UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerome GATTO, Virgil Redmond, Joseph Bonanno, Jr., and Salvatore Bonanno, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 84-1121, 84-1133.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Dec. 11, 1984. Decided June 14, 1985.
763 F.2d 1040
D. Gilbert Athay, Salt Lake City, Utah, Charles R. Garry, Dennis P. Riordan, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Before WALLACE, HUG, and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.
WALLACE, Circuit Judge:
The federal government appeals the district court‘s order excluding evidence seized by Utah state officials in a trash search operation about which the federal government failed to notify the defense until a few weeks before trial was to begin, even though the state had obtained the evidence two years earlier. It also appeals the district court‘s subsequent dismissal of the action with prejudice for failing to proceed to trial before the appeal of the exclusion order was resolved. The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to
I
Early in 1982, the Sacramento field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating operations at the Los Gatos, California, office of Sunburst Industries, a company with offices there and in Salt Lake City, Utah. On July 7, 1982, as a result of the Sacramento investigation, a grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendants with 47 counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of forged or altered securities, and conspiracy. The district court ordered the federal government to рrovide discovery “in accordance with FRCrimP 16.” Over the next eighteen months, there were numerous pretrial motions dealing with discovery and admissibility of evidence. Finally, a jury trial was set for April 24, 1984.
After holding a six-day evidentiary hearing, the district judge issued an order excluding any evidence the federal government obtained from the Utah authorities which the Utah authorities had seized pursuant to the trash search operation, as well as such evidence obtained as a result of the trash search. He also ordered the government to identify any evidence it possessed and intended to introduce during trial that could be directly traced tо the trash search operation. The trial date was continued to May 1, 1984.
The district judge based his ruling on the authority of
The district judge concluded that the facts of this case allowed him to exercise both his
The district judge reasoned that these facts neither required him to dismiss the case nor allowed him merely to order a continuance, which he admitted was the normal remedy. He stated that dismissal was unacceptable because there was no proof that the government had intentionally or willfully concealed the evidence, the problem occurred before trial began, the evidence was not exculpatory, and any tainted evidence left over could be dealt with at trial on a piece-by-piece basis. He maintained that a continuance was insufficient, however, because it failed to satisfy either the demands of due process or notions of fair play and substantial justice, because the time, effort, and money that would be lost would be prejudicial, unfair, and unjust to the defendants. He observed that the indictment had been filеd nearly two years before, and thus the sword had hung over the defendants long enough, that they had spent sufficient money on their defense, and that the court had expended sufficient judicial resources in managing the case. Moreover, the trial was set to begin in four days, and postponing it would inconvenience both the court and the defense attorneys in reclearing their calendars. Finally, a related state trial would be delayed if a continuance were ordered.
The government appealed this exclusionary order pursuant to
II
The government argues that the district court‘s supervisory power did not provide it with authority to exclude the evidence in this case because the government‘s late disclosure did not violate the Constitution or any federal statute. It contends that the district court‘s reliance on United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1982), vacated and remanded, --- U.S. ---, 104 S.Ct. 54, 78 L.Ed.2d 73 (1983) (Gonsalves), demonstrates error because the Supreme Court subsequently vacated that case in light of United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (Hasting). The government argues that the Court in Hasting limited the exercise of supervisory power to instances in which the courts are implementing a remedy for the violation of recognized rights, preserving judicial integrity by ensuring that a jury‘s verdict rests on appropriate considerations, or deterring future illegal conduct. Because the govern-
The Supreme Court first used the label “supervisory power” in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), to describe its authority to formulate procedural rules in its administration of criminal justice. Although federal courts had formulated common-law procedural rules before McNabb, they had not previously claimed any general power to do so, but had instead been careful to identify specific congressional mandates for such rule creation and to abide by any express or implied limits placed by Congress on its mandates. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 365, 13 L.Ed. 1023 (1851); Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 1433, 1438 & n. 28 (1984).
Although the Supreme Court continues to recognize that lower federal courts еnjoy supervisory power, it has circumscribed this power to the formulation of “procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.” Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505, 103 S.Ct. at 1978 (emphasis added). In addition, it has never identified its source. Beale, supra, at 1434, 1462. It is clear, however, that the power has limits. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505, 103 S.Ct. at 1978.
We asserted in Gonsalves that the source of the power lies in the judiciary‘s role in our constitutional system of checks and balances as limited by the doctrine of separation of powers, 691 F.2d at 1318, and that it is necessary to the courts’ role in “check[ing] ... governmental excesses of the executive and the legislature” that threaten the courts’ “own institutional integrity.” Id. at 1319. We also claimed that the supervisory power was animated by “notiоns of fair play which are more exacting than the minimum constitutional requirements of due process,” id. at 1316, and that it allowed federal courts “to do justice.” Id. The district judge relied upon this case in exercising his supervisory power.
But the Supreme Court vacated and remanded our decision in Gonsalves in light of Hasting. This suggests that our extensive discussion was insufficiently sensitive to the power‘s limitations. In particular, the Supreme Court‘s action calls into question the expansive supervisory discretion we attempted to derive from the supposed animating force of “notions of fair play.” The Court‘s emphasis that supervisory power is a power limited to “formulate procedural rules,” 461 U.S. at 505, 103 S.Ct. at 1978, is directly opposed to our contention that the power allows federal courts “to do justice in particular fact situations that do not lend themselves to rules of general application.” Gonsalves, 691 F.2d at 1316.
One prominent theory, but different from our notions in Gonsalves, attempts to justify the exercise of supervisory power as a form of specialized and limited federal common law. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term---Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 34-38 (1975); cf. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959) (Palermo). No one seriously disputes that Congress has the authority to create procedural rules to govern criminal proceedings. See Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656, 9 L.Ed. 255 (1835); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 21-22, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825). Moreover, the power of federal courts to decide cases is at least potentially coextensive with Congress‘s legislative power. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824). Thus, the theory goes, the federal courts may sometimes be justified in creating procedural rules, subject to statutory and separation-of-powers limitations, when injustices arise for which Congress almost certainly would provide a remedy were it feasible for it to do so.
Regardless of whether the supervisory power stems from the federal courts’ inherent power to check intrusions by other branches of government or whether it is a form of specialized federal common law, the separation-of-powers principle imposes significant limits on it. As a threshold matter, a court may not exercise any supervisory power absent “a clear basis in fact and law for doing so.” United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 83 (1977); see also United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1283-86 (9th Cir.1984). Proper regard for judicial integrity does not justify a “chancellor‘s foot’ veto” over activities of coequal branches of government. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1644, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). Judicial integrity is rarely threatened significantly when executive action does not violate the Constitution, a federal statute, or a procedural rule. A federal court that imposes sanctions on executive conduct that is otherwise permitted by the Constitution, a federal statute or a rule will most likely be invading the executive sphere rather than protecting itself from invasion. Similarly, the separation-of-powers principle suggests that the creation of a rule by supervisory power can be justified only when a recognizеd right has been violated. Even then, it may be wise for the courts to await congressional action.
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the supervisory power may not be used to impose remedies for the vindication of nonconstitutional rights that the Court deliberately has limited in the context of vindicating constitutional rights. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2446, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980). Thus, for example, courts may not impose an exclusionary rule in the name of exercising their supervisory power to remedy a nonconstitutional violation in seizing evidence to the extent the Supreme Court limits that remedy to fourth amendment violations. Id. at 736, 100 S.Ct. at 2446.
The delay in disclosure in this case did not violate any constitutional provision, federal statute, specific discovery order, or any other recognized right except perhaps
III
The government also argues that the district court erred in excluding the evidence
The record shows that neither the Sacramento-based officials nor the Salt Lake City FBI agent actually possessed, had custody of, or controlled the trash search evidence before March 27, 1984. Moreover, the district judge never made any finding to the contrary.1 Thus, the precise issue we face is whether
Our first question is whether, pursuant to
In United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (5th Cir.1977), the court addressed the question of whether a presentence report in the possession of the probation department was in the possession of the “government” for purposes of
The important question, therefore, is whether the documents must be in the actual possession or control of the FBI agents or whether constructive possession or control is sufficient. Under
The cases discussing a prosecutor‘s due diligence obligation under
Because we find no due diligence language in
The Fifth Circuit has also addressed this issue and concluded that
Similarly, in Thor v. United States, 574 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.1978), the defendant attempted to subpoena an address book allegedly in the possession of state officials that he said would exculpate him. Id. at 219. In affirming the district court‘s refusal to issue the subpoena, the court of appeals held, in reference to
Therefore, we conclude that the triggering requirement under
The defendants may have been put into a difficult position because the government announced, four weeks before trial, that it had 382 tangible items it planned to introduce into evidence. Although the district court could not suppress the evidence pursuant to any supervisory powers or rule 16, and the parties have cited to us no other authority for such an order, the district judge could have considered more searchingly whether a continuance was appropriate under the circumstances simply as a matter of proper case management. The record is barren as to how much time longer than four weeks, if any, the defendants would have needed to prepare to meet this new evidence---indeed, the defendants did not even request a continuance. Thus, we cannot review whether a continuance would have been appropriate here.
IV
Our holding that the district court erroneously suppressed the evidence will not result in a reversal, however, if the district court properly dismissed the indictment with prejudice for failure to prosеcute. The government contends that its initial appeal of the exclusionary order deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the case or, in the alternative, that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment with prejudice when the government‘s failure to prosecute was its only way to assure receipt of the full benefit of its right to appeal the exclusionary order.
We reject the government‘s argument that the district court lost jurisdiction over the action when the government filed its notice of appeal pursuant to
In protecting its right to appeal, the government may request the district court to stay proceedings pending appeal and, if refused, pursue the issue with this court. If the indictment is dismissed, as in this case, we review the district court‘s order based upon whether there was an abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863, 101 S.Ct. 167, 66 L.Ed.2d 80 (1980).
In the case bеfore us, we do not reach the issue whether the district court could have dismissed the indictment without prejudice for unnecessary delay, but only whether it abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment with prejudice.
Although the district court gave the required warning before dismissing with prejudice, our decision in Loud Hawk shows that the district court failed to exercise sufficient caution. In Loud Hawk, the district court had issued an order excluding evidence relating to dynamite counts in an indictment charging the defendants with several dynamite and nondynamite related violations of federal firearms laws. Id. at 1149-50. The government appealed the order pursuant to
In this case, the district court concluded that the indictment should be dismissed with prejudice because of the government‘s failure to abide by orders of the court, unnecessary delay, and abuse of prosecutorial discretion. The only order that the court accused the government of violating, however, was the discovery order pursuant to rule 16. As held earlier, there was no such violation. The delay alleged was necessary to appeal the exclusion order. The district judge believed the government could have proceeded with the evidence it possessed before its knowledge of the trash sеarch. That, however, misses the point. The necessity requirement, as we said in Loud Hawk, goes to whether the suppressed evidence constitutes “substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” 628 F.2d at 1150. There was no finding here that it was not, nor would the record support such a finding. If, as we assume, the charged prosecutorial abuse relates to the failure to proceed until the appeal of the suppression order, the record fails to support the ordered dismissal with prejudice. Here, the government had a right to appeal under Loud Hawk. The case is too similar to the action of the prosecutor of the dynamite counts in that case for us to distinguish the two.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The documents in question were the product of a joint investigation by Utah and Federal Authorities. The Utah trash search was linked to this Sacramento prosecution by an extensive network of state and federal authorities, including an FBI agent in Utah who acted as liaison between the Utah investigators and the Sacramento prosecutors. The trash search was also linked to this prosecution by a federally funded computer network designed to make evidence readily available to all participating state and federal agencies. No reasonable explanation appears in this record for the prosecutors’ twin failures to obtain and disclose these documents long befоre the eve of trial. The district court found the prosecution negligent to the point of recklessness and came just short of finding an intentional withholding of documents.
In my view, these documents were within the government‘s “control” pursuant to the meaning of rule 16. The majority‘s contrary holding rewards prosecutors who wait until the last minute to examine available evidence. It encourages gamesmanship and delay rather than forthrightness and efficiency.
That these documents were material, indeed key, to the prosecution is demonstrated by the government‘s refusal to go forward with its case upon their suppression. Prejudice to the defendants, had the district court refused to order suppression, is similarly clear. As the district court observed, the government created a dilemma for defendants by forcing them to go to trial unprepared or to expend more time and money in further preparation of an already very costly case. Therefore, I would hold that in the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the indictment with prejudice after the government refused to proceed. I would affirm.
J. CLIFFORD WALLACE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
