Lead Opinion
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER concurs as to Parts III., IV.A, and V. and dissents as to Parts II. and IV.B., and Judge WYNN concurs, except for Part III. Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judge WYNN each wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
James Owens brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, an assistant State’s Attorney, the Baltimore City Police Department, and several Baltimore City police officers. In his complaint, Owens alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence during his 1988 trial for the rape and murder of Colleen Williar. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety against all defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds. In the alternative, the court held that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office enjoyed sovereign immunity, the individual police officers enjoyed qualified immunity, and Owens’s cause of action against the Baltimore City Police Department failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Owens appeals the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, we recount the facts as alleged by Owens in his complaint, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts. See Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc.,
A.
In the early morning hours of August 2, 1987, Colleen Williar was raped, robbed, and murdered in the second-floor bedroom of her Baltimore City apartment. The following day, one of Williar’s neighbors, James Thompson, contacted the city police department to inquire about a reward it had offered for information relating to Ms. Williar’s death. Thompson claimed that he had found a knife outside of Ms. Will-iar’s apartment the previous evening, which he had carried home and cleaned before realizing its connection to the crime. Over the course of Thompson’s conversation with police, however, it became apparent that Thompson had not simply “happened” on the knife, as he originally claimed. Rather, in response to questioning from Officers Thomas Pelligri-ni, Gary Dunnigan, and Jay Landsman (collectively, “the Officers”), Thompson asserted that he had retrieved the knife at the behest of his friend, James Owens. The Officers executed a search warrant at Owens’s apartment, but found no physical evidence linking Owens to the crime. Even though the search was fruitless, police arrested Owens on the basis of Thompson’s statement. A grand jury then indicted Owens for Ms. Williar’s murder, rape, and burglary.
On the eve of Owens’s trial, Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) Marvin Brave, the prosecutor assigned to Owens’s case,
At trial, ASA Brave presented only this third version of events to the jury. Brave never informed defense counsel about Thompson’s earlier accounts, and thus, when cross-examining Thompson, defense counsel was unaware that the witness had changed his story several times over the course of the investigation.
Nevertheless, defense counsel apparently cast enough doubt on Thompson’s testimony to prompt ASA Brave to seek out additional evidence of Owens’s guilt. To this end, mid-trial, ASA Brave ordered testing of a pubic hair found on Ms. Will-iar’s body. When the results were returned, however, they indicated that Thompson—not Owens—matched the sample. Concerned that Thompson was involved in the crimes, ASA Brave instructed the Officers to reinterrogate Thompson.
At ASA Brave’s direction, Officers Pelli-grini, Dunnigan, and Landsman brought Thompson into the stationhouse and questioned him for two hours. The Officers accused Thompson of lying on the witness stand, warned him that he “was in a lot of trouble,” and asserted that he could be charged with a crime for his misrepresentations to the jury. After receiving their warnings, Thompson stated that he wanted to change his story yet again. In fact, over the course of the two-hour interview, Thompson changed his story five additional times.
In his first new attempt, Thompson told the Officers that he and Owens had broken into Ms. Williar’s apartment on the day of the murder only to find Ms. Williar already dead in her bedroom. When the Officers replied that they did not believe him, Thompson offered another iteration. This time, he contended that Owens had raped and murdered Ms. Williar upstairs while Thompson waited downstairs in the living room. The Officers responded that there was evidence that Thompson had been on the second floor, and thus, his amended account could not be true. After this prompt, Thompson admitted that he had been on the second floor, but insisted that he had hidden in the bathroom during Owens’s crimes. The Officers again rejected Thompson’s story, stating that investigators had found physical evidence of Thompson’s presence in Ms. Williar’s bedroom. In response, Thompson admitted that he had been in the bedroom while Owens raped and killed Ms. Williar, but he insisted that he had refused to participate in any assault. At this point, the Officers informed Thompson that his pubic hair had been found on Ms. Williar. Faced with the forensic evidence, Thompson offered a fifth version of events. In this account, Thompson claimed that he and Owens had broken into Ms. Williar’s apartment with the intent to steal her jewelry. When the pair found the victim alone in her bedroom, Owens raped and killed her, while Thompson masturbated at the foot of her bed.
After the Officers elicited this latest account, Officer Landsman told ASA Brave about Thompson’s final version of events. None of the Officers disclosed that Thompson had offered several other accounts of
Following his conversation with the Officers, ASA Brave immediately called Thompson back to the witness stand and had him share with the jury his new account of what happened. However, because only the Officers knew of the inconsistencies in Thompson’s statements, neither ASA Brave nor defense counsel questioned Thompson about the four inconsistent versions of the story that the witness had offered before he settled on his final account. Moreover, neither ASA Brave nor the Officers told defense counsel about the discovery of Thompson’s pubic hair. Indeed, when defense counsel inquired about whether there had been forensic testing of the hair, ASA Brave represented to the court that “there [hadn’t] been any match made” between the sample and a suspect.
The jury convicted Owens of burglary and felоny murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Owens filed an unsuccessful appeal, and, over the course of the next two decades, several unsuccessful state-court petitions for post-conviction relief. In 2006, however, a state court granted Owens’s request for post-conviction DNA testing. The results were returned some months later and indicated that Owens’s DNA did not match the blood and semen evidence found at the scene of the crime.
On June 4, 2007, a state court granted Owens’s “petition to reopen his Post Conviction Proceeding” and ordered that “by agreement of Counsel and this Honorable Court, ... Petitioner shall be granted a new trial.” During the next sixteen months, Owens remained in state prison awaiting retrial. On October 15, 2008, the State’s Attorney entered a nolle prosequi, dropping the charges against him. On that date, after Owens had spent more than twenty years in prison, the state court ordered him released from incarceration.
B.
On October 12, 2011, a few days before the three-year anniversary of the nolle prosequi, Owens filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, ASA Brave, the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”), and Officers Pelligrini, Dunni-gan, and Landsman. In his complaint, Owens alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by intentionally and in bad faith withholding exculpatory and impeachment evidence at his 1988 trial.
All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office asserted that it was not an entity amenable to suit, and that even if it were, it was an “arm of the State,” immune from liability. The individual Officers, the BCPD, and ASA Brave all moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds. Alternatively, the individual Officers asserted that qualified immunity protected them from suit, and the BCPD
After Owens voluntarily dismissed the claims against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the district court, in an oral ruling, dismissed the claims against the other defendants. The court initially determined that Owens’s claims were time barred because the limitations period for his causes of action commenced when the state court granted Owens’s request for a new trial, not (as Owens claimed) on the date that prosecutors entered the nolle prosequi. Although the limitations issue disposed of all of Owens’s claims, the court went on to briefly address the defendants’ alternative grounds for dismissal. In a series of rulings, the court determined that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office was entitled to sovereign immunity, that the individual Officers and the BCPD were entitled to qualified immunity, and that Owens’s complaint failed to state a claim against the BCPD. Owens noted a timely appeal.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari,
II.
We first consider whether the applicable statute of limitations bars all of Owens’s claims.
Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. Thus, to determine the timely filing of a § 1983 claim, courts borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-law cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). For § 1983 suits, that cause of action is a personal-injury suit. See Owens v. Okure,
The parties agree that Owens had three years to file his § 1983 action. They disagree, however, as to the date on which this three-year limitations period began to run. Appellees contend that the three-year clock on Owens’s claims began to run on June 4, 2007, the date on which the state court vacated his conviction and granted him a new trial. Appellees’ Br. 24. Because Owens filed suit more than three years after this date (on October 12, 2011), the Appellees maintain that all of Owens’s claims are time barred. Id. Owens, by contrast, maintains that the statute of limitations for his claims did not begin to run until October 15, 2008—the date on which prosecutors filed a nolle prosequi, finally resolving the proceedings against him. Appellant’s Br. 22. Because he filed suit within three years of this date, Owens contends that he met the operative deadline.
Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal law governs the date on which that limitations period begins to run. Wallace v. Koto, 549 U.S.
In Wallace, however, the Supreme Court recognized that limitations on common-law torts do not always begin on the date that a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury. Wallace,
Instead, the Wallace Court held that to determine the date of accrual for a particular § 1983 claim, a court must look to the common-law tort that is most analogous to the plaintiffs § 1983 claim and determine the date on which the limitations period for this most analogous tort claim would begin to run. Id.; see also Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist.,
In Wallace, the Supreme Court addressed a § 1983 claim alleging an unconstitutional detention by police officers.
The Court noted that Wallace could have brought his claim under § 1983 “immediately upon his false arrest.” Id. at 390 n. 3,
Under the common law, the limitations period for a plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim commences when the proceedings brought against him are resolved in his favor. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 119 (5th ed.1984); see also 3 Dan B. Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 590 (2d ed.2011); 8 Stuart M. Speiser, et al., The American Law of Torts § 28.5 (2011); 1 Fowler V. Harper, et al., Harper, James, and Gray on Torts § 4.4 (3d ed. rev.2006). To satisfy this favorable-termination requirement, a plaintiff must show that the proceedings against him were favorably terminated “in such manner that [they] cannot be revived.” Keeton, et al. at § 119. “This is true, for example, of an acquittal in court, a disсharge ... upon preliminary hearing, [or] the entry of a nolle prosequi.” Id.; see also Speiser, et al. at § 28.5; Harper, et al. at § 4.4. It is not true of “[a]ny disposition of the criminal action which does not terminate it but permits it to be renewed.” Keeton, et al. at § 119 (emphasis added). Under the common law, such terminations “cannot serve as the foundation for [a malicious prosecution] action,” and thus, the limitations period for malicious prosecution claims does not begin to run until a truly final disposition is achieved. Id.
The grant of a new trial does not terminate the proceedings against a defendant “in such a manner that [they] cannot be revived.” Keeton, et al. at § 119. Rather, it provides a procedural victory, which simply postpones the proceedings’ ultimate outcome. See Harper, et al. at § 4.4 (“The termination in the plaintiffs favor must be a final one, and if the proceedings are immediately renewed for the same offense, they are sufficient to bar plaintiffs action for malicious prosecution until they are finally determined.”).
Because the grant of a new trial does not trigger the limitations period for a malicious prosecution claim, the statute of limitations on Owens’s § 1983 claims did not begin to run on the date he was granted a new trial. Instead, the operative limitations period began to run on the date a malicious prosecution claim became ripe at common law, i.e., the date on which the nolle prosequi was entered. It was only on this date that proceedings against Owens were favorably terminated in such manner that they could not be revived. Because Owens filed suit within three years of this date, the statute of limitations does not bar his present cause of action.
The partial dissent recognizes that Heck does not resolve the statute-of-limitations issue before us. It nonetheless maintains that Owens’s claims are time barred because, in the dissent’s view, the statute of limitations on Owens’s § 1983 claims began to run when he was granted a new trial, or when he possessed sufficient facts to know about the Appellees’ illegal suppression of evidence, i.e., whenever Owens could have brought his Brady-like claim.
The dissent both acknowledges that, in determining the start date of Owens’s § 1983 claims, a court must look to malicious prosecution as the closest “common law analogue,” and recognizes that the date of favorable termination is the date triggering the onset of limitations for a malicious prosecution claim. But the dissent maintains that we adhere too closely to the malicious prosecution analogue. In the dissent’s view, a court should consider the “underlying purpose of the elements of the common law analogue” and borrow this onset date for a § 1983 claim only if doing so would serve that underlying purpose. Because the dissent concludes that borrowing the onset date for malicious prosecution would not serve this underlying purpose, it beliеves we should not borrow its onset date here.
We recognize the important distinctions between malicious prosecution torts and Owens’s Brady-like claims. But we cannot agree with the dissent that those distinctions somehow permit us to jettison the common law date on which limitations begin to run in determining the date on which limitations begin to ran for an analogous § 1983 claim. Neither precedent nor logic permits this result.
The common law does act as a mere “starting point” in “defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery” under § 1983. Carey v. Piphus,
Furthermore, even if, as the dissent argues, a court should consider the policy and “underlying purpose of the elements of the common law analogue” to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run, we would reach the same result. For the “strong judicial policy against the creation of conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction” furthered by malicious prosecution’s favorable termination requirement, Heck,
In sum, we take the Supreme Court at its word. We determine when the statute of limitations on a plaintiffs § 1983 claim begins to run by looking to the common-law tort most analogous to the plaintiffs claim. In general, the limitations period for common law torts commences when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury. But if the common law provides a “distinctive rule” for determining the start date of the limitations period for the analogous tort, a court should consider this rule in determining when the limitations period for the plaintiffs claim begins to run. Wallace,
III.
Even if Owens’s suit is timely, the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office contends that the suit must be dismissed
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the law of the state in which the district court sits determines an entity’s capacity to be sued. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). Maryland courts have had no occasion to address whether the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office may be sued. But Maryland courts’ treatment of analogous agencies confirms that the “Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office” is not a suable entity.
In Boyer v. State, Maryland’s highest court made clear that, absent a statutory or constitutional provision creating a government agency, an “office” or “department” bears no unique legal identity, and thus, it cannot be sued under Maryland law. See
We are unaware of any statute, public general or public local, establishing an entity known as the Charles County “Sheriffs Department.” The sheriff for each county is a constitutional officer under Art. IV, § 44, of the Constitution of Maryland. [But] [n]either the Constitution nor any other provision of law creates a governmental agency knoum as the “Sheriff’s Department.” Consequently, the motion for summary judgment on behalf of the Charles County ‘Sheriffs Department’ correctly asserted that the ‘Sheriffs Department’ is not an entity capable of being sued.
Id. (emphasis added).
Like the “Sheriffs Department” at issue in Boyer, no constitutional or statutory provision establishes a “Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office.” The “State’s Attorney” for each county and Baltimore City is a constitutional officer, but Maryland law creates no “State’s Attorney’s Office.” Cf. Md. Const, art. V, § 7 (“There shall be an Attorney for the State in each county and the City of Baltimore, to be styled ‘the State’s Attorney.’ ”); Md. Ann.Code, Crim. Proc. § 15-102 (“[A] State’s Attorney shall, in the county served by the State’s Attorney, prosecute and defend on the part of the State all cases in which the State may be interested.”).
Indeed, Maryland law delegates many of the functions a hypothetical “State’s Attorney’s Office” would perform to a separаte “Office of the State’s Attorney’s Coordinator.” See id. § 15-302 (describing the functions of the Office of the State’s Attorney’s Coordinator, including training each State’s Attorney’s professional staff and performing legal research). Unlike the “Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office,” the “Office of the State’s Attorney’s Coordinator” is expressly created by statute. See id. § 15-301(a)(l) (“There is an office of State’s Attorney’s Coordinator.”). That the Maryland General Assembly knew how to create such an office, yet failed to do so with respect to the “entity” here, confirms that the “Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s
Owens notes that Title 15 of the Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure, which establishes the duties of a State’s Attorney, is entitled “Office of the State’s Attorney.” Based on this title, Owens contends that the Maryland General Assembly has established a “State’s Attorney’s Office,” which may be sued under Maryland law. Reply Br. at 2. This argument fails, however, for two reasons. First, as the Supreme Court has long held, a statute’s title provides little assistance to courts interpreting statutory provisions. See, e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,
Our friend’s partial dissent suggests that the Maryland Constitution creates a “Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office” amenable to suit under Maryland law. But, in fact, nearly every provision of law cited for this proposition regulates the State’s Attorney, not a State’s Attorney’s Office. See, e.g., Md. Const, art. V, § 9 (“The State’s Attorney shall perform such duties and receive such salary as shall be prescribed by the General Assembly.” (emphasis added)); id. (“[T]he State’s Attorney for Baltimore City shall have the power to appoint a Deputy and such other Assistants as the Supreme Judicial Bench of Baltimore City may authorize or ap-prove____” (emphasis added)); see also Md.Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 15-102 (“[A] State’s Attorney shall, in the county served by the State’s Attorney, prosecute and defend on the part of the State all eases in which the State may be interested.” (emphasis added)). Far from establishing a State’s Attorney’s Office, these provisions create and administer the position of State’s Attorney—a position Owens could have reached, but did not, by suing the Baltimore City State’s Attorney in his individual or official capacity.
To be sure, close inspection of Maryland’s Constitution does reveal a passing reference to “the office of the State’s Attorney.” Md. Const, art. V, § 9 (“[Expenses for conducting the office of the State’s Attorney ... shall be paid by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to the extent that the total of them exceeds the fees of his office.”). But this passing reference to an “office” seems to us nothing more than shorthand for the position of State’s Attorney. Moreover, the reference fails to distinguish the case at hand from Boyer. For there, although the Maryland Code made a passing reference to
In conclusion, we hold that the “Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office” is a term of convenience only. It refers to the collection of government employees who work under the supervision of the Baltimore City State’s Attorney. It is not an entity amenable to suit.
IV.
We next consider the qualified-immunity defense asserted by Officers Pelligrini, Dunnigan, and Landsman.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for “civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow,
Qualified immunity protects public officials from suit when the state of the law is such that they would not have known that their conduct violates statutory or constitutional rights. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. -,
To establish a qualified-immunity defense, a public official must demonstrate that (1) a plaintiff has not alleged or shown facts that “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” or that (2) “the right at
A qualified immunity defense can be presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but, as the Second Circuit has notеd, when asserted at this early stage in the proceedings, “the defense faces a formidable hurdle” and “is usually not successful.” Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk,
On the one hand, Owens alleges that Officers PeUigrini, Dunnigan, and Landsman violated his clearly established constitutional rights by acting in bad faith to suppress material evidence supporting his innocence. On the other hand, the Officers maintain, and the district court held, that Owens has not pled a plausible claim, Appellees’ Br. at 41-42, and that even if he has, the rights he asserts were not clearly established in 1988—the date of their alleged violation, id. at 29^40. We address each argument in turn.
A.
In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland,
To make out a claim that the Officers violated his constitutional rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence, Owens must allege, and ultimately prove, that (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to him; (2) the Officers suppressed the evidence in bad faith;
Owens alleges that Officers Pelligrini, Dunnigan, and Landsman, at the direction of ASA Brave, subjected Thompson, the State’s star witness, to a lengthy mid-trial interrogation, in which they threatened and cajoled him to change his testimony repeatedly so as to strengthen the State’s then-“failing prosecution.” Owens asserts that the Officers elicited from Thompson a succession of vastly different accounts of his and Owens’s involvement in Ms. Williar’s rape and murder. These accounts ranged from Thompson’s insistence that he had nothing to do with the crimes, to his admission that he had broken into Ms. Williar’s apartment (but stayed downstairs), to his contention that he had remained in the upstairs bathroom and only heard the assault on Ms. Williar, to his final story, in which he asserted that he had masturbated at the foot of the bed while Owens raped and killed Ms. Williar.
Moreover, Owens alleges that Thompson repeatedly changed his story only because the Officers provided additional details about the crime, which they pressured Thompson to incorporate so as to incriminate Owens more directly. When the interview ended, the Officers told ASA Brave only about the witness’s last version of events. That is, Owens alleges that ASA Brave did not know (and so could not and did not tell defense counsel) that Thompson had offered several other accounts of the crimes, all of which conflicted with the iteration Thompson ultimately told the jury.
We have little difficulty concluding that Owens’s allegations state a plausible § 1983 claim. First, the information Officers Pelligrini, Dunnigan, and Landsman assertedly withheld from ASA Brave was favorable to Owens. Had the Officers properly disclosed Thompson’s statements, his inconsistencies would have lent support to the contention advanced by Owens’s defense that Thompson, not Owens, had raped and murdered Ms. Williar. At a minimum, the inconsistencies would have aided Owens in his attempt to discredit Thompson’s testimony and sow reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. See Bagley,
Second, Owens has offered specific allegations as to the Officers’ bad faith. He asserts that these experienced police offi
Finally, Owens’s allegations satisfy Brady ’s materiality requirement. Owens asserts that Thompson was the State’s “star witness,” and that in post-trial proceedings, ASA Brave admitted that without Thompson, “the case could not have gone forward.” Certainly, it is plausible that impeachment of such a key witness could have altered the outcome at trial. We emphasize that Brady does not require that disclosure probably would have modified a trial’s result. Strickler,
B.
We next turn to the question of whether Owens’s constitutional rights were “clearly established” in February and March 1988, when the Officers acted.
i.
For a right to be clearly established, its contours “must be sufficiently clear [such] that a reasonable official would [have] understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton,
In evaluating whether qualified immunity exists, we must keep in mind that it is the plaintiffs constitutional right that must be clearly established, not a plaintiffs access to a monetary remedy. Thus, a right does not become clearly established only if a plaintiff has successfully enforced it through a § 1983 action. Hope,
Furthermore, to be clearly established, a right need not be one with respect to which all judges on all courts agree. Rather, “[i]f the unlawfulness is apparent, the fact that some court may have reached an incorrect result will not shield a defendant’s violation of a clearly established right.” See Wilson v. Layne,
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the constitutional rights Owens asserts were clearly established as of February and March 1988, the time of the alleged violations.
ii.
As outlined above, the Supreme Court held in 1963 that a prosecutor may not suppress material exculpatory evidence during a defendant’s criminal trial. Brady,
In 1976, we applied Barbee’s holding expressly to impeachment evidence. In both United States v. Sutton,
Finally, in Goodwin,
The partial dissent offers a different view. It maintains that the law was not clearly established in 1988 because the cases decided before that date—Barbee, Sutton, and Boone—imposed no independent obligation on police officers to disclose exculpatory evidence. The dissent insists that Barbee, Sutton, and Boone stand only for the proposition that “a police officer’s knowledge of exculpatory evidence will be imputed to the prosecutor for Brady purposes.” This holding, the dissent contends, fails to notify police officers of their susceptibility to suit, and thus, the Officers in the case at hand enjoy qualified immunity.
We cannоt agree. Qualified immunity exists to ensure that “public officials performing discretionary functions [are] free to act without fear of retributive suits ... except when they should have understood that particular conduct was unlawful.” Limone v. Condon,
Barbee, Sutton, and Boone each held that certain conduct by police officers—the suppression of material exculpatory evidence—results in the violation of criminal defendants’ rights. Whether or not an officer’s knowledge is “imputed” to the prosecutor does not affect the lawfulness of the officer’s own conduct. See Limone,
Goodwin recognized this reality, and held in light of Barbee, Sutton, and Boone
Indeed, if the dissent is correct and Barbee, Sutton, and Boone announced no rule of constitutional law applicable to police officers, then Goodwin was wrongly decided. For according to the dissent’s view, Goodwin acted in the absence of any prior circuit precedent to hold that a constitutional right was clearly established and so a police officer did not enjoy qualified immunity. We cannot endorse such an extraordinary view of our precedent.
In sum, our precedent unmistakably provides that, by 1988, a police officer violates clearly established constitutional law when he suppresses material exculpatory evidence in bad faith. Accordingly, we hold that the Officers were clearly on notice of the impermissibility of their conduct in 1988, the time of the alleged violations.
V.
Finally, we address whether Owens has stated a plausible claim against the BCPD.
Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person,” who, under color of state law сauses the violation of another’s federal rights shall be liable to the party injured by his conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,
Unlike public officials, municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence,
For these reasons, the district court erred in dismissing Owens’s claims against the BCPD on the basis of qualified immunity. Apparently recognizing this, the BCPD does not now contend that it has immunity. Rather, it argues that dismissal of the claim against it was nonetheless proper because Owens has assertedly “failed to plead sufficient facts” to set forth a plausible Monell claim. Appellees’ Br. 43. We turn to that argument.
B.
Although municipalities, unlike public officials, cannot claim immunity from suit, the Supreme Court has expressly cabined their liability: under Monell, a municipality is liable only for its own illegal acts. See
Here, Owens alleges that the BCPD violated his federal constitutional rights pursuant to a municipal custom, policy, or practice. Specifically, he alleges that “[a]t all times relevant to this ease,” the BCPD “maintained a custom, policy, and/or practice” of condoning its officers’ conduct in “knowingly, consciously, and repeatedly with[holding] and suppressing]” exculpatory evidence. Owens’s complaint thus alleges a theory of custom “by condo-nation.” Spell v. McDaniel,
Prevailing under such a theory is no easy task. A plaintiff must point to a “persistent and widespread practice[ ] of municipal officials,” the “duration and frequency” of which indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their “deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1386-91 (alterations omitted). Both knowledge and indifference
Although prevailing on the merits of a Monell claim is difficult, simply alleging such a claim is, by definition, easier. For to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need only allege facts which, if true, “ ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal,
In support of his claim, Owens alleges that “[rjeported and unreported cases from the period of time before and during the events complained of’ establish that the BCPD had a custom, policy, or practice of knowingly and repeatedly suppressing exculpatory evidence in criminal prosecutions. He further alleges that “a number of motions were filed and granted during this time period that demonstrate that [the BCPD] maintained a custom, policy, or practice to allow this type of behavior either directly or ... by condoning it, and/or knowingly turning a blind eye to it.” The assertions as to “reported and unreported cases” and numerous “successful motions” are factual allegations, the veracity of which could plausibly support a Monell claim. That BCPD officers withheld information on multiple occasions could establish a “persistent and widespread” pattern of practice, the hallmark of an impermissible custom. Spell,
Urging a different result, the BCPD contends that Owens alleges nothing more than “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” See Appel-lees’ Br. 47 (quoting Iqbal,
Owens’s brief, but non-conclusory, allegations closely resemble those in Haley v. City of Boston,
The same reasoning applies here. Of course, to prevail on the merits, Owens will have to do more than allege a pervasive practice of BCPD misconduct; he must prove it. But at this early stage in the proceedings, we must conclude that Owens has pled sufficient factual content to survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
VI.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of district court to the extent it dismisses Owens’s claims against the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office. We vacate the judgment in all other respects. We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
Notes
. Owens also alleges that ASA Brave withheld impeachment evidence with respect to a different witness: Larry Oliver, Owens's cellmate. Specifically, Owens asserts that ASA Brave intentionally withheld the fact that he had promised leniency to Oliver, who testified that Owens confessed to him in their jail cell. Because the issues involved in this asserted nondisclosure are identical to those involved in ASA Brave's nondisclosures regarding Thompson and the DNA evidence, we focus only on those facts for the sake of simplicity.
. This is not to say that Owens could not have filed suit immediately upon his discovery of the Appellees' asserted suppression of material exculpatory evidence. See Wallace, 549
. In doing so, the Supreme Court majority expressly rejected the suggestion in Justice Souter's concurring opinion that the Court had adhered too closely to the common law analogue. Heck,
. Relatedly, in his appellate brief, Assistant State’s Attorney Brave contends that absolute prosecutorial immunity requires dismissal of the claims against him. Brave waived this defense, however, by failing to raise it in the district court. See Tully v. Barada,
. Because we hold that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is not a suable entity, we do not address its alternative argument, i.e., that the State’s Attorney’s Office is an arm of the State entitled to sovereign immunity. We note, however, that the partial dissent focuses its arm-of-the-State analysis on a single factor—whether a judgment against the Baltimore City State’s Attorney's Office would be paid by the City of Baltimore—to conclude that the State's Attorney’s Office lacks immunity from suit. Although the Supreme Court had previously regarded this factor as the most important, it has subsequently abandoned this view. See Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. Port Auth.,
. As recognized in Jean v. Collins,
. The Officers unpersuasively contend that Owens’s Brady claim fails because he obtained his release from prison on the basis of newly discovered DNA evidence rather than the undisclosed Brady material. But contrary to the Officers' assertion, courts routinely consider the Brady claims of § 1983 plaintiffs exonerated on the basis of newly discovered DNA evidence. See, e.g., Holland v. City of Chicago,
. We were not alone. Other circuits have similarly held that by 1988, police officers violated the Constitution by suppressing exculpatory evidence in bad faith. See, e.g., McMillian v. Johnson,
. In hopes of convincing us to the contrary, the Officers rely on Jean v. Collins,
. The Officers unpersuasively rely on three unpublished posf-1988 opinions to bolster their contention that the rights Owens asserts were not clearly established in 1988. But, as we have repeatedly explained, unpublished opinions are not precedent in this circuit. See, e.g., Hogan v. Carter,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in parts III, IVA, and V of the majority opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from parts II and IV.B. First, I believe that Owens’ Brady claims were untimely because they accrued when he discovered the exculpatory and impeaching evidence that had not been disclosed, not when the proceeding was subsequently terminated via entry of the nolle prosequi. Second, I would conclude that the district court correctly determined that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established in the spring of 1988 that a police officer’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence made the officer potentially liable for a violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.
I.
I turn first to the question of whether Owens’ claims are completely time-barred. Because “[t]here is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, ... the state limitations period which governs personal injury actions is applied.” Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t,
“[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace,
Owens’ claim is based on the defendant police officers’ failure to disclose exculpatory evidence—a due process claim that clearly arises pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. Thus, “application of the general rule would indicate that [plaintiffs § 1983] cause of action [based on Brady] accrued— and the limitations period began-when [plaintiff] discovered that the exculpatory evidence in question had not been disclosed to him.” D’Ambrosio,
But this does not end the analysis. In determining the accrual date of a § 1983 claim, we should consider the most analogous common-law cause of action as a guidepost. Assuming the most analogous common law tort is malicious prosecution, its “favorable termination” requirement constitutes a “distinctive rule” of accrual that displaces the general rule that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury. See Wallace,
I part ways with my friends in the majority on the application of the “favorable termination” requirement in this context. The majority notes that in order to satisfy the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the criminal proceedings against him have been terminated in such a way that they cannot be revived. See Poventud v. City of New York,
In my view, the majority adheres a bit too rigidly to the common-law analogue rather than using it as a “starting point” that “provides a useful guidеpost in making sense of alleged constitutional injuries” for determining the contours of claims of constitutional violations under § 1983. Becker v. Kroll,
Indeed, it is appropriate to consider the underlying purpose of the elements of the common law analogue to determine whether they can be imported for accrual purposes under § 1983. See Heck, 512 484,
This reasoning makes little sense when considering the accrual date for Brady claims under § 1983. For a Brady claim, the plaintiff need only demonstrate “that prejudice resulted from the suppression.” Vinson,
Accordingly, I would conclude that the proceedings were “favorably terminated” when Owens’ conviction was vacated and he was granted a new trial on June 7, 2007. The Brady violation was complete; “the harm the alleged Brady violation had done could not be affected by a retrial.”
II.
As discussed above, I believe Owens’ claims are time-barred. But even if the claims were timely filed, I believe his claims against the individual officers fail on qualified immunity grounds. To satisfy the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis, “a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, — U.S. -,
Owens was convicted by a jury in March 1988 and sentenced in April 1988. Accordingly, for qualified immunity to be overcome, it must have been clearly established at least by early 1988 that a police officer violated a criminal defendant’s due process rights by failing to furnish exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor. Cf. United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc.,
A. Decisions Pre-Dating April 1988
Owens contends that law enforcement officers have been on notice since this
To the same effect is United States v. Sutton, which reversed a bank robbery conviction on direct appeal on the ground that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. See
B. Decisions Post-Dating April 1988
Owens also relies on Goodwin v. Metts, a 1989 decision in which the court let stand a jury award against a police officer on a common law malicious prosecution cause of action. See
Owens makes much of the fact that the conduct at issue in Goodwin—for which the individual officers there were held liable—happened in 1983. But for purposes of determining “clearly established law” in the context of qualified immunity, the relevant precedents “can only be applied prospectively” and “cannot be imputed retroactively to an officer in this circuit whose allegedly tortious conduct predated” the decision in question. Hill v. Crum,
C. Jean v. Collins I & II
Both Owens and the individual defendants claim support from the two Jean v. Collins decisions. These decisions reveal only that, even in 1998, this court was very much split over whether Barbee, Goodwin and Carter established that a police officer could be liable for his failure to disclose exculpatory information. In Jean I, we affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the defendant police officers were entitled to qualified immunity because “the relevant sources of law do not clearly establish that in 1982 police themselves labored under federal constitutional duties with respect to the disclosure of evidence to the prosecution.”
We believe that Jean misapprehends the essential holding of Barbee. Barbee did not require police, as a constitutional matter, to furnish evidence to a prosecutor. Instead, as this circuit later explained, Barbee held simply that the police’s knowledge of such evidence would be imputed to the prosecutor in deciding whether the prosecutor had fulfilled his Brady duties.
Id. at 710. Regarding Goodwin and Carter, the en banc court recognized that these decisiоns “now [in 1989] provide notice to police officers that they can be subject to monetary damages under section 1983 for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor,” but that because “[t]hese decisions ... postdate the events in this case ... we do not adopt the dissent’s theory that proper notice to defendants can be notice after the fact.” Id. at 710 n. 3.
On remand, the en banc court did not revisit the clearly established prong, again affirming, this time by an equally divided court, the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Jean v. Collins,
Although judicial unanimity is not required for a constitutional right to be clearly established, that the judges of this court so fervently disagreed in 1998 and 2000 about the existence, contours and scope of an officer’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence strongly suggests that the right was not clearly established at the time of Owens’ trial in 1988. See Swanson v. Powers,
In sum, I would conclude that the defendant police officers are entitled to qualified immunity as it was not clearly established at the time they failed to disclose exculpatоry evidence that police officers had a constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and vote to affirm the grant of qualified immunity to the individual officers.
. In finding my position unfaithful to the judicial policy against the creation of conflicting resolutions, my colleagues incorrectly assume that if a Brady claim and a malicious prosecution claim produce different results, they will have produced conflicting results. But that is not so for reasons I have already suggested. A Brady claim under § 1983 seeks relief, regardless of the plaintiff's guilt or innocence, for the deprivation of a fair trial as a result of the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. A malicious prosecution claim seeks to remedy the seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was unsupported by probable cause. It would be perfectly consistent to succeed on a Brady claim but fail on a malicious prosecution claim.
. Like Goodwin, Carter v. Burch,
. Thus, Jean I did not acknowledge that Goodwin and Carter provided such notice with respect to conduct occurring after 1982. Since Goodwin and Carter were decided in 1989 and 1994, respectively, it would not be possible for those decisions to afford notice with respect to conduct occurring prior to 1989.
Even though Jean I was vacated and remanded, see
. My friends in the majority characterize as “extraordinary” my view that none of the decisions they cite-most notably Barbee, Sutton, Boone and Goodwin—placed the "constitutional question beyond debate,” al-Kidd,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting in part:
I agree with nearly all aspects of the thoughtful and well-reasoned majority opinion. The only issue on which I part ways with the majority is whether the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is an entity amenable to suit. I conclude that it is, and I would remand for the district court to fully consider whether the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is entitled to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, on this issue alone, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires us to look to the “law of the state where the court is located” to determine whether an entity that is not an individual or a corporation has the capacity to be sued. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(3). I agree with the majority that Maryland’s courts do not yet appear to have determined whether the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office has the capacity to be sued. But a close look at the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Criminal Procedure Code convince me that it is.
The Maryland Constitution establishes a State’s Attorney for each county and for the City of Baltimore—and it goes further
Not surprisingly, then, Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Code acknowledges the existence of the “Office of the State’s Attorney” that the Maryland Constitution created. Md.Code AnmCrim. Proc. § 15. Not only is Criminal Procedure Code Title 15 named “Office of the State’s Attorney,”
Were this a case about a sheriffs department, I, too, would perceive the need to “remain faithful to the [Maryland Court of Appeals’ s] analysis in Boyer.” Ante at 395. But this is a case about the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, not a sheriffs department. All the Boyer court concluded was that there is no such thing as the “Charles County ‘Sheriffs Department,’ ” which was how the plaintiff in that case named the defendant in his complaint. Also, with one exception, the Boyer court consistently referred to the entity in that case as the Charles County “Sheriffs Department”—with quotation marks around “Sheriffs Department.” It should come as no surprise, then, that the Boyer court determined that the Charles County “Sheriffs Department” is not a legal entity; after all, the Boyer court explained that they could find nothing establishing an entity known as the Charles County “ ‘Sheriffs Department.’ ” Boyer v. State,
Unlike the majority, I do not read footnote 9 in Boyer to stand for the broad assertion of Maryland state law that “absent a statutory or constitutional provision creating a governmental agency, an ‘office’ or ‘department’ bears no unique legal identity, and thus, it cannot be sued under Maryland law.” Ante at 393. Instead, that footnote explains why the Maryland Court of Apрeals determined that the Charles County Sheriffs Department was
But even assuming for the sake of argument that footnote 9 in Boyer stands for the broad proposition that the majority opinion ascribes to it, I would still conclude that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is a governmental agency amenable to suit for the reasons stated above. To reiterate, the Maryland Constitution clearly establishes the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, and the Maryland Criminal Procedure Code provides additional evidence of that Office’s existence. Because I think that the Maryland Constitution is clear, I find it outside of our purview to add our gloss to it.
The majority opinion suggests that the establishment of the Office of the State’s Attorney’s Coordinator provides evidence “[t]hat the Maryland General Assembly knew how to create such an office, yet failed to do so with respect to the” Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office. Ante at 393. The majority is persuaded that the absence of a similar statute creating the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office “confirms” that the Office “bears no unique legal identity.” Id. But “[a]s one court has aptly put it, ‘[n]ot every silence is pregnant.’ ” Burns v. United States,
Finally, even if I thought that Maryland law was unclear on this point, I am not persuaded that the majority opinion captures the way that the Maryland Court of Appeals would rule on the issue. “The highest state court is the final authority on state law, but it is still the duty of the federal courts, where the state law supplies the rule of decision, to ascertain and apply that law even though it has not been expounded by the highest court of the State.” Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,
II.
Because I would hold that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is a legal entity capable of being sued, I would also reach the question of whether the district court erred in determining that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is entitled to sovereign immunity. Although the Eleventh Amendment prevents plaintiffs from suing states and “arms of the state” in federal court, “Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations[,] ... even if [they] exercise a slice of State power.” Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
When an entity has both state and local characteristics, “the entity’s potential legal liability” is relevant to the Eleventh Amendment inquiry. Regents of the Univ.
In his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Owens argued that the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is not entitled to sovereign immunity because it is a “hybrid” governmental unit “created by State law but funded and overseen by a city or county government.” J.A. 75. Furthermore, Owens attached exhibits to his opposition that show the State’s Attorney on the City of Baltimore’s organization chart and as a line item on the City’s general fund budget. [J.A. 88-90.] Owens also specifically requested the opportunity to conduct discovery on the matter. J.A. 82.
But when it orally granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court failed to analyze the case law discussed above or to explain why it was rejecting Owens’s arguments in favor of Defendants’ arguments. Further, the district court failed to give the parties a “reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Instead, it simply declared that “based upon the arguments as well as the case law cited in the briefs in this case, ... the State’s Attorneys [sic] Office is a State agency and it certainly is entitled to [] sovereign immunity.” J.A. 355.
In the end, I would reverse and remand the case to the district court with instructions to treat Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and to allow Owens to pursue reasonable discovery as to the sovereign immunity issue. See Plante v. Shivar,
The majority opinion states that the title of the code section "provides little assistance to courts interpreting statutory provisions.” Ante at 394. Although this is certainly a valid canon of construction, it has no relevance here for two reasons. First, we are not interpreting the Maryland Criminal Procedure Code itself; we are determining whether a particular thing—the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office—has a distinct legal identity. Second, that particular canon of construction applies when the statute subject to interpretation contains “some ambiguous word or phrase.” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,