Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office

Germany in and that he intends to III. he lives Although remain there. he exercises his above, For the reasons set forth we States, in the Davis political rights United affirm the grant District Court’s of Davis’ them at the state or local does not exercise subject motion to dismiss for lack of mat- From Davis filed tax level. jurisdiction. ter and returns both the United States Ger- Germany. many listing his address home, business,

addition, family Davis’ Germany.

are all located in

Although Davis continues to have some Pennsylvania, including

ties to some bank Pennsylvania

accounts and a driver’s li- cense, it was not clear error for the Dis- OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, James trict Court to conclude that Davis rebutted presumption continuing domicile BALTIMORE CITY STATE’S ATTOR upon favoring based other evidence a find- OFFICE; Brave, NEYS Marvin Indi ing pre- of a German domicile. With the vidually Capacity and in his Official sumption destroyed, the burden is on City as an Assistant Baltimore prove diversity citizenship Freidrich to Attorneys Office; Baltimore by a preponderance the evidence. City Department; Gary Police Dunni

Freidrich has failed to meet her burden. gan, Individually and in his Official entirely Registra- Freidrich relies on the Capacity as an Officer and Detective Request tion and Ballot form from 2012 City Depart of the Baltimore Police which Davis stated that he intends to re- ment; Jay Landsman, Individually turn to the United States. This alone does Capacity and in his Official as an satisfy preponderance-of-the-evi- Officer and Detective of the Baltimore dence standard. Davis testified that he City Department; Police Thomas Pel made this selection on the form simply ligrini, Individually and in his Official possibili- because he could not rule out the Capacity as an Officer and Detective ty may day that he one return to the Depart of the Baltimore Police History, United States. and the uncer- ment, Defendants-Appellees, situation, tainty of the world show the majority wisdom of that caution. vast Mayor objective

of the other evidence in the rec- Council of Baltimore, upon ord—evidence based more than mere Defendant. intent—points statements of his to Germa- No. 12-2173. “true, ny as permanent Davis’ fixed and Appeals, States United Court place home and of habitation. It is the Fourth Circuit. which, absent, place to whenever he is he McCann, returning.” has the intention of Argued 2014. Jan. Vlandis, (quoting 458 F.3d at 286 Sept. Decided 2230). cannot con- We finding clude that the District Court’s Germany

Davis clear was domiciled

error. Curlett, Jr.,

ARGUED: Charles N. Lev- Baltimore, LLC, Maryland; in & Curlett Brown, Abelson, Ginsberg Laura Goldstein LLP, Baltimore, Levy, Maryland, & for Beck, Appellant. City Daniel C. Baltimore Baltimore, Department, Maryland; Law McDonald, Michele J. Office the Attor- Baltimore, ney Maryland, General of Ma- ryland, for ON BRIEF: Josh- Appellees. Brown, Treem, Levy, ua R. Goldstein & LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, Appellant. for I. Gansler, General, Attorney F. H. Douglas appeals Owens the dismissal of his com Curtis, General, Attorney Assistant Scott plaint for failure to state a claim. Accord Attorney Mary- Office of the General ingly, we recount the facts as alleged by

land, Baltimore, Maryland; George A. Nil- Owens in his complaint, accepting as true son, Bal- City Department, Baltimore Law facts. See Minor v. Bo well-pleaded all timore, Maryland, Appellees. for Labs., Inc., stwick 1n. TRAXLER, Judge, Before Chief and (4th Cir.2012). WYNN, Judges.

MOTZ and Circuit A. in part, part, Affirmed vacated and Judge published opinion. remanded early In the morning August hours of opinion, MOTZ wrote the in which Chief robbed, raped, Colleen Williar was III., Judge TRAXLER concurs as to Parts and murdered in the second-floor bedroom IV.A, and V. and dissents as to Parts II. City apartment. of her Baltimore IV.B., concurs, Judge and and WYNN following day, neighbors, one of Williar’s Part except Judge for III. Chief Thompson, city police James contacted the Judge TRAXLER and WYNN each wrote department inquire about a reward separate opinion concurring part had relating offered information to Ms. dissenting part. Thompson Williar’s death. claimed that MOTZ, DIANA GRIBBON Circuit he had found a knife outside of Ms. Will- Judge: apartment previous evening, iar’s Owens action brought James under which he had home and carried cleaned U.S.C. the Baltimore realizing before its connection to the Office, City Attorney’s State’s an assistant Thompson’s crime. Over the course of Attorney, City State’s the Baltimore Police however, with police, conversation it be- Department, Baltimore several apparent Thompson came had not complaint, officers. In his knife, simply “happened” on the as he alleges that the defendants violated his Rather, originally response claimed. rights by intentionally constitutional with- questioning Pelligri- from Officers Thomas holding exculpatory during evidence his ni, Gary Dunnigan, Jay Landsman rape 1988 trial for the and murder of Officers”), (collectively, “the Thompson as- Colleen Williar. The district court dis- serted that he had retrieved the knife at complaint entirety against missed the in its friend, the behest of his James Owens. all defendants on statute-of-limitations The Officers executed a search warrant at alternative, grounds. In the the court held apartment, physical Owens’s but found no that the Baltimore Attorney’s linking evidence Owens to the crime. enjoyed sovereign immunity, Office the in- fruitless, though po- Even the search was enjoyed dividual qualified officers lice arrested Owens on the basis of immunity, and of action Owens’s cause Thompson’s jury A grand statement. then the Depart- Baltimore Police murder, indicted Owens for Ms. Williar’s ment failed to state a claim on which relief rape, burglary. and granted. could be For the reasons that follow, trial, affirm in in On the eve of Owens’s Assistant part, part, we vacate (“ASA”) Brave, proceed- Attorney and remand the case for further Marvin case, ings opinion. assigned consistent prosecutor with this the to Owens’s fact, In story yet again. change to his veracity Thomp- question the began interview, of the two-hour Brave over the course of events. When ASA version son’s story five addition- changed his Thompson, Thompson these concerns with raised of- his statement and al times. retracted witness knife’s for the explanation another

fered told attempt, Thompson In his first new time, stated Thompson This acquisition. had broken that he and Owens the Officers him, but he belonged knife that day on the apartment into Ms. Williar’s gone missing after that it had claimed Ms. al- only to find Williar the murder his home. Thompson at visited Owens When ready dead in her bedroom. murder, Owens day after Ms. Williar’s believe they that did not replied Officers Thomp- the knife to assertedly returned him, iteration. Thompson offered another son, weapon’s noticed blood on who time, that Owens had he contended This ques- Thompson blade and handle. When upstairs and murdered Ms. Williar raped blood, origin about the tioned Owens in the Thompson waited downstairs while and told using weapon Owens denied responded living room. The Officers it. keep quiet about Thompson Thompson had there evidence that was trial, presented Brave this At ASA thus, floor, been on the second jury. Brave version of events to the third After could not be true. amended account defense counsel about never informed Thompson admitted that he prompt, this accounts, thus, Thompson’s earlier floor, but insisted had been on the second Thompson, defense cross-examining when during that he had hidden the bathroom had counsel was unaware the witness again The Officers re- Owens’s crimes. story times over the changed his several in- jected story, stating that Thompson’s investigation. course of the physical had found evidence vestigators in Ms. bed- Thompson’s presence Williar’s Nevertheless, apparent- defense counsel Thompson admitted response, room. testi- ly enough Thompson’s doubt on cast had been in the bedroom while that he to seek out mony prompt ASA Brave Williar, but he raped and killed Ms. Owens guilt. To additional evidence Owens’s participate refused to insisted that he had end, mid-trial, ASA Brave ordered this any point, At the Officers assault. testing pubic of a hair found on Ms. Will- hair Thompson pubic that his informed were re- body. iar’s When the results Faced been found on Ms. Williar. had turned, however, they indicated that evidencе, Thompson of- with the forensic Thompson—not Owens—matched sam- In this fifth of events. fered a version in- Thompson ple. Concerned account, claimed that he and Thompson crimes, ASA Brave instruct- volved apart- had broken into Ms. Williar’s Owens reinterrogate Thompson. ed the Officers to jewelry. to steal her ment with the intent direction, Pelli- At ASA Brave’s Officers victim alone pair found the When brought grini, Dunnigan, and Landsman her, bedroom, and killed raped her ques- Thompson into the stationhouse foot of Thompson masturbated while him two hours. The Officers tioned her bed. lying on the witness Thompson accused latest ac- elicited this stand, in a lot of After Officers warned him that he “was count, Brave Landsman told ASA trouble,” that he could be Officer and asserted of events. Thompson’s final version misrepresen- about charged with a crime for his Thomp- None of the Officers disclosed jury. receiving After their tations to the of offered several other accounts that he wanted son had warnings, Thompson stated all of which differed dra- viction happened, Proceeding” “by what and ordered that matically agreement from the version of events relat- of Counsel and this Honorable Court, ed to ASA Brave as well as from the ... granted Petitioner shall be physical evidence. During new trial.” the next sixteen months, Owens remained in prison state Following his conversation with the Of- awaiting 15, 2008, retrial. On October ficers, immediately ASA Brave called Attorney State’s entered a prosequi, nolle Thompson back to the witness stand and dropping charges against him. On jury had him share with the ac- his new date, after spent Owens had more However, happened. count what be- twenty than years prison, the state only cause in- the Officers knew of the court ordered him released from incarcera- statements, in Thompson’s consistencies tion. neither ASA Brave nor defense counsel

questioned Thompson about the four in- story consistent versions of the B. witness had offered before he on settled 12, 2011, On days October a few before Moreover, his final account. neither ASA three-year anniversary of the nolle Brave nor the Officers told defense coun- prosequi, Owens filed this action under discovery Thompson’s sel about against Mayor U.S.C. Indeed, City and pubic hair. when defense coun- Baltimore, City Council the Baltimore inquired sel about whether there had Office, Attorney’s Brave, hair, ASA testing been forensic ASA Department Baltimore Police represented Brave to the court (“BCPD”), and any Pelligrini, “there been match Officers Dunni- [hadn’t] made” gan, complaint, between the and Landsman. sample suspect.1 and alleges that the defendants violated jury burglary convicted Owens of rights by intentionally his constitutional murder, felony and the trial court and in bad faith withholding exculpatory him imprisonment sentenced to life with- impeachment evidence at his tri- out the possibility parole. Owens filed al. and, an appeal, unsuccessful over the decades, course the next two several All defendants moved to dismiss the petitions unsuccessful state-court for post- complaint. The Baltimore State’s At- 2006, however, conviction relief. In a state torney’s Office asserted that it was not an granted request post- court Owens’s suit, entity amenable to if it and that even conviction testing. DNA The results were were, State,” it was an “arm of the im- returned some months later and indicated liability. mune from The individual Offi- that Owens’s DNA did not match the blood cers, BCPD, and ASA Brave all moved and semen evidence found at the scene of dismiss on statute-of-limitations the crime. grounds. Alternatively, the individual Offi- June granted qualified immunity pro- On state court cers asserted that suit, “petition reopen Owens’s his Post Con- tected them from BCPD alleges jail 1. Owens also that ASA Brave withheld that Owens confessed to him in their cell. impeachment respect evidence with to a dif- Because the issues involved in this asserted Oliver, Larry ferent witness: Owens's cell- nondisclosure are to those involved idеntical Specifically, regarding mate. Owens asserts that ASA in ASA Brave's nondisclosures evidence, intentionally Thompson Brave withheld the fact that he and the DNA we focus Oliver, promised leniency simplicity. had who testified on those facts for the sake of 388 II. that Owens failed to state

maintained granted. relief could be claim on which applicable whether the We first consider all statute of limitations bars of Owens’s voluntarily the dismissed After Owens claims. against Mayor the Council claims court, Baltimore, in an the district oral 1983 does not contain a Section against the ruling, the claims dismissed Thus, to determine statute of limitations. initially court de- other defendants. The claim, § filing of a 1983 courts timely the time that claims were termined Owens’s from the statute of limitations borrow period the limitations barred because action. analogous most state-law cause of when the his causes of action commenced 1988(a). suits, § § For See U.S.C. for a granted request state court Owens’s personal-injury that cause of action is a claimed) (as trial, on the new Owens Okure, 235, v. 488 U.S. suit. See Owens entered the nolle prosecutors date 249-50, 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 Although the limitations issue prosequi. (1989). Maryland plaintiffs law affords claims, disposed of all of Owens’s the court years personal-injury three to file a action. briefly on to address the defendants’ went Ann., § Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5- See Md.Code grounds for dismissal. In a alternative Hence, peri three-year limitations rulings, series of the court determined to Owens’s claims. applies od Attorney’s the Baltimore Of- parties agree that Owens had sovereign immunity, fice was entitled § years They three to file his 1983 action. Officers and the that the individual BCPD however, disagree, as to the date on which qualified immunity, were entitled three-year period began limitations failed to state a complaint that Owens’s Appellees run. contend that the three- noted a against claim BCPD. Owens to run year began clock on Owens’s claims timely appeal. 4, 2007, on the date on June which state court vacated his conviction and grant court’s review district We granted Appellees’ him a new trial. Br. Mylan of a motion to dismiss de novo. than 24. Because Owens filed suit more Labs., Matkari, Inc. v. 7 F.3d (on years three after this date October (4th Cir.1993). stage pro At this 2011), Appellees maintain that all of ceedings, “accept all we as true Owens’s claims are time barred. Id. Ow allegations factual contained the com contrast, ens, by maintains that the statute plaint,” “draw all infer reasonable begin of limitations for his claims did not plaintiff.” ences in favor of the E.I. du to run until October 2008—the date on Indus., Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon prosecutors prosequi, which filed nolle Cir.2011). Inc., To finally resolving proceedings prevail, Owens must “state a claim to relief him. Br. 22. he filed Appellant’s Because that is on its face.” plausible Ashcroft date, years suit within three of this 662, 678, Iqbal, 556 U.S. operative contends that he met the dead (2009) (emphasis added line. omitted). quotation and internal marks A Although state determines plausibility claim has “facial when the law applicable factual statute of limitations for plaintiff pleads content allows claims, governs court to draw the inference federal law reasonable period miscon date on which that limitations be the defendant is liable for the Koto, gins run. alleged.” duct Id. Wallace L.Ed.2d if provides 973 But the common law a “distinc- law, turn, Federal determining “conform[s] tive rule” for when the limita- principles” ... to common-law tort for period particular tions for a begins tort determining of date. purposes run, this Id. a court must “consider[ ]” “refine- principles, “Under those it is the standard determining ment” in when the limitations plaintiff rule that accrual occurs when the period for plaintiffs analogous claim complete present has a cause ac- § Wallace, under 1983 should commence. is, tion” a defendant—that when 388,127 549 U.S. at S.Ct. 1091. plaintiff knows or has reason to know Wallace, In Supreme Court ad- (internal injury. of his quotation Id. § dressed a 1983 claim alleging an uncon- omitted). marks and brackets stitutional by police detention officers. Wallace, however, 388,127 549 atU.S. S.Ct. 1091. The Court recognized that Court limitations on com- recognized accrual, the “standard rule” for always begin mon-law torts do not on the but because it found the tort of im- false date that a plaintiff knows or has reason to prisonment analogous to be the tort most Wallace, injury. know his 549 U.S. at claim, § plaintiffs to the 1983 it considered 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091. it Accordingly, found the “common law’s distinctive treatment” that the “standard rule” always does not that tort in determining the start of the period control the start of the limitations period plaintiffs § limitations for the 1983 Id.; §a 1983 claim. see ‍​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‍also Devbrow claim. Id. Kalu, Cir.2013) v. 767 The Court noted that Wallace could (relying on Wallace to hold that there is no § have brought his claim under “im- 1983 claims”). “single § accrual rule for all 1983 mediately upon his false arrest.” at Id.

Instead, the Wallace Court held 390 n. 1091. S.Ct. This was so that to determine the date accrual for a because injury Wallace’s commenced at claim, § particular date, court must look that person falsely imprisoned and “a to the common-law tort that right is most analo has the to sue on day the first of his (citation gous plaintiffs omitted). § 1983 claim and detention.” Id. determine the date on which the limita Supreme Court went on to explain, howev- period er, tions analogous law, for this most tort that under the common the statute Id.; claim begin would to run. see also imprisonment of limitations for false does Dist., Varnell Dora Consol. Sch. begin to run at the a plain- outset of (10th Cir.2014) F.3d 1208 (noting rather, tiffs false imprisonment; limita- Wallace, “[f]ollowing we determine the ac begin tions to run at the end crual date of claim by looking Plaintiffs plaintiffs imprisonment. false Id. at the accrual date for the common-law tort Deferring 127 S.Ct. 1091. to the common claim”); analogous rule,” § most to her law’s “distinctive the Court selected Devbrow, 705 at (holding F.3d that a the date on imprison- which Wallace’s false сourt rule that applies “use[s] [accrual] ment ended—not the date on which be- to the common-law cause of action gan—as operative most the start of the limita- plaintiff 391-92,127 similar to the kind of claim the period. tions Id. at asserts”). torts, established, For most common-law a With this start date the Court accrues, plaintiffs § cause of action and the held that 1983 claim accrued Wallace’s period commences, limitations when the on the date that arraigned he was i.e., magistrate, knows or has reason to know of on date which his false rule”). (hence, injury imprisonment the “standard ended. Id. that, hearing, ... Here, acknowledge discharge upon preliminary parties Wallace, Id.; imprisonment entry prosequi.” false of a nolle unlike [or] 28.5; analogous” Harper, § tort “most Owens’s Speiser, not the see also et al. Instead, they properly § claims. “[a]ny § et al. at 4.4. It is not true of prosecu that the tort of malicious agree disposition of the criminal action which tion, recognized Court which Wallace it to be permits does not terminate it but tort, “entirely provides the as an distinct” Keeton, (empha- renewed.” et al. at Brady-like analogy to Owens’s closest added). law, the common such sis Under Brady Maryland, claim. See “cannot serve as the founda- terminations 10 L.Ed.2d 215 action,” prosecution] tion for malicious [a injuries redresses a prosecution Malicious thus, period and the limitations for mali- as a result of a defen plaintiff sustains begin not prosecution cious claims does initiation or maintenance improper dant’s truly disposition run until a final against him. See proceedings of formal achieved. Id. Williams, 260 Lambert v. trial not grant of a new does Cir.2000). (4th Because Owens contends proceedings against terminate the a defen due Appellees process that the violated [they] “in a manner that cannot dant such against him with maintaining proceedings Keeton, § be revived.” et al. at 119. Rath evidеnce, mali disclosing exculpatory out er, victory, a provides procedural which closest anal prosecution provides cious simply postpones proceedings’ ultimate Thus, following § ogy to his 1983 claims. (“The § al. at 4.4 Harper, outcome. See et Wallace, we must determine the start date plaintiffs termination in the favor must be § by looking of Owens’s 1983 claims to the one, if proceedings a final are of the common-law tort most start date offense, immediately renewed for the same claims—here, malicious analogous to his they action plaintiffs are sufficient bar prosecution. prosecution they for malicious until are law, limi Under the common determined.”). finally malicious period plaintiffs tations for trial grant Because the of a new does prosecution claim commences when the trigger period not the limitations for him are re proceedings brought against claim, prosecution malicious the statute of Keeton, Page favor. et solved his W. § limitations on Owens’s 1983 claims did al., § Keeton on Torts Prosser & grant- run begin not on the date he was Dobbs, al., ed.1984); 3 Dan B. et see also Instead, operative ed a new trial. (2d ed.2011); § 590 The Law Torts period began limitations to run on the date al., Speiser, Stuart M. et The American prosecution ripe a malicious claim became (2011); § 1 Fowler Law Torts 28.5 V. law, i.e., at common the date on which the James, al., Gray Harper, Harper, et (3d rev.2006). prosequi only It was nolle was entered. § on Torts 4.4 ed. To satis proceedings against on this date that Ow- fy requirement, this favorable-termination favorably ens were terminated such proceedings must show they “in manner could not be revived. favorably him were terminated Because Owens filed suit within three [they] such manner that cannot be re date, Keeton, years § et al. at 119. “This is of this the statute of limitations vived.” court, true, of action.2 example, acquittal present of an does not bar his cause supprеssion say Appellees' have of materi- 2. This is not to that Owens could not asserted Wallace, immediately upon discovery filed suit his al evidence. See claims, § Contrary Appellees’ sug to the a court must look to mali- gestion, Humphrey, Heck v. prosecution cious as the closest “common (1994), analogue,” law recognizes require does not a different result. Heck date favorable termination is the date may held that a not file suit prisoner under triggering the onset of limitations for a § § as long judgment as prosecution malicious claim. But the dis- imply invalidity favor would of his sent maintains that closely we adhere too criminal conviction. id. at See to the malicious prosecution analogue. case, S.Ct. 2364. In this the Appellees as view, the dissent’s a court should consider out, point the Heck bar to suit was re the “underlying purpose of the elements of moved as soon as the state court invalidat analogue” common law and borrow this granted ed Owens’s conviction and him a § onset date for a 1983 claim if doing contrary new trial. But Appellees’ so would serve that underlying purpose. contention, removal of the Heck bar did Because the dissent concludes that bor- compel immediately to proceed rowing the prose- onset date for malicious under 1983. This is so because the stat cution would not serve this underlying pur- ute of limitations for the most analogous pose, it believes we should not borrow its tort, common-law prosecution, malicious onset date here. begin did not to run until proceedings the recognize We the important distinctions against finally Owens were terminated in ” prosecution between malicious torts and revived, his favor and could not “be Kee Brady-like Owens’s claims. But we cannot ton, 119, i.e., § et al. at prosecu when the agree with the dissent that those distinc- tor filed prosequi. Up the nolle until this permit jettison tions somehow us to the point, Owens imprisoned, remained common law date on which limitations be- the prosecutor could—and for sixteen gin run in determining to the date on did—proceed months him against without which begin limitations to ran for an analo- the need to seek reindictment. § gous precedent 1983 claim. Neither nor partial recognizes The dissent that Heck logic permits this result. does not resolve the statute-of-limitations issue before us. It nonetheless maintains The common law does act as a that Owens’s claims are time barred be- “starting mere in point” “defining the ele cause, view, in the dissent’s the statute of damages ments of and the prerequisites § limitations on Owens’s 1983 claims be- § recovery” Carey for their under gan to run when he granted a new 247, 257-58, Piphus, 435 U.S. 98 S.Ct. trial, or when he possessed sufficient facts (1978) (emphasis 55 L.Ed.2d 252 add to know about the Appellees’ illegal sup- ed). But the dissent cites no in case which i.e., evidence, pression of whenever Owens Supreme the has Court used the common have brought Brady-like could his claim. merely “starting law as the in point” re that,

The dissent acknowledges solving both a statute-of-limitations question determining § the start date of Owens’s a 1983 action. This is so because the 1091; at begin U.S. 390 n. 127 S.Ct. but see Heck ute of limitations did not to run until 477, 486-87, Humphrey, 512 U.S. proceedings against the Owens were favor- (1994) (holding terminated, ably finally because he knew § the date of accrual for a 1983 claim is then, alleged injury of his before he was enti- delayed § judgment plaintiff's if a in a Wallace, tled to seek relief earlier. imply invalidity plain- favor would the at 390 n. 127 S.Ct. 1091. conviction). Although criminal tiff's the stat- § 1983 claim on the one ap- Brady an claimant’s has never sanctioned such

Court hand, claim Rather, resolving precise prosecution the and his malicious proach. other, permit the would the statute on the dissent at issue here—when question (based on bring § to claim begins for a claim claimant to state of limitations conduct) the time for long the dis- the same after applied Wallace Court run—the § expired. the most claim had bringing common law rule for tinctive 888-89, period § limitations 1983 claim tort. 549 at on analogous U.S. (“[T]o have run the state claim beginning might even before determine bring to period ripened, forcing 1983] in this a claimant [§ the limitations ever differ- case, petitioner’s produce actions could separate we must determine when end.”). potentially conflicting an results. imprisonment came to ent false Heck, Moreover, hardly majority expressly approach Thus the dissent’s would prosecution’s judicial policy the “strong on malicious favorable accord with relied delay conflicting ac- creation resolu- requirement termination Brady-based 1983 tions.” Id. plaintiffs crual of the Heck, claim. U.S. at sum, we take Court That would Supreme Court 2364.3 the statute its word. We determine when the tort of require analogize courts limitations plaintiffs § on a 1983 claim of de- prosecution purposes malicious for by looking to run the common- begins claim, yet Brady the onset of a laying plaintiffs tort most analogous law very pur- analogy eschew same period In general, claim. the limitations calculating limita- poses of the onset of law when the for common torts commences claim, Brady for a us as tions strikes knows or reason to know has unlikely. Accordingly, exceedingly we injury. pro- But if the common law partial analy- cannot endorse dissent’s determining vides a “distinctive rule” for sis. period date of the the start limitations tort, analogous consider a court should Furthermore, if, as the dis even the limita- determining this rule when a court argues, sent should consider begins for the period plaintiffs tions claim of the ele policy “underlying purpose Wallace, 388-89, run. analogue” of ments the common law Application 1091. this rule to of limitations determine when statute of claims sets of the limita- Owens’s the start run, begins to we reach the same would period prose- at the date of the nolle tions “strong judicial policy For result. within qui. Because Owens filed suit сonflicting resolu against the creation of date, years of this his claims were three arising out of or identical tions the same timely filed. by prose transaction” furthered malicious require cution’s favorable termination III. Heck, ment, U.S. at timely, con if implicated Brady is also in the Even Owens’s suit is City Attorney’s Office By setting dates for Baltimore State’s text. different of the for a contends that suit must be dismissed beginning period limitations so, argument majority doing precisely S.Ct. 2364. Yet it is In Court Souter, expressly rejected suggestion majori- in Justice Justice rather than the from concurring opinion Souter's the Court ty’s reasoning, on relies in which the dissent closely too the common law had adhered criticizing us. Heck, analogue. at 484 n. U.S. entity capable not an Department’ as to it because is that the ‘Sheriffs is not an being entity capable of sued.4 of being sued. added). (emphasis Id. of

The Federal Rules Civil Procedure that the law of the state in which provide Department” Like the “Sheriffs at issue the district court sits determines an enti- in Boyer, no constitutional or statutory ty’s capacity to be sued. Fed.R.Civ.P. provision City establishes “Baltimore 17(b). Maryland occa- courts have had no Attorney’s State’s Office.” The “State’s to address whether the Baltimore sion Attorney” for each county and Baltimore City Attorney’s may State’s Office be sued. City officer, Mary- is constitutional but Maryland But courts’ treatment of analo- land Attorney’s law creates no “State’s gous agencies confirms “Baltimore Const, V, § Md. art. Office.” Cf. (“There City Attorney’s State’s Office” is not a Attorney shall be an for the State entity. suable Baltimore, county in each and the styled ”); Attorney.’ be ‘the State’s Md. State, Boyer Maryland’s In Ann.Code, (“[A] § Crim. Proc. 15-102 that, court highest made clear absent a shall, Attorney county State’s in the served statutory provision or constitutional creat by the Attorney, prosecute State’s and de- government an ing agency, “office” or part fend on the of the all State cases “department” unique legal bears no identi interested.”). may which the State be thus, ty, and it cannot be sued under Ma ryland law. See 323 Md. 594 A.2d Indeed, Maryland delegates many law Boyer, n. 9 the court the functions a hypothetical “State’s Attor- County considered whether the “Charles ney’s perform Office” would separate to a Department” entity Sheriffs was an ame Attorney’s “Office of the State’s Coordina- nable to suit. Id. It concluded: § tor.” See id. (describing 15-302 statute, are any public

We unaware of functions the Office of the State’s Attor- local, general public establishing ney’s Coordinator, or an including training each entity County Attorney’s known as the Charles professional State’s staff and research). Department.” “Sheriffs performing legal The sheriff for Unlike the county Office,” each is a Attorney’s constitutional officer “Baltimore IV, § under Art. Attorney’s Constitution the “Office of the State’s Coor- Maryland. expressly [But] the Con- dinator” is created [n]either statute. 15-301(a)(l) (“There any provision stitution nor other law See id. an office Coordinator.”). governmental agency Attorney’s creates a knoum of State’s That Department.” Maryland as the Conse- Assembly the General knew how “Sheriff’s quently, office, summary judg- yet the motion for such an create failed to do so here, ment on County respect “entity” behalf of the Charles with to the confirms Department’ correctly City Attorney’s ‘Sheriffs asserted that the “Baltimore State’s brief, 800, 808-09, 2727, Relatedly, appellate in his Assistant U.S. 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d (1982), Attorney State’s Brave contends absolute 396 the district court must determine prosecutorial immunity requires performing prosecutorial dismissal of whether Brave was allegedly claims him. Brave waived this functions at the time he committed defense, however, violations, by failing to raise it in the the asserted constitutional cf. Barada, Fitzsimmons, Tully Buckley district court. See 509 U.S. 591, (7th Cir.2010); 2606, (1993) (hold Collyer v.Darling, 594 98 211, (6th 1996). Moreover, ing immunity F.3d 222 Cir. be that absolute does not attach to immunity prosecutors performing "investigatory cause absolute attaches to func func tions, officеs, tions”). Fitzgerald, see Harlow v. person from the fice,” apart separate identity. unique legal no Office” bears Cf. office. position or occupies who Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. Sosa v. 159 L.Ed.2d 711 n. suggests dissent partial friend’s Our (2004) (“[W]hen uses cer legislature creates a Maryland Constitution statute part of the language one tain Attorney’s Office” “Baltimore State’s another, language and different Maryland law. suit under amenable to in meanings were different court assumes But, fact, of law nearly every provision (internal omit marks quotation tended.” regulates proposition cited for this ted)). Attorney’s Attorney, not State’s State’s Const, V, § See, art. e.g., Md. Office. (“The Title 15 of notes that Owens such Attorney perform shall State’s Procedure, Maryland of Criminal Code salary as shall be receive such duties and of a State’s the duties (em- establishes which Assembly.” by the General prescribed of the State’s Attorney, entitled “Office (“[T]he added)); State’s Attor- id. phasis title, con Based on this Attorney.” pow- City shall have ney Baltimore for Assembly Maryland General tends that the Deputy and such other appoint er to Attorney’s Of a “State’s Bench has established as the Judicial Assistants Maryland fice,” ap- under or may City may be sued authorize which of Baltimore fails, added)); argument see also Reply (emphasis Br. at 2. This prove____” law. (“[A] First, Ann., however, as the Proc. 15-102 reasons. Md.Code Crim. for two shall, county held, Attorney in the served a statute’s State’s long has Supreme Court and de- Attorney, prosecute in the State’s to courts little assistance provides title all eases in part of the State See, fend on the e.g., statutory provisions. terpreting (em- may be interested.” which the State v. Balt. & Ohio Bhd. R.R. Trainmen added)). establishing a Far from phasis 528-29, Co., R.R. Office, Attorney’s provisions these State’s (1947) (“[T]he title of 91 L.Ed. position administer create and heading of a section and the the statute could Attorney—a position Owens State’s meaning of the text. plain limit the cannot not, reached, by suing the but did have use they аre of interpretive purposes, For Attorney in his indi- City State’s Baltimore ambig they light on some only when shed capacity. official vidual or Second, if even phrase.”). uous word or heading, it is the title we were to consider Mary- sure, inspection close To be position that the title refers clear passing does reveal a land’s Constitution sua Attorney, separate, not a the State’s At- to “the office of the State’s reference Const, may (“[Ex- Undoubtedly, a plaintiff V, § ble Md. art. torney.” office. i.e., person Attorney, sue the State’s conducting for the office penses S.C. State position. paid by holds the See Attorney who ... shall be Comm’n, 243 v. Fed. Mar. of Baltimore Mayor Ports Auth. Council Cir.2001) (“[S]tate offi the total of them exceeds F.3d the extent that office.”). damages passing money But this may cers be sued the fees of his to us noth- long as relief an “office” seems capacities, so reference to their individual position for the personally.”), ing the officer more than shorthand sought from Moreover, 1864, the refer- 743, Attorney. 152 122 S.Ct. aff'd, 535 U.S. State’s (2002). the case at hand distinguish fails fails to heading But the ence 962 L.Ed.2d there, Ma- although the Boyer. For identity—and thus from legal to establish passing reference ryland made Attorney’s Of- Code suability—of a “State’s

395 County depart- “Sheriffs S.Ct. 2727. designed the Charles The doctrine is ment,” Maryland’s highest court held that square important two interests: “the need Maryland an en- public “establish[ ] law failed to hold officials accountable when County tity they known as the Charles ‘Sheriffs power exercise irresponsibly [their] ” 9; Department.’ 594 A.2d at 128 n. see and the need to shield officials from 12—208(b)(1) Ann., harassment, distraction, Md.Code Local Gov’t liability when 3) (“The Md.Code, 25, § (formerly they art. perform their reasonably.” duties County County Callahan, Commissioners of Charles 223, 231, Pearson v. 555 U.S. separate pension plan 808, shall establish a 129 172 L.Ed.2d 565 employees of County sworn the Charles Qualified immunity protects public department____” (emphasis add- Sheriffs officials from suit when the state of the law ed)). To remain faithful to the court’s is such that they would not have known analysis Boyer, we must similarly hold their conduct statutory violates or City that the Attorney’s “Baltimore State’s al-Kidd, rights. constitutional v. Ashcroft is not a entity. Office” suable — -, 2074, 2083, U.S. 131 S.Ct. 179 conclusion, we hold that (2011). See, L.Ed.2d 1149 e.g., Pinder v. City “Baltimore Attorney’s State’s Office” Johnson, (4th 1169, 54 F.3d 1177-78 Cir. only. is a term of convenience It refers to 1995) (en banc). The defense does not government the collection of employees officials, however, they shield when have supervision who work under the “incompetently]” acted or have “knowing- City Attorney. Baltimore It State’s is not ly Malley the law.” v. Briggs, violate[d] entity an amenable to suit.5 1092, 475 U.S. (1986). See, e.g., Occupy

L.Ed.2d 271 Co- IV. (4th 107, Haley, lumbia v. Cir.2013); Brockington Boykins, We next consider qualified-immunity 503, Cir.2011); Ridpath F.3d 507-08 by defense asserted Pelligrini, Officers Univ., v. Bd. Governors Marshall Dunnigan, and Landsman. (4th Cir.2006). F.3d Qualified immunity protects government liability from qualified-immunity officials for “civil To establish a damages defense, insofar as their conduct does not a public official must demonstrate (1) clearly rights violate established ... alleged has not or shown person which a reasonable would have facts that “make out a violation of a consti Harlow, (2) known.” right,” 457 U.S. at 102 tutional right or “the City 5. Because we hold that the Baltimore doned this view. See Fed. Maritime Comm'n Attorney’s Port Auth., entity, State’s Office is not a suable v. S.C. argument, we do not address its alternative (2002); U.S. ex rel. i.e., Attorney’s the State’s Office is an Oberg Ky. Higher Corp., Educ. Student Loan sovereign arm of the State entitled to immuni- (4th Cir.2012). n. F.3d Ac note, however, ty. partial We dissent cordingly, engaging when in an arm-of-the- analysis focuses its arm-of-the-State on a sin- analysis, State a court must also consider at gle judgment against factor—whether degree least three other factors—the of auton Attorney's Baltimore Office would omy entity, entity an exercised whether an paid by be of Baltimore—to conclude concerns, is involved with state and how an Attorney’s that the State's Office lacks immu- entity giv under is treated state law—without nity Although from suit. Court ing preeminence any single See factor. previously regarded had this factor as the Oberg, 681 F.3d at 580. important, subsequently most it has aban- at the ‘clearly A. established’ [not] issue Pearson, 555 alleged its violation. time of’ 1963, the Court held 232, 129 S.Ct. 808. U.S. at Brady Maryland, in v. 373 U.S. 1194, (1963), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 215 that immunity can qualified A defense prosecutors’ suppression of evidence “fa 12(b)(6) motion, in a Rule presented be an the vorable to accused” violates Due noted, but, when as the Second Circuit has proves Process Clause when the evidence early in stage proceed at this the asserted punishment.” either to or to guilt “material defense a formidable hur ings, “the faces year Brady, A after we concluded that usually “is not Field dle” and successful.” suppression officers’ of evidence also police Cnty. Suffolk, v. 463 F.3d Day, LLC the See Barbee v. violates Constitution. (2d Cir.2006). 167, This is so be 191-92 Warden, 842, Penitentiary, Md. 331 F.2d 12(b)(6) ap under is cause dismissal Rule (4th Cir.1964). Specifically, 846-47 Bar- only plaintiff if a to state a propriate fails bee, police we found a officer’s failure Iqbal, plausible claim that is on its face. prose to a exculpatory to disclose evidence 678, at A claim 556 U.S. S.Ct. 1937. process a cutor violates defendant’s due plausibility pleaded has “facial when the at rights. Id. 847. “It makes no [constitu allows draw factual content the court to difference,” “if explained, we the tional] defen the reasonable inference that withholding [of officials evidence] alleged.” for the dant is liable misconduct prosecutor. police than the The other are standard, satisfy must Id. To prosecution part also and taint allege than do more facts that show they, the trial is no if rather on less than possibility” wrongdoing. “sheer Id. Attorney, guilty ‍​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‍the State’s were plaintiffs complaint will dismissed not be 846; nondisclosure.” at see Id. also provides long as as he sufficient detail Greene, 263, 280-81, 527 U.S. Strickler claim to has a about his show that he (1999) success more-than-conceivable chance of {“[Brady encompasses ] evidencе known Twombly, on the merits. Bell Corp. Atl. police and not to investigators (internal prosecutor.” quotation marks L,Ed.2d omitted)). Metts, In Goodwin v. 885 F.2d hand, alleges On the one Owens Cir.1989), 163-64 we reaffirmed PeUigrini, Lands- Dunnigan, Officers decision, holding our Barbee that a his consti- clearly man violated established officer violates criminal defendant’s con rights by tutional faith to acting bad rights exculpato by withholding stitutional suppress supporting material evidence ry prosecutors. evidence from hand, innocence. On other the Offi- maintain, held, and the court To cers district make out a claim that the claim, pled plausible has not violated rights Officers his constitutional evidence, 41-42, if Appellees’ by suppressing exculpatory Br. at and that even he Ow has, clearly rights allege, ultimately prove, he ens must asserts were (1) of their al- the evidence established 1988—the date at issue was favorable to (2) violation, him; address leged suppressed id. 29^40. We Officers evi (3) faith;6 prejudice in turn. in bad argument each dence Collins, recognized prosecutors obligations have different with re- As Jean v. (4th Cir.2000) ("Jean II”) (Wilkin- spect disclosure of evi- C.J., son, concurring), Brady, prosecutor police officers and dence. Under violates Angelone, Monroe v. 323 he had ensued. See masturbated at the foot of the bed (4th Cir.2003). 286, Preju F.3d 299-300 raped while Owens and killed Ms. Williar. if proba dice ensues “there is reasonable Moreover, alleges Owens that Thompson bility” jury would have reached a repeatedly changed story only his because different result had the evidence been provided the Officers additional details properly Bag disclosed. United States crime, they about which pressured 667, 682, 3375, ley, 473 U.S. Thompson to incorporate so as to incrimi- (1985). adjective L.Ed.2d 481 “rea nate directly. Owens more the in- When sonable” is in important this context. See ended, terview the Officers told ASA Kyles Whitley, 514 U.S. only Brave about the witness’s last version 131 L.Ed.2d As is, of events. alleges That Owens that explained, Court has “[t]he (and ASA Brave did not know so could not question is not whether the defendant counsel) and did not tell defense likely would more than not have received Thompson had offered several other ac- different verdict” had the evidence been crimes, counts of the all of which conflicted Rather, question disclosed. Id. with the iteration Thompson ultimately whether, disclosure, in the absence of jury. told the trial, defendant “received a fair under difficulty have concluding We little stood as a resulting trial a verdict wor allegations plausible Owens’s state thy of confidence.” Id. First, claim. the information Offi- alleges that Officers Pelli Pelligrini, Dunnigan, cers and Landsman Landsman, grini, Dunnigan, and at the assertedly withheld from ASA Brave was Brave, subjected direction of Thomp ASA favorable to Owens. Had the Officers son, witness, star lengthy State’s to a properly statements, Thompson’s disclosed interrogation, they mid-trial in which support his inconsistencies would have lent cajoled threatened him change contention advanced Owens’s testimony repeatedly strengthen so toas Owens, Thompson, defense that had then-“failing prosecution.” raped and murdered Ms. Williar. At a Owens asserts that the Officers elicited minimum, the inconsistencies would have from Thompson vastly succession of dif attempt aided Owens in his to discredit ferent accounts of his and Owens’s involve Thompson’s testimony and sow reasonable ment in Ms. rape Williar’s and murder. jurors. doubt the minds of the See ranged Thompson’s These accounts from Bagley, 105 S.Ct. 3375 nothing insistence that he had to do with (holding Brady’s duty to disclose evi- crimes, to his admission that he had encompasses dence impeachment evi- (but broken into Ms. apartment Williar’s dence). downstairs), stayed to his contention that Second, upstairs specific he had remained bathroom Owens has offered alle- only Williar, gations heard the assault on Ms. as to the Officers’ bad faith. He story, to his final in which experienced police he asserted that asserts that these offi- the Constitution whenever he fails to disclose But have the lead other courts followed material, evidence, police even if the Jean II to conclude that officers com- purely they nondisclosure was accidental. See 373 mit when constitutional violations suppress exculpatory U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1194. The Sixth Circuit evidence in bad faith. White, applied has this same absolute standard to See Porter v. 483 F.3d Wilhoit, Cir.2007); officers. See Moldowan v. War- Villasana v. 368 F.3d ren, (6th Cir.2009). (8th Cir.2004). 388-89 faith B. willfully, consciously, and bad cers revi- multiple “chose not to disclose” turn to of whether question next We they Thompson’s sions to statement “clearly were rights Owens’s constitutional hours-long during from him their elicited 1988, in February and March established” Further, alleges that the interrogation. he the Officers when acted. final Brave about the told ASA Officers as soon as the story of the almost version i. temporal proxim- had said it. The witness right clearly a estab For to be of nar- Thompson’s succession ity between lished, sufficiently contours be its “must the report and the ratives Officers’ that official clear a reasonable [such] the contention lends prosecutor support he is that what [have] understood] would narratives Thompson’s that inconsistent v. doing right.” violates Anderson minds, thus, in the were fresh Officers’ 640, 635, 107 Creighton, 483 U.S. S.Ct. accidental, not the Officers’ omissions were 3034, “This is not but intentional malicious. say protected that an official is action immunity very the action qualified unless allegations satisfy Bra- Finally, Owens’s previously in has been held question [to materiality Owens as- dy requirement. ’s Pelzer, Hope unlawful.” v. 536 U.S. be] Thompson the “star serts that was 730, 739, 2508, 666 122 S.Ct. 153 L.Ed.2d witness,” proceed- post-trial and that (2002). Rather, if the liability obtains Brave that without ings, ASA admitted law is it have state of the such that would gone have Thompson, “the case could not “apparent” to an that his con been officer plausible that Certainly, forward.” it is violated law. duct constitutional key witness could impeachment of such a Anderson, 640, 3034. 483 U.S. at аt trial. have altered outcome We require not emphasize Brady does In evaluating qualified whether have modi- probably that disclosure would exists, immunity keep we must mind Strickler, at fied a trial’s result. right plaintiffs that it is the constitutional 289-90,119 contrary, it S.Ct. On the established, not a clearly that must be enough that the of evidence suppression monetary remedy. access to plaintiffs a in- proceedings’ doubt cast serious on Thus, clearly does es right a not become prove allega- Id. If can his tegrity. plaintiff successfully if a has tablished tions, they certainly satisfy this re- through § would a 1983 action. enforced 741, 2508. On quirement.7 Hope, 536 U.S. actually unpersuasively contend that innocent of crime for which he 7. The Officers convicted, Strickler, Brady he ob see U.S. at 289- Owens’s claim fails because was 1936; City New prison release on the basis tained his from Poventud York, (2d Cir.2014) (en newly rather 750 F.3d discovered DNA evidence than banc), contrary prove Brady But if he can innocence—for ex- the undisclosed material. assertion, routinely ample, completely ex- Officers' courts because DNA evidence pre- Brady plaintiffs § would consider the claims of onerates him—the Officers’ rule newly plaintiff recovering on the discovered vent exonerated basis of from See, Brady prison. e.g., put violation that We DNA evidence. Holland v. him (7th liability police Chicago, Cir. 643 F.3d 255-56 see no reason insulate from Moreover, 2011). exculpatory adopting Officers’ rule who withhold evidence officers perverse merely evi- of discriminat faith- unrelated DNA would have effect bad because although plain- ing against light proving later came to plaintiffs. For dence innocent that he is tiff’s innocence. a need not establish may clearly February contrary, right a be estab and March the time of the sources, alleged violations. by any including number of lished case, statute, a criminal or the Constitu ii. See, e.g., (relying id. on

tion itself. above, As outlined Eighth Amendment to conclude Cоurt held in prosecutor may 1963 that a established); right clearly was Collier v. suppress material Dickinson, evidence 477 F.3d Cir. during defendant’s criminal trial. Bra 2007) (relying on statute to determine dy, 373 U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1194. established); right clearly that a Ci Barbee, year decided a Brady, after we (1st Cutillo, nelli held that part “[t]he are also Cir.1990) (relying on habeas and criminal thus, prosecution,” they too violate the to right clearly cases determine that a was Constitution if and when they suppress established).

exculpatory evidence. 331 F.2d at 846. Furthermore, clearly to be estab 1976, In we applied holding Barbee’s lished, right need not be one with re expressly impeachment to evidence. In spect Sutton, all judges which on all courts both United States v. 542 F.2d (4th Cir.1976), Rather, 1239 agree. and Boone v. Pader “[i]f unlawfulness is ick, (4th Cir.1976), 541 447 F.2d we over apparent, may the fact that some court turned a defendant’s criminal conviction on have reached an incorrect result will not ground police suppressed that had ex shield a defendant’s violation a clearly culpatory bearing information on the ve established right.” Layne, See Wilson v. racity of a testimony. witness’s See Sut 111, Cir.), 141 122 aff'd, F.3d 526 U.S. ton, 2, Boone, 1243; F.2d at n. 603, 1692, Barbee, 541 F.2d at in 453. As we reiter (1999). Thus, although judicial disagree ated that where “material evidence which ment about right existence of a is tends to exculpate the defendant is not certainly a factor we consider in determin disclosed,” the failure to it “is disclose ing right whether a clearly has been estab neutralized in because was the hands of lished, Pearson, see U.S. police rather than prosecutor.” 808, disagreement alone does not Boone, 541 F.2d at 450-51. plaintiffs defeat a claim in every instance. Goodwin, Finally, 163-64, in 885 F.2d at The Court has never sanctioned applied we logic Barbee’s 1983 cases. rule, see, such a e.g., Hope, 536 U.S. at Burch, also See Carter v. 34 F.3d 263- 745-46, 122 (holding right S.Ct. 2508 (4th Cir.1994). Goodwin, upheld we clearly rejecting quali established and jury award of thousands of dollars fied-immunity notwithstanding defense police a South Carolina officer сontrary justices dissenting views of three who, failed to exculpatory disclose appeals), and the court of and neither have so, In doing rejected evidence. we see, Purnell, we, e.g., Henry v. 652 F.3d qualified-immunity officer’s defense be- (4th Cir.2011) (en banc) (re 524, 536-37 cause we determined that a “reasonable jecting a qualified-immunity defense over a [acting officer would known 1983] have dissent). three-judge prosecution that a carried out ... without mind, principles With these we con- exculpatory disclosure of information sider whether rights the constitutional Ow- rights would violate the constitutional clearly ens asserts were established as of the criminal defendants.” 885 F.2d at li- immunity provides “no qualified capped an unbroken thus 164.8 Goodwin affirming—then (emphasis add- precedent cense to lawless conduct” chain of circuit ed)); defendants’ Forsyth, criminal reaffirming—that Mitchell (1985) mali- by police officers’ rights are violated L.Ed.2d 411 of evidence. suppression immunity cious con- qualified (explaining “whether the conduct of which cerns offers a different partial dissent clearly estab- plaintiff complains violated maintains that the law was not view. It added)). (emphasis law” lished because the clearly established date—Barbee, decided before cases Barbee, Sutton, each and Boone Sutton, Boone—imposed indepen- no by police offi that certain conduct held officers to dis- obligation on dent exculpa of material suppression cers—the The dissent exculpatory close evidence. tory in the violation evidence—results Barbee, Sutton, and Boone insists that or rights. criminal defendants’ Whether po- “a proposition for the stand knowledge “imputed” to not an officer’s evi- knowledge officer’s lice not affect the lawful prosecutor does prosecutor imputed dence will be of the officer’s own conduct. See ness holding, This the dis- Brady purposes.” Limone, (rejecting police at 47 contends, notify police fails to officers sent clearly argument that law was not officers’ suit, thus, the susceptibility their announcing established because cases enjoy qualified in at hand Officers the case right referenced plaintiffs constitutional immunity. po of obligations, “the not those State’s” Qualified immunity agree. cannot We officers). Barbee, Sutton, Boone lice per officials “public exists to ensure that then- taught police officers how to conform free forming discretionary functions [are] held conduct to the law. These cases each ... act fear of retributive suits to without material police suppresses that if a officer they should have understood except when evidence, exculpatory courts will invalidate particular conduct was unlawful.” Li criminal sentence as uncon a defendant’s (1st Condon, 39, 44 mone v. 372 F.3d acting after police stitutional. A officer Cir.2004). since it first articulated Ever decisions, like each of the issuance of these qualified-immunity contours of modern here, thought could not have the Officers doctrine, empha Court has exculpato of material suppression qualified immunity assesses the sized ry pass would constitutional mus evidence apparent unlawfulness of conduct. See See, Ginelli, at 655 e.g., ter. 896 F.2d Harlow, 819, 457 102 S.Ct. 2727 U.S. on notice (holding police officers were (“[W]here expected an official could be right’s of constitutional existence because that certain conduct would violate know criminal sen prior cases had invalidated ..., rights statutory or constitutional misconduct). on similar tences based injury by who caused such person suffers (em recognized reality, this may of action.” Goodwin conduct have a cause Barbee, Sutton, added)); light in of and Boone phasis (explaining see also id. held 293, Cir.1992) (2d (discussing po- 1971 We not alone. Other circuits have 299 8. were 1988, by police action); similarly City Chicago, held that officers 856 F.2d lice Jones v. by suppressing 985, ex- (7th Cir.1988) violated the Constitution (discussing 1981-82 See, e.g., culpatory in faith. evidence bad action); police Fortenberry, 849 F.2d Geter v. 1554, Johnson, 88 F.3d McMillian (5th Cir.1988) (discussing 1982 (11th Cir.1996) (discussing police ac- action). police York, tion); Walker v. New 974 F.2d officers, police obligation that a officer’s lice disclose then Goodwin wrongly was exculpatory clearly material evidence was decided. For according to the dissent’s by years prior established five to the view, Goodwin acted in the absence any Brady alleged violations in ease. Yet prior precedent circuit to hold that a con- suggests the dissent that our reliance on stitutional right clearly established retroactively subjects Goodwin the Offi- police and so a enjoy quali- officer did not liability. although cers to Not so. For fied immunity. We cannot endorse such Goodwin issued after the Officers in this extraordinary an precedent. view of our acted, case Goodwin announced no new sum, In our precedent unmistakably Rather, rule of constitutional law. that, provides by a police officer held, merely light of the constitutional clearly violates established constitutional Barbee, already Sutton, rule established suppresses law when he Boone, exculpa- material duty officer’s tory evidence in bad faith. Accordingly, disclose material evidence was dearly If a right established 1983. was we hold that clearly the Officers were on (as clearly established Goodwin notice of the impermissibility their con- held), it must clearly have been established alleged duct the time of the viola- (when acted). in 1988 the Officers To hold tions.10 contrary directly would conflict with

Goodwin.9 V. Indeed, if the dissent is correct and Barbee, Sutton, Finally, and Boone announced no we address whether Owens has rule of applicable po- constitutional law plausible stated a claim the BCPD. hopes convincing contrary, materially exculpatory us to the prosecu- evidence to a Collins, rely the Officers on Jean v. tor” violates a criminal defendant’s constitu- (4th Cir.1998) (“Jean I”), vacated, rights. (quotation tional Id. at 659 marks and omitted). U.S. alterations (1999), they which contend renders the state precedent opinion, of our uncertain. That unpersuasively rely The Officers on three however, does not assist them. Jean I ad- unpublished posf-1988 opinions to bolster place dressed conduct that took in 1982— rights their contention that the Owens asserts predating the conduct we held But, unconstitution- clearly were not established in 1988. as Goodwin, years al in and six before the con- repeatedly explained, unpublished we have Moreover, duct at issue in this case. soon opinions precedent are not in this circuit. I, Supreme after the See, Carter, issuance of Jean 1113, e.g., Hogan v. 1118 Court vacated Thus, the decision for further consid- (4th 1996) (en banc). unpub- Cir. these light Layne, eration in of Wilson v. 526 U.S. opinions lished cannot alter the clear rule set 603, 1692, (1999). 119 S.Ct. 143 L.Ed.2d 818 published opinions forth in the discussed Collins, 1142, See Jean v. 526 U.S. 119 S.Ct. they judi- above. Nor do reflect the kind of 2016, remand, (1999). 143 L.Ed.2d 1029 On disagreement qualified cial that makes immu- equally because the en banc court was divid- nity appropriate. Just as a dissent does not ed, case, the district court’s denial of relief was unpublished articulate the law of the judges voting affirmed. Those to affirm con- opinions do not the law articulate of the cir- summary judgment appropri- cluded that was may judicial disagreement cuit. Both reflect ate because the had failed to offer right clearly about whether a is in fact estab- lished, sufficient evidence of the Officers’ unconstitu- displace but neither can the circuit’s II, (Wil- tional conduct. Jean 221 F.3d at 663 binding authority. Brockington, 637 F.3d Cf. kinson, C.J., concurring). judges These none- (holding unpublished at 507 decisions Barbee, Sutton, Boone, theless left intact suggesting right that no constitutional Goodwin, expressly po- affirmed that "a quali- violated did not entitle a defendant to failing immunity). lice officer’s аctions to turn over fied

402 — U.S. -, Thompson, Connick v. also

A. 1350, 1359, L.Ed.2d 131 S.Ct. provides “[e]v Section vicariously (2011) not are (“[Municipalities] law who, color of state under ery person,” employees’ their § 1983 for liable under another’s federal violation of causes actions.”). standard, a to this Pursuant injured party be liable rights shall if it under is liable municipality § 1983. 42 U.S.C. his conduct. See by custom, by practice or policy, follows a City Department New York v. Monell con plaintiffs a local officials violate which Services, 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 436 U.S. Social Monell, 436 U.S. rights. stitutional (1978), 56 L.Ed.2d municipality if a sub Only 98 S.Ct. 2018. as municipalities qualify held Court custom, can policy, practice a or scribes statute, rendering under “persons” indepen an to have committed it be said amenable to suit. them liabil act, non of Monell qua the sine dent officials, municipali ity. public Unlike immunity. See enjoy qualified ties do Here, alleges that Owens Independence, Owen constitutional violated his federal BCPD custom, pol municipal to a rights pursuant munic against claims Accordingly, alleges Specifically, he icy, practice. or law, current against measured ipalities are ease,” relevant to this all times “[a]t municipalities’ whether regard to

without custom, policy, a BCPD “maintained at the clearly established were obligations officers’ condoning its practice” of and/or Id. at alleged violations. time of the consciously, and re “knowingly, conduct 1398; Barber v. see also suppressing]” with[holding] peatedly Cir.1992). (6th Salem, F.2d 237-38 complaint evidence. Owens’s “by reasons, theory court of custom condo- alleges the district thus For these McDaniel, F.2d against Spell claims nation.” dismissing Owens’s erred Cir.1987). theory immu- Under qualified on the basis the BCPD municipal this, § 1983 if liability, city violates recognizing nity. Apparently stop to or cor put fail “to policymakers it has contend that does not now BCPD pattern of unconstitu widespread rect a Rather, argues it that dismiss- immunity. alleg conduct.” Id. at 1389. tional nonetheless claim it was al of the officers’ failing to correct its es that assertedly has because Owens proper evidence, suppression of pervasive forth facts” to set plead “failed to sufficient him, committing an inde injured BCPD Br. Appellees’ Monell claim. plausible under that renders liable act pendent argument. turn to that 43. We § 1983.

B. such a theo Prevailing under point A must easy plaintiff no task. ry unlike is Although municipalities, practice[ ] widespread and officials, immunity “persistent to a cannot claim public officials,” “duration and municipal suit, express has from Court policy that Monell, of which indicate frequency” liability: under ly cabined their (1) or constructive had actual ille makers only for its own municipality is liable (2) conduct, and failed knowledge of the ‍​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‍at acts. See 436 U.S. gal indiffer it due to their “deliberate “cannot correct municipality (stating that (alterations omit Id. at 1386-91 employs ence.” solely because be held liable ted). and indifference knowledge Both see original)); (emphasis tortfeasor” from widespread” can be inferred the “extent” of em- pattern practice, the hall- ployees’ Spo- misconduct. Id. at 1891. mark of an impermissible Spell, custom. (but if) or rights radic isolated violations of will 824 F.2d at 1386. If only give liability; only rise to Monell duration frequency and of this conduct “widespread flagrant” or violations widespread recurrent, will. was and Id. at 1387. BCPD’s failure to address it qualify could as “deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1391.

Although prevailing on the merits of a difficult, simply Monell claim is alleging Urging result, a different the BCPD is, definition, by such a claim easier. For alleges contends that Owens nothing more to survive a motion “unadorned, to dismiss under Rule than the-defendant-unlawful- 12(b)(6), a complaint only allege ly-harmed-me need facts See Appel- accusation[s].” “ which, true, if ‘state a claim to relief that lees’ Br. 47 (quoting Iqbal, 556 at U.S. ” 1937). plausible on its face.’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at recognize, course, S.Ct. We 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 that courts have dismissed Monell claims 1955) U.S. at (emphasis when has alleged nothing added). The recitation of facts need not municipality’s more than a adherence to an detailed, particularly be and the chance of impermissible custom. But Owens has success need not particularly high. be See done more than that: alleged Owens has Iqbal, 1937; U.S. facts—the existence of “reported and un- Twombly, 550 U.S. at reported S.Ct. 1955. cases” and numerous “successful A plaintiff fails to motions”—which, true, state a claim when if would buttress he offers “labels and conclusions” or legal for- his conclusion.

mulaieally recites the elements of his brief, non-conclusory, Owens’s but alle § Iqbal, 1983 cause of action. 556 U.S. at gations closely resemble in Haley those 678,129 S.Ct. 1937. Boston, (1st Cir.2011). 657 F.3d 39 claim, In support There, of his alleges a defendant was convicted of mur “[rjeported unreported when cases der two Boston sup officers period from the of time before and during pressed a witness’s casting statement complained events of’ establish guilt. doubt on his Id. at 45. The defen custom, the BCPD had a policy, prac- material, or dant Brady discovered this knowingly tice of and repeatedly sup- thirty-four years after in prison, obtained pressing exculpatory release; evidence criminal his he then sued the Boston Po prosecutions. alleges He further Department “a lice under 1983. The First number of motions were granted filed and Circuit reversed the district court’s dis during period claim, this time that demonstrate holding missal of the that the defen custom, [the BCPD] maintained a dant had a plausible stated Monell claim policy, practice or type allow this Department the Boston Police behavior directly either or ... condon- “wholly unexplained” view of the nature of it, ing knowingly turning suppression blind its officers’ of evidence and and/or (but eye to it.” The “reported alleged assertions as to opin not identified record) unreported cases” and numerous ion or involving “volume of cases” allega- “successful motions” are factual similar violations in the Boston Police Dе tions, veracity 53; plausibly partment. of which could Complaint, Id. at see also Boston, support a Monell claim. That Haley City BCPD offi- v. F.Supp.2d of (D.Mass.2009) (No. 1:09-cv-10197). cers multiple withheld information on oc- “persistent casions could establish a Haley and court concluded that this “volume” of that a documenting sup- spring lished in the cases officers’ of other exculpatory of lent credence to the officer’s failure disclose evi- evidence pression “encouraged, or at the officer liable policymakers potentially claim that dence made practice. a a impermissible tolerated” an for of criminal defendant’s least violation Accordingly, rights. F.3d Haley, “[al- at 53. constitutional in couched though complaint [the was] terms,” that the court concluded general I. suf- complaint “contain[ed] nonetheless survive motion question

ficient factual content to I of turn first whether Id. completely to dismiss.” Owens’ claims are time-barred. is no statute of Because federal “[t]here reasoning applies The same here. Of claims, § for ... the state limitations course, merits, will prevail on the period governs personal which limitations allege pervasive more have to do than injury applied.” Lewis v. Rich actions misconduct; must BCPD he practice Dep’t, mond Police 947 F.2d early stage it. But this in the prove at (4th Cir.1991) curiam); (per see Wallace we must conclude that Owens proceedings, Kato, 384, 387, 127 1091, 166 549 U.S. sufficient factual content to sur- pled has case, In apply we L.Ed.2d 973 this 12(b)(6) Rule vive dismissal. Maryland’s three-year period limitations personal injury for actions. See Md.Code VI. Ann., § Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-101. This above, forth For the reasons set we beyond much is debate. When Owens’ judgment district court to the affirm accrued, however, § 1983 claim is a more it dismisses Owens’s claims extent question. difficult Attorney’s Baltimore Of- judgment fice. vacate the all other We § accrual date of a 1983 cause “[T]he case to respects. Wе remand the the dis- question action is a federal law that is court for consis- proceedings trict further by not resolved reference to state law.” opinion. with this tent Wallace, 127 S.Ct. 1091. PART, IN issue, AFFIRMED IN VACATED very addressing PART, AND REMANDED rule” Court stated “standard determining the date cause of action TRAXLER, Judge, concurring Chief plaintiff accrues is to determine “when the part: and part dissenting present action, a complete has and cause of III, IVA, is, parts plaintiff I file concur when can suit and V (internal However, majority opinion. quotation I obtain Id. respectfully relief.” omitted). First, parts Generally from II and I marks citations dissent IV.B. Brady speaking, that Owens’ claims were a federal claim “accrues when believe untimely they accrued he knows or because when has reason know the basis of his impeaching providing discovered the act or disclosed, occurred,” injury not been not her has and therefore evidence had proceeding subsequently typically “we determine the accrual when entry prosequi. looking via of the nolle 1983 action to the event that terminated Second, lay person I typical would conclude that the district should have alerted the correctly protect or her D rights.” court determined the indi- 'Ambrosio (6th Cir.2014) Marino, entitled to qualified vidual defendants were (internal immunity clearly quotation alterations and marks because it was estab- Warden, omitted); see Nasim v. Md. common law tort is prosecution, malicious Corr., (4th 951, 64 F.3d Cir. its requirement House “favorable termination” banc) 1995) (en (explaining that under fed constitutes a “distinctive rule” of accrual law, a cause of action accrues “when that displaces general eral rule that a claim sufficient plaintiff possesses plaintiff facts accrues when the knows or has him Wallace, about the harm done to that reason reason to injury. know his See action.”); 388, inquiry able will reveal his cause of 549 U.S. at 127 S.Ct. 1091. Because Wallace, 388, 549 U.S. at 127 the favorable-termination element “consti- cf . that, (observing S.Ct. 1091 under the stan tutes a prerequisite for recovery” on a rule, dispute claim, dard there can be no that prosecution malicious naturally it petitioner could filed suit have as soon as “establishes the time from which the claim allegedly Williams, wrongful arrest occurred ... accrues.” See Lambert v. (4th Cir.2000). so that statute of limitations would normal F.3d 262 n. 3 date). ly commence to run from that my I part ways with friends in the ma- jority Owens’ claim is based on the defendant application on the of the “favorable police officers’ failure to exculpa- requirement disclose termination” in this context. tory evidence—a process majority due claim that The notes that in satisfy order to clearly pursuant arises Brady Mary- the favorable termination element of a ma- Thus, claim, land. “application general prosecution licious must [plaintiffs § rule would indicate that demonstrate that the criminal proceedings 1983] Brady] cause of action on [based accrued— him have been terminated such and the period began-when way they limitations cannot be revived. See [plaintiff] York, discovered that exculpatory Poventud v. New 750 F.3d (2nd Cir.2014) (en banc) (“Un- question evidence in had not been dis- 130-31 D’Ambrosio, closed to him.” any F.3d at der the common law final termination added); (emphasis see Julian v. Han- of a criminal proceeding favor of the na, (7th Cir.2013). accused, 732 F.3d Ow- proceeding such that the cannot clearly brought ens knew about at least some of the again, qualifies be as a favorable exculpatory evidence—specifically the fact purposes termination for of a malicious action.”). Thompson gave police prosecution James several Following ap- testimony proach, they different versions of his proceedings before conclude that the during early formally trial—as as were not October terminated until Maryland Special Ap- when Court of nolle prosequi was entеred. peals shifting recounted testimony view, my In majority adheres a bit opinion affirming an Owens’ conviction. rigidly analogue too to the common-law latest, very

At the Owens was aware of the using rather than a “starting point” as impeachment at evidence “provides a useful in mak- guidepost appeal issue in this in June when injuries” ing alleged sense of constitutional his counsel filed a motion to exclude that determining the contours of claims of evidence at his retrial and detailed the § constitutional violations under original evidence discovered after the trial. Kroll, Becker v. 913-14 Cir.2007); Heck,

But analysis. this does not end the see U.S. determining § accrual (recognizing date of a 1983 S.Ct. 2364 the common “ claim, ‘starting point’ analysis we should consider the most analo- law is a for the gous analysis common-law cause action as a under 1983”but that our should guidepost. Assuming analogous “slavishly the most never be derived” from the com-

406 Vinson, law) (internal 420. quotation marks omit 436 F.3d at defendant’s “[A] mon concurring); Carey Brady v. Pi ted) J., (Souter, pre-trial to disclosure under is right 258, 1042, 247, phus, 55 on his to demon- ability not conditioned (1978) (recognizing 252 common- or probably L.Ed.2d strate that he would even for the “starting point law tort rules as the if the prevail would at trial evidence were 1983”). disclosed, § inquiry under in fact much less he is Poventud, 750 (in- innocent.” F.3d at 133 Indeed, the appropriate to consider is omitted). Brady quotation ternal marks is the of the underlying purpose of elements trial; remedy to a fair meant ensure “[t]he analogue to determine wheth- common law Brady trial, a for claim is therefore a new they pur- imported er can be for accrual of need proof as the constitutional violation Heck, 484, 1983. See § under 512 poses guilt.” at not be odds with [defendant’s] (taking the 114 S.Ct. 2364 into account Id.; (“[T]he remedy see id. Brady for a re- purpose the favorable termination judgment violation vacatur of the re- The favorable termination quirement). conviction a new trial the which quirement guard against is intended Brady defendant has the material now possibility of the claimant ... suc- “the Julian, [him].”); accord available 732 ceeding having the tort action after been (“Unlike prosecu- F.3d at 849 malicious [a] underlying prose- in the convicted criminal claim, Brady may tion claim have ac- [a] cution, judicial strong contravention a crued when criminal [the defendant/ conflict- policy against the creation of two plaintiff] granted § 1983 trial was a new arising out or ing resolutions of the same charges against ... before him Crisanti, the were identical transaction.” Kossler v. Brady ordinarily dropped; claim (3d banc) Cir.2009) (en 564 F.3d 187 But happens. does accrue until (internal omitted). Thus, quotation marks although [plaintiffs] ordeal not over was prior this element is satisfied where (because retried), subject he to being plaintiff criminal case has been Brady ripe. exculpato- claim was The disposed way of in a indicates revealed; ry evidence had been the harm v. Murphy See plaintiffs innocence. Brady alleged (2d violation had done could see Cir.1997); Lynn, F.3d (internal (Second) by not be affected a retrial.” cita- Restatement Torts § cmt. omitted)).1 tions a; Taylor Gregg, also see 36 F.3d (5th Cir.1994) curiam); Uboh (per Accordingly, I would conclude Reno, Cir.1998). F.3d proceedings “favorably terminated” were reasoning This makes little sense when when Owens’ conviction was vacated and Brady considering granted the accrual date for he was a new trial on June claim, Brady Brady § For complete; claims under 1983. 2007. violation was plaintiff “that harm had alleged Brady need demonstrate “the violation from could affected prejudice suppression.” resulted done not be a retrial.” judi- finding my position deprivation In unfaithful to the for the of a fair trial as a result of conflicting policy against cial the creation of prosecution's exculpato- failure to disclose resolutions, my colleagues incorrectly assume ry prosecutiоn A malicious claim evidence. Brady prosecu- that if a claim and a malicious remedy the seizure seeks of the results, they produce tion claim different will pursuant legal process unsupport- that was produced conflicting have But that is results. by probable perfectly ed cause. It would be already suggested. not so reasons I have Brady consistent to succeed on claim but relief, Brady re- A claim under 1983 seeks prosecution fail on a malicious claim. innocence, guilt gardless plaintiff's or Julian, immunity 732 F.3d at 849 His claim was defense.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, (4th Cir.1999) and, ripe assuming he therefore knew (internal quotation marks, alterations, the undisclosed about evidence omitted). citation deciding “whether at that question point, the limitations right clearly issue was established period began running at that time. Alter- conduct,” at the time Mey- noted, natively, previously as at the officer’s Md., Cnty., ers v. Baltimore 713 F.3d exculpatory latest was aware the evi- (4th Cir.2013) (inter- added) (emphasis 11, 2008, by attorney dence June when his quotation omitted), nal marks we are inter- a motion to filed exclude that evidence at ested in relevant decisions that were decid- way, his retrial. Either Owens’ claims are ed before the conduct currently at issue untimely. occurred, not decisions announced after- if ward—even those post-dated decisions II. underlying involved violations that oc- above, As discussed I believe Owens’ prior alleged curred to the violations in claims are time-barred. But even if the case, Prater, see Fields v. 566 F.3d filed, timely claims were I believe his (4th Cir.2009) (qualified immunity claims the individual officers fail on protects being defendants from “retroac- qualified immunity grounds. satisfy To tively subject significant penalties at law “clearly prong qual- established” of the for which they proper did not have no- immunity analysis, right ified “a must be tice”). sufficiently every clear that reasonable of- by jury Owens was convicted in March ficial would have understood what he April 1988 and sentencеd in 1988. Accord- doing right.” is violates that Reichle v. ingly, qualified immunity for to be over- — Howards, -, U.S. come, it clearly must have been estab- (2012) (alterations at by early lished least 1988 that a omitted). quotation and internal marks officer violated a criminal defendant’s due is, That “existing precedent must have process rights by failing to furnish excul- placed statutory or constitutional ques- patory evidence to a prosecutor. Unit- Cf. beyond al-Kidd, tion debate.” v. Ashcroft ed v. Grading Paving, States Smith & — -, U.S. 179 Inc., (4th Cir.1985) (“No 760 F.2d clearly L.Ed.2d 1149 “This estab- process long due violation occurs as as lished standard protects the balance be- Brady material is disclosed to a defendant rights tween vindication of constitutional trial.”). in time for its effective use at government per- officials’ effective variety Owens relies on a of decisions that by ensuring formance of their duties pre-date post-date both defendants’ reasonably anticipate officials can when view, spring my conduct In 1988. may give their conduct liability rise to placed none of these decisions had (em- Reichle, damages.” 132 S.Ct. at 2093 debate,” question beyond “constitutional added) (alteration phasis internal quo- al-Kidd, 2083, by at the late omitted). applying tation marks In spring Accordingly, of 1988. I would af- standard, “clearly established” we “ordi- firm the district court’s conclusion that the narily beyond need not look the decisions quali- individual officers were entitled to Court, of the this court of ap- immunity. fied peals, highest and the court of the state in Pre-Dating April A. Decisions right which the case arose. If a recog- circuit, nized in some other but not in this Owens contends that law enforcement one, an official ordinarily will retain the have officers been on notice since this Warden, at culpatory evidence. See decision in Barbee

court’s 1964 (4th Cir. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 this conclusion even The court reached Md. 1964), failure to disclose that an attorney apparent- though prosecuting officer’s prosecutor exculpatory evidence evidence, ly knowledge had no of such liable for potentially the officer made what concluding “legally [the officer] constitu a criminal defendant’s violation of prosecutor.” be imputed knew must Barbee, granted In we rights. tional Paderick, 1241 n. 2. at And Boone Id. his petition to set aside habeas defendant’s ‍​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‍majority, granted also cited habeas failed, prosecutor “because the conviction on prosecution’s relief based failure knowl through personal lack either promise agent’s a law enforcement disclose reason, to disclose for some other edge or key govern- to a of favorable treatment evi potentially trial 447, 448 ment witness. See 541 F.2d police.” Id. possession in the dence Cir.1976). clearly sup- Boone even less so, rejected the doing the court at 843. proposition prosecutor the ports this as the state’s failure to disclose idea that proceedings the habeas that he testified when evidence was excused exculpatory deny told him did not that the officer failed to turn such information police that he promises simply and stated Barbee there attorney. to the state’s over could not remember. a po for the proposition fore stands knowledge evi exculpatory lice officer’s Post-Dating April B. Decisions imputed prosecutor be to the

dence will States v. Brady purposes. See United Metts, also relies on Goodwin (4th Sutton, F.2d 1241 n. Cir. the court let stand a 1989 decision which 1976) (reversing failure to conviction for against a officer jury police award on exculpatory despite pros disclose evidence prosecution common law malicious cause of “legally knowledge ecutor’s lack of because action. See 885 F.2d 166-67 Cir. imputed must be officer] what knew [the 1989). any Goodwin not address due did Barbee, (citing F.2d at prosecutor” Brady. claims process based on Owens’ 846)). simply Barbee did not еstablish on on Goodwin is based reliance enforcement officer violates that a law court’s statement that reasonable offi- “[a] process by failing to rights defendant’s due have when cer would known [in evidence potentially exculpatory turn over occurred,] prosecution events that a salient Collins, see prosecutor; Jean v. probable carried out without cause or dis- banc) (4th Cir.1998) (en 701, 710 F.3d exculpatory information would closure (“Jean ”) not (explaining I that Barbee did rights the constitutional violate duty police on “imposef] constitutional at criminal defendants.” Id. 164. Assum- give prosecutor” to a officers to evidence simply police’s ing puts but “held that the knowl Owens is correct that Goodwin edge imputed of such evidence would be they on notice “could be officers liable prosecutor deciding whether exculpatory failure for their to disclose duties”), Brady prosecutor had fulfilled his evidence,” Appellant Brief of such grounds, on other vacated provided September not until notice was 2016, 143 L.Ed.2d 1029 1989,when was decided. Goodwin Owens’ February place trial between took effect To the same is United States 1988; thus, would have April Goodwin Sutton, robbery which reversed a bank police value of no to the defendant ground been appeal conviction on direct on the ease, in this failure to to disclose ex- officers whose dis- government that the failed close evidence occurred Goodwin der federal constitutional duties with re- before was decided. spect to the disclosure of evidence to the prosecution.” particu- 155 F.3d at 712. Of

Owens makes much of the fact that the lar majority’s relevance were the observa- conduct at issue in Goodwin—for which regarding tions Barbee: the individual officers there were held lia- ble—happened purposes 1983. But for We believe that Jean misapprehends the determining “clearly established law” in hоlding essential of Barbee. Barbee did qualified immunity, the context of the rele- require not police, as a constitutional “can precedents only applied pro- vant be matter, to furnish evidence to a prosecu- spectively” imputed and “cannot be retro- Instead, tor. as this circuit later ex- actively to an officer in this circuit whose plained, Barbee simply po- held allegedly conduct predated” tortious knowledge lice’s of such evidence would Crum, in question. decision Hill v. be imputed prosecutor in deciding (4th Cir.2013). Thus, F.3d prosecutor whether the had fulfilled his decided, matters when the case was Brady duties. the underlying when conduct occurred.2 Regarding Id. at 710. Goodwin and Car- demonstrates, As the next section our ter, the en banc recognized court sharply court later was divided over the these decisions provide “now [in 1989] no- value of these to a suing cases tice to they officers that can be individual officers. subject monetary damages under sec- tion 1983 for failure to disclose C. Jean v. Collins I II& prosecutor,” evidence to the but that be- Both Owens and the individual defen- cause ... postdate “[t]hese decisions the support dants claim from the two Jean v. events in this case ... adopt we do not the Collins decisions. These decisions reveal theory dissent’s that proper notice to de- that, only even in this court very was fendants can be notice after the fact.” Id. Barbee, split much over whether Goodwin at 710 n. 3.3 police and Carter established that a officer remand, On the en banc court did not could be liable for his failure to disclose clearly revisit the I, prong, again established exculpatory information. In Jean we affirming, this time an equally divided affirmed the district court’s conclusion that court, grant the district court’s of sum- police the defendant officers were entitled Collins, mary qualified immunity judgment. to See Jean v. because “the rele- (4th (“Jean IF) Cir.2000) vant sources of clearly lаw do not establish F.3d 656 The police affirmance, themselves labored un- concurring opinion for having Goodwin, Burch, possible 2. Like Carter v. 34 F.3d 257 for those decisions to afford notice 1994), Cir. was decided too late to be of respect occurring prior with to conduct to any value to the officers in this case. Carter 1989. upheld damages against an award of nominal though Even Jean I was vacated and re- exculpa officer who failed to disclose manded, see 526 U.S. 119 S.Ct. tory evidence in connection with a trial occur (1999), 143 L.Ed.2d 1029 for reconsideration 1988; court, however, ring in March the did 603, 609, light Layne, of Wilson v. 526 U.S. not decide Carter until 1994. (1999), the Thus, acknowledge Jean I did not Supreme Court did not address Jean con- I's provided Goodwin Carter such notice that, 1982, police clusion as of had no consti- respect occurring with to conduct after 1982. duly provide prose- tutional to evidence to a Since Goodwin and Carter were decided in cutor. 1994, respectively, 1989 and it would not be to criminal Accord- constitutional evidence defendants. that there was no concluded respectfully failure to I and vote ingly, the officer’s dissent because violation faith, immunity to good position grant took the of qualified affirm the disclose duty is one Brady disclosure that that individual officers.4 rather than prosecution that rests with By at 660-62. police. WYNN, id. dissenting

with See Judge, Circuit contrast, arguing dissenting opinion, part: reversal, contrary view assumed the

for agree nearly aspects I with all duty un- independent owe an that officers majority thoughtful and well-reasoned informa- Brady der disclose part I on which opinion. issue id. at 664. tion. See majority with the is whether ways not re- Although judicial unanimity is Attorney’s Office is Baltimore State’s right to be constitutional quired I conclude entity an amenable to suit. established, judges of clearly that the is, I for the it and would remand fervently in 1998 and disagreed court so fully court to whether district consider existence, contours and 2000 about Attorney’s Office is Baltimore duty an scope of officer’s constitutional sovereign immunity. Accord- entitled strongly sug- exculpatory evidence disclose alone, ingly, respectfully on this issue I clearly right was not estab- gests dissent. time trial in 1988. lished at the of Owens’ Powers, See Swanson I. (4th Cir.1991) (“Since immunity qualified 17(b) Rule Federal Rules Civil if officers could appropriate reasonable requires to the “law Procedure us to look issue, surely disagree on the relevant where located” to of the state the court is ju- appropriate must when reasonable be entity whether that is not an determine an (citation omitted)); so.” see rists can do corporation capacity individual or a has the v. Layne, also Wilson 17(b)(3). I to be sued. Fed.R.Civ.P. (1999) (“If 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 Maryland’s agree majority with judges disagree thus on a constitutional yet not have deter- appear courts do to to subject police it is to question, unfair City the mined whether Baltimore State’s money damages losing for the side picking Attorney’s capacity to be Office has the controversy.”). Maryland But a close at the sued. look sum, In I would conclude that the defen- Maryland and Criminal Constitution the police qualified officers are entitled to dant Code me that is. Procedure convince immunity clearly as it not established a they exculpa- Maryland establishes at the time failed to disclose Constitution Attorney county for and for had each tory evidence that officers a State’s further duty City goes the of Baltimore—and it constitutional to disclose view, espoused including judges My majority in two 4. friends the characterize as court, “extraordinary” my sitting hardly view that none of the currently it is still on the Barbee, they notably Sut- decisions cite-most stunning unsupportable or See Jean v. one. ton, Goodwin—placed Boone and the "consti- Collins, Cir.1998) (enbanc) F.3d debate,” al-Kidd, question beyond tutional C.J., (authored Wilkinson, joined by occur- 131 S.Ct. at for officers' conduct J.), Niemeyer, grounds, 526 vacated on other Goodwin, ring prior issuance of U.S. that more most recent these. Given than (1999). court half of the members of the en banc only specific provisions apply Appeals’ analysis Boyer.” with s] Ante at 395. But Attorney City.” for Baltimore this is a case about “the State’s the Balti- Const, V, Office, more example, Attorney’s § art. 9. For State’s Md. department. sheriffs All Boyer “that the At- court provides Constitution State’s concluded was that thing there is no such torney for Baltimore shall have the as County the “Charles Depart- power appoint Deputy and such other ‘Sheriffs ” ment,’ which was how the in that Assistants as the Bench of Balti- case named the defendant in complaint. City may approve[J” more authorize or Also, exception, with one Boyer court Maryland’s specifies Id. Constitution also consistently entity referred to the in that Attorney, salaries for Baltimore’s State’s case County as the Charles De- Attorney, Deputy Baltimore’s State’s “Sheriffs partment”—with quotation marks around Attorneys. Baltimore’s Assistant State’s Department.” “Sheriffs It should come as Finally, “expenses Id. it states that the then, surprise, no Boyer court conducting the the State’s Attor- office of County determined that the Charles ney paid by Mayor ... shall be Department” legal is not a enti- City Council of Id. Baltimore[.]” “Sheriffs all, ty; Boyer after explained court then, surprisingly, Maryland’s Not they nothing could find establishing acknowledges Criminal Procedure Code entity an “ County known as the Charles the existence of the “Office of the State’s ” State, Department.’ ‘Sheriffs Boyer v. Attorney” Maryland that the Constitution 323 Md. 594 A.2d n. 9 § created. Md.Code AnmCrim. Proc. short, nothing Boyer persuades me Not is Criminal Procedure Code Title Maryland Appeals Court of used 15 named “Office of the Attor analytical that case to set forth an frame- * id., ney,” but it defines “State’s Attor determining work for whether entities oth- ney” holding as “the individual that office County er than the Charles Sheriffs De- V, Maryland § under Article 7 of the Con partment are amenable to suit. stitution!;,]” § id. 15-101. It forth all sets majority, I Unlikе the do not read foot- powers possessed by of the duties and Boyer note 9 in to stand for the broad Office, 15-102-109, §§ id. and it distin Maryland assertion of state law that “ab- guishes Attorney the Office of the State’s statutory sent a or constitutional provision Prosecutor, from the Office of the State creating governmental agency, an ‘office’ which “an indepen was established be or ‘department’ unique legal bears no iden- Attorney dent unit the Office of the thus, tity, and it cannot be sued under 14—102(a)(2). General.” Id. Instead, Maryland law.” Ante at 393.

Were this a case about a sheriffs de- explains why Maryland that footnote I, too, partment, perceive would Appeals the need Court of determined that [Maryland to faithful County Department “remain Court Charles Sheriffs * Second, majority opinion particular The states that the title of the that canon of construction "provides code section little assistance to applies subject interpreta- when the statute to interpreting statutory provisions.” courts ambiguous tion contains “some word or Although certainly Ante at 394. this is valid phrase.” Bhd. R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & of construction, canon of relevance has no Co., 519, 528-29, R.R. 331 Ohio U.S. First, here for two reasons. we are not inter- 1387, (1947). majority 91 L.Ed. 1646 The preting Maryland the Criminal Procedure points nothing ambiguous to in the statute itself; determining Code we are whether a might trigger application that the of that can- particular thing—the City Baltimore State’s on.? Attorney’s legal identity. Office—has a distinct

412 City Attor- agency lishing a stand- the Baltimore State’s governmental or ney’s Maryland of entity capable being

alone sued. Office is that the Constitu- legal words, any already the absence of men- tion had done so. other County tion De- of the Charles Sheriff’s Finally, thought Maryland if I that even Maryland partment in the either Constitu- point, I law was unclear on this am not any or state tion other statute confirms persuaded majority opinion cap of legal particu- the nonexistence that Maryland tures the the of way that Court department. lar rule on the “The Appeals would issue. authority the final highest state court is on assuming argu- But for the of even sake law, duty state but it is still the Boyer 9 in for ment that footnote stands courts, state sup federal where the law majority the that proposition broad the decision, it, the to plies I rule of ascertain and opinion would still conclude ascribes though it has apply that law even not been City Attorney’s that Baltimore State’s expounded highest by the court of the governmental agency Office amenable is a Field, Trust Co. Fidelity State.” Union v. to suit the reasons stated To above. 177, 176, 169, reiterate, 311 U.S. 85 L.Ed. Maryland Constitution clear- (1940) (citations omitted). footnote 109 ly City the Baltimore State’s establishes unclear, Office, law is “must Maryland and the When the state we Attorney’s Crimi- apply appears highest ... as it provides nal law Procedure Code additional ev- court that state would rule.” Brendle v. idence of that Office’s Because existence. Co., 243, Rubber 505 Maryland I General Tire & F.2d think that the Constitution is (4th Cir.1974) added). clear, (emphasis 245 I find it outside of our purview add gloss our to it. II. majority suggests The opinion I would hold that the Baltimore Because of the Office of establishment the State’s City Attorney’s legal State’s Office is a Attorney’s provides Coordinator evidence sued, entity capable I being would also Maryland Assembly “[t]hat General reach the of whether question the district office, yet knew to create such an how determining court erred in the Balti- failed respect to do so with the” Balti Attorney’s more State’s Office is enti- Attorney’s more City State’s Office. Ante sovereign immunity. Although tled to majority persuaded is Eleventh prevents plaintiffs Amendment creating absence of a similar statute from and “arms of suing states the state” Attorney’s Baltimore Of court, in federal “Eleventh Amendment fice “confirms” that Office “bears no immunity does not extend counties and unique identity.” Id. legal But one “[a]s corporations[,] similar ... municipal even it, court aptly put every ‘[n]ot has silence ” if [they] a slice of power.” exercise State States, pregnant.’ Burns United 501 Educ., Cnty. Cash v. Bd. Granville 129, 136, U.S. S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d (4th Cir.2001) (quotations F.3d (1991) Dep’t Ill. (quoting Pub. Aid v. omitted); marks citations Monell v. Schweiker, Cir. Servs., Dep’t Soc. 1983)), abrogated on other grounds (1978). S.Ct. 56 L.Ed.2d 611 Booker, United States U.S. state entity I con When an has both and local characteristics, entity’s potential legal clude a more reasonable interpreta “the Maryland liability” tion of fact that the General is relevant Eleventh Regents a Assembly inquiry. has not enacted statute estab- Amendment the Univ. Doe, Attorneys Cal. State’s Office a [sic] is State agency L.Ed.2d 55 “Because the certainly and it is entitled to [] treasury factor is ‘the most salient sovereign immunity.” State J.A. 355. factor Eleventh Amendment determina- end, In I would reverse and remand tions,’ treasury finding the State will the case to the district court with instruc by a judgment against not be affected tions to treat Defendants’ motion to dis governmental entity weighs against finding miss as a motion summary judgment Cash, entity immune.” 242 F.3d at and to allow pursue Owens to reasonable (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans- discovery as to the sovereign immunity Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. Shivar, issue. See Plante v. (1994)). L.Ed.2d If the state 1233, 1235 Cir.1976). judgment,

would not be liable for courts factors, consider several additional includ-

ing the amount of control that the state entity, scope

exercises over the concerns,

entity’s way and the in which entity

state law treats the to determine sovereign immunity

whether bars the law- suit. Id. HENTOSH, Patricia Plaintiff- opposition his to Defendants’ motion Appellant, dismiss, argued Balti- Attorney’s more is Office UNIVERSITY, OLD sovereign immunity entitled ‍​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‍to because it DOMINION Defendant-Appellee. “hybrid” governmental is unit “created by State law but funded and overseen No. 13-2037. city county government.” or J.A. 75. United States Court of

Furthermore, Appeals, Owens attached exhibits to Fourth Circuit. opposition that show the State’s Attor- ney on the organization of Baltimore’s Argued: May 2014. chart and as a City’s line item on the Sept. Decided: general budget. fund [J.A. 88-90.] Ow- specifically requested ens also the opportu-

nity to discovery conduct on the matter.

J.A. 82. orally granted

But when it Defendants’ dismiss,

motion to the district court failed analyze the case law discussed above or why

to explain rejecting it was Owens’s

arguments in argu- favor of Defendants’ Further,

ments. the district court failed give parties opportu- “reasonable

nity present all the material

pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(d). Instead, simply declared that upon arguments

“based as well as the case,

case law cited in the briefs ...

Case Details

Case Name: Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 24, 2014

Citation: 767 F.3d 379

Docket Number: 12-2173

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.