The People of the State of Colorado v. Michael W. Struckmeyer
No. 19SC50
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
October 19, 2020
2020 CO 76
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
October 19, 2020
2020 CO 76
No. 19SC50, People v. Struckmeyer—Mutually Exclusive Verdicts—Legally Consistent Verdicts—
A jury found the defendant guilty of both child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), a class 3 felony, and child abuse (criminal negligence), a class 4 felony, based on the same criminal conduct. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the verdicts were logically and legally inconsistent and could not be sustained because the class 3 felony child abuse (knowingly or recklessly) conviction required the jury to determine that the defendant was aware of the risk of serious bodily injury to the child victim, while the class 4 felony child abuse (criminal negligence) conviction required the jury to find that the defendant was unaware of the risk of serious bodily injury to the child victim. Because the division believed that the trial court had accepted mutually exclusive guilty verdicts, it found plain error, reversed the judgment of conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2020 CO 76
Supreme Court Case No. 19SC50
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 15CA536
Petitioner:
The People of the State of Colorado,
v.
Respondent:
Michael W. Struckmeyer.
Judgment Reversed
en banc
October 19, 2020
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Erin K. Grundy, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Elyse Maranjian, Deputy Public Defender
Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE GABRIEL dissents.
¶2 The People then filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted in its entirety.1 We now reverse.
¶3 Whether verdicts are mutually exclusive is a question of law. People v. Delgado, 2019 CO 82, ¶ 13, 450 P.3d 703, 705. We review questions of law de novo. Id.
¶4 Where, as here, a defendant fails to preserve an error, we must decide whether there was “an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege” or merely a “failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 40, 416 P.3d 893, 902 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). If it‘s the former, the error is waived and appellate review is extinguished. Id. If it‘s the latter, the error is deemed forfeited and this court reviews for plain error. Id. “An error is plain if it is obvious and substantial and so undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Id. at ¶ 48, 416 P.3d at 903.
¶5 The People argue that Struckmeyer waived any error regarding verdict inconsistency because he failed to raise the issue in the district court. We find this
II. Analysis
¶6 Just last month we observed in People v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74, ¶ 21, 471 P.3d 1068, that
¶7 Following our decision in Rigsby, we hold that the guilty verdict for child abuse (knowingly or recklessly) and the guilty verdict for child abuse (criminal negligence), even if logically inconsistent, are not legally inconsistent. By proving that Struckmeyer acted knowingly or recklessly, the People necessarily established that he acted with criminal negligence. It follows that by returning a guilty verdict on child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), the jury, as a matter of law, necessarily found that he acted with criminal negligence. Therefore, even if there is a logical inconsistency between acting knowingly and acting with criminal negligence, and between acting recklessly and acting with criminal negligence, no legal inconsistency exists in either scenario based on
III. Conclusion
¶9 For all the foregoing reasons, we reverse. We remand the matter to the court of appeals to reinstate Struckmeyer‘s judgment of conviction.
JUSTICE GABRIEL dissents.
¶10 Apparently perceiving this case principally to involve an issue of multiplicity and merger, and not one of legally and logically inconsistent verdicts, the majority reverses the judgment of the division below. Maj. op. ¶¶ 8-9. The majority reaches this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that upholding Michael Struckmeyer‘s convictions for child abuse (knowingly or recklessly) and child abuse (criminal negligence) necessarily means that the jury found that Struckmeyer was aware of the risk of serious bodily injury to the child victim presented by his conduct and unaware of that same risk at the very same time.
¶11 For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74, ¶ 65, 471 P.3d 1068 (Gabriel, J., dissenting), I do not believe that this case presents an issue of multiplicity and merger, which implicates double jeopardy concerns. Rather, this case involves different constitutional principles, namely, a criminal defendant‘s rights to due process and to have a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crimes charged. Id. Moreover, for the reasons that I developed at some length in my dissent in Rigsby, which I will not repeat here, I believe, contrary to the majority‘s view, that it is both legally and logically inconsistent for the jury to have found that Struckmeyer was aware of the risk of injury to the child victim and unaware of that same risk at the same time based on the same conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 49-65. I would thus conclude that reasonable
¶12 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
- Whether the court of appeals erred by concluding that the jury‘s verdicts finding the defendant guilty of both knowing/reckless child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and criminally negligent child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury were inconsistent verdicts.
- Whether the court of appeals erred by reversing for a new trial for inconsistent jury verdicts, instead of maximizing the jury verdicts by affirming the most serious conviction and merging the lesser offense.