People v. HarrisonPeople v. Harrison
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Samour (en banc)
Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch‘s homepage at http://www.courts.state.co.us. Opinions are also posted on the Colorado Bar Association‘s homepage at http://www.cobar.org.
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
June 15, 2020
2020 CO 57
No. 19SC448, People v. Harrison—
The supreme court holds that the plain language of
Judgment Reversed
en banc
June 15, 2020
Attorneys
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Trina K. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Jessica Sommer, Deputy Public Defender
Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In Colorado, if a person suffers an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event and certain requirements are satisfied, she may not be prosecuted, or even arrested, for possession of a cоntrolled substance or possession of drug paraphernalia.
¶2 Brittany Page Harrison was charged with possession of two controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. Before trial, she filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that she was entitled to immunity pursuant to
¶3 In what is our first foray into the safe haven created by
¶4 Though
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶5 One morning, Harrison and her teenage friend, A.M., walked into a Burger King, ordered food, and sat down in a booth. About an hour and a half later, staff noticed that Harrison and A.M. had not touched their food, were slumped on the table, and appeared to be asleep. At the request of the restaurant‘s manager, an employee attempted to wake them up by touching their shoulders, shaking them, banging on the table, and yelling. Harrison and A.M. didn‘t even flinch or open their eyes. Shortly thereafter, the manager asked the employee to take another crack at waking Harrison and A.M. He obliged, but was unsuccessful.
¶6 Because she was concerned for the two patrons’ well-being and wondered if something was wrong, the manager called 911. She asked for help for two individuals who were sleeping in the restaurant and would not wake up. Her expectation was that the police would respond, rouse Harrison and A.M., admonish them about sleeping there, and ask them to leave. It “never really crossed [her] mind” that either of them was suffering from a drug or alcohol overdose. She did not observe anything that looked like drugs or paraphernalia or any signs that were indicative of intoxication or impairment.
¶7 Corporal Payne was the first to respond. Harrison woke uр after he shook her and announced himself. He could not get A.M. to wake up, and A.M. was eventually transported to a hospital via ambulance. Upon awakening, Harrison was sluggish and groggy. But soon after, she provided her identification, asked if she could eat her food, ate a hamburger, and had a brief conversation with Corporal Payne. Corporal Payne documented in his report that in response to one of his questions, Harrison indicated that she had not used drugs that day.
¶8 Officer Gonzales arrived while Corporal Payne was talking with Harrison. As he watched their interaction, he thought that she appeared to be under the influence of some substance. Corporal Payne concurred. With Harrison‘s permission, Corporal Payne searched her purse, where he discovered a syringe, a spoon, a butane torch, tin-foil with burn marks, and a baggie with a tar-type substance that later tested positive for heroin. Harrison also consented to a search of her backpack. Inside the backpack, Officer Gonzales found two glass pipes, a lighter, butane fluid, two butane torches, aluminum foil, and a baggie containing a powdery substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine.
¶9 Based on the items collected during the two searches, Harrison was arrested. Corporal Payne and Officer Gonzales noted that she had no trouble walking. And Harrison did not require or receive any medical assistance.
¶10 The prosecution subsequently charged Harrison with two counts of possession of a controlled substance (one alleging possession of heroin and the other alleging possession of methamphetaminе) and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. She pled not guilty to the three charges.
¶11 Before trial, Harrison filed a motion to dismiss, asserting immunity under
¶12 Harrison appealed, and a division of the court of appeals vacated her judgment of conviction based on its construction of the requirement in
¶13 The prosecution thеn sought review in our court, and we granted certiorari.1
II. Analysis
¶14 We begin by interpreting
A. Interpretation of Section 18-1-711(1)(a)
¶15 The interpretation of
¶16 When construing a statute, we strive to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Colo. Med. Bd. v. McLaughlin, 2019 CO 93, ¶ 22, 451 P.3d 841, 845. The first step in this endeavor is to examine the statutory language. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12, 431 P.3d 215, 218. In the absence of а definition, we must read statutory terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at ¶ 14, 431 P.3d at 218. To ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of a word in a statute, “we may consider a definition in a recognized dictionary.” Id.
¶17 We are required to read the words and phrases in a statute in context. Id. at ¶ 13, 431 P.3d at 218. And we must “give consistent effect to all parts of [the] statute, and construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory design.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, ¶ 12, 303 P.3d 558, 560–61). This concept goes hand-in-hand with the notion that courts must avoid constructions that render any word in a statute superfluous. Mook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs, 2020 CO 12, ¶ 36, 457 P.3d 568, 576.
¶18 If the statutory languagе is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written and look no further. Cowen, ¶ 12, 431 P.3d at 218. This is so because “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
¶19 Here, as
(a) [A] person report[ed] in good faith [the] emergency drug or alcohol overdose event to a law enforcement officer, to the 911 system, or to a medical provider;
(b) The person remain[ed] at the scene of the event until a law enforcement officer or an emergency medical responder arrive[d] or the person remain[ed] at the facilities of the medical provider until a law enforcement officer arrive[d];
(c) The person identifie[d] . . . herself to, and cooperate[d] with, the law enforcement officer, emergency medical responder, or medical provider; and
(d) [Harrison‘s] offense[s] ar[ose] from the same course of events from which the emergency drug or alcohol overdose event arose.
(Emphasis added.)
¶20 Only the condition set forth in paragraph (a) is at issue in this appeal. To be more precise, the question we confront revolves around the first part of that condition—“[a] person reports in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event.” In construing this language, the division focused almost exclusively on the definition of “an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event.” See Harrison, ¶ 22. That definition appears in
(5) As used in this section, unless the context othеrwise requires, “emergency drug or alcohol overdose event” means an acute condition including, but not limited to, physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria, or death resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, or of alcohol, . . . and that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance.
¶21 Because
¶22 We cannot embrace the division‘s analysis because it fails to give effect to some of the words in
¶23 The division read the “good faith” requirement out of the rule. See Harrison, ¶¶ 22–25. It suggested instead that
¶24 We, however, can conceive of no way to assess whether the manager made her report to the 911 system in good faith without considering her subjective perception of Harrison‘s state. “[G]ood faith” is “[a] state of mind consisting in . . . honesty in belief or purpose.” Good Faith, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). If the subjective perception of the person making the report is taken out of the equation, how can a jury ever evaluate whether she acted with honesty in belief or purpose? Reporting an event with honesty necessarily means accurately reporting one‘s perception of the event.4 Accordingly, in contrast to the division‘s determination, we conclude that the good-faith requirement renders the subjective perception of the person making the report relevant.
¶25 True, the division acknowlеdged the “good faith” requirement: “[I]mmunity must apply so long as the person reporting the event reports in good faith an ‘acute condition’ that a reasonable person would believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose.” Harrison, ¶ 22 (emphasis omitted). But it deprived it of any meaning in the next breath: “[T]o require the person reporting the overdose to
subjectively perceive an emergency overdose [] would necessitate reading terms into the statute ‘that simply are not there.‘” Id. at ¶ 23 (quoting People v. Benavidez, 222 P.3d 391, 393–94 (Colo. App. 2009)). Contrary to the division‘s belief, no terms must be added because thе term “good faith” already appears in
¶26 The division also seemingly overlooked the part of
¶27 Ultimately, in attempting to honor the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that prohibits the infusion of words into a statute, the division ended up violating a different cardinal rule of statutory interpretation because it rendered some words in
¶28 We are not persuaded otherwise by Harrison‘s insistence that the division was correсt in reading
¶29 In sum, we hold that
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶30 Our interpretation of
¶31 “[W]e review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain the convictions.” Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005). The proper analytical framework for reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on appeal is the one we ushered in almost a half century ago in People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1973), in the context of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1288 (Colo. 2010). Bennett made clear that to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal, the prosecution must establish a prima facie case of
guilt—that is, it must introduce sufficient evidence to establish guilt—“no more, no lеss.” 515 P.2d at 469 (quoting Corbett v. People, 387 P.2d 409, 412 (Colo. 1963)).
¶32 Under Bennett‘s substantial evidence test, we inquire whether the evidence, “viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In applying this test, we are required to “give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn from the evidence.” People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 25, 367 P.3d 695, 701 (quoting People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo. 1983)).
¶33 An appellate court may not serve as a thirteenth juror and consider whether it might have reached a different conclusion than the jury. See Clark, 232 P.3d at 1293. Nor may an appellate court “invade the province of the jury” by second-guessing any of the jury‘s findings that are supported by the evidence. Perez, ¶ 31, 367 P.3d at 702.
¶34 When an affirmative defense is submitted to the jury, it “effectively becomes an additional element of the charged offense.” Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 22, 399 P.3d 702, 705. “[T]he prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the affirmative defense is inapplicable.” Id. In other words, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant‘s conduct was not lеgally authorized by the affirmative defense. See generally COLJI-Crim. ch. H. To do so, the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the conditions of the affirmative defense. Id.
¶35 In this case, the division arrived at the wrong conclusion because it answered the wrong question. Given its interpretation of
¶36 But under our interpretation of
condition, which was caused by the consumption or use of drugs or alcohol and which a layperson would reasonably have believed was a drug or alcohol overdose needing medical assistance. The record answers the correct question with a resounding “yes.”
¶37 The manager testified that: She believed Harrison was asleep; she told the 911 operator that Harrison would not wake up; she expected that the responding officers would rouse Harrison, admonish her for sleeping in a restaurant, and ask her to leavе; she did not observe any drugs or paraphernalia; she did not notice any signs of intoxication or impairment; and it never crossed her mind that Harrison was suffering from a drug or alcohol overdose. Viewing this evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it was sufficient to disprove that the manager reported in good faith what she perceived to be an acute condition resulting from the consumption or use of drugs or alcohol. Thus, even if, as the division found, the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to disprove that a layperson would reasonably have believed that Harrison was suffering from a drug or alcohol overdose in need of medical assistance, the prosecution still disproved the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶38 In any event, we agree with the prosecution that it disproved beyond a reasonable doubt that Harrison actually suffered an acute condition brought on by the consumption or use of drugs or alcohol.7 The division implied that Harrison was unconscious and that her unconsciousness was аn acute condition caused by the consumption or use of drugs. Id. However, even if unconsciousness qualifies as an acute condition under
¶39 No one testified that Harrison was “unconscious.” All of the pertinent witnesses said that Harrison was asleep. There was testimony as to the following: Harrison was tired and fell asleep; although thе staff at Burger King could not wake her up, she awoke when Corporal Payne identified himself and shook her; she was sluggish and groggy upon waking up, but soon after provided her identification, asked if she could eat her food, ate a hamburger, and answered Corporal Payne‘s questions; she told Corporal Payne that she had not taken drugs; she was subsequently able to consent to have her purse searched by Corporal Payne and her backpack searched by Officer Gonzales; and she did not need help walking or require medical assistancе. Giving the prosecution the benefit of every
reasonable inference that may be fairly drawn from this evidence, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that Harrison was simply asleep.
¶40 The division refrained from considering much of this evidence, reasoning that whatever transpired after the 911 call was irrelevant. Harrison, ¶¶ 24–25. While that view may be correct as it relates to whether a layperson would reasonably have believed that
¶41 Because the prosecution‘s evidence was sufficient to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least two conditions of the affirmative defense—though it was only required to disprove one condition—we hоld that the evidence was sufficient to support Harrison‘s convictions. Therefore, on remand the division must reinstate the judgment of conviction.
III. Conclusion
¶42 We conclude that the division erred in vacating Harrison‘s judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
- Whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the requirement in the drug overdose immunity statute,
section 18-1-711(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019) , that a person “report[] in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event.” - Whether the court of appеals correctly concluded that the defendant‘s convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.