UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RONALD FRANCIS CROTEAU, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-11720
D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00121-SPC-DNF-1
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
(April 11, 2016)
Before HULL, JULIE CARNES and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. HULL, Circuit Judge:
[PUBLISH]
*Honorable Rhesa H. Barksdale, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Following a jury trial, Ronald Croteau appeals his conviction and 56-month sentence for ten counts of making false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims on his tax returns, in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
A. Offense Conduct
The eleven-count indictment against defendant Croteau charged that from September 2008 to September 2010, Croteau filed at least ten false income tax returns with the IRS and created, submitted, and recorded various other false, fictitious, or fraudulent documents with the IRS and other government entities. We recount the evidence presented to the jury, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 744 (11th Cir. 2008).
In September 2008, defendant Croteau filed three false and fraudulent tax returns for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008. In these returns, Croteau reported that he was entitled to refunds totaling approximately $400,000 for these years. Croteau signed the forms under penalty of perjury, and he requested that the refunds be deposited into his bank account.
As substantiation for his tax returns, Croteau separately mailed to the IRS “transmittal-of-information” forms with attached 1099-OID (Original Issue Discount) forms purportedly issued to him by various financial institutions. The 1099-OID forms reported that the financial institutions had issued interest income to Croteau and had withheld sums for federal tax purposes. Croteau‘s tax returns sought refunds of the money withheld.1
In November 2008, after Croteau submitted amended tax returns for 2006, 2007, and 2008, which still contained fictitious and fraudulent information, the IRS sent Croteau another letter. The letter warned Croteau that the tax return information he had submitted in September 2008 contained frivolous tax information, which reflected “a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws.” The letter explained that “[f]ederal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, [had] considered and repeatedly rejected, as without merit, positions” that Croteau had taken in his tax returns.
The IRS gave Croteau 30 days in which to file corrected information and threatened to impose a $5,000 penalty if he did not or if he again submitted a frivolous tax return. The IRS included with the letter a copy of a publication entitled “Why Do I Have to Pay Taxes?” and urged Croteau to seek advice from a competent tax professional or qualified attorney. Croteau promptly contacted the IRS in December 2008 requesting the IRS to cancel the 2007 and 2008 returns he had filed because the amounts were incorrect, and he indicated that he would contact his accountant. The IRS responded with a letter thanking Croteau for his cooperation.
Over the course of the next two years, this pattern repeated itself as (1) Croteau would submit tax returns claiming hundreds of thousands of dollars in refunds based on false and fraudulent financial information, (2) Croteau would likewise submit false and fraudulent supporting financial information to substantiate his returns in the form of fraudulent 1099-OID forms containing false income and withholding information, which the banks had not actually issued, (3) the IRS would then warn Croteau that it had discovered his frivolous submissions and that he was required to submit corrected information or be penalized, and (4) Croteau would then respond by admitting that he had made mistakes in his filings. The IRS assessed Croteau with three $5,000 penalties in total. The IRS never issued any refunds to Croteau because it successfully identified all his tax returns and refund information as being frivolous.
Yet again, in April 2009, Croteau filed two more frivolous tax returns containing false and fraudulent information. He filed a 1040 form for 2007 by mail, and he filed one for 2008 electronically. In his 2007 return, Croteau reported that he had earned taxable interest and total income of $147,557, that he owed taxes of $32,977, that $146,665 had been withheld, and that he was due a refund of $113,688. In his 2008 return, Croteau reported that he had earned taxable interest and total income of $1,000,011, that he owed taxes of $325,877, that $952,958 had been withheld, and that he was due a refund of $627,081. As before, Croteau submitted false and fictitious
In May 2010, Croteau submitted two virtually identical false and frivolous 2009 tax returns claiming a refund of $957,670 based on tax payments he purportedly had made in 2008. He submitted one of these tax return forms by mail and the other electronically. Both his claimed tax payments and returns were false.
Then, in September 2010, Croteau mailed another false and frivolous 2007 tax return but altered the form to pertain to 2008. His supporting documentation likewise pertained to 2008. Croteau claimed a refund of $538,733. He also attached bogus 1099-OID forms purporting to show that 100% of his OID interest income had been withheld.
None of the financial institutions had actually issued the various 1099-OID forms that Croteau submitted along with his tax returns. These financial institutions also had no records that substantiated the information in Croteau‘s forms.
The IRS also had no record that Croteau had been paid 1099-OID interest income for tax years 2006, 2007, or 2008.
During much of this span, Croteau availed himself of the IRS‘s Filing Information Returns Electronically (“FIRE“) system, an online computer system that businesses and financial institutions typically use to submit information returns to the IRS. The IRS uses these information returns to verify information that individual tax payers submit in their personal tax returns. Croteau used the FIRE system to submit dozens of 1099-OID information files to the IRS between March 2009 and September 2010 in support of his various tax return submissions.
Also from 2008 to 2012, Croteau created, submitted, and recorded various fictitious and fraudulent documents claiming rights to millions of dollars owed him by the U.S. Treasury and various government agencies and officials. For example, Croteau sent multiple fictitious and fraudulent financial instruments resembling stock certificates to the Secretary of the Treasury claiming $300 million in bonds. Croteau asked the Secretary to deposit the bonds for credit into Croteau‘s “private offset account.” Next to his signature on these documents, Croteau affixed a fingerprint. A government witness from the U.S. Department of the Treasury testified that though Croteau‘s fictitious and fraudulent bond instruments exhibited “indicia or hallmarks . . . intended to make [them] appear genuine,” other features of the documents including the terminology used made it apparent that the documents were “nonsense.”
Croteau also recorded several false, fictitious, and fraudulent liens and documents in the Lee County Clerk‘s office asserting that the IRS and various IRS officials owed him hundreds of millions of dollars in total. In August 2008, Croteau signed and recorded a “Notice of Lien, Diplomatic Immunity and Identity Bond on Land” and a “Private Discharging and Indemnity Bond” for $300 million. A month later, in October 2009, Croteau recorded a “Constructive Notice & Formal Complaint” printed on “Croteau & Associates The Law Men Group” letterhead. This document stated that “Ronald-Francis of the family Croteau” had discharged debt to the IRS totaling $1,973,692.17 from his Federal Reserve Bank trust account and that he had used the 1099-OID and 1099-A processes to discharge his tax payments for 2007 and 2008. The document also stated that the IRS and certain IRS employees and officials owed Croteau $1.3 million. None of the people named in these liens or complaints
B. Indictment and Trial
On August 21, 2013, a grand jury indicted Croteau with ten counts of filing false, fictitious, and fraudulent tax returns with the IRS, in violation of
The government called 19 witnesses in its case-in-chief who described in detail defendant Croteau‘s conduct related to his filing and recording numerous false, fictitious, and fraudulent tax forms and other documents. One of the government‘s witnesses included IRS Special Agent Cameron Lalli.
Agent Lalli testified that when he and another agent had arrested Croteau in November 2013, Croteau had agreed to be interviewed, and he had been carrying a driver‘s license and identification card from the Little Tribe of the Pembina Nation indicating that he was a member of that tribe.3 Agent Lalli testified that one can pay to become a member of this tribe. After Agent Lalli explained to Croteau that he was arrested for filing false tax returns, Croteau admitted that he had filed the returns but claimed that he had made a mistake and had been trying to resolve the problem with the IRS.
At trial, Croteau‘s defense strategy was not to contest that he had in fact filed the false, fictitious, and fraudulent tax returns and various other financial documents the government alleged, but rather to assert a good-faith defense. In his opening statement, Croteau‘s counsel explained to the jury:
There really won‘t be any dispute as to whether or not Mr. Croteau filed all the documents that were filed. It‘s difficult if not
impossible to get away from paper documents that have been filed; that‘s not our issue here.
Rather, his counsel explained, “Mr. Croteau had an honest belief that what he was doing was correct.”
Defendant Croteau took the stand to try to explain his conduct. On cross-examination, Croteau admitted that he had signed and filed the tax returns covered by at least Counts One through Eight in the indictment. He also admitted that he had set up an account through the IRS‘s FIRE system and that he had filed numerous 1099-OID forms. Croteau conceded that several financial institutions had not in fact paid him interest or withheld interest income as Croteau had claimed they had, as substantiation for some of his tax returns.
Prior to the fall of 2008, defendant Croteau had always filed his taxes properly and without incident. He explained that up to that point, he had his accountant Barry Woodrow do his income taxes for about ten years. During that time, Woodrow filed Croteau‘s tax returns and Croteau regularly paid taxes to the IRS. Croteau explained that he had “perfect books” and was never audited.
For example, in February 2006, Croteau and his wife authorized Woodrow to file their 2005 joint income tax return. They claimed an adjusted gross income of $238,741, including his wife‘s wages ($48,469), interest ($88), business income ($4,000), capital gains ($270,462), and losses from rental real estate ($84,298). They claimed that $2,941 of their income had been withheld and that they owed $23,761 in taxes. Also, in August of 2007, Croteau authorized Woodrow to file his 2006 tax return, for which he was sent a $30 tax refund.
Defendant Croteau also testified that for 25 years, he owned and operated a welding company, which was profitable for a time, and he typically employed between four and fifteen people. But things began to unravel. By 2005, Croteau‘s business was failing. In 2006, Croteau was injured in an automobile accident and hospitalized for approximately two weeks. Croteau‘s wife filed for divorce.
Defendant Croteau admitted that, after these events, he became involved with a tax protester and sovereign citizen group called the Little Tribe of the Pembina Nation. This group advocated that its members did not need to submit to governmental authority or pay taxes. At his brother Armand‘s prompting, Croteau began researching the theories espoused by this group. As he read more and more, Croteau concluded that the sovereign citizen theories “made real sense” to him. He and his brother Armand “donated” approximately $700 to join the Little Tribe of the Pembina Nation and have access to identification cards, driver‘s licenses, and other such materials put out by the group. One such card explained that members were exempt from paying taxes.
Croteau also ordered CDs on the Internet from, and watched YouTube videos created by, a man named Winston Shrout, even paying $500 to attend one of Shrout‘s 2-day seminars. Croteau testified that based on the information from these sources, he came to believe that he had a secret Federal Reserve bank account containing money to which he was entitled. He also testified that he learned from Shrout that he could access his “principal
In addition, Croteau called two witnesses to testify on his behalf. One was Walker Todd, an attorney and tax-preparer who had worked for the Federal Reserve Bank. Todd discussed a number of the sovereign citizen theories, such as the idea that taxpayers can access secret accounts and the “redemption theory.” Todd explained that these theories lacked “historical basis,” were “not real,” and were “totally fantasy.” Todd explained that the IRS scam involving the use of 1099-OID forms emerged in the late 2000‘s and is considered one of the top tax scams in recent years. Todd testified that these ideas are promulgated through the Internet, seminars, DVDs, and YouTube videos, with Winston Shrout being one of the main proponents.
Defendant Croteau‘s other witness was Dr. Jethro Toomer. As a clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr. Toomer was consulted by defense counsel and asked to evaluate Croteau to assess his overall mental functioning as it related to Croteau‘s criminal charges. As part of that evaluation, Dr. Toomer interviewed Croteau once and performed various tests on Croteau, including use of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV“) to do the clinical interview. Dr. Toomer concluded that Croteau suffered from mild depression, schizoid personality disorder, and delusional disorder. Dr. Toomer opined that Croteau‘s delusional disorder caused him to be “very certain with regard to his opinions” and to “believe[] that his view of the world is correct.” Dr. Toomer explained that such a disorder would cause someone like Croteau to be fixed in his beliefs in spite of evidence to the contrary. Thus, Dr. Toomer opined that Croteau‘s delusional condition caused him to persist in filing frivolous tax forms and documents despite repeated warnings and instructions by the IRS and others that what he was doing was unwarranted. Dr. Toomer testified that Croteau‘s response to these IRS warnings was to conclude, “[T]hat‘s wrong, that‘s not correct.” Dr. Toomer could not say, however, whether Croteau had truly believed what he had said.
On cross-examination, Dr. Toomer admitted that he had not reviewed Croteau‘s medical records, had not spoken to members of Croteau‘s family or to investigators, and had not performed neurological or neuro-psychiatric testing. Dr. Toomer also did not recommend any further treatment for Croteau. Dr. Toomer conceded that the DSM now instructs the examiner to take into account the person‘s religious and cultural background when diagnosing a person with delusional disorder. Dr. Toomer agreed that a person is not considered delusional if his belief is derived from membership or association with a particular subculture.
The government called rebuttal witness Dr. Douglas Shadle, a board-certified psychiatrist practicing mainly in the area of forensic psychiatry, who also evaluated defendant Croteau in connection with his criminal charges. Dr. Shadle examined Croteau‘s past psychological evaluations, including Dr. Toomer‘s and an evaluation by another doctor, as well as various documents related to the criminal investigation, including materials about the Little Tribe of the Pembina Nation and the sovereign citizen movement. Dr. Shadle performed a basic psychiatric examination of Croteau and administered the Folstein Mini Mental screening test for various psychological conditions. On this test, which evaluates orientation, memory, recall, and abilities to
Dr. Shadle had “very little difficulty” interacting with Croteau, although Croteau was apprehensive initially. Croteau was talkative, answered questions appropriately, and displayed a suitable range of emotions, from sadness to humor. Though Dr. Shadle found that defendant Croteau had a personality disorder marked by antisocial and narcissistic behaviors as well as some mild depression, Dr. Shadle firmly disagreed with Dr. Toomer‘s delusional disorder diagnosis of Croteau and disagreed that Croteau had any kind of schizoid personality disorder.
In support of this opinion, Dr. Shadle first explained that unlike with the DSM-IV—the outdated psychiatric evaluation framework Dr. Toomer had used to examine Croteau—the up-to-date DSM-V evaluation framework instructs that familiarity with a person‘s culture or subgroup is now considered important for purposes of diagnosing delusional disorders. Dr. Shadle explained that it is possible to misdiagnose a person as having a delusional disorder if the clinician does not take into account the subgroups or cultures with which the patient identifies. This is because when people associate with a particular culture or subgroup, “within their culture . . . within the group that they associate with, that is the way everybody proceeds.” In Croteau‘s case, Dr. Shadle concluded that despite the perhaps “misguided” nature of some of Croteau‘s beliefs, nevertheless, “it was all based in reality. It wasn‘t a fixed delusional belief that had no relationship whatsoever to the people [Croteau] associated with or his own life history.”
At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury. The court‘s instructions outlined the elements of defendant Croteau‘s false and fraudulent tax return charges and his charge for corruptly interfering with the administration of internal revenue laws. The court also instructed the jury regarding Croteau‘s good-faith defense.
The jury convicted Croteau on all eleven counts. Subsequently Croteau filed a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied.
C. Sentencing
Croteau‘s presentence investigation report (“PSI“) recommended a total offense level of 24, which factored in an intended tax loss of $3,848,991.70, under
Croteau filed a sentencing memorandum requesting a downward variance and departure.4 He sought a downward departure pursuant to At the sentencing hearing, after acknowledging the contents of the PSI, the district court concluded Croteau‘s guidelines range was 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment. The district court then considered Croteau‘s arguments in favor of a downward an opportunity to argue how the The district court explained that it had considered the testimony of both Dr. Toomer and Dr. Shadle as well as Croteau‘s testimony and all other evidence presented at trial. Based on that evidence, the court found that Croteau had knowingly and intentionally committed the offenses charged. The court found Croteau to be an “intelligent man” who had been able to run a business successfully for many years. The court found no basis for a downward departure. The district court then explained that it had examined the relevant factors in Croteau‘s case. It had examined Dr. Toomer‘s testimony, Croteau‘s history and characteristics, and the need for Croteau‘s sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense. The court found that Croteau had not accepted responsibility for his actions. As to Croteau‘s sentencing disparity argument, the court concluded that Armand Croteau‘s circumstances differed from defendant Croteau‘s in relevant respects. Armand had pled guilty to three counts, testified to the actions he had taken, and accepted responsibility for them.5 The court also denied defendant Croteau‘s downward variance request. The district court then sentenced defendant Croteau to 56 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts One through Ten, and to 36 months’ imprisonment on Count Eleven, with all sentences to run concurrently. Croteau‘s sentence was within the advisory guidelines range. We first consider defendant Croteau‘s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. As noted earlier, when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury‘s verdict. See United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1013 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 744 (11th Cir. 2008).6 We will affirm a conviction so long as “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hunt, 526 F.3d at 745 (quotation marks omitted). “It is well-established that credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury.” United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and alterations favor of the government” and “assume that the jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict.” Lebowitz, 676 F.3d at 1013. Accordingly, “the jury‘s verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law.” United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Criminal defendants may not be compelled by the government to testify, see And for purposes of proving mens rea, “[g]uilty knowledge can rarely be established by direct evidence, especially in respect to fraud crimes which, by their very nature, often yield little in the way of direct proof.” United States v. Suba, 132 F.3d 662, 673 (11th Cir. 1998). Therefore, mens rea elements such as knowledge or intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 521, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2029 (2008); Suba, 132 F.3d at 673. To establish the false claim charges for violating When charging the jury, as to the first element, the district court instructed that the jury must find that Croteau “knowingly presented a false claim.” The court explained that the word “knowingly” means “that an act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of a mistake or by accident.” As to the second element, the court instructed that the jury must find that the “claim was based on a false or fraudulent material fact.” As to the third element, the court instructed that a “claim is false or fraudulent if it is untrue when made or presented and the person making or presenting it knows it is untrue.” The court added that “the government does not have to show that the governmental department or agency was, in fact, deceived or misled.” Here the government presented ample evidence to support Croteau‘s ten In this case, the evidence sufficiently proved that defendant Croteau knew the tax returns he filed with the IRS were false, fictitious, or fraudulent. For years, with the help of his accountant Barry Woodrow, Croteau had properly filed his taxes without incident. Specifically, in August 2007 Croteau authorized Woodrow to file his 2006 tax return, for which he was sent a $30 tax refund. Croteau then began filing his tax returns on his own based on theories espoused by the taxprotesting sovereign citizen group that he had joined. The method Croteau used was inconsistent with how he had always filed his taxes before. Croteau admitted that after using his new methods, he was warned numerous times by the IRS that he had submitted frivolous tax returns and that he needed to correct these returns. Those warnings stated that there was “no basis in the law” for the manner in which Croteau had filed his returns and that Croteau‘s “information reflect[ed] a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws.” Despite these warnings, Croteau persisted in filing false, fictitious, and fraudulent tax returns in the same manner. Croteau also admitted he had lost his business and his marriage, from which the jury could reasonably infer that Croteau needed money. The jury readily could have concluded from the evidence that defendant Croteau knew what was required of him in filing his tax returns; he simply disregarded the law by trying to use a tax protester scheme. The jury was also free to disbelieve Croteau‘s testimony to the effect that he did not know the tax returns he filed were false and instead “conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.” See Brown, 53 F.3d at 314 (quotation marks omitted). The jury was entitled to reject Croteau‘s narrative. Defendant Croteau also argues that the government failed to prove criminal intent because none of the government‘s witnesses could testify about his knowledge or intent. For example, Croteau points out that one such witness, called to testify about false and fraudulent financial instruments, conceded that the fact that someone submits a fictitious document to a government entity does not itself reveal why someone would do so or whether they had a valid reason to do so. But the government was not required to prove motive—it was simply required to prove knowledge of falsity—and in doing so it was allowed to rely on circumstantial evidence in establishing knowledge. See Suba, 132 F.3d at 673. It amply did so. The government also was not required to prove that Croteau acted with specific intent to violate the law or with specific intent to commit a crime to prove violations of The jury was also free to disbelieve the testimony of Croteau‘s expert witness, Dr. Toomer, who opined that Croteau suffered from a delusional disorder. Based on the government‘s cross-examination of Dr. Toomer, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Dr. Toomer‘s evaluation of Both parties agree that good faith is a defense to charged violations of Even assuming arguendo that a good faith defense were applicable in the context of To establish the corruptly interfering charge for violating When charging the jury, the district court instructed that the jury must find Croteau (1) “knowingly tried to obstruct or impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws,” and (2) “did so corruptly.” This Court has held that to act corruptly includes “all activities that seek to thwart the efforts of government officers and employees in executing the laws enacted by Congress.” United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991). When proving violations of We easily conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to support Croteau‘s conviction as to this We reject defendant Croteau‘s argument that the government was required to offer explanations for why Croteau would submit the various false, fictitious, and fraudulent documents that he did. It is enough that Croteau tried to obstruct or impede the IRS or other government entities. His motive for doing so is not relevant. We also disagree that in assessing whether Croteau acted corruptly, our sufficiency analysis must take into account whether the numerous documents Croteau submitted were obviously fictitious or fraudulent. Croteau points to the testimony of one government witness who explained that it was apparent that Croteau‘s fictitious financial instruments filed with the U.S. Treasury Department were “nonsense.” But And as we have previously explained, the jury was free to reject Dr. Toomer‘s theory, that an alleged delusional disorder prevented Croteau from acting with the necessary criminal intent. Simply put, the evidence was more than adequate to support Croteau‘s conviction for violating Croteau also challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. He argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 and § 5H1.3 or alternatively a variance. In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We then examine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show that the sentence imposed is unreasonable in light of the record and the As to the first step, we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the As to the second step—assessing substantive reasonableness—the district court must impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes listed in The weight given to any specific We do not presume that a sentence falling within the guidelines range is The district court is required “to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review a district court‘s discretionary refusal to grant a downward departure unless the district court incorrectly believed that it lacked the authority to depart from the guidelines range. United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2006). As an initial matter, the record shows that the district court fully understood its authority to grant the downward departure that Croteau requested. The court listened to the parties’ arguments for and against the departure and heard testimony in support of the departure before denying Croteau‘s request for a downward departure. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court‘s denial of Croteau‘s downward departure request. Id. Defendant Croteau has not demonstrated that his sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable.7 The district court heard testimony, explained its sentence, and noted that it considered the PSI, filings by counsel, and the The district court more than adequately explained its sentence and did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a downward variance. Croteau argues that the “testimony of Dr. Toomer alone supports the granting of a variance” to Croteau‘s sentence. Although Croteau contends that the district court did not adequately consider Dr. Toomer‘s testimony, the record shows that the court acknowledged Dr. Toomer‘s testimony along with testimony by Dr. Shadle, Croteau himself, and other evidence presented at trial. The district court was not required to believe Dr. Toomer‘s testimony. The court also considered Croteau‘s history and characteristics. It was well within the court‘s discretion to conclude that Croteau committed the charged offenses, and the weight given to any specific Moreover, Croteau‘s sentence was within the advisory guidelines range, and we normally expect a sentence falling within the guidelines range to be reasonable. Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746. Further, if the penalty for all charged crimes are combined, the sentence was also well below the total statutory maximum of 53 years, another indicator of reasonableness. Gonzales, 550 F.3d at 1324. We recognize that Armand Croteau was sentenced to 27 months. But there was no unwarranted sentencing disparity between Croteau and his brother Armand, as his brother accepted responsibility and was convicted on For all these reasons, we affirm Croteau‘s convictions and sentence. AFFIRMED.II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Standard of Review
B. Ten False Claim
C. Corruptly Interfering
III. SENTENCING
A. General Reasonableness Principles
B. Analysis