Vaundell Duwayne Kingbird, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
A19-1850
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
May 4, 2022
McKeig, J. Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Thissen, Anderson, JJ.
Court of Appeals. Filed: May 4, 2022 Office of Appellate Courts
Robert J. Shane, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota;
Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota; and
Adam E. Petras, Special Assistant Itasca County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
-
The 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2 (2020) , governing petitions for an order declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration, is not a jurisdictional bar to review. - Because Kingbird did not demonstrate that he was exonerated on “grounds consistent with innocence,” which requires a showing of “any evidence of factual innocence,”
Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1) ,1(c)(2) (2020) , he is not eligible for compensation based on exoneration.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
MCKEIG, Justice.
At issue in this case is whether appellant/cross-respondent Vaundell Duwayne Kingbird was exonerated for purposes of the statute used to determine if a person whose conviction has been reversed, vacated, or set aside is eligible for compensation based on exoneration,
Kingbird was convicted in 2010 of violating
FACTS
In May 2010, a caller reported to law enforcement that a man, later identified as Kingbird, had a handgun and was holding a woman against her will at his residence. When the officers responded to the call, they noticed Kingbird walking outside the house with his hands in his pockets. The officers drew their weapons and ordered Kingbird to show them his hands and to get on the ground; he did not comply. One of the officers used a taser on Kingbird
The next day, the State charged Kingbird with one count of ineligible-person-in possession of a firearm,
by shooting statute), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 30, 1995). One of these cases involved another statute, which like
As part of a plea agreement, Kingbird admitted that he possessed an air-compressed BB gun and pleaded guilty to being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm,
In 2016, we held that an air-compressed BB gun is not a “firearm” under
On September 25, 2017, Kingbird filed a petition for an order declaring him eligible for exoneration compensation, contending that he was “exonerated” as defined by
In 2019, the Minnesota Legislature amended the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute. The Legislature adopted a new definition of “exonerated,” added new language to explain the meaning of “on grounds consistent with innocence,” and established a special deadline for some people impacted by our decision in Back to bring a petition. Act of May 30, 2019, ch. 5, art. 2, § 13, 2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 965, 965–66 (codified at
On October 3, 2019, the district court denied Kingbird‘s second petition, concluding that he did not meet the definition of “exonerated.” Specifically, the court noted that because the statutory phrase “on grounds consistent with innocence” is further defined as meaning “any evidence of factual innocence,” Kingbird must show evidence of factual innocence. Further, the district court concluded that Kingbird had “not advanced an argument that he did not commit the act for which he was arrested and convicted. Rather, his conviction was vacated due to a change in the law.” The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Kingbird was not “exonerated” within the meaning of
ANALYSIS
I.
There are two issues before us. First, we consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Kingbird‘s petition. This jurisdictional question is a threshold issue that we raise sua sponte. See Dead Lake Ass‘n, Inc. v. Otter Tail Cnty., 695 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Minn. 2005) (stating that “lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time . . . sua sponte by the court.“). We directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on this issue.
At issue is whether the 2-year statute of limitations in
A petition must be brought within two years, but no less than 60 days after the petitioner is exonerated. If before July 1, 2019, a person did not meet both requirements of Minnesota Statutes 2018, section 590.11, subdivision 1, clause (1), item (i), and did not file a petition or the petition was denied, that person may commence an action meeting the requirements under subdivision 1, paragraph (b), clause (1), item (i), on or after July 1, 2019, and before July 1, 2021.
In their supplemental briefs, Kingbird and the State agreed that Kingbird‘s 2019 petition was timely. Moreover, they agreed that the State waived any statute of limitation defense by failing to assert it below. This agreement by the parties, however, does not end the matter. The waiver by the State is only conclusive if the time bar is in fact a waivable statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional requirement. If it is the latter, it cannot be waived by the parties, and we must still independently confirm jurisdiction and determine whether the petition was timely. See Dead Lake Ass‘n, Inc., 695 N.W.2d at 134 (noting that “lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . cannot be waived by the parties.“).
We thus consider whether the 2-year limitations period in the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute is a jurisdictional bar to review if a petition is not timely filed,5 or if that deadline is a statute of limitations subject to waiver. In Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 600–02 (Minn. 2012), we explained the distinction between a waivable limitations period and a limitations period that serves as a jurisdictional bar to hearing the claim. It is “well established” that a statute of limitations “may be waived by a defendant who fails to assert it.” See id. at 600 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When, however, a “statute gives a new right of action, not existing at common law, a statutory time limit constitutes an element in the right itself, such that failure to comply with the time limit will deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the claim.” id. at 601 (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). But even if a new statutory cause of action is involved, we will consider “the statute‘s language, history, and structure to evaluate whether the Legislature intended the time limit . . . to be a waivable statute of limitations, or a jurisdictional bar.” id. at 602; see also Carlson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 623, 392 N.W.2d 216, 220–22 (Minn. 1986) (examining the statute‘s language, purpose, structure, and legislative history to determine whether the 6-month filing requirement in the Minnesota Human Rights Act was a jurisdictional bar).
As an initial matter, the State concedes that a petition for a determination of eligibility for exoneration compensation does not create a new statutory cause of action, but instead is simply a type of postconviction claim. See Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 601–02 (explaining that the postconviction statutes, chapter 590, “did not create an entirely new cause of action unknown at common law” but “merely codified or replaced preexisting remedies . . . .“).6 But
We begin by looking to the language of the statute,
We next consider the statute‘s legislative history. When the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute was originally enacted in 2014, see Act of May 16, 2014, ch. 269, § 1, 2014 Minn. Laws. 1020, 1020–25 (codified as amended at
As previously stated, in Back we held that one of the two alternative requirements contained in the definition of “exonerated” in
The legislative history related to the general requirement that a petition be filed within 2 years of a person being exonerated further supports our conclusion that the limitations period was not intended to be a jurisdictional bar.8 When the Legislature enacted the general 2-year limitations period in 2014, we had already decided in Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 606, that another provision in the postconviction statutes,
Finally, the structure of
In conclusion, the language of the statute, its legislative history, structure, and purpose all make clear that
II.
We now turn to the merits of this appeal: whether Kingbird has been “exonerated” within the meaning of
“[W]hether an individual has been ‘exonerated’ ” is “[t]he threshold determination” under the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute. Back, 902 N.W.2d at 26. As relevant here, a person is exonerated if a court “vacate[s]” a conviction “on grounds consistent with innocence.”
(1) exonerated, through a pardon or sentence commutation, based on factual innocence; or
(2) exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.
Kingbird contends that he meets the eligibility standard set out in
If a statutory phrase is unambiguous, we apply the statute‘s plain meaning. State v. Defatte, 928 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. 2019). When a statute does not define a word or a phrase, we often determine plain meaning by looking to dictionary definitions and applying them in the context of the statute. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d at 488. We also interpret the statute as a whole to give effect to all of its parts. State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015).
Here, the Legislature used a very specific form of “innocence” to ascribe meaning to “grounds consistent with innocence“: “any evidence of factual innocence.”
Because the adjective “factual” modifies the noun “innocence,” the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase “factual innocence” is the state of being not guilty of a crime (innocence) but only when the reason is restricted to or based on facts (factual). Kingbird argues that because a BB gun is not a firearm under Haywood, his actions were not against the law and therefore he is innocent. But this claim of innocence is not restricted to or based on facts, because without Haywood, Kingbird would not be deemed innocent. And because Kingbird‘s case turns on a legal significance, the statutory meaning of the term firearm—not facts alone—Kingbird‘s claim does not squarely fit within the definition of “factual innocence.”
In other words, the facts of Kingbird‘s case did not change. The facts of the offense on which Kingbird was convicted are undisputed: he admitted as part of his plea agreement that he possessed a BB gun at a time when he was ineligible to possess certain firearms. His conviction was vacated based on our decision in Haywood—a decision that concluded the State did not have a legal basis to bring an ineligible-person-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge based on an air-powered BB gun. Because Kingbird has not shown evidence of “factual innocence,”9 he has not demonstrated
consistent with innocence,” as the statute requires. As a result, we hold that Kingbird is not exonerated under
a crime has been clarified by a court such that the unchanged facts can no longer sustain the conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
.
Vaundell Duwayne Kingbird, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
A19-1850
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
C/D-1
C O N C U R R E N C E & D I S S E N T
THISSEN, J., (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with the court that the 2-year limitations period in
This case turns on the meaning of the phrase “factual innocence” in
Kingbird‘s conviction was vacated because he did not possess a firearm. Possession of a firearm is an essential element of the crime of illegally possessing a firearm; a person cannot be convicted of the crime if he did not possess a firearm. Kingbird possessed an air-compressed BB gun which is not a firearm. See State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. 2016) (holding that the term “firearm” in section 609.165 does not include—and never has included—an air-compressed BB gun). Stated another way, the State did not prove a fact—that Kingbird possessed a firearm—necessary to his conviction. It is hard to avoid the common-sense conclusion that Kingbird was “factually innocent” of the crime.
I am unclear what rule of law defendants, lawyers, and judges can take from this decision.1 If the vacation of Kingbird‘s conviction for a possession of a firearm because he did not possess a firearm does not make him eligible, who can be? One possibility is that to be eligible for exoneration damages, a person‘s conviction must be vacated based on newly discovered evidence not known at the time of trial. But the text of the statute refutes such a limited scope since it defines “on grounds consistent with innocence” as “exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed . . . and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.”
I am not wholly unsympathetic to the majority‘s conclusion that the Legislature did not intend persons in Kingbird‘s situation—a person whose conviction for illegal possession of a firearm was vacated following our decision in Haywood—to be eligible for exoneration damages. The legislative history provides some clues that may be the case.
In 2018, the Legislature considered a bill to amend section 590.11 in response to our decision in Back v. State (Back II), 902 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Minn. 2017), where we struck down as unconstitutional a provision of
And in that case—the Haywood decision—despite 40 years of precedent, held that a BB gun was not a firearm. And there were many people who were convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm when the firearm was a BB gun. And so those decisions, those convictions were vacated. There were over 80 of those. And under this bill, if that is considered consistent with innocence, that‘s 12 million dollars. And so, it would seem that the Legislature might want to consider defining the term “consistent with innocence.” And we are very willing to talk about what that definition might be. It would be the definition that was in the first and second bills that were introduced in both the House and the Senate.
Id. Following the testimony, the committee amended the bill to provide a definition for “on grounds consistent with innocence” that included the “any evidence of factual innocence” language.
This legislative history provides some support for the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend persons like Kingbird—whose convictions for illegal possession of a firearm were vacated because of our decision in Back—to qualify for exoneration damages. But under our court‘s rules about statutory interpretation, consideration of legislative history is forbidden unless a statute is ambiguous; an approach that sometimes forces the court into the linguistic contortions demonstrated in this case.
Moreover, in this case, the legislative history is far from definitive. The testifier for the Minnesota County Attorneys Association raised two concerns—general problems with an ambiguous statute and specific concerns about the implications of Haywood. Further, no legislator specifically addressed the Haywood decision. Therefore, we do not know if the Legislature in adopting the amendment to limit “consistent with innocence” to “factual innocence” was responding to the testifier‘s concern that the phrase “consistent with innocence” was generally ambiguous or if it was responding to the specific concern that the Haywood decision potentially exposed the State to millions of dollars in exoneration damages. What we do know is that the Legislature did not choose to limit exoneration damages to situations involving “newly discovered evidence” (the limit proposed by the State in Back I before the court of appeals). Further, we know that the Legislature did not choose language excluding cases where a person was convicted consistent with the prevailing understanding of a statute at the time even if that understanding was later reversed (the situation of Kingbird and other Haywood exonerees). Accordingly, it follows that the
It is undoubtedly true that the prosecutors who pursued the case against Kingbird acted in good faith. At the time, the term “firearm” as used in section 609.165 was (wrongly) understood to include BB guns. That historical reality may underlie the majority‘s decision in this case. But I find nothing in the text of the statute (or otherwise) to suggest that eligibility for exoneration damages turns on the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutors who brought the case. If the Legislature intended that, it could have very clearly said so.
Because Kingbird is factually innocent—because the State did not prove the essential fact that he possessed a firearm—Kingbird qualifies to seek exoneration damages under section 590.11. I would reverse.
ANDERSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Thissen.