UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ANGEL MANUEL CENTENO-MORALES, Defendant – Appellant.
No. 22-6607
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
January 5, 2024
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
PUBLISHED. Argued: October 24, 2023.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Richardson joined.
ARGUED: Andrea Lantz Harris, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jonathan Patrick Jones, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Juval O. Scott, Federаl Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Federal prisoner Angel Centeno-Morales moved for compassionate release under
I.
A.
Angel Centeno-Morales has a long criminal history of offenses involving drugs and violence. Before committing the offenses for which he is now incarcеrated, he was previously convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, battery, illegal possession of weapons, and several drug offenses. In 2010, Centeno-Morales was convicted in Virginia state court for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. He was released from custody on probation in 2013 and almost immediately became involved in the drug trafficking conspiracy that led to his current incarceration.
From spring to fall of 2014, Centeno-Morales and his co-conspirators trafficked methamphetamine in and around Staunton, Virginia. Centeno-Morales often sold methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm. He frequently used a firearm to threaten those to whom he sold methamphetamine, pаrticularly to prevent them from cooperating with law enforcement.
Centeno-Morales’ enterprise ended in September 2014, when based on a tip from a confidential informant, law enforcement instigated a traffic stop of his vehicle. A search of the vehicle yielded $3,000 in cash and a loaded handgun. Centeno-Morales was arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon and later charged with drug offenses based on information received from informants.
Centeno-Morales entered into a plea agreement with the United States under which he pleaded guilty to distribution of more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of
B.
In May 2021, after serving about six years of his sentence, Centeno-Morales filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under
C.
Before the district court could rule on this first motion for compassionate release, Centeno-Morales’ wife died of COVID-19. Centeno-Morales, this time through his court-appointed counsel, filed a supplemental motion arguing that these circumstances also warranted release under
In his supplemental motion, Centeno-Morales argued that the death of his wife left his minor son without a primary caregiver and created an additional extraordinary and compelling reason justifying an early release. In support of this contention, Centeno-Morales highlighted the importance of a parent‘s presence in the life of an adоlescent and described the personal difficulties he experienced as a child without a father figure. Centeno-Morales then argued that the
The Government opposed the motion. It conceded that the death of Cеnteno-Morales’ wife constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason, but it argued that the
As detailed below, the district court denied the motion.* Although the court agreed with the parties that Centeno-Morales could show “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to support his motion given the death of his wife, it disagreed with his argument that the
After the district court denied relief, Centeno-Morales noted a timely appeal. We have jurisdiction under
II.
A.
At the outset, we note that ordinarily a sentencing court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.”
To grant a compassionate release motion under
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote rеspect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with . . . medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
District courts “enjoy broad discretion” in evaluating the
It is “significant“—and weighs against finding an abuse of discretion—“when the same judge who sentenced the defendant rules on the cоmpassionate release motion.” Bethea, 54 F.4th at 834 (citation omitted). Indeed, “[w]hen the same sentencing judge assesses the
A movant for compassionate release bears the burden of showing why the
B.
The
After finding that Centeno-Morales fulfilled the first prong of the inquiry, the district court denied the motion based on an analysis of the
We review the district court‘s denial of Centeno-Morales’ motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. High, 997 F.3d at 185. “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to follow statutory requirements, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” Bethea, 54 F.4th at 831 (cleaned up). Under this standard, this Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the district court. United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).
C.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in analyzing the
First, nothing in the record suggests that the district court overlooked Centeno-Morales’ arguments about his changed circumstances. In fact, the district court explicitly acknowledged Centeno-Morales’ loss at least twice, but it still concluded that the
Second, the district court owed Centeno-Morales no detailed explanation of its reasoning on his arguments about post-sentencing rehabilitation. We have previously held that where a movant presents substantial evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, a district court must provide “a more robust and detailed” explanation in ruling on a motion for compassionate release. High, 997 F.3d at 190 (quoting United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 396 (4th Cir. 2019)). But that requirement is the exception, not the rule. The movant in Martin presented “a mountain of new mitigating evidence that the sentencing court never evaluated.” Martin, 916 F.3d at 396. What‘s more, the movant in Martin was incarcerated for nearly two decades, became a respected tutor for other inmates, and exhibited such exemplary behavior that correctional staff moved her into a low-security facility. Id. But our guidance in Martin was based on the specific record presented to the district court in that case. We have repeatedly оbserved that district courts must only “set forth enough to satisfy our court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority, so as to allow for meaningful appellate review.” High, 997 F.3d at 190 (cleaned up). Thus, the district court does not owe every movant for compassionate release a “robust and detailed” exрlanation on every argument about post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts. Id.; Martin, 916 F.3d at 396.
Moreover, Centeno-Morales presented no “mountain” of mitigating evidence here. He completed just a few vocational courses and received two disciplinary infractions while incarcerated. Importantly, he remains classified as a “medium” security inmate. This is not the kind of excеptional post-sentencing evidence for which Martin would require a “robust and detailed” explanation on a motion for compassionate release. Martin, 916 F.3d at 396. Rather, as we have repeatedly affirmed, the district court was only required to “consider[] the parties’ arguments” and exercise “a reasoned basis” for its decision. High, 997 F.3d at 190. The record reflects that the district court аmply fulfilled that obligation here.
Third, and of final relevance to our review, we note that the same judge presided over both Centeno-Morales’ sentencing and his motion for compassionate release, a factor that we have previously deemed relevant when reviewing the sufficiency of a court‘s explanation for its denial of a motion for compаssionate release. In short, because Judge Dillon presided over both proceedings, she is presumed to have known of Centeno-Morales’ circumstances—both favorable and unfavorable—and to have considered the totality of the record when ruling on Centeno-Morales’ motion for compassionate release. Bethea, 54 F.4th at 834.
The record shows that the district cоurt did not ignore or inadequately explain its reasoning on Centeno-Morales’ arguments about the death of his wife or his rehabilitative efforts. The district court acknowledged both Centeno-Morales’ loss and his prison disciplinary record in its decision. Absent some conspicuous absence in the district court‘s decision, we presume that the district court considered all the relevаnt evidence. The presumption is stronger still when the same judge sentenced
III.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Centeno-Morales’ motion for compassionаte release. The record does not support Centeno-Morales’ contention that the district court ignored his arguments about post-sentencing conduct and changed circumstances. Rather, the record reflects that the district court explicitly considered each of those arguments. Further, our precedent does not require that a district court engage in depth with each new argument raised by a defendant when hearing a motion for compassionate release. All our precedent requires, absent substantial mitigating evidence, is that the district court consider new arguments when evaluating the
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court denying Centeno-Morales’ motion for compassionate release.
AFFIRMED