UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus ARTURO SHOWS URQUIDI; MARIO IGLESIAS-VILLEGAS, Defendants—Appellants.
No. 22-50164
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
June 22, 2023
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, USDC No. 3:12-CR-849-14, USDC No. 3:12-CR-849-19
KING, Circuit Judge:
Defendants were among 24 individuals indicted on various charges in connection with their involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel. Defendants were jointly tried during a 10-day jury trial. Arturo Shows Urquidi was convicted on five counts, while Mario Iglesias-Villegas was convicted on 12 counts. Each received concurrent life sentences for all counts on which they were convicted. Defendants raise various challenges to their respective convictions and sentences on appeal. We AFFIRM the convictions but
I.
On April 11, 2012, Defendants-Appellants Arturo Shows Urquidi and Mario Iglesias-Villegas (together, the “Defendants“) were among 24 individuals who were indicted in connection with their affiliation and dealings with the Sinaloa Cartel (alternatively, the “Cartel“). Defendants were tried together during a 10-day jury trial, which concluded on October 21, 2022.
The Sinaloa Cartel is a criminal organization whose members and associates engage in the illegal trafficking of cocaine and marijuana from Mexico into the United States. Drug proceeds accrued in the United States are secretly transported back to Mexico and into the Cartel‘s coffers. Cartel members frequently engage in violence—such as murder, torture, and kidnapping—against rivals, those they deem responsible for lost or stolen assets, and individuals cooperating with law enforcement, among others. These acts of violence, which also include the mutilation and dismemberment of victims’ bodies, are often publicized by the Cartel as a means of intimidation.
The Sinaloa Cartel has a hierarchical structure and was led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada Garcia during the events that were recounted at trial.1 Below Chapo and Mayo were “plaza bosses” who managed the Cartel‘s daily operations in each major city within its network. These operations included moving and importing drugs,
On October 22, 2022, the jury found both Shows Urquidi and Iglesias-Villegas guilty of Racketeering Conspiracy, Conspiracy to Possess a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, Conspiracy to Import a Controlled Substance, Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments, and Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking Crimes (Counts I through V). Iglesias-Villegas was also found guilty of five counts for Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (Counts VI through X), Conspiracy to Kill in a Foreign Country (Count XIII), and Kidnapping and Aiding and Abetting Kidnapping (Count XIV). On March 3 and March 24, 2022, Shows Urquidi and Iglesias-Villegas were sentenced to concurrent life sentences on each count of conviction. Iglesias-Villegas was also fined $100,000. Defendants raise various issues on appeal that span from pre-trial discovery through their sentencing. We address each issue in turn.
II.
Iglesias-Villegas argues that the district court erred in denying his pre-trial motion for the disclosure of evidence presented to the grand jury supporting the indictment as it related to him.
“Federal courts long have recognized that secrecy is essential to maintaining the integrity of the grand jury system.” In re Grand Jury Testimony, 832 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a court may authorize the disclosure of grand jury materials “at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand jury.”
Iglesias-Villegas asserts that the grand jury transcripts were necessary to prove that his case is one of mistaken identity. The indictment incorrectly names him as Mario Alberto Iglesias-Villegas. Throughout this case, Iglesias-Villegas has maintained that Mario Alberto Iglesias-Villegas refers to his now-deceased cousin Mario Alberto Iglesias-Chavaria and not himself. In his motion below, Iglesias-Villegas argued that he needed the grand jury materials so that he could “become aware whether he was indicted via allegations to the grand jury of conduct that was attributable to his cousin” and “determine whether a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment.” The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that Iglesias-Villegas failed to establish that there was any confusion between his identity and that of his
This was not an abuse of discretion. “We have ‘refuse[d] to adopt the proposition that, absent perjury or government misconduct, an indictment is flawed simply because it is based on testimony that may later prove to be questionable.‘” United States v. Cessa, 861 F.3d 121, 142 (5th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1978)). “[W]hen a defendant claims that the prosecution put false information before the grand jury, we ask two questions (1) did the government ‘knowingly []sponsor[]’ false information before the grand jury and (2) was that information material, that is, was the information ‘capable’ of influencing the grand jury‘s decision.” Id. (quoting United States v. Strouse, 286 F.3d 767, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2002)). Iglesias-Villegas speculates that the Government did not present accurate evidence to the grand jury due to its purported confusion between his identity and that of his cousin. But he does not allege that the Government intended to deceive the grand jury to the extent that any confusion existed. Without more, confusion alone does not amount to the knowing sponsorship of false information. Furthermore, his argument that the district court should have granted him access to the grand jury materials so he could “determine what information the government had presented and . . . whether the indictment had been influenced by any misconduct” establishes that he cannot demonstrate that any false information was actually presented to the grand jury. Iglesias-Villegas thus cannot show that a possible injustice could have been avoided.2
III.
Iglesias-Villegas also challenges the district court‘s denial of his motion to suppress statements that he made to DEA Special Agent Juan Briano while in Mexican custody.
For a denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions, including “whether Miranda‘s guarantees have been impermissibly denied,” de novo. United States v. Nelson, 990 F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 2021). We evaluate evidence in a light most favorable to the party that prevailed below and will uphold the district court‘s ruling “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” United States v. Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). “Our review is ‘particularly deferential where denial of the suppression motion is based on live oral testimony because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.‘” United States v. Lim, 897 F.3d 673, 685 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 781 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 2015)).
A.
On April 19, 2012, shortly after the indictment in this case was filed, a group of agents from both the DEA and FBI interviewed Iglesias-Villegas, who was being held in Mexican custody after being arrested. Iglesias-Villegas was informed that he had been indicted and that the purpose of this meeting was to seek his cooperation for an interview. After some initial hesitation, Iglesias-Villegas began to cooperate, confirming his aliases; Delta, Delfin, and Dos; and admitting to working for Jose Antonio Torres Marrufo, a plaza
The first incident concerned an operation ordered by Marrufo in which a bridegroom, his brother, and his uncle were all to be kidnapped from a church in Juarez during the bridegroom‘s wedding and brought to another location where they would be interrogated and eventually killed (the “Wedding Murders“). Iglesias-Villegas told Agent Briano that Marrufo had instructed him to assist the principal coordinator of the operation, Rafael Figueroa-Merino. Figueroa-Merino initially wanted to kill the three men inside the church, but Iglesias-Villegas explained to Agent Briano that he disagreed with this approach due to his respect for the church and persuaded Figueroa-Merino to kidnap them instead.
The second incident concerned the kidnapping of Sergio Saucedo in Horizon City, Texas (the “Horizon City Kidnapping“). After being kidnapped, Saucedo was secreted across the border to Juarez by associates of Gabino Salas, the plaza boss in El Valle de Juarez, Mexico. From there, Salas‘s associates handed Saucedo over to individuals working for Marrufo via a roadside exchange. Iglesias-Villegas told Agent Briano that he picked up Marrufo and brought him to the office where Saucedo was being held so that Saucedo could be interviewed by Marrufo. After the interview, Saucedo was killed and several sicarios “dump[ed] the corpse in Ciudad Juarez.”
The third incident involved the murder of two men, one of whom was an FBI informant, at an Xtreme Car Wash in Juarez (the “Xtreme Car Wash Murders“); Marrufo had instructed Iglesias-Villegas to arrange for the murders. The murders were reported by the Mexican news media and later
Before trial, Iglesias-Villegas moved to suppress the statements he made during his interview with Agent Briano. At the suppression hearing, Iglesias-Villegas testified3 that on March 17, 2012, he was arrested by Mexican federal police, handcuffed, and moved into an unmarked car so that he could be transported to the prosecutor‘s office. While in this car, he claimed that the police beat him on the side of his ribs with their rifles and smacked him with their open hands on his neck. Once they had arrived at the office, he was told that his mother and wife would be arrested if he did not sign documents that were presented to him. He testified that he signed the documents without having an opportunity to review them because he “felt cornered” and that his mother and wife would be “in the crosshairs” of Mexican authorities otherwise. Iglesias-Villegas was then taken to a hotel, where he was detained for over a month. While detained at the hotel, he shared a room with four other people who had been arrested and was only allowed to leave the room to eat. He was in line to receive a visit from his
When Iglesias-Villegas arrived at the prosecutor‘s office, the prosecutor informed him that U.S. agents wanted to speak with him. No one ever asked if he wanted to speak with the agents. He testified that he felt as if he had no choice and would be beaten again if he refused. He was eventually escorted into an office with glass walls and sat at the head of a long table alone with the U.S. agents. One of the U.S. agents then attempted to close the door but was stopped by a Mexican agent looking after Iglesias-Villegas. The door was kept open throughout the interview while the Mexican agent sat outside beside the door and within earshot. Iglesias-Villegas admitted that no threats or promises were ever made by any of the agents, and he agreed that he was “treated with respect.” Agent Briano testified that the agents attempted to read Iglesias-Villegas his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and “explain . . . what his U.S. Constitutional rights were in the United States” but that Iglesias-Villegas said he “didn‘t want to hear it” and “scoffed and backed off the seat.” Iglesias-Villegas disputes that he was ever given Miranda warnings and testified that he was never provided with a form explaining his extraterritorial rights. The interview lasted no longer than an hour and a half and was terminated by Iglesias-Villegas, who said that he would continue to cooperate after speaking with his attorneys. Iglesias-Villegas was released from Mexican custody on May 6, 2012, about two-and-a-half weeks after the interview.
Iglesias-Villegas argues that the statements he made during this interview should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because they were given involuntarily and because he was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights.
“Whether a confession is admissible or not turns on whether it was made voluntarily.” United States v. Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 2012). An individual makes an involuntary statement if, due to state action, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986), “his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). A court considers whether a confession was voluntary based on a totality of the circumstances, which include the length of detention, length of questioning and its location, the use of physical punishment, and whether the accused is informed of his constitutional rights. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693–94 (1993); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
Here, Iglesias-Villegas contends that his confession was a product of coercion. He argues that he would not have submitted to the interview with U.S. agents if given a choice. Additionally, he asserts that he was fearful of an “impending threat of violence” by Mexican law enforcement if he did not engage with Agent Briano‘s questions. But we fail to see such a threat. Iglesias-Villegas concedes that he had not been beaten by Mexican law enforcement since his arrest, which occurred over a month prior to the interview. By the time of his interview, too much time had elapsed from the initial beating for Iglesias-Villegas to credibly fear retaliation for failing to engage with the U.S. agents. He does not allege that he was beaten or threatened by Mexican authorities since his arrest. Without more, we cannot conclude that there was a looming threat of violence if Iglesias-Villegas chose not to cooperate with the U.S. agents. Other facts surrounding the interview support this conclusion. Iglesias-Villegas never evinced any fear of the U.S. agents conducting the interview; indeed, he acknowledged that they treated him with respect. We also credit the district court‘s finding that Iglesias-Villegas was advised of his extraterritorial rights and that his testimony to the
C.
Miranda warnings are necessary during a custodial interrogation for a suspect‘s statements to later be admissible in compliance with the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Coulter, 41 F.4th 451, 456 (5th Cir. 2022). “A suspect is . . . ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect‘s position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.” United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988)). Put more succinctly: “would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). “‘[W]hether a suspect is “in custody” is an objective inquiry’ that ‘depends on the “totality of the circumstances.“‘” Wright, 777 F.3d at 774–75 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011); and then quoting United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2012)). Although “no one fact is determinative,” we have “repeatedly considered certain key details when analyzing whether an individual was or was not in custody,” including “the length of the questioning“; “the location
In Howes v. Fields, the Supreme Court ruled that “imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda.” 565 U.S. 499, 510–11 (2012). Three reasons undergirded the Court‘s holding in Howes: (1) “[i]n the paradigmatic Miranda situation . . . detention represents a sharp and ominous change, and the shock may give rise to coercive pressures,” whereas “a person who is already serving a term of imprisonment . . . usually [experiences] no such change” due to their already being acclimated to the “ordinary,” albeit “unpleasant,” restrictions of prison life at the time of the interrogation; (2) “a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release“; and (3) “a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted and sentenced, knows that the law enforcement officers who question him probably lack the authority to affect the duration of his sentence.” Id. at 511–12.
Iglesias-Villegas argues that Howes is inapplicable to his case, making the conclusory assertion that he had good reason to think that speaking with U.S. agents would affect the conditions and length of his custody and pointing to his release 17 days later. But his invocation of subjective beliefs and post-hoc rationalizations are unavailing. Iglesias-Villegas‘s detention was sufficiently analogous to the detention contemplated in Howes that it, without more, cannot be adjudged as per se custodial for the purpose of Miranda. A reasonable person would be aware that U.S. agents likely lack the authority to effect a release from detention from an independent sovereign. Consequently, despite not being sentenced to a term of years, there would be little incentive for a reasonable person in Iglesias-Villegas‘s carceral state to
The remaining circumstances surrounding the interview support a determination that Iglesias-Villegas was not in custody. Despite originally not being given a choice to attend the interview, Iglesias-Villegas was informed of his extraterritorial rights, including that he did not have to speak with the U.S. agents, and that if he decided to answer their questions, he had the right to stop answering questions at any time. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 514–15 (although “respondent did not invite the interview,” this was “[m]ost important[ly]” offset by him being told that “he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted“); Coulter, 41 F.4th at 461 (“[A]ssurances that a suspect ‘[is] not under arrest and that he [is] free to leave’ weigh in favor of determining that a suspect is not in custody.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Wright, 777 F.3d at 777)). He later evinced an understanding of those rights when he terminated the interview on his own and stated that he would like to speak with his attorneys before continuing further. And the U.S. agents treated him with respect throughout the interview, which lasted no longer than 90 minutes and took place in a non-hostile office environment. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 515 (suspect-prisoner was not in custody where interview lasted between five and seven hours and occurred in a “well-lit, average-sized conference room“); see also United States v. Arellano-Banuelos, 927 F.3d 355, 361–63 (5th Cir. 2019) (inmate serving state prison sentence not in custody while being interviewed by ICE agents where he was not told before arriving that he could decline the interview or was otherwise free to leave, was not provided with full Miranda
IV.
Shows Urquidi argues that numerous Government exhibits were either inadmissible due to their irrelevance or unduly prejudicial nature under
Evidentiary holdings subject to timely objections are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Garcia, 530 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2008). “However, the standard for assigning error under Rule 403 is ‘especially high’ and requires a showing of a ‘clear abuse of discretion.‘” United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 716 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 495 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Rare is the appellant who can make that showing.” Id. “Importantly, we have cautioned that ‘Rule 403 . . . is an extraordinary measure because it permits a trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence, and thus it should be used sparingly.‘” United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 287 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395, 1404 (5th Cir. 1987)). “Accordingly, ‘[w]hen reviewing this exercise of discretion, we must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.‘” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Caldwell, 820 F.2d at 1404).
Unpreserved evidentiary challenges are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Richard, 775 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2014). “This court finds plain error when: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant‘s substantial rights.” United States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 358–59 (5th Cir. 2005)). Even if these three prongs are satisfied, whether the error must be remedied is subject to our discretion—this discretion need only be exercised “if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.‘” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). It is Shows Urquidi‘s burden to establish plain error. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004).
Evidence is relevant if it (1) “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and (2) “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”
At trial, Shows Urquidi objected to the admissibility of three photographs pursuant to Rule 403. The first two photographs, Exhibits 33-a and 33-b, depict the corpse of a confidential source for the DEA, Edgar Ariel Avalos, who agreed to cooperate against Marrufo and was later killed during the Xtreme Car Wash Murders. Both photographs show Avalos‘s bullet-riddled body contorted on the floor of a garage with a large amount of blood pooled around his head. Exhibit 33-b is a closeup photograph depicting the same image as Exhibit 33-a. The third photograph, Exhibit 24-o, depicts the dead body of Alonso Sotelo, a friend of the groom who was gunned down as he tried to escape during the Wedding Murders. In the photograph, Sotelo is lying face up on the ground with a bloodied face and arm.
Shows Urquidi now contends that additional evidence should not have been admitted. For example, he cites photographs depicting the body of a dead waiter who had his finger severed and placed in his mouth after he was suspected of losing $250,000 of the Cartel‘s cocaine. The man who killed the waiter testified that the finger was severed to signal that he was a thief, and it was placed in his mouth to show that he was cooperating with the U.S. government. Shows Urquidi also points to a photograph of Sergio Saucedo following the Horizon City Kidnapping. In that photograph, Saucedo is lying dead on the ground with his severed arms placed on top of his chest. The other photographs that Shows Urquidi now contests are similarly graphic. He also challenges multiple pieces of testimony, including that of the father of the groom who gave his account of the Wedding Murders. Shows Urquidi asserts that all of this evidence—both the evidence he originally objected to and that which he challenges for the first time on appeal—was not relevant
We disagree. First, because Shows Urquidi challenges this evidence‘s relevancy for the first time on appeal, he must establish that its admission on this basis was plainly erroneous, which he fails to do. He does not contend that this evidence was wholly irrelevant, but that it was merely irrelevant to the case as it pertained to him. Specifically, he does not assert that this evidence was irrelevant to the Government‘s case against Iglesias-Villegas, who notably makes no such assertion on his own. Indeed, it appears that the crux of Shows Urquidi‘s argument is that he was tried together with Iglesias-Villegas, i.e., that evidence relevant only to the case against Iglesias-Villegas could be presented in such close proximity to the case against Shows Urquidi, an issue he raises separately and which we address in Part VI infra.
Second, it was not clearly—or plainly—erroneous for the district court to conclude that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by it being overly cumulative or unfairly prejudicial. The photographic evidence was critical in proving many of the counts of the indictment. And it supported one of the principal theories of the Government‘s case: that the Sinaloa Cartel utilized extreme forms of violence as a means of achieving its objectives via intimidation. Nor was it cumulative as it provided support to witness testimony. See United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 325 (5th Cir. 2022) (“gruesome” photographs were admissible where they had “nontrivial probative value” in that they helped prove overt acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy, lent support to testimony, and established the violence of the crimes committed). The challenged testimony—which is all subject to plain error review—likewise provided the jury with a unique and important perspective as to the Cartel‘s violence that would otherwise have been solely portrayed through the
V.
Defendants each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence: Shows Urquidi as to Count I, and Iglesias-Villegas as to Counts IV, VI, and VII.
Properly preserved challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo, but our review is “highly deferential to the verdict.” United States v. Beacham, 774 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 835 (5th Cir. 2014)). The evidence will be deemed sufficient unless no “rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the offense to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury‘s verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2004)). The jury, however, “retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Scott, 892 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012)).
If a defendant fails to renew a motion for acquittal after the jury‘s verdict, then we will only reverse the verdict if there is a “‘manifest miscarriage of justice,’ which occurs only where ‘the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt’ or the evidence is so tenuous that a conviction is ‘shocking.‘” United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
Both Defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal following the conclusion of the Government‘s case-in-chief. Because Iglesias-Villegas failed to renew his motion after he presented evidence, his issues are reviewed for a manifest miscarriage of justice. Shows Urquidi did not present
A.
Shows Urquidi was convicted on Count I for Racketeering Conspiracy pursuant to
“To prove a RICO conspiracy the government must establish (1) that two or more people agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense and (2) that the defendant knew of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense.” United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 857 (5th Cir. 1998).
Although a defendant‘s mere presence at the scene of a crime is not, by itself, sufficient to support a finding that the defendant is participating in a conspiracy, presence and association may be considered by the jury along with other evidence in finding that the defendant participated in a conspiracy.
Id. at 857–58. “Moreover, a defendant may be convicted of a conspiracy if the evidence shows that he only participated at one level of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, and only played a minor role in the conspiracy.” Id. at 858.
Shows Urquidi maintains that the Government failed to prove that he had knowledge of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense. He contends that any illicit activities he committed were for his sole economic benefit and that the Government failed to connect him, either by his activities or affiliations, to the Sinaloa Cartel.
The evidence adduced at trial, though, was more than sufficient to prove his knowledge of and agreement to the Cartel‘s objectives. Multiple witnesses identified Shows Urquidi as a member of the Sinaloa Cartel. Further testimony described Shows Urquidi frequenting locations as well as parties and meetings where attendance was restricted to Cartel members. During these meetings, Cartel members discussed business strategy and the Cartel‘s operations. Multiple witnesses also recounted that Shows Urquidi
Shows Urquidi‘s membership and participation in meetings and parties for the Sinaloa Cartel demonstrates that he had knowledge of its objectives. And his support for the Cartel through, inter alia, acting as a guard, packaging cocaine, and committing violent acts is sufficient to affirm his
1.
Iglesias-Villegas was convicted on Count IV for Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments pursuant to
transport[], transmit[], or transfer[], or attempt[] to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States . . . with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.
Here, the trial record is not devoid of evidence pointing to Iglesias-Villegas‘s guilt, nor is his conviction shocking. Iglesias-Villegas was an active member of the Sinaloa Cartel. He was also familiar with its money-laundering operations as shown by his discussions with Agent Briano. Cartel offices were often used to store laundered money, and Iglesias-Villegas was in charge of
2.
Iglesias-Villegas was convicted on Counts VI and VII for violations of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (“VICAR“) statute,
The VICAR statute states:
Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished . . . .
that (1) an enterprise existed; (2) the enterprise engaged in, or its activities affected, interstate commerce; (3) it was engaged in racketeering activity; (4) the defendant committed violent crimes; and (5) the defendant committed the violent crimes to
gain entrance to, or maintain or increase his position in, the enterprise.
United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 320 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Jones, 873 F.3d 482, 492 (5th Cir. 2017)).
For Count VI, Iglesias-Villegas contends that the Government failed to show that he entered into an agreement with the other Cartel members who conspired to murder Saucedo. For Count VII, he similarly asserts that there was no evidence that he either murdered or aided and abetted in the murder of Saucedo. We disagree; the record was not devoid of evidence to support either conviction, i.e., there was no manifest miscarriage of justice. Iglesias-Villegas provided Agent Briano with details concerning the Horizon City Kidnapping, including that he complied with instructions from Marrufo—who coordinated the Horizon City Kidnapping—to drive him to the office where Saucedo was being interrogated and admitted that he assisted in disposing Saucedo‘s body. While he was being held by the Cartel, Saucedo was kept for multiple days at Iglesias-Villegas‘s office, where he was interrogated by Marrufo. Further testimony showed that Iglesias-Villegas had arranged for his office to be used for similar interrogations on other occasions and that individuals who were interrogated in Cartel offices were often subsequently executed. Iglesias-Villegas‘s agreement can be established through hosting Saucedo‘s interrogation by keeping him at his office, bringing Marrufo to the interrogation, and his general knowledge regarding how the Cartel handled matters akin to the Horizon City
VI.
Shows Urquidi contends that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte sever his trial from that of Iglesias-Villegas. Because Shows Urquidi raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review the ruling below for plain error. See United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 371-73 (5th Cir. 2018).
“If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment . . . or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant . . . , the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.”
“To warrant vacatur, the defendant must show ‘specific and compelling prejudice’ resulting from the joint trial.” Chapman, 851 F.3d at 379 (quoting Owens, 683 F.3d at 100). “[C]ompelling prejudice is not shown if it appears that, through use of cautionary instructions, the jury could reasonably separate the evidence and render impartial verdicts as to each defendant.” United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 665 (5th Cir. 1986). “Merely alleging a ‘spillover effect‘—whereby the jury imputes the defendant‘s guilt based on evidence presented against his co-defendants—‘is an insufficient predicate for a motion to sever.‘” Chapman, 851 F.3d at 379 (quoting United States v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 397 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1085 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The additional evidence adduced at joint trials does not constitute compelling prejudice by itself.“). “Nor is it sufficient for a defendant to allege they were less involved than other defendants.” United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 343 (5th Cir. 2022). “[I]n conspiracy cases we generally favor specific instructions over severance.” Ledezma-Cepeda, 894 F.3d at 690; see also id. (“[d]efendants who are indicted together should generally be tried together, particularly in conspiracy cases” (alteration in original) (quoting Musquiz, 45 F.3d at 931)).
Here, Shows Urquidi argues that most of the evidence adduced at trial was exclusively targeted at the counts that were only faced by Iglesias-Villegas and that this evidence was particularly “graphic, emotional, gruesome, and gut-wrenching.” For example, Shows Urquidi points to testimony describing Iglesias-Villegas‘s work as a sicario and his management of an office of 30 to 35 other sicarios that assisted the Artistas Asesinos, a gang-affiliated group supporting the Sinaloa Cartel, as they
Notes
The parties disagree as to whether Iglesias-Villegas was handcuffed during the interview, and the district court did not make a finding regarding this fact. But whether Iglesias-Villegas was restrained is not dispositive to our analysis, and we would come to the same conclusion regardless. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (“Our cases make clear . . . that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010))); Dolph v. Davis, 765 F. App‘x 986, 991 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[T]here is no clearly established law that Miranda warnings must be given whenever an individual is handcuffed.“).
Iglesias-Villegas also contends that his statements must be excluded under United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980), which held that a statement made in foreign custody without Miranda warnings must be excluded if (1) “the conduct of the foreign officers shocks the conscience of the American court,” or (2) “American officials participated in the foreign search or interrogation, or if the foreign authorities were acting as agents for their American counterparts.” As we explained earlier in our voluntariness analysis, see supra Part III.B, the conduct of Mexican law enforcement with respect to the interview does not shock the conscience of this court; the totality of the circumstances renders Iglesias-Villegas‘s confession voluntary. We have likewise just concluded that Iglesias-Villegas was not in custody for the purpose of Miranda.