DEON PIER WALKER v. TERI LAWSON, ANNE L. PRECYTHE, and JEFF NORMAN
No. 4:19-CV-2528-NCC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION
February 7, 2020
NOELLE C. COLLINS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Deon Pier Walker, an inmate at the Farmington Correctional Center, for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined to grant the motion, and assess an initial partial filing fee of $7.24. Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will give plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to
In support of the instant motion, plaintiff submitted an inmate account statement showing an average monthly deposit of $20.34 and an average monthly balance of $36.23. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $7.24, which is twenty percent of plaintiff‘s average monthly balance.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson‘s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to
Plaintiff was “subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by staff” in that he was made to sit on a restraint bench for 6 hours and 19 minutes with no restroom or water breaks. Plaintiff was also “[discriminated] against and denied P.C. custody also abused by staff with a spontaneous use of force,” and his property was taken. This occurred beginning on April 5, 2019 and ended on April 6, 2019. “Each defendant” failed to take action to resolve the issues, and “defendants” also failed to follow standard operating procedure. As a result, plaintiff suffered from back and leg pain. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief.
With the complaint, plaintiff filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel. After filing the complaint, plaintiff filed a motion to subpoena “all medical records from Farmington Correctional Center Medical Office,” and two supplemental documents seeking to add parties to this action. On January 22, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion requesting “all summons pertaining to
Discussion
The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Lawson in her official capacity, and against Precythe and Norman.1 Official-capacity suits represent another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is an agent. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985)). Therefore, plaintiff‘s official-capacity claims are assumed to be claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC“), a state agency. See id.; see also Walker v. Mo. Dep‘t of Corr., 213 F.3d 1035, 1036 (8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing MDOC as state agency); see also Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). However, plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state an official-capacity claim. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Additionally, to the extent plaintiff seeks relief other than prospective injunctive relief, his official capacity claims would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
Even if plaintiff had sued the defendants in their individual capacities, the complaint would be subject to dismissal. Plaintiff fails to adequately allege facts showing how each named defendant was personally aware of and disregarded a substantial risk to plaintiff‘s health or safety. “Liability under
In consideration of plaintiff‘s pro se status, the Court will allow him to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will replace the original. See In re Wireless Telephone Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litigation, 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect“). Plaintiff must type or neatly print the amended complaint on the Court‘s prisoner civil rights complaint form, which will be provided to him. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 45 – 2.06(A) (“All actions brought by pro se plaintiffs or petitioners should be filed on Court-provided forms“).
In the “Caption” section of the complaint form, plaintiff should write the name of the person he intends to sue. See
It is important that plaintiff allege facts explaining how the defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for harming him. See Madewell, 909 F.2d at 1208. Plaintiff must explain the role of the defendant, so that the defendant will have notice of what he or she is accused of doing or failing to do. See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that the essential function of a complaint “is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim.“). Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that the “Statement of Claim” requires more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” See Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2017). Finally, plaintiff must avoid attempting to amend a complaint by filing separate documents containing changes he wishes to make to certain parts. Instead, plaintiff must file a single comprehensive pleading that sets forth his claims for relief. See Popoalii v. Correctional Medical Services, 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that it is appropriate to deny leave to amend a complaint when a proposed amended complaint was not submitted with the motion).
The Court now addresses plaintiff‘s motions. Plaintiff‘s motion seeking a subpoena of “all medical records from Farmington Correctional Center Medical Office” will be denied. The motion is premature, as no defendant has been served with process in this matter and the Court has yet to enter a Case Management Order to establish discovery deadlines. Additionally, the subpoena plaintiff seeks is impermissibly broad. Plaintiff‘s motion seeking the appointment of counsel will also be denied. “A pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case.” Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998). When
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff‘s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $7.24 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to mail to plaintiff a copy of the Court‘s prisoner civil rights complaint form.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff‘s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 2) is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff‘s motion for subpoenas (ECF No. 7) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff‘s pro se motion (ECF No. 12) is DENIED.
Dated this 7th day of February, 2020.
/s/ Noelle C. Collins
NOELLE C. COLLINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
