2020 CO 57
Colo.2020Background
- Brittany Harrison and a teenager were found unresponsive/slumped at a Burger King; staff called 911 thinking they were sleeping and would be awakened and asked to leave.
- The manager testified she did not observe drugs, paraphernalia, or signs of intoxication and never suspected an overdose.
- Police woke Harrison; she was groggy but responsive, ate, walked without difficulty, consented to searches, and did not seek or receive medical aid.
- Officers found a syringe, paraphernalia, heroin, and methamphetamine in Harrison’s belongings; she was charged with two possession counts and possession of paraphernalia.
- The district court allowed Harrison to raise § 18-1-711 as an affirmative defense; a jury convicted her. A division of the court of appeals vacated the convictions, holding the manager’s report should be judged by an objective reasonable-person standard.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari, held subsection (1)(a) requires both subjective good-faith reporting and an objective layperson belief, and concluded the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to disprove the defense and reinstate the convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Harrison) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper construction of § 18-1-711(1)(a): whether a report must be judged only objectively or both subjectively and objectively | Subsection (1)(a) requires the reporter to have subjectively reported what she believed and that a layperson would reasonably believe the condition was an overdose — i.e., both subjective good faith and objective reasonable-person elements | The reporting requirement should be judged by an objective reasonable-person standard only; the reporter’s subjective belief is irrelevant | The statute requires both: (1) the reporter must in good faith report what she subjectively perceives to be an acute, drug- or alcohol-caused condition, and (2) a layperson would reasonably believe the reported condition is a drug/alcohol overdose needing medical assistance. |
| Sufficiency of evidence to disprove Harrison’s § 18-1-711 affirmative defense | The manager expressly thought Harrison was merely asleep, observed no signs of intoxication or drugs, and later events (Harrison’s responsiveness, eating, walking, consenting to searches, denials of drug use) support that there was no acute overdose — prosecute disproved at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt | A reasonable person in the manager’s position could have believed an overdose was occurring; evidence was insufficient to disprove the defense under an objective standard | Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt (manager’s subjective belief that they were sleeping; post-contact evidence supported that Harrison was not suffering an acute drug/alcohol overdose). Convictions reinstated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (apply plain statutory language when text is clear)
- People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1973) (substantial-evidence / sufficiency standard for judgment of acquittal)
- Cowen v. People, 431 P.3d 215 (Colo. 2018) (statutory interpretation principles; plain and ordinary meaning)
- Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287 (Colo. 2010) (appellate courts must not act as a thirteenth juror)
- People v. Perez, 367 P.3d 695 (Colo. 2016) (give prosecution benefit of reasonable inferences)
- Isom v. People, 407 P.3d 559 (Colo. 2017) (statutory interpretation is question of law)
- Roberts v. People, 399 P.3d 702 (Colo. 2017) (when an affirmative defense is submitted, prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Mook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 457 P.3d 568 (Colo. 2020) (must give effect to every word in a statute)