COLORADO MEDICAL BOARD v. SCOTT STORM MCLAUGHLIN, M.D.
No. 18SC330
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
November 12, 2019
2019 CO 93
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 17CA73. en banc. Judgment Reversed.
Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch‘s homepage at http://www.courts.state.co.us. Opinions are also posted on the Colorado Bar Association‘s homepage at http://www.cobar.org.
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
November 12, 2019
2019 CO 93
No. 18SC330, Colorado Medical Board v. McLaughlin – Administrative Law – Colorado Medical Board – Disciplinary Procedures – Subpoenas.
In this case, the supreme court is asked to determine whether an investigative subpoena issued by the Colorado Medical Board (the “Board“) can have a lawfully authorized purpose if the investigation was prompted by a complaint made by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the “CDPHE“) pursuant to a policy that violated the Open Meetings Law (the “OML“) or the State Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA“).
In Doe v. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment, 2019 CO 92, ___ P.3d ___, which the supreme court also decides today, the court concludes that (1) the CDPHE, as a state agency, is not a “state public body” under the OML and therefore could not violate that statute and (2) the CDPHE did not violate the APA in developing the policy at issue or in referring doctors to the Board under that policy. For this reason alone, the court necessarily rejects the respondent‘s argument that the investigative subpoena lacked a lawfully authorized purpose because it was based on a policy that violated the OML and the APA.
Even if the CDPHE‘s adoption of the policy at issue and its reliance on it were invalid, however, the supreme court concludes that the Board‘s investigative subpoena had a lawfully authorized purpose because it was issued pursuant to the Board‘s statutory authority to investigate allegations of unprofessional conduct and was properly tailored to that purpose.
Accordingly, the court reverses the judgment of the division below and remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Ashley E. Moller, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Sierra Ward, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado
Maxfield Gunning, LLP
Eric H. Maxfield
Boulder, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Hershey Decker Drake
Carmen Nicole Decker
Kaylyn Peister
Lone Tree, Colorado
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the
¶1 In this case, we are asked to determine whether an investigative subpoena issued by the Colorado Medical Board (the “Board“) can have a lawfully authorized purpose if the investigation was prompted by a complaint made by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the “CDPHE“) pursuant to a policy that violated the Open Meetings Law (the “OML“) or the State Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA“).1
¶2 In Doe v. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment, 2019 CO 92, ___ P.3d ___, which we also decide today, we conclude that (1) the CDPHE, as a state agency, is not a “state public body” under the OML and therefore could not violate that statute and (2) the CDPHE did not violate the APA in developing the policy at issue or in referring doctors to the Board under that policy. For this reason alone, we necessarily reject Scott McLaughlin‘s argument that the investigative subpoena lacked a lawfully authorized purpose because it was based on a policy that violated the OML and the APA.
¶3 Even if the CDPHE‘s adoption of the policy at issue and its reliance on it were invalid, however, we still would conclude that the Board‘s investigative subpoena had a lawfully authorized purpose because it was issued pursuant to the Board‘s statutory authority to investigate allegations of unprofessional conduct and was properly tailored to that purpose.
¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶5 McLaughlin is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Colorado. As part of his practice, he evaluates patients to see if they have a qualifying condition that would benefit from the use of medical marijuana.
¶6 Information related to medical marijuana in Colorado is maintained by the CDPHE in a confidential registry that includes the names of all patients who have applied for and are entitled to receive a marijuana registry identification card, as well as the names and contact information for the patients’ physicians and, if applicable, their primary caregivers.
¶7 In May 2014, the CDPHE implemented Medical Marijuana Policy No. 2014-01 (“the Referral Policy“). The Referral Policy provides that the CDPHE will use its statistical reviews of physician medical marijuana recommendations to determine whether reasonable cause exists to refer a physician to the Board for investigation. Factors to be considered include (1) whether a physician has a high caseload, as determined by the number of patients for whom medical marijuana is recommended (a high caseload is calculated as 3,521 or more patient recommendations in one year); (2) whether a physician recommended increased plant counts for more than thirty percent of his or her caseload; and (3) whether more than one-third of the physician‘s patient caseload is under the age of thirty. The CDPHE referred McLaughlin to the Board for investigation on the ground that he allegedly exceeded one of these thresholds.
¶8 Thereafter, the Board served a subpoena duces tecum on McLaughlin, ordering him to produce his complete medical records for
¶9 McLaughlin refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Referral Policy was adopted in violation of the
¶10 McLaughlin then moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that (1) it stemmed from the CDPHE‘s violation of the OML, (2) action taken in violation of the OML is null and void, and (3) the subpoena therefore was not issued for a lawful purpose.
¶11 The district court ultimately denied McLaughlin‘s motion to quash. Although by the time of the court‘s ruling the court had determined that the Referral Policy violated the OML, the court nevertheless concluded that the Board‘s investigation and subpoena were for a lawfully authorized purpose, namely, the Board‘s duty to investigate licensed physicians who may fail to meet generally accepted standards of practice.
¶12 McLaughlin appealed, and in a split, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals reversed the district court‘s order enforcing the subpoena. Colo. Med. Bd. v. McLaughlin, 2018 COA 41, 425 P.3d 1187. In so ruling, the majority first concluded that the Referral Policy was invalid under both the OML and the APA because the CDPHE and Board “officials” had drafted that Policy without public meetings, public notice, or compliance with applicable notice and comment rulemaking procedures. Id. at ¶¶ 23–26, 425 P.3d at 1192–93.
¶13 The majority then addressed the Board‘s authority to investigate complaints. The division opined that (1) although the Board may have had the authority to initiate a complaint against McLaughlin if it suspected that he had engaged in “unprofessional conduct,” the Board had not pointed to any provision in the statutory definition of “unprofessional conduct” that McLaughlin was suspected of violating; (2) although the Board can investigate complaints regarding validly adopted agency rules, the Referral Policy was not validly adopted; and (3) although the CDPHE could refer a physician to the Board if it had reasonable cause to believe the physician had violated rules promulgated pursuant to the CDPHE‘s rulemaking authority, the Referral Policy was not such a rule. Id. at ¶¶ 32–33, 425 P.3d at 1194. The majority thus concluded, “[B]ecause the [Referral Policy] was void, the referral was void, and it is thus as if there were no complaint at all to prompt the Board‘s investigation.” Id. at ¶ 33, 425 P.3d at 1194.
¶14 Finally, the majority rejected the Board‘s argument that even if the Referral Policy and the referral were void, the investigation and subpoena were still valid because the Board can initiate an investigation even without suspicion of misconduct. Id. at ¶¶ 35-37, 425 P.3d at 1194-95. In so ruling, the majority specifically rejected the Board‘s reliance on Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). McLaughlin, ¶¶ 35–37, 425 P.3d at 1194–95. In the majority‘s view, the subpoena in Walling was “lawful because the agency acted in ‘exact compliance’ with the statute authorizing its investigations.” Id. at ¶ 36, 425 P.3d at 1195 (quoting Walling, 327 U.S. at 201). This distinguished Walling from the circumstances in the present case, where, according to the majority, the Board had issued a subpoena that had no lawful purpose (because an alleged violation of an invalid policy could not provide a lawful basis for suspecting misconduct). Id. at ¶¶ 34, 37, 425 P.3d at 1194, 95.
¶16 First, she noted that the Board‘s authority to investigate matters related to the practice of medicine does not depend on receiving a complaint. McLaughlin, ¶ 47, 425 P.3d at 1196. Indeed, in her view, an administrative agency can investigate solely based on its suspicion that the law was being violated. Id.
¶17 Second, she distinguished Walling on the ground that there, the Supreme Court was concerned not with the subpoena‘s purpose, but with its breadth and relevance to the subject matter of the investigation. Id. at ¶ 48, 425 P.3d at 1196.
¶18 Third, she observed that by statute, the Board has authority to (1) “investigate ‘matters relating to the exercise and performance of the powers and duties vested in the board,‘” including allegations of unprofessional conduct; and (2) start an investigation on its own motion or based on a citizen complaint. Id. at ¶ 49, 425 P.3d at 1197 (quoting
¶19 Finally, Judge Booras noted that although courts may inquire into the underlying reasons for a summons when a party alleges an abuse of process (e.g., harassment or bad faith), reliance on a referral policy that the CDPHE promulgated in violation of the OML did not rise to that level. Id.
¶20 The Board petitioned this court to review the division‘s judgment, and we granted that petition.
II. Analysis
¶21 We begin by reciting the applicable standards of review. We then proceed to apply our holding in Doe to this case, and we conclude that because neither the CDPHE‘s adoption of the Referral Policy nor its referral of McLaughlin to the Board violated the OML or the APA, the premise of McLaughlin‘s argument that the subpoena at issue lacked a lawful purpose is unfounded and therefore his challenge to the subpoena fails. Finally, we consider whether the subpoena was issued for a lawfully authorized purpose even if the Referral Policy could be said to have been adopted in violation of the OML and the APA, and we conclude that it was.
A. Standard of Review
¶22 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. All. for a Safe & Indep. Woodmen Hills v. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC, 2019 CO 76, ¶ 20, ___ P.3d ___. In construing statutes, we seek to give effect to the General Assembly‘s intent. Id. at ¶ 21. We read words and phrases in context, according them their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. If the language is clear, we apply it as written and need not resort to other tools of statutory interpretation. Id.
¶23 The question of whether an administrative subpoena had a lawfully authorized purpose generally presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves the application of a legal standard to a particular set of evidentiary facts. See Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, 690 P.2d 231, 239 (Colo. 1984). Here, however, the parties do not dispute the underlying facts or the purpose for the subpoena. They dispute only the legal determination of whether that purpose was “lawfully authorized.” We therefore review the division‘s legal conclusions on this issue de novo. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, ¶ 12, 396 P.3d 651, 654.
B. Doe v. CDPHE
¶24 In Doe, ¶¶ 14–46, which we also decide today, we affirmed the division‘s conclusions
¶25 In light of these conclusions, McLaughlin‘s assertion that the subpoena lacked a lawfully authorized purpose because it was issued as a result of a referral made under a policy that violated the OML and the APA is based on a faulty premise and therefore cannot prevail.
C. “Lawfully Authorized Purpose”
¶26 Even if the Referral Policy could be said to have been adopted in violation of the OML and the APA, however, we would reach the same result.
¶27 Seizure of administrative records through an administrative agency subpoena is valid if (1) the investigation pursuant to which the subpoena was issued is for a lawfully authorized purpose; (2) the information sought is relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the subpoena is sufficiently specific to obtain documents that are adequate but not excessive for the inquiry. Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Colo. 1980). If a party challenges an administrative subpoena, then the issuing agency bears the burden of demonstrating the propriety of the subpoena. Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 116 P.3d 1245, 1248 (Colo. App. 2005). Here, McLaughlin contests only the first requirement, namely, whether the subpoena had a lawfully authorized purpose.
¶28 Although we have not considered the meaning of the phrase “lawfully authorized purpose” in the context of a subpoena issued by the Board, in Charnes, 612 P.2d at 1123, we considered the meaning of that phrase in the context of a taxpayer‘s challenge to a Department of Revenue subpoena for certain financial records that was issued to the taxpayer‘s bank. We concluded that the investigation pursuant to which the subpoena was issued was for a lawfully authorized purpose because the Department had a statutory duty to enforce Colorado‘s tax laws and the information sought related to the accuracy of the taxpayer‘s return and the amount of his income, both of which were relevant to the Department‘s enforcement efforts. Id. at 1122.
¶29 In our view, the same reasoning applies here.
¶30 The legislative declaration of the Colorado Medical Practice Act
declares it to be in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare to enact laws regulating and controlling the practice of the healing arts to the end that the people shall be properly protected against unauthorized, unqualified, and improper practice of the healing arts in this state, and this article 240 shall be construed in conformity with this declaration of purpose.
¶31 To carry out these purposes, the legislature created the Board and gave it the authority to “[m]ake investigations, hold hearings, and take evidence in accordance with section 12-20-403 in all matters relating to the exercise and performance of the powers and duties vested in the board.”
¶32 Finally,
¶34 Our conclusion in this regard finds further support in the text of
¶35 As noted above, the legislature enacted the Colorado Medical Practice Act to ensure that the people shall be properly protected against the unauthorized, unqualified, and improper practice of the healing arts in Colorado.
¶36 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the subpoena had a lawfully authorized purpose, regardless of whether the Referral Policy was adopted in violation of either the OML or the APA.
¶37 We are not persuaded otherwise by Board of Medical Examiners v. Duhon, 895 P.2d 143, 147 (Colo. 1995), on which the majority below relied. That case principally involved a question of when in the course of an investigation the Board is authorized to issue an administrative subpoena. Id. at 146–48. This case does not present such a timing issue. Moreover, Duhon expressly did not address the question now before us (i.e., whether the subpoena was reasonable under the test adopted in Charnes) because the record there was insufficient to allow a court to evaluate the reasonableness of the subpoena at issue. Id. at 149. Accordingly, Duhon is inapposite.
III. Conclusion
¶38 Because neither the adoption of the Referral Policy nor the referral of McLaughlin to the Board violated the OML or the APA, McLaughlin‘s contention that the subpoena served on him was void because it was the product of a referral made in violation of the OML and APA is based on a flawed premise and therefore is unpersuasive. Even if the adoption of the Referral Policy and the referral itself violated the OML or the APA, however, we still conclude that the Board‘s subpoena to McLaughlin had a lawfully authorized purpose because in issuing the subpoena, the Board was acting within the scope of its statutory authority to investigate complaints relating to the conduct of a person licensed or authorized to practice medicine in Colorado and the subpoena was properly tailored to that purpose.
¶39 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
Whether an agency investigative subpoena can have a lawfully authorized purpose even if the investigation was prompted by a complaint from a different agency under a referral policy that violated the Open Meetings Law or Administrative Procedure Act.