UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. R. GRACE; ALAN R. STRINGER; HENRY A. ESCHENBACH; JACK W. WOLTER; WILLIAM J. MCCAIG; ROBERT J. BETTACCHI; O. MARIO FAVORITO; ROBERT C. WALSH, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 06-30192
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
May 15, 2008
D.C. No. CR-05-00007-DWM
FOR PUBLICATION
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Donald W. Molloy, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted En Banc December 12, 2007—Pasadena, California
Filed May 15, 2008
Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Michael Daly Hawkins, Susan P. Graber, M. Margaret McKeown, Kim McLane Wardlaw, Raymond C. Fisher, Carlos T. Bea and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Fisher; Concurrence by Judge Hawkins
COUNSEL
Christopher Landau, P.C. (argued), Laurence A. Urgenson, Tyler D. Mace and Michael D. Shumsky, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; Stephen R.
Ronald F. Waterman, Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, Helena, Montana; David S. Krakoff and Gary A. Winters, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, for defendant-appellee Henry A. Eschenbach.
Mike Milodragovich and W. Adam Duerk, Milodragovich, Dale, Steinbrenner & Binney, Missoula, Montana; Jeremy Maltby, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellee Jack W. Wolter.
Palmer Hoovestal, Hoovestal Law Firm, PLLC, Helena, Montana; Elizabeth Van Doren Gray, Sowell, Gray, Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina; William A. Coates, Roe Cassidy Coates & Price, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for defendant-appellee William J. McCaig.
Brian Gallik, Goetz, Gallik & Baldwin, P.C., Bozeman, Montana; Thomas C. Frongillo, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Vernon S. Broderick, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, New York, for defendant-appellee Robert J. Bettacchi.
C.J. Johnson, Kalkstein Law Firm, Missoula, Montana; Stephen A. Jonas and Robert Keefe, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for defendant-appellee O. Mario Favorito.
Catherine A. Laughner and Aimee M. Grmoljez, Browning Kaleczyc Berry & Hoven, P.C., Helena, Montana; Stephen R. Spivack, Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; David E. Roth, Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, for defendant-appellee Robert C. Walsh.
OPINION
FISHER, Circuit Judge:
We granted en banc review of this appeal by the government, brought pursuant to
First, we hold that the United States Attorney’s bare certification regarding delay and materiality in accordance with the terms of
OVERVIEW
W.R. Grace & Co. mined and processed vermiculite ore outside Libby, Montana, from the early 1960s until the early 1990s. On February 7, 2005, the United States indicted Grace and several of its officers on numerous charges alleging that they engaged in criminal acts during the course of Grace’s mining operations, related to the improper disposal of asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. The district court, recognizing the magnitude of the case — with a relevant time period spanning nearly 30 years and potentially more than a thousand victims — held a pretrial case management confer-ence in March 2005 and thereafter entered a case management order memorializing the results of the conference.
The March 2005 order established a “firm” trial date of September 11, 2006, and set forth a discovery schedule. In pertinent part, the schedule required the government to produce “all discoverable materials specified in
On September 30, 2005, the government notified the district court that it had produced for the defendants its “final witness list and final exhibit list,” but stated that the government “reserve[d] its right to update its witness list and exhibit list through the close of all evidence at trial.” The government’s disclosure included more than 230 witnesses.
The defendants disputed the sufficiency of the government’s disclosures. On November 23, 2005, the district court issued three orders pursuant to
On December 2, 2005, the parties met with the district court for a status conference. At this conference, the discussion included the sufficiency of the prosecution’s expert dis-closures, its compliance with the previous discovery orders, and the defendants’ concern about the growing size of the government’s witness list. Shortly thereafter, the district court entered an order on December 5, 2005 (“the December 2005 order“), limiting the government’s presentation of witnesses at trial “to those witnesses that have been disclosed as of the filing of this Order” and limiting the reports the government experts may rely upon to those “contained in the discovery produced to date or . . . currently subject to an order of this Court requiring production.”
Section 3731 provides in part:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
(Emphasis added.) Here, the United States Attorney for the District of Montana certified in the words of the statute that the government’s interlocutory appeal “is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence excluded by the districtcourt’s order described in [the] notice of appeal is substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding ongoing before the district court.” The government contends that its unembellished certification suffices to establish appellate jurisdiction. On the merits of its appeal, the government challenges the district court’s authority to require or enforce a finalized pretrial list of witnesses and trial exhibits, and argues that, even if authorized, the enforcement orders were an abuse of the court’s discretion. The defendants counter that the government’s
Adhering to existing Ninth Circuit law, a three-judge panel of this court declined to accept the government’s bare certification that simply recited the language of
We agreed to rehear this case en banc to reexamine the precedents that governed the decision of the three-judge panel.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“Jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review.” United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1993). We review de novo a district court’s rulings on the scope of its authority to order discovery under
II. Section 3731
Section 3731 grants the government the right to an interlocutory appeal from a district court’s evidentiary rulings in certain circumstances. We have previously explained that the government’s “right (via
[1] The purposes of our certification-plus rule were salutary — to assure that the government’s decision to involve us in the trial process was a carefully considered judgment and to provide us with enough information to determine whether a time-consuming appeal was truly justified. Nonetheless, we are now persuaded that the plain language of the statute shows that Congress intended that, as long as the other requirements of
[2]
By so holding, we align ourselves with our sister circuits that have held that
The concurring opinion raises two principal concerns based on its fears of what might go wrong under the prevailing certification-only rule we are adopting. First, it worries about delays in the trial proceedings, to the disadvantage of defendants. We acknowledge those concerns but do not believe that they allow us to impose a two-step screening process that Congress has not required. Section 3731 not only requires the United States Attorney to certify that the interlocutory appeal is not for purpose of delay, but also mandates that the appeal “shall be taken within thirty days after the decision, judgment or order has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted.” We have the authority to assure that these affirmative requirements are met.4 Moreover, we also
Second, the concurrence urges that, by accepting the United States Attorney’s certification as sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction, we are “blindly trust[ing] United States Attorneys,” adopting a rule that “permits a prosecutor to disrupt proceedings with the stroke of a pen” and giving the prosecution “unchecked authority to pursue interlocutory appeals from all suppression orders.” Concurring op. at 5675, 5682, 5679. Not so. The certification itself is a representation by the United States Attorney, as an officer of the court, that the appeal is not for purposes of delay and that the suppressed evidence is indeed material.6 As to materiality,
In that regard, we emphasize that we are not diluting a standard implicit in the certification requirement. By specifying that the United States Attorney must certify the appeal, Congress plainly intended that the decision to take an interlocutory appeal be a serious, considered judgment,
The authorization to file these interlocutory appeals is important to the prosecution of criminal cases because it permits the government to obtain appellate review, before jeopardy attaches, of trial court decisions suppressing what the government believes is evidence necessary to prove a crime. But because such an appeal necessarily disrupts trial court proceedings, the authorization contains an important limitation that is intended to protect defendants from undue delay . . .
The certification requirement of
§ 3731 operates to ensure that before the United States interrupts a criminal proceeding (and thereby delays a defendant from obtaining resolution of the charges against him) by taking an interlocutory appeal, it has evaluated whether the appeal is warranted.Thus, the filing of a
§ 3731 certification is not merely an administrative formality; it serves the important purpose of assuring the defendant’s protection from undue delay.
McNeill, 484 F.3d at 308 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Significantly, the United States Attorney’s decision to appeal requires the concurrence of the Solicitor General of the United States. See Centracchio, 236 F.3d at 813 (concluding that the Solicitor General’s approval means there is “no significant danger that the appeal will be frivolous, warranting dismissal rather than disposition on the merits“); Romaszko, 253 F.3d at 760 (“[T]he Solicitor General authorized the appeal. This authorization likely ensures that the purposes of section 3731 were met.“); see also McNeill, 484 F.3d at 307 (referring to the United States Attorney obtaining approval from the Solicitor General “in accordance with internal Department of Justice policy“); United States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 296-97 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the appeal followed the government obtaining approval of the Acting Solicitor General). Thus we expect the concerns about frivolous or disruptive attempts to involve us prematurely in ongoing trial proceedings that animated our previous certification-plus rule (and trouble our concurring colleague) will be addressed by the government’s wise and careful invocation of
[3] In sum, we conclude that the United States Attorney’s certification in this case suffices to establish our jurisdiction to hear the government’s interlocutory appeal. We therefore turn to the government’s challenges to the district court’s pretrial orders.
III. The Pretrial Case Management and Enforcement Orders
The government advances several arguments why the challenged pretrial orders are flawed: First, the district court lacked the authority to require in its March 2005 order that the government provide a pretrial witness list; second, even if the court had such authority, it could not require a final list, especially a year before trial; finally, the exclusionary effect of the enforcement orders was an inappropriate sanction. In response, the defendants argue that the district court hadauthority to order witness lists and acted within its discretion in enforcing its orders. We agree with the defendants.
A. Authority
We begin with the principle that the district court is charged with effectuating the speedy and orderly administration of justice. There is universal acceptance in the federal courts that, in carrying out
The principal orders at issue are the district court’s March 2005 order that, among other things, required the government to disclose by September 30, 2005 a “finalized list of witnesses“; and the court’s enforcement orders that limited the government’s use of witnesses in its case-in-chief (but not rebuttal) to those who had been timely disclosed. The government did not object to the March 2005 order at the time, but when it filed its proposed witness list in September it purported to reserve “its right to update its witness list and exhibit list through the close of all evidence at trial.” The government now argues that the district court had no authority to require the government to produce such a witness list, particularly not a finalized list one year before trial, and to preclude the government from calling additional witnesses not disclosed by the time of the court’s mandated deadline.
We disagree. The district court’s March 2005 pretrial order and the enforcement orders fit comfortably within the court’s authority under
[4] There is a “well established” principle that “[d]istrict courts have inherent power to control their dockets.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “judges exercise substantial discretion over what happens inside the courtroom.” United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991). We have accepted that ” ‘[a]ll federal courts are vested with inherent powers enabling them to manage their cases and courtrooms effectively and to ensure obedience to their orders.’ ” Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 376 F.3d 960, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Other circuits that have addressed a district court’s authority to require the government to disclose its witness list in advance of trial have agreed that the court may do so. See United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The general discretion of district courts to compel the government to identify its witnesses is acknowledged widely . . . .“). Some have invoked the court’s “inherent power, exercisable under appropriate circumstances, to assure the proper and orderly administration of criminal justice.” United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 1975); see United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[A] district court has the authority to require the government toprovide the defendant with
We first examine the rule-based approach.
[5] Congress has thus addressed the kinds of information the government and defendants are obligated to provide to each other before trial by way of discovery and the district court’s authority to enforce those obligations.
Although
Jackson, 508 F.2d at 1006 (“[T]he Government fails to distinguish between the right of the defendant to demand a list of witnesses, and the authority of the court to order such disclosure under the appropriate circumstances.“).
[6] As noted earlier, some courts have found an affirmative grant of authority to order the pretrial disclosure of all of the government’s proposed witnesses in Rule 16’s enforcement provisions (sometimes also invoking Rule 2). In doing so, these decisions have elided the language of Rule 16(d)(1) and (2) that appears to focus on enforcing the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 16 itself.10 We do not, however,
Insofar as we held in Hicks that a district court has no authority to order the government to produce a pretrial witness list beyond that specified in
Inferring from the legislative history such a sweeping denial of authority was not an inevitable conclusion. There was no suggestion that Congress intended to bar district courts from exercising their discretionary authority to order pretrial discovery and disclosures from the government under ing these amendments, we do not read Congress as precluding district courts’ authority to regulate the discovery of nonexpert witnesses just because Congress specifically adopted certain rules pertaining to expert witness disclosures. The reasons for not limiting such authority are well expressed in Richter, 488 F.2d at 173-74.
terms and conditions that courts normally use to manage the fair and efficient conduct of trials. Rather, Congress was concerned that a mandatory disclosure rule would discourage government witnesses from testifying and lead to witness intimidation. See Napue, 834 F.2d at 1317 (“The conference committee expressed concern that such a requirement would discourage witnesses from testifying and would lead to ‘improper contact directed at influencing their testimony.’ “) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-414, at 12 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 713, 716). Congress said nothing about the district court‘s discretion to order such a pretrial disclosure, subject to the court‘s ability to tailor disclosures to specific concerns in a particular case, including the use of protective orders. See, e.g., United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007). We therefore conclude that Hicks adopted an overly broad reading of
[7] In sum, we hold that a district court, consistent with
B. The District Court‘s Exercise of its Authority
The government contends that, even if the orders were authorized, both the March 2005 order and the enforcement orders were an abuse of the court‘s discretion. We do not agree. Although a district court‘s discretion to order pretrial discovery is not unfettered, the district court did not abuse its discretion here.
[8] We first address the court‘s orders insofar as they concerned expert disclosures and scientific reports, the disclosure of which is governed by
Next, as to both expert and nonexpert witnesses, the government argues that requiring it to disclose its final list of witnesses a year before trial was unreasonable and that the district court‘s exclusion of witnesses and reports not disclosed by December 5, 2005 was an inappropriate sanction. We reject the government‘s objections for several reasons.
[9] First, the district court‘s March 2005 order set a relatively early deadline for the government to provide a final witness list in advance of the then-scheduled September 2006 trial. The record reflects that the court had good reason to impose such a deadline, however; the court believed that the deadline would bring the necessary focus and organization to ready the case for trial. The charged conspiracy
Second, the government mischaracterizes the enforcement orders as an exclusionary “sanction.” The enforcement orders were not imposed as a sanction; they simply enforce the earlier pretrial order requiring the timely identification of trial witnesses and documentary evidence. In March 2005, when the government told the court it was prepared to try the case that September, the government estimated it would be calling 60 to 80 witnesses; by the time it filed its witness list on September 30, the number of witnesses had grown to 233 and counting. At the December 2005 status hearing, the district court rejected the government‘s arguments for expanding the list further, finding that the government “cannot now credibly claim that it is necessary to continue adding witnesses to an already unwieldy list.” Accordingly, it ruled that “the government‘s presentation at trial will be limited to those witnesses that have been disclosed as of the filing of this Order [i.e., December 5, 2005],” later clarifying in the February 2006 order that this limitation applied only to the government‘s case-in-chief, not to rebuttal witnesses. Given the many discussions the court had with counsel about the fluid nature of the government‘s evolving case and the court‘s expressed concerns that the government seemed unable to get its trial preparation under control, it could hardly have been a surprise that the court froze the witness list when and as it did.
Third, even if we were to view the enforcement orders as a sanction, they still would not be an abuse of the court‘s discretion. At the outset, we emphasize that we are addressing only the preclusive effect of the enforcement orders as they currently stand because, apart from this interlocutory appeal, the government has thus far sought no relief from the district court‘s orders with respect to any particular excluded witness. We do not know whether the district court would be persuaded to allow the government to add or substitute one or more new witnesses for good cause. See, e.g.,
Finally, the government argues that even if a court can legitimately compel the government to disclose its witness list, it cannot force the government to finalize that list on penalty of exclusion of later discovered witnesses, particularly a year before trial. Relying on United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985), it contends the district court‘s orders violated the separation of powers principle by improperly commandeering the government‘s investigatory and prosecutorial functions. Of course, the orders did no such thing — as we have discussed, they dealt with managing the proceedings inside the courtroom, not with the government‘s performance of its prosecutorial duties outside the courtroom. The government‘s discretion to investigate and present its case does not override the district court‘s authority to manage the trial proceedings — including by setting discovery and disclosure deadlines — and Gatto does not hold otherwise.13
The government‘s reliance on Gatto is misplaced. That case involved a district court order requiring the government to provide discovery in accordance with
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold that the United States Attorney‘s
AFFIRMED.
HAWKINS, Circuit Judge, with whom PREGERSON and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, join, concurring as to Part III, and concurring in the judgment:
We face two closely related issues, both dealing with the ability of district judges to manage complex criminal trials. One is whether a district judge may order the government to provide a final witness list prior to the beginning of trial. This one the Opinion gets absolutely right, holding that the interests of trial continuity outweigh any interest in withholding those names and disclosing them only when the prosecution deems it appropriate. The other is whether the prosecution can delay a trial and require an interlocutory appeal on an evidentiary ruling on nothing more than its say so. By my lights, the Opinion not only gets this one wrong, but also creates along the way what our colleague Judge Goodwin describes as a “hazard to navigation” to the efficient and evenhanded administration of justice in our trial courts.
I. Statutory Text
According to the majority, the plain language of
The second paragraph of
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
Reading this, the majority believes that it is evident from the statute‘s phrasing that the courts of appeals are forbidden from applying even the most modest scrutiny to the United States Attorney‘s certification. On my reading, the statute is ambiguous and nothing in the text compels the majority‘s interpretation.
We begin with a straightforward proposition: Congress not only knows how to tell courts of appeals to defer completely to the United States Attorney, it has done just that in the confines of a remarkably similar certification statute. Under the Westfall Act,
The Supreme Court has considered both the removal and substitution subsections of the Westfall Act. Interpreting the removal provision, the Court explained that “Congress gave district courts no authority to return cases to state courts on the ground that the Attorney General‘s certification was unwarranted. . . . For purposes of establishing a forum to adjudicate the case . . .
By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that the scope-of-employment certification under
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.
In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Supreme Court framed “[t]he sole question . . . [as] who decides on which side of the [scope-of-employment] line the case falls: the local United States Attorney, unreviewably or, when that official‘s decision is contested, the court.”1 515 U.S. at 423-24. Unlike the majority in the present case, the Court did not hold that the phrase “[u]pon certification by the Attorney General,” or the word “shall,”2 made evident Congress‘s intent to preclude
courts from looking beyond the Attorney General‘s naked certification. Instead, the Court believed that “Congress did not address this precise issue unambiguously, if at all . . . . [T]he Westfall Act is, on the ‘who decides’ question we confront, open to divergent interpretation.”3 Id. at 424.
Where the Supreme Court perceived “statutory fog,” id. at 425, the majority finds congressional intent that “has been expressed in reasonably plain terms.” We are told that “[n]othing in the statute requires the government to go further and prove that the evidence suppressed or excluded by the district court is actually material to the proceeding before our jurisdiction can attach.” A fair point, but not one that establishes the statute is unambiguous. Using the same reasoning, it seems clear that nothing in
The majority finds guidance in the portion of
The majority posits that “[t]he purpose of
This reading distorts Congress‘s intent. The majority‘s description would be accurate if there were no certification requirement in the statute. But that requirement exists, and it undoubtedly reflects Congress‘s concern that the government might abuse its appellate rights. Indeed, the majority recognizes that “[b]y specifying that the United States Attorney must certify the appeal, Congress plainly intended that the decision to take an interlocutory appeal be a serious, considered judgment, not simply an administrative formality.”
Deterring frivolous appeals is as much of a statutory purpose as enabling worthy ones, and the Loud Hawk rule liberally construes the certification requirement to effectuate both purposes. Far from being unwritten hurdles, the jurisdictional conditions identified by Loud Hawk are drawn straight from
Interestingly, of the three jurisdiction-conferring provisions of
Congress was especially concerned that federal prosecutors might abuse the ability to interlocutorily appeal suppression orders,6 thereby unnecessarily
II. Legislative History
Where the statutory language is ambiguous, we “turn to the legislative history for evidence of congressional intent.” Dent v. Cox Commc‘ns Las Vegas, Inc., 502 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007). Although the legislative history fails to directly resolve the question presented here, it does shed some light on Congress‘s purpose in adopting
The second paragraph was adopted, with slightly different
language,7 as part of the
First, the legislation was designed to facilitate successful prosecutions by granting the government an opportunity to challenge the suppression of important evidence. Senator Allott hoped that “our law-enforcement agencies will be given the tools with which to launch a meaningful attack on the critical problem of crime in this country,” and he explained that “[i]t is obviously much better to prove a case with tangible and concrete evidence than upon oral testimony and observa-
tion of witnesses.” 114 Cong. Rec. at 14788 (statement of Sen. Allott). The House report noted that an order granting a motion to suppress evidence is often “in effect, a final order bringing the prosecution to an end, for the Government is unable to proceed without the suppressed evidence.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-603, at 2 (1967).
Second, the provision was intended to lead to “the development of a complete body of law regarding the legality of searches and seizures presently hampered by the inability of the government to bring to the appellate courts significant cases” arising out of suppression orders. Id. at 3. “[T]he law of search and seizure and confessions [was] highly uncertain,” and the amendment would ameliorate that uncertainty.
These two goals were not to come at the expense of a criminal defendant‘s rights. A report authored by the President‘s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, cited favorably by Senator Allott, stated that “[w]here the prosecution is permitted to appeal from pretrial orders, rules should be established to protect the defendant‘s interest in obtaining a speedy trial.” 114 Cong. Rec. at 14789. The Commission admonished the government that “appeals should not be taken routinely from every adverse pretrial ruling. They should be reserved for cases in which there is a substantial law enforcement interest.” Id. The House Committee on the Judiciary stressed that the “rights of the defendants, of course, have been taken into consideration and are in no way impinged upon” by the bill. H.R. Rep. No. 90-603, at 3. The provision required the prosecution to pursue appeals within thirty days of the district court‘s decision and to prosecute them “diligently.”8 The courts of appeals were expected to dispose of these appeals “with despatch so that the interest of justice, both on the part of the defendant and the Government, will be met as quickly as possible.” Id.
There is nothing in the legislative history that speaks directly to the propriety of courts reviewing the United States Attorney‘s certification. By revealing Congress‘s concerns, however, the history guides us in our efforts to liberally construe the statute in order to effectuate all of its purposes.
III. Proper Interpretation of § 3731
The legislative history confirms that Congress was not concerned exclusively with facilitating successful prosecutions; rather, Congress was also eager to see the courts develop a coherent body of search and seizure law, and was solicitous of defendants’ rights. It is these latter goals that inform our understanding of the certification requirement.
There is no dispute that the government is forbidden from appealing for the purpose of delay or from an order suppressing evidence that is insubstantial or immaterial, and Loud Hawk does not modify those substantive conditions. The precise question before us concerns the procedure by which Congress chose to enforce these restrictions: How, in other words, does the certification requirement impact our ability to ensure that the government is complying with the jurisdictional conditions?
If the same conditions were present without a certification requirement, we would presumably have the authority and duty to ensure that they were satisfied. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (stating that courts “have an
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party“). If, for example, the government violated the fourth paragraph of
Given this presumptive ability to determine our own jurisdiction, the majority must have concluded that the second paragraph of
Section 3731 serves a gatekeeping function by balancing the prosecution‘s desire to appeal suppression orders with the defense‘s and court‘s interest in a prompt and orderly trial. Congress may have tasked prosecutors with reviewing potential interlocutory appeals in the first instance, but experience with certification provisions in two other significant contexts suggests that Congress did not intend to wholly outsource our jurisdictional inquiry.
In civil actions, courts of appeals may entertain an interlocutory appeal from a non-final district court order if the district judge certifies that he is “of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”
Our review of a district court‘s decision to grant or deny a habeas corpus petitioner‘s request for a Certificate of Appealability (“COA“) is even broader. “In federal habeas corpus proceedings, . . . the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the issuance of a COA.” Phelps v. Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
These two examples show the remarkable nature of the majority‘s ruling. In two core areas of our jurisdiction, Con-
gress has employed the device of certification to assist us in — without eliminating — our determination of jurisdictional conditions. Without explanation as to why Congress would desire such a result, the majority tells us that a prosecutor deserves much greater deference than district judges tasked with analogous gatekeeper-like responsibilities. This simply does not square with the notion that the decision to exercise jurisdiction, is, at bottom, a judicial, not a prosecutorial, function.
This paradox is puzzling when one conceives of the
Certifications are formalities, and in some contexts they may “perform a cautionary or deterrent function by acting as a check against inconsiderate action.” Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 800 (1941). Parties in the federal courts are familiar with certification requirements that serve a cautionary function. Under
These certifications do not serve a gatekeeper function, and they are not a means of presenting the courts with useful information. They serve a much more basic purpose: remind-
ing the parties of their obligation to comply with the courts’ rules. See, e.g.,
The certification requirement in
Given Congress‘s clearly expressed concern over the potential for prosecutors to abuse their appellate rights, it is hard to believe that the statute requires us to blindly trust United States Attorneys or those who supervise them.9 The
men and women of the Department of Justice are fine public servants, dedicated to advancing the public interest. Nevertheless, Congress‘s recognition of prosecutors’ self-interest is inherent in
By my lights, the Loud Hawk rule more effectively advances the statutory goals than the majority‘s approach. For starters, the Loud Hawk rule is modest.
The burden on the prosecution is thus slight, and this should allay any fear that Loud Hawk might undermine the first identifiable purpose of the statute, the facilitation of successful prosecutions. Prosecutors pursuing worthy appeals have little to fear from our precedents. Certifying the
Congress also hoped that
have a greater sense of what the case is about and the consequences of their potential rulings.
The Loud Hawk rule also accommodates the statute‘s final purpose, protecting defendants’ rights. The majority finds comfort in its aspirational rhetoric; my colleagues “expect the concerns about frivolous or disruptive attempts to involve us prematurely in ongoing trial proceedings . . . will be addressed by the government‘s wise and careful invocation of
If Congress had explicitly made the United States Attorneys’ certifications conclusive, as it did for the scope-of-employment certifications under the Westfall Act when removal was at issue, I would concede that the court would be left with no choice but to place our faith in the executive branch. As it currently reads, however,
Recognizing our concern about improper appeals, the majority attempts to minimize the impact of its holding. It insists that we will not blindly trust the government, nor allow it to disrupt proceedings on a whim. This is because “[i]f the merits of the appeal independently require us to question whether the evidence truly is material, the government‘s certification is not conclusive.”
This non sequitur completely mischaracterizes my position. I do not assert that the Loud Hawk rule affects our merits analysis; I recognize that under either the Loud Hawk rule or the majority‘s rule, a
By raising our power to expedite review, the majority also discounts the disruptive value of
appeal in a criminal case to its placement on an argument calendar.12 Even if we were able to somehow reduce that time by half, it would still amount to an inordinate delay in trial proceedings. Under the naked power the majority gives the government, appeals taken for the purpose of delay will achieve that purpose regardless of our alacrity.
Indeed, this very appeal demonstrates the Loud Hawk rule‘s necessity. The government filed its notice of appeal in this case on March 16, 2006. It filed another interlocutory appeal regarding a separate issue on August 23, 2006, and yet another on September 27, 2006. In this appeal, the government initially refused to provide the three-judge panel with any evidence to support its bare certification that the suppressed evidence was material, further delaying proceedings. The government‘s litigation strategy has effectively derailed the criminal trial, while it no doubt continues its search for more witnesses and victims. The trial date remains in limbo, and the defendants’ right to a speedy trial has been completely frustrated.
Further, the majority fails to apprehend the design of the Loud Hawk rule, pointing out that our precedent “does nothing to get the appeal on an argument calendar any faster than the prevailing certification-only rule,” and that “because we must first determine the jurisdictional issue and then determine the merits separately, a final determination under the Loud Hawk rule may well take longer.” This misses the point. Even if it were true that the majority‘s rule will lead to a slightly faster disposition of individual
As with most deterrents, the benefit is not
Under the rule we adopt today, the only thing standing between a prosecutor and an interlocutory appeal is a piece of paper. A prosecutor faced with an unfavorable suppression order must decide within thirty days whether to appeal, and must leave enough time to obtain the approval of the Solicitor General.14 If the suppressed evidence is of questionable value, will she take the time to fully consider its materiality? If there is even the slightest chance that the evidence might bolster the prosecution‘s case or buy time to further prepare its case, the temptation will be there to forgo any serious consideration of the certification requirements, secure in the knowledge that
we will not question the justification for the decision to appeal.
The Loud Hawk rule, by contrast, is conducive to a thoughtful certification process. Knowing a modest showing in support of the certification will be required, the prosecutor has incentive to seriously consider whether to seek an interlocutory appeal. Even a hasty decision to challenge the suppression of insubstantial or immaterial evidence might be reconsidered when actually facing the task of Loud Hawk compliance. Similarly, a written showing provides the prosecutor‘s superiors with something they can truly evaluate; they need not rely on the trial prosecutor‘s vague assurances that the suppressed evidence is important.
Like the majority, my hope and expectation is that the government will act wisely and carefully when deciding whether to pursue an interlocutory appeal, and that its unchecked ability to do so will not diminish the independent judgment of district judges in the making of important evidentiary rulings. Unlike the majority, though, I would measure that confidence with caution. To paraphrase a former President, I would “trust, but verify.”15 Only this way can we provide the congressionally desired review necessary to safeguard defendants’ rights.
The Loud Hawk rule secures the continuity of proceedings by ensuring that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay
Notes
- to implement a remedy for a violation of recognized rights;
- to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a criminal conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury; and
- to deter future illegal conduct.
