Dеfendant-Appellant Fortino Saucedo Villegas pled guilty and was sentenced in the district court before the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
United States v. Booker,
— U.S. -,
Villegas pled guilty to being an alien in unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court imposed a four-level sentence enhancement under United States Sentenoing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2003) because it found by a preponderance of the evidence that Villegas possessed a firearm in connection with his use of fraudulent immigration documents. Villegas now appeals the sentence enhancement. We VACATE Vil-legas’s sentence and REMAND for resen-tencing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On April 26, 2003, Fortino Saucedo Vil-legas, a Mexiсan national unlawfully present in the United States, attended a gun show at the Pasadena Convention Center in Pasadena, Texas. At the show, Villegas approached Roland Kulish, who was operating a booth at the show, and he expressed an interest in purchasing a Colt semi-automatic pistol. Kulish informed Villegas that he did not have any at the show but that he did have some at his store and would bring one to the next gun show, scheduled for the following weekend. The next week, Kulish returned to the gun show and brought the firearm Villegas had requested. Villegas also returned to the gun show and sought out Kulish tо purchase the firearm. According to Kulish and his wife, Villegas submitted three forms of identification: (1) a Texas driver’s license, no. 19476405; (2) a Texas identification card, no. 12088537; and (3) a resident alien card, no. 12088537. On the ATF form 4473, Villegas stated that he was a resident alien. In response to line eleven, which asks for an “INS-issued alien number or admission number,” Ville-gas listed 12088537. The words “pictured Texas resident I.D. card” were written directly above this response. Kulish sold the handgun to Villegas on May 3, 2003.
On June 5, 2003, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) received information from the National Instant Chеek System (“NICS”) about Villegas’s firearm purchase. A check with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement revealed Villegas’s criminal immigration history. 1 Based on this information, the ATF obtained a search warrant for the residence that Vil-legas had listed on his ATF forms.
On June 26, 2003, ATP agents executed the search warrant. When the agents ar *358 rived, Villegas was asleep in his bedroom. The agents found several firearms, ammunition, and a resident alien card suspected to be counterfeit. A search of Villegas’s automobile revealed receipts for an AK-47 and the Colt handgun he had purсhased from Kulish. The agents placed Villegas under arrest and advised him of his constitutional rights. He waived his right to remain silent and admitted that he was a Mexican citizen illegally present in the United States. He also acknowledged that the gun on the headboard belonged to him and claimed he kept it for protection. Further, he admitted to purchasing the Colt handgun from Kulish. He stated that he had taken it to a gunsmith to have the finish changed from black to chrome.
B. Procedural Background
On July 24, 2003, a grand jury indicted Villegas for “being an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States, knowingly and unlawfully possessing] in and affecting interstate оr foreign commerce, one or more firearms ... [i]n violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2).” On September 8, 2003, Villegas pled guilty to this charge. In the pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”), the probation officer recommended that Villegas receive a four-level sentence enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or the “Guidelines”) § 2K2.1(b)(5) for using or possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The probation officer stated that “[t]he defendant falsified an ATF Form 4473 and possessed a counterfeit resident alien card for identification in order to illegally obtain possession of the Colt .38 caliber pistol -” The United States Code makes it a felony to create or possess fraudulent immigration documents. 18 U.S.C. § 1546. Thus, the probation officer reasoned, Villegas used a firearm in connection with another felony.
Prior to sentencing, Villegas filed written objections to the PSR, arguing that he did not in fact present Kulish with a counterfeit resident alien card. Villegas’s factual assertions notwithstanding, the district court found that it was more likely than not that Villegas used a counterfeit resident alien card to obtain the Colt handgun. Thus, the district court accepted the PSR’s recommendation of the four-level enhancement. The district court sentenced Villegas to twenty-one months imprisonment. Villegas now appeals, arguing that: (1) the district court erred as a matter of law in applying a four-level enhancement for his use of a firearm in connection with a felony; and (2) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the government did not bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he used a counterfeit resident alien card.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Villegas did not rаise in the district court either his legal objection to the imposition of the four-level enhancement or his Sixth Amendment claim. Because of the lack of objections below, this court’s review is for plain error.
See, e.g., United States v. Aderholt,
In resolving Villegas’s claim that the district court misapplied § 2K2.1(b)(5) of the Guidelines to enhance his sentence, we must first address the possible effect of
Booker
on our standard of review. It is beyond question that before
Booker,
this court would have reviewed the district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo.
E.g., United States v. Martinez-Mata,
The Supreme Court in
Booker
instructed that although the Guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory, § 3553(a) of Title 18 still requires the district courts to consider the Guidelines when determining a defendant’s sentence.
See Booker,
During the pendency of this appeal the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory only and replaced the prior standard of appellate review with review for unreasonableness. Although the Guidelines are now advisory, district courts must still “consult the Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” Thus, appellate review continues to encompass review of the district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines. Because we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3661, we need not address any further impact of Booker on appellate review.
Id.
at 1257-58 n. 5 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in
Hazelwood,
This court recently reached a similar conclusion regarding
Booker’s,
effect on the standard of review in an unpublished opinion,
United States v. Davis,
The remedial opinion in
Booker
does not foreclose or otherwise caution against this approach. It is true that the Court excised § 3742(e), which statutorily set forth the standards of review, and stated that the remaining statute implied a reasonableness standard for reviewing sentences.
Booker,
Booker left standing all sections of the Sentencing Reform Act other than §§ 3553(b)(1) 5 and 3742(e). 6 Booker, 125 *362 S.Ct. at 764. Thus, § 3742(a) still remains in force, providing that “[a] defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence ... was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). Moreover, § 3742(f) still рrovides: “If the court of appeals determines that ... the sentence was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). The survival of these provisions further counsels that we maintain our review of the district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines when it has imposed a sentence under the Guidelines. 7
III. DISCUSSION
Villegas argues on appeal that the district court erred as a matter of law when it enhanced his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for using or possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. Specifically, Villegas contends that this enhancement provision does not apply to him because the firearms that he possessed were not used to facilitate the other felony offense at issue here (his use of a fraudulent immigration document) and because the presence of the firearm did not make the commission of the other felony inherently more dangerous. Further, Villegas argues that he did not yet possess the firearm at the time he used the fraudulent immigration document, so he could not have used the firearm in connection with his use of forged documents.
*363
In reviewing Villegas’s claim for plain error, our first and second steps are to determine whether the district court committed an error and whether that error was plain.
See Olano,
Although the Guidelines do not define the phrase “in connection with” as it appears in § 2K2.1(b)(5), we must give this language its ordinary and natural meaning.
See United States v. Condren,
However, in
United States v. Fadipe,
Thus, our precedent indicates that § 2K2.1(b)(5) applies only when the defendant’s use or possession of a firearm may have facilitated or made more dangerous the other felony offense. It is clear that Villegas’s possession of a firearm did nothing to facilitate his use of a fraudulent identification card or to make it a more dangerous crime. This is particularly so considering the chronology of events in this case: Villegas’s offense of using false immigration documents occurred the day before he actually acquired possession of the firearm. Hence, Villegas’s possession of a firearm was not in connection with his use of a counterfeit alien registration card for the purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(5), and the district court erred in imposing a sentence resulting from its incorrect application of the Guidelines. Moreover, because Fadipe and Houston clearly establish that the sentence enhancement under § 2K2.1 (b)(5) was inappropriate in this instance, we also find that the district cоurt’s error was plain, in the sense that it was clear or obvious. Thus, Villegas has satisfied the first two prongs of the plain-error test.
The third step in the plain-error analysis requires us to consider whether the district court’s error affected Villegas’s substantial rights.
See Olano,
In the absence of the four-level enhancement, Villegas’s sentencing range would have been reduced from between twenty-one and twenty-seven months to between ten and sixteen months. Because these two sentencing ranges do not overlap, the district court’s error necessarily increased Villegas’s sentence and thus affected his substantial rights.
See, e.g., Aderholt,
Although the district court on remand is not bound by the Guidelines, it must consider them, and in doing so, it ordinarily is required to calculate the proper Guidelines range.
See, e.g., Booker,
Because we have determined that the district court’s misapplication of the Guidelines requires a remand in this case, we need not consider Villegas’s argument that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.
TV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we VACATE Villegas’s sentence and REMAND for re-sentencing consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. In June 1999, he was allowed to depart the United States voluntarily in lieu of deportation after being found illegally present in the United States.
. Section 3553 provides:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence^ — The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentеncing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines — ■ (i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28)....
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (Supp.2004).
. It is worth noting that both Doe and Hazel-wood involved preserved error because the defendant objected below. Although Doe does not address the issue, Hazelwood reviewed the error for harmlessness as instructed by the Booker Court. Conversely, we rеview Villegas's sentence for plain error because he did not object below.
. This court took a similar approach in
United States v. Montgomery,
. Section 3553(b)(1), which made the Guidelines mandatory, provided:
(b) Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence.—
(1)In general. — Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sеntencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline in the case of an offense other than a petty offense, the court shall also have due regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines aрplicable to similar offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp.2004).
.Section 3742(e) provided:
(e) Consideration. — Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence—
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and
(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons required by section 3553(c);
(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that—
(i) does not advаnce the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or
(ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b); or
*362 (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range, having regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section 3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and, except with respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp.2004).
. This conclusion is infоrmed in part by this court's pre-2003 practice of reviewing sentencing departures from the range established by the Guidelines. Before the PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, amended § 3742(e) to provide for a complete de novo review of all departures, this court reviewed departures in two steps: first, we asked whether the departure was proper under the Guidelines, which was reviewed de novo; and second, we asked whether the degree of the departure was reasonable, which was reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States
v.
Fierro,
. It is true that Villegas also alleges a Sixth Amendment Booker error on the ground that the district court found facts to enhance his sentence and imposed the sentence under the mandatory Guidelines. However, we must first address the antecedent error that the district court committed by misapplying the Guidelines.
. Moreover, the record contains nothing to suggest that the district court would have imposed the twenty-one month sentence had it not been required by the Guidelines, nor does it include any explanation of why the court would have considered such a sentence appropriate even if it were contrary to the Guidelines.
. In Antonakopoulos, the First Circuit stated:
[W]here in a pre-Booker world we would have remanded for procedural or substantive error in the application of the Guidelines, that would normally lead to a Booker remand. Where, as in pre-Booker cases, we engage in plain-error review and find it clear that the district court has made a sentencing error under the Guidelines, the correction of which ordinarily would have led to a lower sentence in the pre-Booker era, there is a strong argument for remand. This means that in some cases we will continue to review pre-Booker type claims of Guideline error where it is plausible that the error committed affected the sentence.