State of Ohio/City of Vermilion v. Christiana Lane
Court of Appeals No. E-18-008; Trial Court No. TRC 1702801
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ERIE COUNTY
Decided: December 28, 2018
[Cite as Vermilion v. Lane, 2018-Ohio-5284.]
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
Ann C. Eckstein and Barry Eckstein, for appellant.
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} This accelerated appeal is from the January 24, 2018 judgment of the Vermilion Municipal Court which, following a no contest plea to driving while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), in violation of
{¶ 2} The relevant facts are as follows. Following the July 16, 2017 stop of her vehicle in Vermilion, Erie County, Ohio, appellant was charged with OVI and failure to drive in marked lanes,
{¶ 3} On September 5, 2017, appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop including the trooper’s observations of appellant, field sobriety tests, and results of all breath alcohol tests. Appellant argued that the initial stop of her vehicle was unlawful because the Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred. Appellant further argued that field sobriety tests were not issued in compliance with the protocol established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
{¶ 4} A hearing on the motion was held on November 7, 2017, and the sole witness was Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Brandon Dean. Relevant to this appeal, Trooper Dean testified that on July 16, 2017, at approximately 1:00 a.m., he initiated the traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle due to the following:
Well, she drew attention for the length of the signal she had and stopping past the stop bar, and then she should’ve turned right, so she made a marked lanes violation by continuing through the intersection into the next right turn-only lane, and that’s why I stopped her.
{¶ 6} Trooper Dean was then questioned regarding the marked lanes statute; he testified that he believed appellant had violated
(A) Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, or wherever within municipal corporations traffic is lawfully moving in two or more substantially continuous lines in the same direction, the following rules apply:
(B) A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
{¶ 8} On December 28, 2017, the trial court denied appellant’s motion as to the validity of the initial stop. The court concluded that at the time of the stop, Trooper Dean had reasonable suspicion that appellant was in violation of
{¶ 9} On January 24, 2018, appellant withdrew her not guilty plea and entered a plea of no contest to the OVI charge and the marked lanes violation. Appellant’s sentence was stayed pending this appeal wherein, appellant raises the following assignment of error for our review:
The trial court abused its discretion when it found there was legal justification for the initial traffic stop of Defendant for violating R.C. 4511.33.
{¶ 10} We initially note that appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). An appellate court defers to a trial court’s factual findings made with respect to its ruling on a motion to suppress where the findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id.; State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030 (1996). “[T]he appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶ 11} In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the trooper had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that she committed a traffic violation. The state counters that Trooper Dean’s reasonable mistake of law justified the stop.
{¶ 12} “The Fourth Amendment guarantees ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). We note that an investigatory traffic stop may only be legitimately effectuated when there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Swanson, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-05-065, 2006-Ohio-4798, ¶ 15. This court has previously held that mistakes of law cannot support probable cause to conduct a stop. State v. Babcock, 2013-Ohio-2366, 992 N.E.2d 1215 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 13} Subsequent to our decision in Babcock, the Supreme Court of the United States held that in addition to mistakes of fact, an objectively reasonable mistake of law
{¶ 14} The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the car which the trial court denied. On appeal, the court reversed finding that the initial stop was not valid because the relevant statute required only one working brake light. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed finding that the officer could have reasonably, albeit mistakenly, read the code to require that both brake lights be in good working order. Id.
{¶ 15} The United States Supreme Court first noted that no justification existed to differentiate between reasonable mistakes of fact, which may form the basis of a valid stop, and mistakes of law. The court stressed that such mistakes must be objectively reasonable to not allow a “Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws [the officer] is duty-bound to enforce.” Id. at 539-540.
{¶ 16} Turning to the brake-light violation at issue, the court concluded that the wording of the statute made it reasonable for the officer to conclude that a stop lamp was a type of rear lamp and that they were both required to be functional. Id. at 540. Thus, because it was objectively reasonable for the officer to think that the faulty brake light was in violation of a law, the stop was valid. Id.
{¶ 18} Unlike the courts’ interpretation of the statutory language implicated in Heien and Stadelmann, we find that the marked lanes statute is unambiguous. As quoted above,
{¶ 20} Based on the foregoing, we must conclude that it was not objectively reasonable for the trooper to stop appellant’s vehicle for a violation of
{¶ 21} On consideration whereof, we find that appellant was prejudiced and prevented from having a fair proceeding, the portion of the court’s December 28, 2017 order finding that the officer had reasonable belief that appellant committed a traffic
Judgment reversed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J. CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.