UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION, a federally recognized Indian Tribe and a federally chartered corporation; UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE; UTE ENERGY HOLDINGS, a Delaware LLC, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. BARRY G. LAWRENCE, District Judge, Utah Third Judicial District Court, in his individual and official capacities; LYNN D. BECKER, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 18-4013
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
January 6, 2022
PUBLISH
FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit January 6, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 2:16-CV-00579-CW)
Frances C. Bassett and Thomasina Real Bird (Thomas W. Fredericks and Jeremy J. Patterson, with them on the briefs), Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, Louisville, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
David K. Isom, Isom Law Firm PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee Lynn D. Becker.
Nancy J. Sylvester (Brent M. Johnson, with her on the brief), Administrative Office of the Courts, Utah District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee Judge Barry G. Lawrence.
Before MORITZ, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
This appeal marks the latest chapter in a long-running contract dispute between the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the Tribe)1 and Lynn Becker, a non-Indian. The contract concerned Becker‘s work marketing and developing the Tribe‘s mineral resources on the Ute reservation. Almost seven years ago, Becker sued the Tribe in Utah state court for allegedly breaching the contract by failing to pay him a percentage of certain revenue the Tribe received from its mineral holdings. Later, the Tribe filed this lawsuit, challenging the state court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction under federal law. The district court denied the Tribe‘s motion for a preliminary injunction against the state-court proceedings, and the Tribe appeals.
We reverse and hold that the Tribe is entitled to injunctive relief. The district court‘s factual findings establish that Becker‘s state-court claims arose on the reservation because no substantial part of the conduct supporting them occurred elsewhere. And because the claims arose on the reservation, the state court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction absent congressional authorization. But contrary to the district court‘s ruling,
Background
The contract dispute at the heart of this appeal has spawned lawsuits in federal, state, and tribal court. Our court alone has issued four separate opinions. See Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 770 F.3d 944 (10th Cir. 2014) (Becker I); Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 868 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2017) (Becker II); Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv. v. Lawrence, 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lawrence); Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 11 F.4th 1140 (10th Cir. 2021) (Becker III).2 Those opinions provide detailed accounts of both the underlying contract dispute and the dense procedural history that followed. We therefore provide an abridged version of this history, covering only the events relevant to the appeal before us.
In June 2016, about a year after Judge Lawrence denied the Tribe‘s motion to dismiss the state-court action, the Tribe filed this federal lawsuit against Becker and Judge Lawrence, challenging in part the state court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction under federal law. Initially, the district court determined that it lacked federal subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the Tribe‘s challenge and dismissed the case. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that “the Tribe‘s claim—that federal law precludes state-court jurisdiction over a claim against Indians arising on the reservation—presents a federal question that sustains federal jurisdiction.” Lawrence, 875 F.3d at 540.
On remand, the Tribe reasserted its position that the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in a motion for both preliminary and permanent injunctions against the state-court proceedings. Rather than take up those motions, the district court sua sponte directed the parties to address a different issue, resulting in an order that purported to avoid consideration of the Tribe‘s motions on supplemental-jurisdiction grounds.4
The Tribe then filed this appeal, but we abated it, instructing the district court to follow Lawrence‘s mandate and “decide the Tribe‘s request for injunctive relief against the state[-]court proceedings.” App. vol. 8, 1541. The district court ultimately denied a preliminary injunction, finding that the Tribe was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the Utah state court lacks jurisdiction. In so doing, it reasoned that even assuming Becker‘s claims involve events that occurred on the reservation, a federal statute authorizes state-court jurisdiction over such claims.5 See
Analysis
We review the district court‘s decision to deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1157 (10th Cir. 2011). The district court abuses its discretion if it “commits a legal error,” if it “relies on clearly erroneous factual findings,” or if “there is no rational basis in the evidence for its ruling.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002)).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show that (1) it is substantially likely to prevail on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) this threatened injury outweighs the harm that granting the injunction may cause the opposing parties; and (4) the injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. Becker II, 868 F.3d at 1202. Here, the district court concluded that the Tribe failed the first requirement—it had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on its claim that federal law precludes the state court from exercising jurisdiction over Becker‘s lawsuit. On appeal, the Tribe challenges that conclusion, arguing that it can show even more than a likelihood of success on the merits—it can show actual success on the merits. The Tribe further argues that it satisfies the remaining injunction requirements and thus asks, as a remedy, that we order the district court to grant a permanent injunction.
I. The State Court‘s Jurisdiction
The Tribe argues that the Utah state court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Becker‘s lawsuit as a matter of federal law. Admittedly, federal law usually plays a limited role in assessing whether a state court has jurisdiction because state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, can hear a wide variety of cases. 13 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522 (3d ed. 2021) (“Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and the presumption is that they have subject matter jurisdiction over any controversy unless a showing is made to the contrary.“); cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (“[F]ederal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress.“). But this general jurisdiction does not necessarily hold true when a case involves a tribe or its members. Instead, state courts’ “adjudicative authority over Indians for on-reservation conduct is greatly limited by federal law.” Lawrence, 875 F.3d at 542.
These limits reflect a longstanding federal policy—enforceable against the states under the federal government‘s plenary and exclusive constitutional authority “to legislate in respect to Indian tribes“—of
Accordingly, to assess the Tribe‘s argument that the state court lacks jurisdiction over this dispute, we consider (1) whether Becker‘s claims arose on the reservation; and (2) if they did, whether Congress has authorized state-court jurisdiction over such claims.
A. Where Becker‘s Claims Arose
The Supreme Court has never set out a precise standard for determining whether a lawsuit or a claim arose in Indian country. Even so, its precedents make clear that the inquiry requires examination of where the material factual events underlying the plaintiff‘s claims occurred.8 In Williams, for example, a non-Indian sued a Navajo couple in state court to recover a debt stemming from goods sold at the non-Indian‘s store located on tribal land. 358 U.S. at 217-18. The Court held that the state court lacked jurisdiction over that claim, which it described as “aris[ing] on an Indian reservation.” Id. at 218; see also id. at 223 (noting that plaintiff “was on the [r]eservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there“). And in Fisher v. District Court of Montana, the Court stated that an adoption proceeding between
For some claims, determining that the material conduct occurred on tribal land is a straightforward task. A tort claim based on a slip-and-fall injury at a casino on a reservation, for instance, clearly “aris[es] on Indian land.” Dalley, 896 F.3d at 1200, 1204-05. So does a lawsuit “springing from [an] on-reservation automobile accident[].” Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991). We cannot so easily classify Becker‘s claims as arising on the reservation, however, because the district court‘s supplemental factual findings suggest that at least some of the underlying events took place off the reservation.
As a result, we assess the district court‘s factual findings to determine whether any “substantial part of the conduct supporting the [claims] took place off the reservation.”9 Fisher, 424 U.S. at 389; cf. also 1 Cohen‘s Handbook of Federal Indian
Law § 6.01(5) (2019) (“Where activities occur partially within and partially outside Indian country, and a substantial part of the activity takes place outside, courts have generally upheld nondiscriminatory applications of state jurisdiction.“). In a contract case like Becker‘s, this inquiry involves several factors, including where the parties executed, negotiated, and performed the contract; where the contract subject matter is located; and where the parties reside. See R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 1983). When weighing these factors, we “evaluat[e] each [one] according to its relative importance with respect to the dispute.” Id.
The district court‘s findings establish that the parties executed the Agreement on the reservation. The district court found that the Tribe‘s Business Committee Chair signed the Agreement at tribal headquarters on the reservation, citing undisputed statements to that effect from two witnesses. As for Becker, the district court concluded it was “unclear where [he] executed” the Agreement. Supp. App. vol. 3, 25. But the record reveals no such uncertainty. True, Becker himself testified that he did not recall where he signed the Agreement. But he also specifically testified that he and the Chair signed the Agreement at the same time. Supp. App. vol. 2, 483 (stating that during conversation with Chair, “we signed the Agreement” (emphasis added)). Thus, given the undisputed evidence that the Chair signed on the reservation, the only reasonable inference is that Becker also signed on the reservation, and the district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise. See McDonnell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 878 F.3d 1247, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2018) (factual finding supporting district court‘s preliminary-injunction analysis was clearly erroneous “[b]ecause there [wa]s no record support for [it]“). Because both parties signed on
The place-of-performance factor likewise supports the conclusion that Becker‘s claims arose on the reservation. The district court interpreted the record as inconclusive on where the Tribe performed, explaining that “[n]o evidence was submitted to suggest that [it] performed [its] obligations on, or off of, [t]ribal [l]and.” Supp. App. vol. 3, 24. That statement is puzzling given the district court‘s recognition that, “[b]ecause the Tribe is not a natural person,” its conduct “must be interpreted through its . . . ordinances, resolutions, and actions.” Id. at 6. Such conduct necessarily occurred on the reservation where, as the district court also recognized, the Tribe conducts its business from tribal headquarters. Thus, absent any contrary evidence, we fail to see how the Tribe could have performed (or failed to perform) its contractual duties from anywhere but the reservation. See Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 1184 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]nternally inconsistent findings constitute clear error.” (quoting John Allan Co. v. Craig Allen Co., 540 F.3d 1133, 1139 (10th Cir. 2008))).
As for Becker, the district court found that he devoted a substantial amount of time to working both on and off the reservation. We take no issue with the district court‘s factual findings on this point. The district court estimated that Becker worked off the reservation “[a]pproximately half” or “[a]t least half” of the time, either working remotely (rather than in his on-reservation office) or traveling out of state or to other Utah cities for business meetings. Id. at 23, 25. Becker‘s appellate brief points to a similar figure and emphasizes this off-reservation work.
Yet as the district court acknowledged, all that off-reservation work served the Tribe‘s minerals interests which were located entirely within reservation boundaries. For example, when Becker attended meetings in other states, he did so “to effectively market and monetize [the Tribe‘s] minerals,” which “were located on [t]ribal [l]and.” Id. at 22. The same is true for meetings Becker attended within Utah but off the reservation, which were “devoted to issues ‘relating . . . to . . . the Tribe‘s surface or mineral estate within the exterior boundaries of the reservation.‘” Id. at 23 (quoting Supp. App. vol. 2, 490). Thus, the nature of Becker‘s duties diminishes the significance of Becker‘s off-reservation work. Moreover, at least half of Becker‘s time was devoted to working on the reservation.
Finally, we find the location of the Agreement‘s subject matter especially significant. See R.J. Williams, 719 F.2d at 985 (“When a contract concerns a specific physical thing, such as land or a chattel, the location of the thing is regarded as highly significant.“). The Agreement concerned Becker‘s work marketing and developing tribal mineral assets located exclusively within the reservation; as the district court put it, “[a]t all times relevant to this matter, the Tribe did not acquire or own oil, gas, or mineral interests in lands off of” the reservation. Supp. App. vol. 3, 5. And as mentioned, while Becker may have performed some tasks off tribal land, his actions were always in furtherance of his role managing those resources. This factor overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Becker‘s claims arose on the reservation.
To summarize, both parties signed the Agreement on the reservation, and the Tribe necessarily performed its duties there. And crucially, even though Becker performed his duties off the reservation about half of the time, his work was always in service of his role managing tribal mineral
B. Whether Congress Authorized State-Court Jurisdiction
Because Becker‘s claims against the Tribe arose on the reservation, the Utah state court could exercise jurisdiction over the dispute only with “clear congressional authorization.” Dalley, 896 F.3d at 1204. The district court determined that
jurisdiction under § 1322 “requires certain prelitigation action.” Lawrence, 875 F.3d at 545-46. The Tribe argues that one such prelitigation action is tribal consent; that is, a tribe must agree in advance to a state‘s assumption of § 1322 jurisdiction. And because the Tribe has never consented to Utah courts exercising § 1322 jurisdiction, the Tribe contends, that statute does not supply the Utah state court with jurisdiction over Becker‘s case.
We agree. States may only assume jurisdiction under
jurisdiction . . . must be manifested by majority vote of the enrolled Indians within the affected area of Indian country.“). Here, Becker does not suggest that the Tribe ever held a special election accepting Utah‘s assumption of § 1322 jurisdiction; nor does any record evidence suggest that such an election took place. See Lawrence, 875 F.3d at 546 n.4; 1 Cohen‘s
The district court resisted this straightforward conclusion by accepting Becker‘s argument that a special election is not always necessary for a tribe to consent to the exercise of state jurisdiction under
First, we agree with the Tribe that the district court‘s interpretation is inconsistent with the explicit statutory text. Section 1326 makes clear that “[s]tate jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter . . . shall be applicable in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians within the affected area . . . accept such jurisdiction” by holding a special election.
The district court‘s interpretation also contradicts the Supreme Court‘s controlling decision in Kennerly, 400 U.S. 423. There, the Court held that a Montana state court lacked jurisdiction over a non-Indian‘s lawsuit against several tribe members to collect a debt incurred on that tribe‘s reservation. 400 U.S. at 424, 429-30. The tribal government had passed an ordinance granting state courts concurrent jurisdiction over civil cases involving tribe members named as defendants. Id. at 425. The Court considered whether this ordinance satisfied the tribal-consent requirement. Id. at 428-29. After quoting § 1322 and § 1326 in full, the Court determined that “the meaning of these provisions is clear: [T]he tribal consent that is prerequisite to the assumption of state jurisdiction . . . must be manifested by majority vote of the enrolled Indians within the affected area of Indian country.” Id. And because the tribal ordinance “d[id] not comport with the explicit requirements of the Act” for obtaining tribal consent, the Montana state court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 429.
The district court attempted to distinguish Kennerly by highlighting statements in the majority opinion about selective consent, statements the majority offered in response to the dissent.13 But a close reading of Kennerly reveals the flaw in this approach. Justice Stewart‘s dissent in Kennerly suggested that the majority‘s opinion would “reduce[] the [self-government] options available to [tribes] with respect to state[-]court jurisdiction.” Id. at 431. The dissent further speculated that “reservation Indians must now choose between exclusive tribal[-]court jurisdiction on the one hand and permanent, irrevocable state jurisdiction on the other.” Id.
Although the Kennerly dissent offered no explanation for this all-or-nothing interpretation, the Kennerly majority explained that the dissent had inferred “from the express allowance for selective state exercise of jurisdiction” in § 1322 that Congress somehow intended “to exclude selective tribal consent to state exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 430 n.6. The majority rejected this inference, clarifying that “th[e] case present[ed] no question concerning the power of the Indian tribes to place time, geographical, or other conditions on the ‘tribal consent’ to state exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 429 (emphasis added). Instead, the Court reiterated that it was “presented solely with a question of the procedures by which ‘tribal consent’ must be manifested under the [statute].” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the Kennerly majority left open the possibility that tribes could consent to state-court jurisdiction over some cases and not others.
Nevertheless, the district court here stretched the Kennerly majority‘s suggestion that § 1322 may allow selective tribal consent to mean that § 1326‘s special-election procedure is only a prerequisite to state-court jurisdiction when a tribe “globally” consents to such jurisdiction. App. vol. 15, 3730. But even if Kennerly‘s dictum
Next, as the Tribe asserts, the district court conflated tribal sovereign immunity with subject-matter jurisdiction. To support its conclusion that the Tribe‘s purported waiver of sovereign immunity rendered the special-election requirement inapplicable, the district court quoted Supreme Court caselaw noting that “[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.” App. vol. 15, 3732 (emphasis added) (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998)). Becker likewise emphasizes this statement on appeal, noting also that the Court cited it favorably three years later in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
But both Kiowa and C & L Enterprises concern issues of sovereign immunity. Their statements about when a tribe is “subject to suit” address the circumstances in which a tribe cannot assert sovereign immunity as a defense: when “Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.” Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754; see also id. at 760 (“Congress has not abrogated this immunity, nor has [the tribe] waived it, so the immunity governs this case.“); C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 418 (“To abrogate tribal immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that purpose. Similarly, to relinquish its immunity, a tribe‘s waiver must be ‘clear.‘” (citation omitted) (first quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978), and then quoting Okla. Tax Comm‘n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991))). And as we emphasized in Lawrence, tribal “sovereign immunity and a court‘s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are different animals.” 875 F.3d at 545. Waiving sovereign immunity simply renders a party “amenable to suit in a court properly possessing jurisdiction; it does not guarantee a forum.” United States v. Park Place Assocs., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 923 (9th Cir. 2009). Put differently, “the absence of immunity does not establish the presence of subject[-]matter jurisdiction.” Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007). So, contrary to the district court‘s view, even if the Agreement waives tribal sovereign immunity, that waiver does not resolve whether the Utah state court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Becker‘s case. Resolving that issue, we have explained, depends instead on whether the requirements of
In short, the Tribe‘s argument that the state court lacks jurisdiction rests
II. Remedy
Next, we must consider the appropriate disposition of this appeal. Our conclusion
As an initial matter, the requirements for obtaining a permanent injunction are “remarkably similar” to those for obtaining a preliminary injunction. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 476 F.3d 818, 822 (10th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the same four elements apply to both types of injunctive relief, and “[t]he only measurable difference between the two is that a permanent injunction requires showing actual success on the merits, whereas a preliminary injunction requires showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. (emphases added).
Moreover, circumstances sometimes arise in which “a decision on the merits underlying the . . . denial of a preliminary injunction” best serves the interests of judicial economy. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm‘n v. Int‘l Registration Plan, Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 757 (1986) (“That a court of appeals ordinarily will limit its review in a case of this kind to abuse of discretion is a rule of orderly judicial administration, not a limit on judicial power.“), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). That is, we have discretion, when appropriate, to decide not only that a party “has shown a likelihood of success on the merits,” but also that “it is altogether clear that [the party] will succeed on the merits.” Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005).
We acknowledge that the issue of the state court‘s jurisdiction involves assessing the district court‘s findings on where Becker‘s claims arose. But crucially, because we remanded for supplemental findings on that issue, we have “a full record before [us]” that is “‘unusually complete‘” for the preliminary-injunction stage. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757 (quoting Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), aff‘d, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). Indeed, the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing resembling a full-blown trial at which it “heard testimony from fifteen witnesses and received over 140 exhibits.” Supp. App. vol. 3, 2. And neither party suggests that any additional evidence remains to be presented, were we to remand for additional proceedings. Cf. Friarton Ests. Corp. v. City of New York, 681 F.2d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 1982) (directing dismissal of complaint in addition to reversing grant of preliminary injunction because “[t]he facts critical to a decision . . . are found in the record” and “there is no indication that anything more could be produced at a trial“). Nor do they suggest that any of the remaining injunction requirements involve factual issues requiring a remand.18 Doing so would only prolong the litigation, while “immediate resolution may avoid wasteful future litigation.” Okla. ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm‘n, 455 F.3d at 1113.
With that in mind, we have no trouble concluding that the Tribe satisfies all four requirements for a permanent injunction.19 On the first element, we have already explained why the Tribe succeeds on its claim that the Utah state court lacks jurisdiction.20 And because the Tribe, with its “sovereign status,” “should not be compelled
The Tribe likewise satisfies the third requirement, that the injury to the Tribe “outweighs the harm that the injunction may cause” to Becker. Wagnon, 476 F.3d at 822 (quoting Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2003)). Though granting the injunction will leave Becker unable to sue the Tribe in state court—“something [he] ha[d] no legal entitlement to do in the first place,” given our conclusion that Congress has not authorized jurisdiction—this harm does not outweigh the damage to tribal sovereignty that would result from denying the injunction. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv. v. Utah, 790 F.3d 1000, 1005 (10th Cir. 2015); see also id. (weighing this factor in favor of granting temporary injunction because doing so would only prevent state defendants from prosecuting tribal members).21
Fourth, enjoining the state-court action will not adversely affect the public interest. See Wagnon, 476 F.3d at 822. In the district court, Becker argued otherwise based on Utah‘s alleged interest in adjudicating novel contract disputes between tribes and private parties that are governed by Utah law. But again, Utah had no such interest to begin with: This contract dispute arose on the reservation, and the federal-law prerequisites for state-court jurisdiction are not met. In sum, because the Tribe has shown all the required elements, it is entitled to a permanent injunction against Becker‘s state-court lawsuit.22
Conclusion
The district court erred in denying the Tribe‘s motion to enjoin Becker‘s lawsuit in Utah state court. Becker‘s claims arose on the reservation because no substantial part of the conduct supporting them occurred elsewhere, so the state court could assert jurisdiction only with congressional authorization. Section 1322 does not supply such authorization because the Tribe never consented to jurisdiction under that provision by holding a special election as provided
As a final matter, we deny the Tribe‘s motion to reassign this case to a different judge on remand. Having carefully examined the record, we conclude that the Tribe has fallen short of establishing the “personal bias” or “extreme circumstances” required under our precedents to grant the “extraordinary” relief of reassignment. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1448 (10th Cir. 1996).
No. 18-4013, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, et al. v. Lawrence
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I dissent. In my view, the majority errs in three respects: by proceeding to address in the first instance the question of whether the Utah state courts have jurisdiction over Becker‘s pending action against the Tribe; in the manner in which it decides that issue; and by issuing permanent injunctive relief.
Given the history of this litigation, it is my view that we should abstain pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine from deciding whether the Utah state courts have jurisdiction over Becker‘s pending action against the Tribe. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-821 (1976). It is indisputable that the Utah state courts are capable of determining for themselves whether or not they have jurisdiction over Becker‘s action against the Tribe. And, in the event that the Utah state courts finally rule against the Tribe on this issue, the Tribe can seek review from the United States Supreme Court. I therefore would remand to the district court with directions to dismiss this case without prejudice.
As for the merits, the majority errs by ignoring the provisions of the parties’ written agreement that address how and where disputes should be resolved, and in turn suggesting that
I
A
It is of course true that in a prior related appeal we held “that whether the state court has jurisdiction to hear . . . Becker‘s claim” against the Tribe “is a matter of federal law.” Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence, 875 F.3d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lawrence I). But we have never held that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction over that issue. To the contrary, it is well established that, at least “[u]nder normal circumstances, . . . state courts . . . can and do decide questions of federal law.” El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 485 n.7 (1999). It is also well established that such questions include issues of state court jurisdiction over civil disputes involving Indian tribes. E.g., Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018) (reviewing decision of the Supreme Court of Washington addressing tribal sovereign immunity in a civil in rem dispute).
The Tribe has effectively conceded these points. After Becker filed his action in Utah state district court, the Tribe did not
In light of this history, I conclude that abstention under the Colorado River doctrine is the proper course of action here. More specifically, I conclude, as this court did under similar circumstances in D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2013), that “the Colorado River doctrine wisely counsels our abstention from duplicative interference with the exceptionally protracted state proceedings present here.” 705 F.3d at 1226.
B
The question of whether the district court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the Tribe‘s case has been lurking in this matter since shortly after the Tribe filed its federal complaint. To begin with, Judge Lawrence moved to dismiss the Tribe‘s federal complaint on the basis of a number of abstention doctrines, including the Colorado River doctrine. The Tribe responded to Lawrence‘s motion, but the district court never ruled on the motion. Subsequently, on January 17, 2018, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Tribe‘s case pursuant to
To be sure, on February 16, 2018, a two-judge panel of this court, acting upon a motion filed by the Tribe in connection with this appeal, “abate[d] the Tribe‘s appeal,” “direct[ed] a limited remand,” and instructed the district court on remand “to exercise its original jurisdiction in accord with the mandate in [Lawrence I], and decide the Tribe‘s request for injunctive relief against the [Utah] state court proceedings.” Feb. 16, 2018 Order at 2. But nothing in that order addressed, let alone obviated, the district court‘s alternative rationales for declining to exercise jurisdiction. And for good reason: the two-judge panel lacked authority to address those alternative rationales on the merits. As outlined in
Thus, the district court‘s January 17, 2018 decision offering the alternative rationales for abstaining from exercising jurisdiction remains subject to review by this court. More specifically, as a result of the two-judge order of this court issued on February 16, 2018, we now have before us in this appeal two related, but alternative rulings from the district court: (1) the district court‘s original January 17, 2018 decision concluding, in pertinent part, that the Tribe‘s case should be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine; and (2) the district court‘s supplemental decision and order of April 30, 2018, concluding that, even if it exercised jurisdiction over the Tribe‘s action, the Tribe was unlikely to prevail on the merits thereof and thus was not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
Moreover, even aside from the district court‘s January 17, 2018 decision, it is beyond dispute that we possess the authority to raise the issue of abstention sua sponte. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (indicating “that abstention may be raised by the court [s]ua sponte.“); D.A. Osguthorpe, 705 F.3d at 1231 (“[A] court may raise the issue of abstention sua sponte.“). Thus, I proceed to address the issue of abstention, starting first with the Younger doctrine that the district court relied on, and concluding with the Colorado River doctrine.
C
“Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813. Therefore, “federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction,” and “[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter.” Sprint Commc‘ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013).
The district court in this case concluded that Younger abstention was appropriate. Reviewing that conclusion de novo, I disagree. See D.A. Osguthorpe, 705 F.3d at 1231 (outlining standard of review). ”Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.” Sprint Commc‘ns, 571 U.S. at 72. The Supreme Court “has extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, or that implicate a State‘s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Id. at 72-73 (citations omitted). On the record before us, I am not persuaded that Becker‘s state court proceeding—which involves a civil dispute between private parties over a written contract—falls into any of these narrow categories.
I do, however, agree with Judge Lawrence that abstention is warranted under the Colorado River doctrine. In Colorado River, the Supreme Court recognized that, in exceptional circumstances, “‘reasons of wise judicial administration’ must weigh in favor of ‘permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding.‘” D.A. Osguthorpe, 705 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818).
The focus of the Colorado River doctrine is on “efficiency and economy” and “the avoidance of duplicative litigation.” Id. The Supreme Court in Colorado River “declined to prescribe a hard and fast rule” for application of the doctrine, “but instead described [four] factors relevant to the
The first two of these factors carry little, if any, weight in the case at hand. To begin with, “this is not an action in rem or quasi in rem” and thus “[n]either the state nor district court has acquired jurisdiction over property in the course of this litigation.” D.A. Osguthorpe, 705 F.3d at 1234. The second factor—the inconvenience of the federal forum—is essentially irrelevant because “[t]he state and federal courthouses involved in this case are at no great geographical distance from each other, and no party has suggested any physical or logistical inconvenience suffered as a result of litigating in dual forums.” Id.
All of the remaining factors, however, weigh heavily in favor of dismissing the Tribe‘s federal action. Becker filed his state court action against the Tribe on December 11, 2014. Since that time, the parties have litigated extensively in the state district court, as well as in the Utah appellate courts, and the case is ready for trial. In contrast, the Tribe did not file its federal court action until June 13, 2016, approximately eighteen months after Becker filed his state court action. Moreover, the record makes abundantly clear that the Tribe‘s filing of its federal lawsuit was reactive in nature, coming only after the Tribe had unsuccessfully attempted in both the state district court and the Utah appellate courts to have Becker‘s suit dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Relatedly, the Tribe‘s federal lawsuit was never intended to fully litigate the parties’ dispute regarding the Agreement, but rather only to stop the state court proceedings. In other words, the claims raised in the Tribe‘s federal lawsuit would effectively require the district court, and in turn this court, to serve as an appellate tribunal over the state court‘s decision regarding subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, allowing the Tribe‘s federal lawsuit to proceed could only result in piecemeal litigation, i.e., the federal courts weighing in on the matter of the state court‘s jurisdiction over the Tribe, and not a full resolution of the parties’ dispute. And, even assuming that the Tribe‘s defenses to Becker‘s state court action implicate federal law, it appears that the majority of the parties’ dispute—to the extent that dispute is properly before the Utah state courts—will be governed by Utah state law. Indeed, the parties’ written Agreement expressly provides that Utah state law will govern any disputes arising out of the agreement. Lastly, any defenses the Tribe may have to Becker‘s state court action—including defenses that implicate federal law—can, without question, be fully and fairly litigated in the Utah state court system and, if appropriate, the United States Supreme Court. See Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 874 (2006) (noting that state courts are “independently authorized to
Having considered all of the relevant factors, I conclude that the Tribe‘s federal action is indeed the exceptional case warranting Colorado River abstention. I therefore vote to remand to the district court with directions to dismiss this action without prejudice.
II
A
The majority ignores the procedural history of this case and Judge Lawrence‘s abstention arguments, and proceeds to decide the jurisdiction issue in the first instance. In doing so, however, the majority makes what I believe to be three key errors.
First, the majority makes no mention of the fact that the parties’ Agreement, which was drafted by the Tribe‘s attorneys, expressly provided that all disputes arising out of the Agreement would be governed by Utah state law, waived any requirement that disputes be brought in Tribal court, and purported to waive the Tribe‘s sovereign immunity. Although the Agreement did not expressly mention the Utah state courts, I submit that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from reading the contractual language is that the parties intended for any disputes to be heard in the Utah state courts in the event that the United States District Court for the District of Utah lacked jurisdiction over such disputes.1
Second, the majority concludes that the Utah state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Becker‘s claims against the Tribe because “25 U.S.C. § 1322 does not provide such authorization.” Maj. Op at 3. I agree that
Finally, the majority takes the remarkable step of granting the Tribe permanent, rather than preliminary, injunctive relief. Of course, the standards for preliminary and permanent injunctions are nearly identical. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). But there is one important difference between the two standards: a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must show a likelihood of success on the merits” of its claim, while a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must establish “actual success” on the merits of its claim. Id. According to the majority, this appeal is “a good candidate for a merits decision” because, in part, “[t]he Tribe‘s argument involves a pure
B
The majority responds to my criticisms by noting that I have “not explain[ed] why or how the state court has jurisdiction in the first place.” Maj. Op. at 23 n.15. That is because, as I have already outlined, I am of the view that we should abstain from addressing that question and allow the Utah state courts to resolve this question in the first instance.
That said, I will proceed to highlight several related points that I believe are relevant to the ultimate resolution of this jurisdiction question. It is well established that “[a] state court‘s jurisdiction is general” and thus quite broad. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001). Broad enough, in fact, to encompass actions brought by Tribes and tribal members against non-Indians for disputes arising on Indian land. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (“suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts have been sanctioned“). That said, we know that Congress has, by way of Public Law 280 (including