity before making their decision.” Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132. In her Amended Complaint, Appellant alleges Appellee ”knew of [Appellant’s] engagement in protected activity prior to engaging in the [prior] adverse actions when they were informed by [Appellant] directly, advised by an [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] representative, or otherwise should have known that [Appellant] engaged in the complaint process based on her informal and formal complaint filings.” J.A. 64. While we draw all
Here, Appellant does not cite to or allege any underlying facts to support this conclusory assertion. Accordingly, the causal link element is not satisfied based on temporal proximity alone for her May 31, 2022, protected activity. The temporal causal nexus is similarly lacking with respect to Appellant’s February 16, 2021 EEOC Complaint, as over a year passed between the EEOC Complaint and the forced termination. See Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132 (”[T]he gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action can generally be no longer than two months.”); Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 127 (4th Cir. 2021) (three months was insufficient to infer a causal relationship without other evidence of a causal link).
Still, this conclusion is not fatal to Appellant’s claim, as Appellant’s claim can survive if she has alleged ”continuing retaliatory conduct and animus” following her protected activity. Alberti, 65 F.4th at 156. ”[I]ntervening events can bridge what would otherwise be a prohibitively long temporal gap.” Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579, 593 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 300 (4th Cir. 2022)).
In support of Appellant’s argument that there was “continuing retaliatory conduct and animus” following her EEOC filing on February 16, 2021, she points to the two instances in which she was informed Internal Affairs would be involved: (1) in early 2019, before Internal Affairs informed Appellant that she was being investigated, Lieutenant Mark Walrath allegedly told Appellant she was being “blackballed” by Appellee and that “Internal Affairs is up your a**;” and (2) following Appellant’s testimony in Koushall’s trial, Assistant State’s Attorney Steve Trostle allegedly said to Appellant, “I feel bad for you; just be prepared that the shit storm in coming because [Internal Affairs] is coming for you.” J.A. 48–49; see Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132 (“[E]ven in the absence of temporal proximity, causation can be established through a pervasive sequence of intervening events indicating disdain for or intermeddling with the protected activity.”).
In Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293 (4th Cir. 2022), we found intervening comments made by the plaintiff’s supervisor bridged a typically prohibitively long gap between the plaintiff’s protected activity and subsequent adverse action as to establish
In contrast, in the case at hand, the statements relating to Internal Affairs’ involvement pre-date Appellant’s EEOC Complaint and are, therefore, not intervening events. Accordingly, Appellant’s allegations as pled cannot support a reasonable inference of retaliation because Appellee’s conduct is consistent with pursuing charges it lodged against Appellant nearly a year before she filed her EEOC Complaint. And Appellant does not make plausible allegations that the comments made by Lieutenant Walrath and Assistant State’s Attorney Trostle regarding Internal Affairs’ involvement with the investigation were sufficient “intervening events [to] bridge [an] otherwise [] prohibitively long temporal gap.” Barbour, 105 F.4th at 593.
Similarly, there is no evidence or allegation to demonstrate “continuing retaliatory conduct and animus” in the short one day span between Appellant’s Internal Affairs complaint and her forced resignation.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s retaliation claim pursuant to
Monell Claim
To hold a municipality liable for a constitutional violation pursuant to Monell, a plaintiff must establish “the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.” Howard v. City of Durham, 68 F.4th 934, 952 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994). An official policy or custom may be expressed in four ways:
(1) [T]hrough an express policy, such as such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
Id. at 952 (citing Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cnty. Sch. Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 533 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003))).
In her Amended Complaint, Appellant contends Appellee:
J.A. 66–67.
Appellant alleges these acts were “part of an institutional practice or custom, constituting an official policy of [Appellee] to cover up officer misconduct, discrimination, and retaliation against fellow officers who stand up against the Department for violations of their civil rights.” J.A. 67. Accordingly, Appellant’s Monell claim requires her to allege the existence of a practice that is so “persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law,” often referred to as the theory of custom “by condonation.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014).
To prevail under this theory, a plaintiff must point to a “persistent and widespread practice of municipal officials, the duration and frequency of which indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their deliberate indifference.” Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Sporadic or isolated violations of rights will not give rise to Monell liability; only “widespread or flagrant” violations will. Id. at 402–03.
That means “proof of a single incident of the unconstitutional activity charged is not sufficient to prove the existence of a municipal custom.” Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 713–14 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Howard, 68 F.4th at 954
Here, the only specific instances Appellant alleges in support of her Monell claim are her own. As noted, we have previously held this insufficient to support a reasonable inference that there is a “persistent and widespread practice” so as to plausibly allege a Monell claim. Otherwise, the Amended Complaint merely refers generally to “a custom of discrimination,” and “an institutional practice or custom . . . to cover up officer misconduct, discrimination and retaliation against fellow officers who stand up against [Appellee] for violations of their civil rights.” J.A. 67–68. That bare, conclusory allegation is not enough.
Appellant disagrees. In support of her contrary position, she argues that her Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged the required factual allegations by stating:
It is well-known throughout the Department that [Appellee] routinely suspends officers for extended periods, keeps them in the dark during false investigations, and ultimately forces them out of the Department. Black officers, in particular, have been targeted and have suffered these injustices for far too
long; [Appellant] and her husband were not the only ones affected by this systematic mistreatment.
J.A. 58.
But this allegation is insufficient to cross the plausibility threshold. A comparison with Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014) demonstrates why. In Owens, the plaintiff alleged that “[r]eported and unreported cases from the period of time before and during the events complained of” and “a number of motions [] filed and granted during this time period [] demonstrate that [the defendant] maintained a custom, policy, or practice to allow this type of behavior either directly or . . . by condoning it, and/or knowingly turning a blind eye to it.” Owens, 767 F.3d at 403. We determined “the assertions as to ‘reported and unreported cases’ and numerous ‘successful motions’ are factual allegations, the veracity of which could plausibly support a Monell claim.” Id. But, we also recognized “that courts have dismissed Monell claims when the plaintiff has alleged nothing more than a municipality’s adherence to an impermissible custom.” Id. We reasoned that the plaintiff in Owens had “done more than that: [the plaintiff] has alleged facts—the existence of ‘reported and unreported cases’ and numerous ‘successful motions.’” Id.
In contrast, in the present appeal, while Appellant broadly references violations outside her own, her allegations are far too general to be considered sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss stage. Accordingly, in the absence of more specific factual allegations of a widespread pattern of practice, the district court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s Monell claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of the retaliation and Monell claims. I would, however, affirm the district court’s entire judgment, including its dismissal of plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim under
The majority disrupts this progress by entertaining Johnson’s lawsuit beyond its worth. To plead a prima facie case of disparate treatment, of course, Johnson must allege that the BPD more favorably treated employees who were “not just similar in some respects, but ‘similarly-situated in all respects’” besides race. Spencer v. Va. State Univ., 919 F.3d 199, 207–08 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). Johnson’s amended complaint, however, describes merely a hodgepodge of BPD employees who all differed from her in material ways—be it in their rank, misconduct, or guilt. Because her case is bound to fail, I dissent from stringing it along any further.
In practically every workplace, there must be a “special relationship of trust between the employer and employee.” Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993). Most jobs, for instance, require that subordinates “gain access to privileged information regarding the employer’s particular business practices, methods of production, names of customers, and so forth”—all of which would be destructive to the organization if disclosed. Id. Trust is also essential to building cohesion between workers, and to facilitating both cooperation and positive morale to the ultimate benefit of consumers. See, e.g., Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 219 (4th Cir. 2002).
These well-understood dynamics apply even more so to the police. We have long recognized the “undoubted need for mutual trust and confidence within any law enforcement agency.” Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1338 (4th Cir. 1984). “[G]iven the high stakes involved” in on-the-ground police work, including “life and death decisions,” “the risks of disharmony can be grave.” Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 319 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc). “The need for confidentiality” also “cannot be gainsaid.” Id. Law enforcement officials often must keep information private to, say, protect an informant’s safety or prevent the suspects in an investigation from learning about ongoing surveillance.
Untrustworthy officers risk undermining these critical objectives. So too do they impede the work of prosecutors, who generally rely on the police for evidence and testimony. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 13.1(a), at 125–26 (4th ed. 2015). If officers cannot be trusted to dutifully perform investigations and truthfully relay their findings, criminal cases can hardly be trusted to yield just outcomes. In short, just as
Johnson breached this duty of candor. Her colleagues cannot rely on her to honestly report criminal behavior or not to cover it up. Indeed, not only did she repeatedly provide “false statements” during the police investigation into the altercations at Norma Jean’s, but she also assaulted a patron there and failed to tell her supervisors about doing so. Harrison v. Johnson, Nos. 1209, 1229, 1230, 2021 WL 4841134, at *4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 18, 2021). Just ask the administrative trial board that presided over her case: after two days of reviewing evidence amassed over a two-year investigation, it “sustained” all the charges against Johnson. J.A. 57. That is, it found her guilty of everything. J.A. 101, 103; see also Balt. Police Dep’t Pub. Integrity Bureau, Internal Operations and Training Manual 121 (Sep. 2020) (“‘Sustained,’ means where the investigation determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged misconduct did occur.”). The majority’s attempt to interpret this conclusion as reflecting something other than culpability, see Maj. Op. at 6 n.5, makes less than little sense.
The adjudicatory process was perfectly fair, too. Johnson knew about the investigation into her misconduct nearly three years before her hearing, even receiving the BPD’s own “case file” about her a month in advance of the proceedings. J.A. 55. Before the trial board, she enjoyed the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
True, her amended complaint alleges two officers committed “numerous errors and misconduct” during the investigation. J.A. 57. But it goes on to say that this alleged wrongdoing was “revealed and openly acknowledged at the trial board hearing.” J.A. 57. In other words, the board had the opportunity to discount the findings and testimony of these two officers based on Johnson’s countervailing evidence, yet it still found her guilty.
So to recap, Johnson says she was forced to resign after a yearslong investigation and fair two-day hearing culminated in her being found guilty of four serious offenses. This was no fly-by-night operation; the BPD gave Johnson plenty of time and opportunities to explain herself, seeking her termination only when the trial board decisively deemed her actions unacceptable. What exactly should her employer have done instead? Permitting Johnson to stay would have only burdened Baltimore’s law enforcement with an officer that the BPD validly suspected was not to be trusted. How can a police department fight crime with someone who won’t accurately report it? Imagine too the hit to morale when other members of the police force learn that their department was unable to dismiss from its ranks someone who had assaulted, concealed, and lied in connection with the incident at Norma Jean’s nightclub. What are other officers supposed to think?
Of course, these very problems were, and continue to be, at the top of the BPD’s mind. In 2016, the Department of Justice found a host of lamentable issues marring Baltimore’s police. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department (Aug. 10, 2016). Among them were the “lack[]” of “meaningful
II.
Doing otherwise, the majority prolongs Johnson’s ill-fated lawsuit in the name of
Consider first how Johnson herself frames the attempted analogues. Each of these other employees, her amended complaint reads, kept their jobs despite being “suspected of misconduct or other severe offenses.” J.A. 50. The majority does the same thing, stating that Johnson “was charged” with various offenses. Maj. Op. at 14. But Johnson’s
Accounting for culpability leaves six so-called peers, each of whom the complaint, when read charitably, states had at one point been deemed guilty of various offenses. But to the extent those decisions were even reached by a trial board, they all differ from Johnson’s case in meaningful ways. Most notably, none were found guilty of tendering false statements during investigations into the commission and concealment of their own assault. This makes all the difference. One of “the most likely sources of different but
The majority stresses repeatedly that “a perfect one on one fit” among comparators is not required. Maj. Op. at 14. But its failure to find a “fit” among the multiple possibilities in the force comes pretty close to acknowledging that Johnson’s situation was, in fact, different and unique. Once again, as the district court noted, “none of the proffered comparators are availing, as none were accused of and found guilty following a trial board of misconduct similar to Plaintiff.” J.A. 101. The district court got this exactly right, and it is disappointing that its careful logic now fails to warrant due respect.
Other key factors only further undermine Johnson’s proposed comparators. Nowhere does she allege, for instance, that any of these purported analogues “dealt with the same supervisor,” a requirement “to establish a valid comparator.” Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). In fact, although the majority claims otherwise, nine were not even rank-and-file police officers, as Johnson was; they held “differen[t] . . . positions” within the BPD, which would ordinarily render any “purported comparison” to them “too loose.” Lightner, 545 F.3d at 265.
Finally, there is reason to believe that at least one proposed comparator highlighted by the majority, Marlon Koushall, may belong to the same protected class as Johnson. After
Johnson and the majority try to downplay these many defects by emphasizing how, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of [her] claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.”
Normally, this sort of imprecision warrants dismissal for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Seabrook v. Driscoll, 148 F.4th 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2025) (affirming dismissal of
III.
My friends in the majority stress that that they “take no issue with” the BPD holding officers accountable and seek only to “ensure” that it “does so in a nondiscriminatory manner.” Maj. Op. at 17. Of course we respect the nondiscrimination mandate embodied in our landmark civil rights laws. But
The BPD’s alleged discipline of Johnson had nothing to do with race, and everything to do with the absence of trust. Against the amended complaint’s scattershot list of proposed comparators, Johnson stands alone in being charged and found guilty—after two years of investigation and two days of fair adjudication—of assaulting a civilian,