UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus SANFORD EUGENE JOHNSON, III, a.k.a. Bubba, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 17-15259
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
November 19, 2020
D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00074-RV-3; [PUBLISH]; Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES, and KELLY,* Circuit Judges.
Defendant Sanford Eugene Johnson, III, directed the ordering, pickup, distribution and sale of large quantities of marijuana in northwest Florida. Following an investigation that ensnared fellow participants in the same criminal enterprise, Defendant was charged and pled guilty to two counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana and (2) conspiracy to commit money laundering. The district court sentenced Defendant to two concurrent 151-month sentences.
Defendant appeals his sentence. He argues the district court erred by holding him responsible for more than 400 kg of marijuana, enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice and criminal livelihood, failing to give him full credit for his timely acceptance of responsibility, and imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence of 151 months when his co-conspirators received lesser sentences. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Marijuana Distribution Conspiracy
Defendant and seven other codefendants participated in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana from about January 1, 2014 until about May 22, 2017. Each codefendant also conspired to launder money from the sale of marijuana through various bank accounts.
The conspiracy centered on Charles Sindylek, a former Pensacola, Florida, resident who moved to California. Sindylek coordinated the receipt of orders from buyers in Florida, ordered marijuana from a California supplier, Brandon Remeyer, and provided payment instructions to the buyers. Remeyer would package the marijuana in other items, like dog beds, and ship the package via UPS and Fed Ex to various addresses in Florida as directed by the
B. Procedural History
In July 2017, a federal grand jury indicted Defendant along with Sindylek, Remeyer, and five other defendants: David DelGiacco, Andrew Marcelonis, Brett Brownell, William Brownell, and Steven Sholly. The indictment charged all defendants with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of
1. Defendant‘s Violation of a Protective Order
Though he eventually accepted responsibility for his actions, Defendant became
After indicting Defendant, the Government moved for a protective order to limit the dissemination of discovery materials that Defendant might use to retaliate against cooperating witnesses. The Government explained in its motion:
Based upon the nature of the charges and the drug trafficking organization with which the defendants are alleged to be associated, the government‘s discovery materials include reports involving the debriefings of potential cooperating witnesses adverse to the defendants. This includes those who the defendants, or others who remain at large, would have reason to harm in retaliation for cooperation with the government. Given the totality of circumstances underlying this indictment, the government contends it would be inappropriate for the defendants to receive a physical copy of discovery to keep in their possession.
The district court granted the motion and issued a protective order prohibiting Defendant and his counsel from: (1) using discovery material for any purpose other than defense of the case; (2) disclosing discovery material directly or indirectly to any other person; or (3) copying or reproducing discovery materials. The protective order also required defense counsel to redact identifying information of cooperating witnesses from discovery materials provided to Defendant.
Defendant violated the protective order, photographing discovery materials of two reports of interviews with Brett Brownell and sending them via Facebook Messenger to a potential witness, Lauren Gibbs. Gibbs had made multiple cash deposits of drug proceeds. Defendant and Gibbs exchanged the following messages:
Defendant: I have allllll the paper work
Brett [Brownell] snitched on all of us
...
Zack [Sindylek] did go in. Yes Everyone except me did
...
He‘s [Brett‘s] not the only one who told. So far, with the paper work I‘ve seen 4 snitches
Gibbs: Brett‘s Mom said his lawyer told her there were numerous criminal informants telling on y‘all before your door ever got kicked in
Those are the snitches you need to be looking for
Brett did what anyone else would do in his situation
He was told that everyone was making him out to be the main guy
Defendant: Well I can‘t talk for everyone else. But I know that for a fact [his]name never came out of [my] mouth.
But u can believe it will now
And when I see him he‘s mine
...
But he told on point blank.
...
Idgaf if he told on zack.
....
But I‘m mad about me
As explained below, because Defendant violated the protective order and communicated with a potential witness, the district court concluded that he had obstructed justice and enhanced his sentencing guidelines range accordingly.
a. The Presentence Investigation Report
Following Defendant‘s guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR“). The PSR adopted the facts contained in the plea agreement and included additional information derived from investigators regarding Defendant‘s criminal activity.
The probation officer concluded that Defendant should be held responsible for 586.95 kilograms of marijuana based on the calculation that Defendant had received at least 174 packages containing at least 6 pounds of marijuana each (totaling 473.55 kilograms of marijuana bud) and an additional 5 pounds of wax made from butane hash oil (“BHO“) (equivalent to 113.4 kilograms of marijuana). This calculation meant that Defendant should be held responsible for more than 400 but less than 700 kilograms of marijuana, which resulted in a Base Offense Level of 26 pursuant to
The probation officer concluded that Defendant had recruited, directed, supervised, and/or controlled a number of individuals who received marijuana packages for him and/or made bank deposits for him. Based on that information, the probation officer determined that Defendant played an aggravating role in the conspiracy and recommended a 4-level enhancement pursuant to
The PSR added two levels to Defendant‘s Base Offense Level pursuant to
Despite Defendant‘s guilty plea and admission to being involved in the charged offense, the PSR included no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Explaining this omission, the PSR cited Application Note 4 to
With nine criminal history points, plus two more added because Defendant committed the charged offense while under another criminal justice sentence, Defendant‘s Criminal History Category was V. His guideline imprisonment range was 292-365 months.
Johnson filed objections to the PSR. Relevant to this appeal, he objected to the calculation of drug weight, the two-level enhancement for criminal livelihood, the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, and the decision to deny him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He also argued that his criminal history category of V over-represented the seriousness of his prior criminal offense.
b. Evidence at the Sentencing Hearing
The district court conducted a sentencing hearing during which two Government witnesses, DEA Special Agent Benjamin
Special Agent Pekerol testified about Sindylek‘s statements concerning Defendant‘s involvement in the conspiracy. He testified that Sindylek informed him that Defendant received approximately two boxes of marijuana per week and that each box contained between 6 and 8 pounds, but almost always 8 pounds. In addition to those shipments, Special Agent Pekerol relayed that Sindylek stated that Defendant received five shipments of BHO, which were almost always one pound per box.
Special Agent Pekerol further described his own independent investigation of the quantity of marijuana bud attributable to Defendant. He explained that his analysis of FedEx and UPS shipping records established that Defendant was responsible for 174 shipments of marijuana. Special Agent Pekerol conservatively estimated that Defendant was responsible for 1,044 pounds of marijuana bud. He testified that this figure was conservative because it excluded shipments to Defendant‘s personal residence2 and was based on each package containing only six pounds of marijuana, which was the low end of the range that witnesses, including Sindylek, had stated were typically shipped in each package. Accordingly, he estimated Defendant was responsible for 1,044 pounds, or 473.5 kg, of marijuana bud.
Addressing the criminal livelihood enhancement, Special Agent Pekerol also testified that, while Defendant made approximately $104,400 from marijuana bud sales (not including any money made from distribution of BHO) over an approximately two-year period, Defendant‘s tax returns and bank statements showed little evidence of regular employment wages or a source of legitimate income during that time.
Addressing the obstruction of justice enhancement, Special Agent Pekerol explained the nature and scope of Defendant‘s breach of the protective order. He further recounted Defendant‘s messages to Gibbs, including the “he‘s mine” statement that could be perceived as a threat to Brownell.
c. The District Court‘s Rulings on Defendant‘s Objections
The district court overruled Defendant‘s objection to the drug quantity calculation, noting that the weight estimate
As to the four-level enhancement for being a leader, Defendant argued that others were more involved and at an earlier time than him. The district court sustained the objection, in part, and deemed a two-level enhancement appropriate given Defendant‘s supervisory role in this “midlevel-distribution ring.” The district court also sustained Defendant‘s objection to not receiving a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility based on his guilty plea, which plea had occurred after his obstructive conduct. The court expressed an inclination to give the additional one-level reduction available to defendants who timely plead guilty, but indicated its inability to do so, given that
Defendant objected that his Criminal History Category overrepresented his criminal history. The district court agreed. The court therefore decreased Defendant‘s Criminal History Category from V to III, reducing his guideline imprisonment range to a 151–188 month range. The court sentenced Defendant to a term of 151 months on each of Counts One and Two, with the terms to run concurrently.
II. DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Defendant raises five challenges to his sentence: the three enhancements based on the quantity of marijuana, obstruction of justice, and criminal livelihood; the district court‘s failure to award an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility; and the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence.
A. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding Defendant Responsible for More Than 400 Kilograms of Marijuana
The district court found Defendant responsible for more than 400 kilograms of marijuana based on the testimony of Special Agents Murphy and Pekerol regarding the number of marijuana packages shipped to Defendant and the approximate quantity of marijuana contained in each package. Defendant maintains the evidence was insufficient to hold him responsible for more than 400kg of marijuana, which is the threshold required to apply a base offense level of 26 under
As an initial matter, Defendant concedes that the documentary evidence supports holding him accountable for 174 shipments of marijuana from California to addresses he controlled in Florida. Thus, this case is not like United States v. Sholly, 785 F. App‘x 714, 719 (11th Cir. 2019), where we vacated the sentence of Defendant‘s co-conspirator, Steven Sholly. In its non-precedential opinion, the Sholly panel explained that it could find no apparent support in the record for the reliability of the hearsay statement establishing the number of shipments to Sholly, nor any hint
In particular, the Government had failed to provide shipment records to corroborate hearsay statements made by Sindylek regarding the number of packages shipped to Sholly. Id. That is not the case here. And as noted, Defendant does not contest the number of shipments, which fact is clearly established by the documentary evidence in this case. Instead, he challenges the amount of marijuana shipped in each package. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to hold him accountable for more than 400 kg of marijuana because the Government “relied solely on Sindylek‘s hearsay statements to find that each package contained six pounds of marijuana and that [he] received five pounds of BHO.” (emphasis added by Defendant). Defendant maintains this hearsay evidence is not reliable because “the court did not have the opportunity to make its own credibility determinations as to the veracity of Sindylek‘s statements, nor did the government give the court any corroborating evidence to rely upon.” Thus, Defendant contends the Government did not carry its burden of establishing drug weight by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005).
We find no error in the district court‘s assessment of the evidence and determination that Defendant should be held accountable for more than 400 kg of marijuana. As an initial matter, Defendant‘s own admissions corroborate Sindylek‘s hearsay statements that Defendant typically received six to eight pounds in each marijuana package. Defendant stated his cut was $100 per pound and he was making $600 to $1200 per week. Thus, Defendant admits to distributing six to 12 pounds of marijuana each week. Moreover, that Defendant estimated he was making $600 to $1200 per week is consistent with him averaging receipt of one to two shipments a week, each containing six pounds. That too is consistent with the shipping records showing 174 shipments over an approximately 112-week period.3 Accordingly, the drug quantity approximation used by the district court is well within Defendant‘s own estimated range.
To the extent the district court may have also considered the hearsay statements of Sindylek that Defendant received 6 to 8 pounds per shipment, we find no error there. Hearsay evidence can support a sentencing decision “provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”
Here, the record sufficiently indicates the reliability of Sindylek‘s statements concerning the quantity of marijuana contained in each package sent to Defendant. As noted, Defendant‘s own admissions are consistent with Sindylek‘s 6 to 8-pound
Given the totality of the evidence, the district court did not clearly err in attributing 6 pounds of marijuana per shipment to Defendant and holding Defendant responsible for at least 1,044 pounds, or about 473.55 kilograms, of marijuana. The court was entitled to approximate the quantity of marijuana for which Defendant was responsible based on evidence “demonstrating the average frequency and amount of a defendant‘s drug sales over a given period of time.” Almedina, 686 F.3d at 1315–16; Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1296 (citing United States v. Frazier, 89 F.3d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1996));
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s finding that Defendant should be held accountable for more than 400 kg of marijuana.
B. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Applying a Two-Level Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice
The district court found Defendant obstructed justice because Defendant transmitted discovery to Gibbs in violation of the court‘s protective order, and threatened a co-conspirator, Brett Brownell, when he stated, “And when I see him, he‘s mine.” “Whether the district court properly applied the obstruction of justice enhancement is a mixed question of law and fact.” United States v. Bradford, 277 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). “This Court reviews a district court‘s factual findings for clear error and their application of the Guidelines to those facts de novo.” Id.
The district court did not clearly err in applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Sentencing Guidelines provide:
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant‘s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.
Here, the facts support a finding that Defendant unlawfully photographed discovery materials, used the photographs
Defendant contends that transmitting discovery in violation of the court‘s order and threatening a co-defendant snitch cannot support a finding of obstruction because cases finding obstruction and the application notes to
Defendant‘s arguments that the court clearly erred in finding his conduct to constitute obstruction of justice are not persuasive. First, the commentary provides a “non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which [the obstruction] adjustment applies.”
Third, it was not unreasonable for the district court to view Defendant‘s statement “when I see him[,] he‘s mine” as a threat to Brownell, especially given Defendant‘s earlier expressed desire to “bash [snitches‘] heads in.” Moreover, Defendant both transmitted the discovery material in violation of the court‘s order and voiced his displeasure with cooperating witnesses to Gibbs, who, as a depositor of cash payments for marijuana sales, was herself a potential witness.
Finally, even if one could plausibly interpret Defendant‘s communication to Gibbs as merely “venting,” and not representing an actual or attempted threat, the district court did not clearly err in finding obstruction so long as its interpretation was reasonable. “Where a fact pattern gives rise to two reasonable and different constructions, the factfinder‘s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Almedina, 686 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation omitted). And the district court‘s conclusion that Defendant‘s communication was an attempt to obstruct the investigation was clearly reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s finding of obstruction of justice and application of a two-level enhancement under
Defendant contends the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for livelihood. A livelihood enhancement is appropriate when a defendant: (1) receives an aggravating role adjustment under
Defendant argues only that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence that he “engaged in” the criminal conduct “as a livelihood.” “[E]ngaged in as a livelihood” as used in
(A) the defendant derived income from the pattern of criminal conduct that in any twelve-month period exceeded 2,000 times the then existing hourly minimum wage under federal law; and (B) the totality of circumstances shows that such criminal conduct was the defendant‘s primary occupation in that twelve-month period (e.g., the defendant engaged in criminal conduct rather than regular, legitimate employment; or the defendant‘s legitimate employment was merely a front for the defendant‘s criminal conduct).
The district court overruled Defendant‘s objection to the two-level increase in offense level for livelihood under Sections
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant‘s income from marijuana sales was greater than minimum wage and a lot more than his income from legitimate employment. The record supports that Defendant made more than $100,000 from marijuana sales over a two-year period, which far exceeds minimum wage.5 Moreover, Defendant reported less than $10,000 of legitimate income for 2015 and 2016.
While Defendant claims unreported “under the table” income from working at Cameron Amore Painting, no direct evidence of how much Defendant earned under the table exists. Defendant alleges he worked at Cameron Amore Painting for six months at $12.00 to $15.00 per hour. Even if true, that amounts to only about $15,000, assuming the highest rate of compensation and a 40-hour work week. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly error in assessing the value of Defendant‘s marijuana income as being clearly greater than his legitimate employment income and the minimum wage.
engage in criminal conduct “rather than regular, legitimate employment.” Id. (emphasis added).8
Because the record supports the conclusion that marijuana distribution was Defendant‘s primary occupation, and because he is attributed with deriving more than $14,500, or 2000 times the federal minimum wage, in income from the conspiracy for 2015 and 2016, the district court did not err in finding that Defendant engaged in marijuana distribution as his livelihood. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s application of a two-level increase in Defendant‘s base offense level pursuant to
D. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err in Denying Defendant an Additional One-Level Reduction for Timely Acceptance of Responsibility
1. Plain Error Review Applies
The impact of the district court‘s imposition of an enhancement based on Defendant‘s obstructive conduct bled over into the amount of credit he got for his acceptance of responsibility, as Defendant‘s obstruction prompted the Government not to file a motion asking that Defendant be given an additional one-level reduction for his timely acceptance of responsibility. Defendant now contends that the district court should have sua sponte awarded him the additional reduction, even without a Government motion.
To understand Defendant‘s argument, one must first understand the structure of the Guideline provision governing acceptance of responsibility. Section
Here, the district court awarded Defendant a two-level reduction under
This being so, we review only for plain error Defendant‘s contention that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte declare as impermissible the Government‘s refusal to move for an additional one-level reduction. United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 1344, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2019) (a defendant‘s failure to object on procedural reasonableness grounds at sentencing means that his alleged error will be reviewed for plain error only). Indeed, our sister circuits have applied the same standard of review in similar circumstances. See United States v. Jordan, 877 F.3d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 2017) (applying plain error review where on appeal the defendant challenged the Government‘s refusal to move for a
2. Legal Background
Prior to 2003,
After passage of the 2003 amendment, we held that the additional one-level reduction cannot be granted absent a Government motion. In particular, we did not question the Government‘s motives in withholding a motion when we rejected defendant‘s argument that he was entitled to an additional one-level reduction under subsection (b) in United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 2006). There we stated that “[a] reduction under subsection (b) may be granted only on formal motion by the government at the time of sentencing ‘[b]ecause the Government is in the best position to determine whether the defendant has assisted authorities in a manner that avoids preparing for trial.‘” Id. (quoting
Some circuits did, however, wrestle with the question whether, following the 2003 amendment, there were limits to the Government‘s discretion to withhold a motion. The primary bone of contention concerned whether a defendant‘s refusal to waive his appeal rights as part of his plea agreement was a valid basis for the Government‘s refusal. Nowhere in
Other circuits, however, deemed this to be an illegitimate reason for the Government to withhold a motion. For example, the Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that defendant‘s refusal to sign an appellate waiver justified the Government withholding a
To address this circuit split, the Sentencing Commission amended the Commentary of
Because the Government is in the best position to determine whether the defendant has assisted authorities in a manner that avoids preparing for trial, an adjustment under subsection (b) may only be granted upon a formal motion by the Government at the time of sentencing. See section 401(g)(2)(B) of Pub. L. 108-21. The government should not withhold such a motion based on interests not identified in
§3E1.1 , such as whether the defendant agrees to waive his or her right to appeal.
“We treat the commentary in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual as authoritative.” United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1195 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Amendment 775 restricts the grounds upon which the Government may justify withholding a motion to those grounds that serve an interest identified in
Although our Court has not addressed in a published decision the extent of the Government‘s discretion to refuse to move for a third-level reduction when the defendant has timely notified the prosecution of his intent to plead guilty, a few other circuits have done so. In United States v. Brockman, 924 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2019), the defendant complained that the Government had declined to recommend a third
Gaye bears some similarities to this case. In Gaye, prior to pleading guilty, the defendant had attempted to discourage a witness from testifying against him. Accordingly, at sentencing, the district court had enhanced Gaye‘s sentence by two levels based on his attempted obstruction of justice. 902 F.3d at 788-89. The district court awarded Gaye a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under
The First Circuit addressed the impact of Amendment 775 in United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020). There, without objection from the Government, the district court awarded the defendant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility per
The Fifth Circuit has dipped its toes into these waters in a few cases. In United States v. Castillo, 779 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2015), the Government refused to make the
That said, the court rejected the Government‘s argument that the time expended litigating the extent of the loss resulting from the defendant‘s theft undermined the “efficient allocation of governmental resources,” as set out in
The interests identified in
The Fifth Circuit again confronted the question whether the Government could properly decline to file a
Finally, in United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit once again addressed a case in which the Government refused to recommend that the defendant receive the third-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility because the defendant put the Government to the burden of a suppression hearing. Id. at 374. In Longoria, there was no contention that the defendant‘s suppression motion was falsified or frivolous. Further, the Fifth Circuit noted that “if [it] were writing on a blank slate, Longoria might have a compelling argument,” as
“[I]t tellingly does not directly address the circuit split that has long existed on whether the government‘s having to go through a suppression hearing is a valid basis for not requesting the third point. That silence suggests that the Commission, which keeps track of splits on Guidelines issues, chose not to clarify section
3. The Take-Away From The Caselaw
The take-away from related case authority is inconclusive. As to the breadth of a timeliness assessment, the circuits are not uniform as to whether the defendant‘s insistence on a suppression hearing can justify the Government‘s refusal to make a
The issue underlying the Government‘s refusal here to file the motion—Defendant‘s obstruction of justice—did not cause the Government additional work, as would the filing of a suppression motion. Nor was untimeliness in any way implicated by the Defendant‘s conduct. Thus, the question becomes whether the Government can decline to make a
Obstructive conduct is a factor to consider in determining whether to award a defendant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under
In short, in the case of a timely notification of a decision to plead guilty, it is clear that the Government can no longer base its refusal to move for a third-level reduction on a defendant‘s refusal to waive appellate rights. Beyond that, nothing else is clear as a review of out-of-circuit cases suggests no consensus on what other grounds can justify the Government‘s refusal to make a
E. The District Court Did Not Impose a Substantively Unreasonable Sentence
Defendant challenges his concurrent 151-month sentences as being substantively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that “the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the [18 U.S.C.]
After reviewing the record and the
Nevertheless, Defendant argues that his sentence should be deemed substantively unreasonable because of the disparity between his sentence and the sentences of other co-conspirators. We must consider the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.
Defendant asserts “[t]he disparity in sentences in this case is outrageous,” noting that Brett Brownell received a 70-month sentence, Remeyer a 72-month sentence, and Sindylek a 90-month sentence. But none of those co-conspirators were similarly situated. Brownell had only a Criminal History Category of I, whereas Defendant had a Criminal History Category of V, which the district court downwardly departed to reduce to a Category III. Moreover, Brownell was not subject to an
Likewise, Defendant is not similarly situated to Remeyer and Sindylek. Both provided substantial assistance to the Government and received a substantial downward departure under
“It is not enough for [Defendant] to simply compare the sentences of other defendants in the conspiracy to his own; there must be comparable underlying factual circumstances.” Id. Defendant has not carried his burden to show specific facts establishing that any codefendants are similarly situated. Accordingly, we find Defendant‘s sentencing disparity arguments unpersuasive and we affirm the district court‘s imposition of concurrent 151-month sentences as substantively reasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
After careful review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court for the reasons explained above. AFFIRMED.