Victoria Elia KALDAWI v. The State of KUWAIT; et al.
No. 17-55389
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
December 26, 2017
705 F. App‘x 452
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Submitted December 18, 2017. Victoria Elia Kaldawi, Pro Se.
The magistrate judge concluded that Yoon stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to safety claim in his second amended complaint because Yoon alleged facts sufficient to show that defendants Durant, Gray, Pinedo, and Saaveda knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety. See Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials for failure to protect inmates from violence by other inmates). However, the magistrate judge‘s final recommendation of Yoon‘s second amended complaint did not specifically address this claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge‘s findings and recommendation without stating whether it permitted Yoon to proceed on this claim. Because the district court appears to have overlooked Yoon‘s deliberate indifference to safety claim, we vacate the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings as to this claim only.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Yoon‘s motions for appointment of counsel because Yoon failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
Yoon‘s request to proceed in forma pauperis, set forth in his opening brief, is denied as unnecessary.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
MEMORANDUM**
Victoria Elia Kaldawi appeals pro se from the district court‘s judgment dismissing her claims against the sovereign defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying her motion to enter default judgment and dismissing her claims against the individual defendants. We have jurisdiction under
The district court properly dismissed Kaldawi‘s claims against the sovereign defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Kaldawi failed to establish an exception to the sovereign defendants’ immunity under the FSIA. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989) (statutory exceptions to FSIA provide sole basis for jurisdiction over a foreign state); see also In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.“). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaldawi‘s motion to enter default against these defendants for the same reason. See
Dismissal of Kaldawi‘s claims against Al-Fahed, Al-Suheil and Al-Fares for lack of personal jurisdiction was proper because Kaldawi did not establish that these defendants had “certain minimum contacts” with California “such that the maintenance of the suit d[id] not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Love, 611 F.3d at 609 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaldawi‘s motion to enter default judgment against these defendants for the same reason. See Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712 (it is proper to avoid entry of default judgment if there is no personal jurisdiction over a defendant); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of review).
Kaldawi‘s motion to expedite case and ruling (Docket Entry No. 17) is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See