*1 Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges. MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
Glen Sterling Carpenter appeals his sentence of 97 months of incarceration and lifetime supervised release. In 2013, federal law enforcement authorities detected an account sharing child pornography over the Internet, which they traced to Carpenter. When they searched his laptop, they discovered 64 videos of child pornography -- many depicting minors under the age of 12, and some depicting sadistic and masochistic conduct. Carpenter subsequently admitted that he had been downloading child pornography for about a year. He was charged by indictment with one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2), and eventually pled guilty. On appeal, Carpenter argues that his sentence of 97 months in prison is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He also claims that his sentence of supervised release for life is unreasonable, and that two of the special conditions of his release -- barring him from possessing a computer or another device that can access the Internet, and from possessing sexually explicit material involving adults -- are unreasonable as well.
We disagree, and uphold his sentence in its entirety. As for Carpenter’s prison sentence, the district court accurately calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory, provided a thorough explanation of how it weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and addressed Carpenter’s motion for a downward variance at considerable length. The district court’s approach was procedurally reasonable, and yielded a substantively reasonable result, in light of the severity of Carpenter’s conduct. As for his sentence of supervised release, Carpenter invited the district court to impose a life term, and cannot now complain that the court did as he asked. Finally, he failed to make a specific and contemporaneous objection to the two special conditions of his supervised release, and he cannot show that the court plainly erred in imposing those conditions. We affirm.
I.
The basic facts and procedural history are these. On September 16, 2013, federal law enforcement authorities detected a user on the Ares peer-to-peer network by the name of “gcarp@ares,” who was advertising child pornography for download. Law enforcement downloaded a video containing child pornography from the user, and identified the IP address associated with that user name as belonging to Carpenter at his known residence. On January 14, 2014, law enforcement executed a search warrant at Carpenter’s home. They did not find a computer, but did discover a receipt indicating that Carpenter had sold a Lenovo laptop to a local pawnshop. That same day, the agents went to the pawnshop and recovered the laptop.
A forensic search of Carpenter’s laptop revealed that it contained a vast collection of child pornography. Specifically, the laptop contained 64 videos depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, or 4,800 discrete images. [1] Many of the videos depicted prepubescent minors under the age of 12; some even depicted toddlers. Three videos depicted “sadistic and masochistic” conduct. Nineteen of the videos ranged from 10 to 44 minutes in length. The record contains specific details of several of the videos:
1. A video depicting an adult male engaging in vaginal intercourse with a minor female who is kneeling face down on a bed.
2. A video depicting different images of adult males vaginally penetrating female toddlers. One female toddler is tied at the ankles and around the back of her neck as she is bent over a bed.
3. A video depicting an adult male engaged in vaginal and anal intercourse with a female under the age of 18.
4. A video depicting an adult male performing oral sex on a female under 18 and penetrating the female’s anus with his finger.
The laptop also contained 45 videos depicting adult pornography, as well as 2 videos where the ages of the subjects could not be determined.
Carpenter waived his Miranda rights, and subsequently confessed to downloading and possessing child pornography on his laptop. Specifically, he admitted to downloading child pornography for about a year, and explained that he used search terms such as “kiddy porn” to locate the videos. He also said that he attempted to masturbate while viewing the videos, but was unable to do so, that he felt bad for the children depicted in the videos, that he had an attraction to children, and that he needed help with his problem of viewing child pornography.
On January 30, 2014, Carpenter was charged by a federal grand jury sitting in the Southern District of Florida with one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2). He eventually pled guilty to the charged offense without a plea agreement in a change of plea hearing on March 11. At the hearing, the district court conducted a plea colloquy in which Carpenter confirmed that he understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and the penalties he faced. In particular, Carpenter understood that he was subject to a term of up to 20 years of imprisonment, as well as a term of supervised release ranging from 5 years to life. Carpenter acknowledged that the court would consider all the sentencing factors provided by law, including the Guidelines, and that the court would impose a sentence it deemed appropriate. The prosecutor also made a factual proffer at the hearing, to which Carpenter assented. The court, finding that Carpenter was competent to plead, that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and that it was supported by an adequate factual basis, accepted his plea and adjudged him guilty as charged.
The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) calculated Carpenter’s Guidelines range this way. His base offense level was 18. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1). He received a 2-level enhancement because the offense involved material depicting a minor below the age of 12, id. § 2G2.2(b)(2); 2 levels because the offense involved distribution, id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F); 4 levels because the offense involved material depicting sadistic or masochistic conduct, id. § 2G2.2(b)(4); 2 levels because the offense involved the use of a computer, id. § 2G2.2(b)(6); and 5 levels because the offense involved 600 or more images, id. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). He received a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Carpenter’s total offense level was 30, so with a criminal history category of I, his Guidelines range was 97 to 121 months of imprisonment. The maximum statutory penalty was 20 years, followed by a term of supervised release from 5 years to life. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b)(2), 3583(k); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2). The PSI also noted that a factor potentially meriting an upward departure, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 n.4(B)(ii), was that Carpenter possessed a visual depiction over 5 minutes, since 19 of the videos on Carpenter’s laptop ranged from 10 to 44 minutes in duration.
The PSI revealed several details about Carpenter’s life and personal characteristics. Carpenter was born in 1955, rendering him 58 at the time of sentencing. According to Carpenter, his mother was an alcoholic, and married a man who was physically abusive toward Carpenter, his mother, and his siblings. He denied experiencing any sexual or psychological abuse. He admitted a history of substance abuse, namely heroin. The PSI also recommended a number of conditions of supervised release, including the two conditions Carpenter challenges in this case:
1. Computer Possession Restriction: The defendant shall not possess or use any computer; except that the defendant may, with the prior approval of the Court, use a computer in connection with authorized employment.
2. Restricted from Possession of Sexual Materials: The defendant shall not buy, sell, exchange, possess, trade, or produce visual depictions of minors or adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The defendant shall not correspond or communicate in person, by mail, telephone, or computer, with individuals or companies offering to buy, sell, trade, exchange, or produce visual depictions of minors or adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Carpenter made no objection to the PSI, nor to any of the listed conditions.
Carpenter did, however, request a downward variance in a sentencing memorandum. Specifically, he asked for a sentence of 56 months, and argued that a December 2012 report by the United States Sentencing Commission (“the Report”) had determined that the Sentencing Guidelines for child pornography cases, found in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, were flawed. Carpenter argued, citing the Report, that the § 2G2.2 enhancements are outdated because they apply in nearly every case, and yield Guidelines sentences higher than in cases involving sexual contact with minors. He noted that, in response, courts have typically varied downward, and imposed Guidelines-range sentences in only 27.3 percent of cases. Carpenter also cited several cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida where defendants had received downward variances despite allegedly engaging in more serious conduct than himself. He closed by arguing that a 56 month sentence would adequately take into account his individual characteristics, as well as the flaws in the Sentencing Guidelines.
At the sentencing hearing, held on July 7, 2014, the district court took argument on Carpenter’s motion for a downward variance and, ultimately, the appropriate sentence. Defense counsel argued that, in the Sentencing Commission’s “own words,” the Guidelines were “outdated and produce[d] disproportionate sentencings.” Counsel reiterated that courts have tended to downwardly vary. Counsel also presented several mitigating factors: Carpenter’s abuse at the hands of his stepfather, his history of substance abuse, the fact that he did not have “a long history” of downloading child pornography, and the fact that his offense conduct began at the time of an alleged relapse. Counsel requested a sentence of 56 months, “as well as lifetime supervised release,” which would mean that Carpenter would “always have the resources that Probation has to offer in terms of counseling and therapy, which has not been the case with his drug addiction.” Before finishing her presentation, counsel again argued that “a sentence of 56 months would sufficiently serve the purposes of punishment . . . [and] would safeguard the public by placing [Carpenter] on supervised release for life.” Carpenter himself then stated that it was his “wish that the BOP place [him] in a facility where [he] [could] get that help that [he] desperately need[ed].”
The prosecutor then responded to defense counsel’s arguments.
Specifically, he argued that the “whole concept of empirical studies” is not “very
valid,” and “serve[d] as a distraction.” He referred to our decision in United States
v. Cubero, in which we held that the Report “[did] not change the statutory
sentencing scheme, the applicable sentencing guidelines, or the binding precedent
about § 2G2.2 in this Circuit.”
The district court then pronounced the sentence. It began by acknowledging that it was obliged to “consult the guidelines, take them into account, but [was] not bound by them,” and that it had to look to the “factors under [§ 3553(a)] to determine whether they support the requested sentence.” The court first considered “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of [Carpenter].” It observed that the 64 videos possessed by Carpenter generated 4,800 distinct images -- eight times the 600 images necessary to qualify for the maximum enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7) -- and that three of those videos “depicted minors engaged in sadistic and masochistic conduct.” The court also referred to the mitigating evidence presented by Carpenter: that Carpenter “ha[d] one prior criminal history point; ha[d] a drug problem; and . . . was subjected to physical abuse by his stepfather.” The court then acknowledged “the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment . . . , [and] afford adequate deterrence[,] . . . the need to protect the public from further crimes of the Defendant, . . . [and] the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.”
In light of the seriousness of Carpenter’s offense, the trial court determined that a sentence of 56 months would not meet “the requirements of [§] 3553(a).” While the court agreed that it could consider the criticisms of the Guidelines advanced in the Sentencing Commission’s Report, it determined that it was not bound by them, and denied Carpenter’s request for a downward variance. Instead, it imposed a 97 month sentence “at the lowest end of the advisory guideline range.” It also imposed a life term of supervised release upon Carpenter’s release from incarceration. That sentence included the two conditions recommended by the PSI, prohibiting Carpenter from possessing a computer, except in connection with employment with prior court approval, or adult pornography. It also stipulated that “[t]he computer restrictions . . . shall also apply to any smartphone or any other access device.” The court then asked if either party had any objections, and defense counsel replied: “In order to preserve Mr. Carpenter’s appellate rights, I would object to the substantive and procedural reasonableness of the sentence.” The court’s judgment was entered on July 10, 2014.
This timely appeal followed.
II.
Carpenter first argues that his sentence of 97 months of imprisonment is
unreasonable, an objection he preserved before the district court. On appeal, he
bears the burden to show that his sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Tome,
A.
We begin by considering whether the district court committed any
procedural error in fashioning or explaining Carpenter’s sentence. The answer is
no. When pronouncing a defendant’s sentence, the court need only “set forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Rita v. United States,
As we see it, the district court’s explanation of its sentence was beyond sufficient. Indeed, it spanned over seven pages of transcript. The court expressly acknowledged that the Guidelines are merely advisory, and that it had to look to the “factors under [§ 3553(a)] to determine whether they support the requested sentence.” The court then provided a thorough account of how it applied the § 3553(a) factors. First, the court considered “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of [Carpenter].” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1). It observed that Carpenter possessed at least one video depicting the rape of female toddlers, one of whom “was tied at the ankles and neck”; that many of the videos ranged from 10 to 44 minutes in length; that he possessed 4,800 images, or eight times the 600 images needed to qualify for a 5-level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(7) of the Guidelines; that he had been downloading child pornography for a year; and that three of the videos “depicted minors engaged in sadistic and masochistic conduct.” Yet the court also acknowledged, as mitigation, that Carpenter had been “physically abused” and had a drug problem. In light of the severity of Carpenter’s offense, and “[i]n order to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and certainly to afford adequate deterrence,” see id. § 3553(a)(2), the court concluded that 97 months, “a sentence at the lowest end of the advisory guideline range,” would be appropriate.
Carpenter argues, however, that the district court failed to consider a number
of factors: his personal history and characteristics, the need for educational training
and medical treatment, and the importance of avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities. We are unpersuaded on all fronts. For starters, the district court was
not even required to “articulate its consideration of each individual § 3553(a)
factor.” Ghertler,
Nor are we convinced that the district court treated the Guidelines as
presumptively reasonable. The Supreme Court held in Nelson v. United States that
district courts may not apply a “presumption of reasonableness” to the Guidelines
range.
Finally, Carpenter argues that he presented a nonfrivolous argument for a downward variance, based on the Sentencing Commission’s Report, and was entitled to a more extensive explanation than the district court gave for rejecting it. The court, however, explained why it rejected Carpenter’s request in considerable detail. The court cited our decision in Cubero, in which we held that the Report
“does not render the non-production child pornography Guidelines in § 2G2.2
invalid or illegitimate.”
B.
Carpenter’s 97-month sentence is also substantively reasonable. We review
“the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States,
In particular, “[a] district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to
afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error
of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Irey,
The district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in sentencing
Carpenter to 97 months of imprisonment. At the outset, we note that Carpenter’s
sentence is at the very bottom of the advisory Guidelines range of 97 to 121
months, and is less than half of the statutory maximum of 240 months, two factors
which indicate reasonableness. Cubero,
As we see it, the facts of this case fully support the sentence pronounced by the district court. As we’ve explained, Carpenter possessed 4,800 images, contained in 64 videos, depicting minors involved in sexually explicit conduct -- eight times the number of images required to qualify for the maximum enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7). Nineteen of the videos found on Carpenter’s laptop ranged from 10 to 44 minutes in duration, or two to nine times the five minutes contemplated by the Guidelines, a factor which could well have served as cause for an upward departure. Id. § 2G2.2 n.4(B)(ii). At least three of the videos depicted sadistic and masochistic conduct. To take just one particularly disturbing example, Carpenter possessed a video depicting several instances of adult males sexually assaulting female toddlers, one of whom was tied at the ankles and neck. In light of these undisputed facts, the district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence calculated to “reflect[] the seriousness of the offense.” Yet the district court also weighed Carpenter’s mitigation -- his history of physical abuse and his drug problem -- in giving him a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. On this record, we cannot say that the district court committed any clear error in judgment.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Carpenter’s request
for a downward variance. Before the district court, Carpenter presented his
argument as a challenge to the Guidelines themselves, based on the Sentencing
Commission’s Report. This argument is a non-starter. As we explained in Cubero,
the Report “does not render the non-production child pornography guidelines in §
2G2.2 invalid or illegitimate.”
On appeal, Carpenter presents a slightly different formulation of his
argument, claiming that his position has never been that the Report “invalidated”
the § 2G2.2 Guidelines. Instead, he argues that 97 months is too harsh for him, “a
first time offender in a mine-run non-production case that never had inappropriate
sexual contact with a minor,” and that courts in similar cases have granted
downward variances. The defendant in Cubero made the same argument. See
Cubero,
III.
Carpenter also challenges several aspects of the district court’s decision to sentence him to lifetime supervised release. First, Carpenter objects to the life term. Second, he objects to two of the special conditions that the court imposed. Each of these challenges fails as well.
A.
Carpenter claims that the court automatically sentenced him to lifetime
supervision without any consideration of the circumstances of his case, and that a
life term was not warranted without some showing that he had abused children.
Carpenter, however, cannot complain about the life term of his supervised release
because he expressly requested that the district court sentence him to a life term,
and thereby invited any error the court may have made in doing so. It is by now “a
cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or
other trial proceeding invited by that party.” United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d
1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
invited error doctrine “stems from the common sense view that where a party
invites the trial court to commit error, he cannot later cry foul on appeal.” United
States v. Brannan,
Indeed, this case is strikingly similar to United States v. Love, in which we
held that a defendant could not challenge his supervised release on appeal after
asking the district court to impose such a sentence.
Like the defendant in Love, Carpenter may not challenge his lifetime supervision because he repeatedly asked the court to impose a life term. Thus, during sentencing, defense counsel opined that she thought “a sentence . . . of 56 months . . . , as well as lifetime supervised release” would be appropriate. Indeed, she extolled the virtues of supervised release for life: “[W]hat that would mean for [Carpenter] is that he will always have the resources that Probation has to offer in terms of counseling and therapy, which has not been the case with his drug addiction.” Counsel observed that Carpenter had only been able to access treatment in the past by “cobbl[ing] together his own benefits.” And counsel also averred that lifetime supervised release “would safeguard the public.” The court took these statements into account and “agree[d] that a sentence of supervised release for life is . . . appropriate.” On this record, it is clear that Carpenter not only asked for supervised release, but affirmatively argued in favor of a life term given his need for treatment and close supervision. By doing so, he invited any error the court may have made in imposing the life term.
Carpenter claims, however, that he only agreed to lifetime supervision to encourage the court to grant his requested downward variance. However, his argument cannot be squared with what his attorney actually said at the sentencing hearing. As we’ve explained, counsel argued for a life term of supervised release in its own right, claiming that it would mean that Carpenter would “always” have access to therapy, and that it would help to safeguard the public. Counsel did not say that a life term of supervised release was appropriate only if the court decided to give Carpenter a downward variance. Such a claim would have been utterly unconvincing, because whether or not Carpenter received 56 months or 97 months in prison would have had no bearing on his subsequent need for supervision and treatment upon his release.
Moreover, even if Carpenter’s request for lifetime supervision was meant to
induce the court to sentence him to a shorter prison term, “a criminal defendant
may not make an affirmative, apparently strategic decision at trial and then
complain on appeal that the result of that decision constitutes reversible error.”
United States v. Jernigan,
his strategy may have backfired.
B.
Next, we consider Carpenter’s challenges to two of the special conditions of his supervised release: that he not possess or use a computer, except in connection with employment as approved by the district court, or another access device, and that he not possess sexually explicit material involving adults. Carpenter did not make a specific and contemporaneous objection to either condition, and so our review is for plain error. Even if we were to assume that the district court committed some error in imposing these conditions, no binding authority established that the error was plain.
Generally, “[w]e review the imposition of special conditions of supervised
release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Moran,
(11th Cir. 1997).
Before the district court, Carpenter never once objected to the special
conditions barring him from possessing a computer, access device, or adult
pornography. The presentence investigation report expressly recommended that
the district court impose the conditions barring him from possessing a computer or
pornography, but Carpenter made no objection when the PSI was made available to
him. When Carpenter filed a sentencing memorandum in advance of the hearing,
that filing also made no mention of these two conditions. Then, at the hearing,
neither Carpenter nor his counsel said a word about the conditions. Indeed, as
we’ve explained, counsel specifically requested a term of supervised release. The
district court imposed the requested sentence, and recited the conditions of
Carpenter’s supervision in copious detail, including the challenged conditions.
Afterwards, the court asked if Carpenter had any objections, and counsel said only
supervision that he seeks to challenge on appeal. See, e.g., Moran,
We exercise plain error review “sparingly, and only in those circumstances
in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” United States v.
Rodriguez,
To show plain error, Carpenter must show “an error that is obvious and is
clear under current law.” Humphrey,
1.
The first condition Carpenter challenges is the condition stipulating that he “shall not possess or use any computer or access device; except that [he] may, with the prior approval of the [district court], use a computer in connection with authorized employment.” We discern no plain error in the district court’s imposition of this condition. Carpenter’s crime was a sex offense involving the use of a computer, and so the Guidelines expressly recommended a condition limiting his computer access. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B); id. § 5D1.2 n.1. Carpenter does not point to a single decision of the Supreme Court or this Court invalidating such a condition on facts similar to this case, and we have been unable to find any.
To the contrary, our cases have uniformly upheld conditions prohibiting
defendants convicted of sex offenses from accessing a computer or the Internet for
the duration of their supervised release. Thus, for example, in United States v.
Zinn, we upheld a condition stipulating that a defendant convicted of possessing
child pornography “shall not possess or use a computer with access to any on-line
service at any location, including employment, without written approval from the
probation officer.”
1140-41; United States v. Taylor,
Carpenter argues that the condition imposed in his case differs in two ways from the conditions we have previously upheld: first, it extends for the duration of his supervised release, i.e. life, and second, it prohibits any computer usage outside the context of employment. Neither difference establishes that the district court plainly erred. For starters, no case of the Supreme Court or this Court says that a condition like this one cannot be imposed. Without such a case, there is no precedent directly resolving Carpenter’s claim in his favor, and there can be no plain error. Moreover, to the extent that the duration of the condition makes a difference, we reiterate that Carpenter invited the court to impose a life term, and
he may not disavow that decision on appeal. As for the broad scope of the condition, the district court possessed significant discretion to tailor it to the facts of Carpenter’s case. We see no plain error in the way the court exercised that discretion.
Carpenter also directs our attention to cases from other courts invalidating
prohibitions on computer usage. To be sure, at least one of our sister circuits has
struck down a condition barring computer access for life with no exceptions. See
United States v. Voelker,
2.
Finally, Carpenter challenges the condition requiring him not to “buy, sell, exchange, possess, trade, or produce visual depictions of minors or adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” He claims that the condition is unduly restrictive because it bars him from possessing legal, adult pornography. This argument fails as well on plain error review, because Carpenter does not cite to any binding authority holding that a restriction on possessing all forms of pornography is substantively unreasonable. There is no Supreme Court precedent establishing that such a condition is impermissible. Nor has this Court reached such a conclusion, as Carpenter himself admits.
Carpenter again refers to several cases from our sister circuits, this time
invalidating prohibitions on possessing adult pornography. These cases are readily
distinguished. Thus, for example, in United States v. Perazza-Mercado, the First
Circuit found “no suggestion in the [PSI] or at sentencing that [the defendant] had
abused or even possessed pornography in the past.”
988, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Loy,
IV.
In sum, we conclude: (1) Carpenter’s sentence of incarceration is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable; (2) Carpenter invited any error the district court may have made in sentencing him to a life term of supervised release; and (3) Carpenter failed to object to the conditions of his supervised release during sentencing, and he can show no plain error in the conditions the district court imposed. Thus, we affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
[1] One video is considered to contain 75 images. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 n.4(B)(ii).
[2] Carpenter argues that our holding in Zinn is outdated in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and its progeny, and suggests that a defendant today need only object to the reasonableness of his sentence as a whole. However, Booker has no bearing on the specificity with which a defendant must object to particular components of his sentence. In several cases since Booker, we have reiterated that a defendant must specifically object to the conditions of
[3] However, we do not decide whether imposing such a condition on facts similar to this case would constitute an abuse of discretion where a defendant specifically objects to the condition
[4] Finally, we observe that the terms of Carpenter’s supervised release are not written in stone. He may, as counsel for the United States readily conceded at oral argument, petition the district court to revise the conditions of supervised release or, after serving at least one year of supervised release, petition the district court to shorten or terminate his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), (2). Indeed, a district court may reduce the conditions of supervised release pursuant to the “provisions applicable to the initial setting of the terms and conditions of post- release supervision.” Id. § 3583(e)(2). And a district court may shorten the term of supervised release “if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” Id. § 3583(e)(1).