UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. REHELIO D. TRANT
No. 18-3199
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
May 15, 2019
PRECEDENTIAL
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
District Court No. 3-18-cr-00004-001
District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gomez
Argued April 8, 2019
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 15, 2019)
Gretchen C.F. Shappert
Sigrid M. Tejo-Sprotte [ARGUED]
Office of United States Attorney
5500 Veterans Drive, Suite 260
United States Courthouse
St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellee
Omodare B. Jupiter
Office of the Federal Public Defender
200 South Lamar Street
Suite 200-N
Jackson, MS 39201
Melanie Turnbull [ARGUED]
Gabriel J. Villegas
Office of Federal Public Defender
1336 Beltjen Road
Suite 202, Tunick Building
St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellant
SMITH, Chief Judge.
One evening on St. Thomas, in the U.S. Virgin Islands (the V.I.), a minor dispute between two men over the use of a can opener escalated into each man menacingly showing the other his pistol. After law enforcement officers looked into these events, a federal grand jury charged one of them, Rehelio Trant, with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
I.1
In the fall of 2017, Rehelio Trant and Jimez Ashby had a heated encounter at a gas station in Bovoni, St. Thomas, that ended with each displaying his pistol to the other. Trant wantеd to use a can opener inside the gas station, but Ashby was at a counter and in his way. Trant asked Ashby to move, but Ashby did not hear him. Trant then yelled his request in Ashby‘s ear. Although Ashby complied, he admonished Trant for screaming at him. The encounter seemed to have ended when the two men shook hands and Trant exited the store. Yet Trant signaled Ashby to join him outside. When Ashby did so, a breeze blew hard enough against Trant that Ashby, standing less than a car‘s length away, was able to see Trant‘s waistband tighten and the imprint of a gun against his body. Ashby immediately brаndished his firearm and backed away. Then standing “a little more than a car length” from Ashby, Trant lifted up his shirt and revealed a gun in his waistband. (App. 61.) Just then, a woman walked between the two men, and Trant left the gas station. Ashby quickly called the police to report the incident.
Several months later, a federal grand jury charged Trant with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Before trial, the Government and Trant stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction. In addition, Trant filed а motion in limine seeking the Court‘s permission to inquire into “Ashby‘s unlawful possession
At trial, the Government‘s case included the testimony of Ashby and Sergeant Bernard Burke, the Supervisor of the Virgin Islands Police Department‘s Firearms Unit. Ashby described his encounter with Trant, and added that the light “was good” when he saw both the imprint of a gun in Trant‘s waistband and Trant lift his shirt to expose the gun. (App. 60, 76-77.) On cross examination, Ashby testified that he knew the imprint in Trant‘s waistband was of a gun and recalled telling the police that Trant‘s firearm “look[ed] like a Glock“—a gun that Ashby said resembled his own Glock pistol. (App. 71.) Trant‘s counsel attempted to ask Ashby three questions about the unlawfulness of his possession of a firearm at the time of the altercation with Trant, but the District Court sustained, apparently under
Next, Trant moved under
(App. 85.) This left the Government with no alternative but to move to reopen its case-in-chief. In support of its motion, the prosecutor argued that the Court should grant the motion because Trant would not suffer any prejudice from the admission of the stipulation. Trant objected but offered no reason why the Court should deny the motion other than that “it‘s too latе” and “[t]he [G]overnment has rested.” (App. 88.)
The District Court granted the Government‘s motion to reopen. After the stipulation was admitted into evidence, the Government again rested. Trant, not presenting any evidence of his own, also rested.
The jury found Trant guilty of violating
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under
III.
On appeal, Trant raises three issues. He contends that the District Court erred by granting the Government‘s motion to reopen its case-in-chief and by restricting his cross examination of Ashby. Trant also asserts that the record lacks the necessary evidence to support his conviction. We reject each of his challenges.
A.
Trant argues that the District Court impermissibly granted the Government‘s motion to reopen because the Government lacked a reasonable explanation for failing to present the stipulation during its case-in-chief. Trant adds that “the [G]overnment added insult to injury by misrepresenting what had occurred.” (Trant‘s Br. аt 21.) He further contends that our review of the District Court‘s ruling should “end” with the Government‘s inadequate justification for failing to move the stipulation into evidence because, he implies, a reasonable explanation was necessary for reopening. (Id. at 22.) Alternatively, Trant asserts that the Court abused its discretion by granting the motion because he was prejudiced by the reopening—i.e., he lost the opportunity to be acquitted based on the Government‘s failure to prove that he is a convicted felon.
1.
There is scarce authority in our circuit on the standard governing this Court‘s review of a ruling on a motion to reopen the Government‘s case-in-chief during a criminal trial. We therefore take this opportunity to clarify and build upon our case law.4 When considering a party‘s motion to reopen its case at trial, “the district court‘s primary focus should be on whether the party opposing reopening would be prejudiced if reopening is permitted.” United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000)) (explaining how district courts should approach ruling on motions to reopen a suppression hearing). As in the suppression context, two principal considerations for the district court‘s inquiry are the timing of the moving party‘s request to reopen (whether, if the motion is granted, the opposing party will have a reasonable opportunity to rebut the moving party‘s new evidence) and “the effect of the granting of the motion” (whether granting the motion will cause substantial disruption to the proceedings or result in the new evidenсe taking on “distorted importance“). Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, district courts should assess the reasonableness of the moving party‘s explanation for failing to introduce the desired evidence before resting and whether the new evidence is admissible and has probative value. See id.
Although we have announced the standard governing motions to reopen at trial by referring to our suppression-hearing case law, our statement that “courts should be extremely reluctant to grant reopenings,” Coward, 296 F.3d at 180 (quoting Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), does not apply to a district court‘s consideration of a motion to reopen at trial. Both Coward and Kithcart explained that this restraint on reopening applies to motions to reopen a suppression hearing. See id.; Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219-20. Wе conclude that any such caution against reopening the record in the trial context would constitute an anomalous constraint on a district court‘s traditional and well-understood exercise of its discretion. See United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 167 n.21 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that district courts “have wide discretion in the management of their cases” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Coward and Kithcart recognize that “decisions to reopen proceedings are traditionally a discretionary matter for the district court.” Coward, 296 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219. We will not, therefore, direct a district court to place a thumb on the scale by suggesting that reopening a trial record is somehow disfavored, while at the same time giving lip service to our reliance upon the trial judge‘s sound discretion. In our view, this would only confuse a trial judge‘s inquiry into whether or not to reopen, as well as our eventual review for abuse of discretion.
We add that our cautionary warning against reopening suppression hearings upon remand is not warranted in the trial context for three additional reasons. First, in comparison to suppression hearings, trials present a greater need for district courts to be unconstrained in the exercise of their case-management discretion. Trials are fluid proceedings with a much wider horizon of evidence for district courts to consider than in suppression hearings, and courts enjoy broad discretion during trial precisely so that they can promptly and effectively respond to the varied and often unanticipated issues that may arisе. Cf. Schiff, 602 F.3d at 176 (noting district courts have “broad discretion” to engage in case management during trial). Second and relatedly, suppression hearings usually present fewer and more narrow issues than arise at trial. That means that parties moving to reopen suppression hearings will generally have less justifiable reasons for failing to introduce the desired evidence into the record than parties moving to reopen at trial. As Coward noted, “[r]eopening is often permitted to supply some technical rеquirement ... or to supply some detail overlooked by inadvertence.” 296 F.3d at 182 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We believe that, as exemplified by this case, there are more opportunities for technical requirements or details to be overlooked during the often high pressure of a trial proceeding than in a suppression hearing where a jury is never present. Third,
2.
With this standard now defined, we turn to Trant‘s argument that the District Court impermissibly granted the Government‘s motion to reopen its case-in-chief.6 We agree with Trant that the Government‘s reason for failing to introduce the stipulation before resting (it “simply forgot” (Gov. Br. at 16)) is hardly compelling. But prejudice to the party objecting to reopening the trial record constitutes the primary consideration for a district court that must rule on a motion to reopen. The Court was not required to deny the motion solely because the Government‘s explanation was weak. See United States v. Wrensford, 866 F.3d 76, 88 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Reopening may ... be permitted to allow the presentation of evidence about a technical matter overlooked by inadvertence.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion because Trant was not prejudiced by the Government‘s reopening of its case-in-chief: the Government moved to reopen before Trant had the opportunity to present his evidence, thereby giving him the opportunity to respond and also limiting any disruption to the proceedings.7 See Coward, 296 F.3d at 181 (“Where, as in this case, reopening is permitted after the [G]overnment has rested its case in chief, but before the defendant has presented any evidence, it is unlikely that prejudice sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion can be established.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). And importantly, the object of the motion to reopen was the admission of a stipulation—Trant had agreed to it.8 See United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the nonmoving parties were not рrejudiced by the District Court‘s granting a motion to reopen the record on
B.
Trant next contends that the District Court committed two errors by preventing him from cross examining Ashby about his unlawful possession of a firearm. First, Trant argues that the Court should have permitted him to question Ashby about this matter, suggesting it was probative of Ashby‘s character for untruthfulness and necessary for the jury to evaluate Ashby‘s credibility. Trant asserts that Ashby‘s own illegal activity gave him a reason to lie about Trant‘s gun possession. When Ashby called the police, Trant contends, he wanted officers to focus on Trant‘s criminal activity and not his own. In support, Trant points to United States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976), for the proposition that “credibility may be attacked by showing specific instances of the witness‘s prior misconduct, other than convictions, which bear on veracity.” Id. at 700.
In implicitly applying
Second, Trant argues that the District Court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, see
Trant failed to raise this argument below, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-34 (1993).11 The District Court did not plаinly err because if Trant had been permitted to pursue his proposed cross examination, the jury would not have had “a significantly different impression” of Ashby‘s credibility. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986); see also United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). Had the cross examination taken place, no reasonable jury could have believed that Ashby testified against Trant to avoid his own prosecution for illegally having a firearm. And how could they? It was Ashby himself who first called the police and reported to them that he had brandished his own firearm in the presence of Trant. Trant‘s proposed cross examination would not have given “the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of” Ashby. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And even if the restriction on cross examination was error, the implausible nature of Ashby‘s having an ulterior motive for testifying hardly made it “obvious” that Trant had the right to ask Ashby about the latter‘s illegal possession of a firearm. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
C.
Trant finally raises two arguments in support of his contention that the record lacks sufficiеnt evidence to support his conviction. First, he asserts that Ashby‘s testimony lacks adequate specificity for a rational factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the object Ashby saw in Trant‘s possession fit the definition of a firearm under
Ashby‘s testimony, however, provides sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirement for a
Second, Trant contends that the Government failed to prove that his firearm traveled in interstate commerce—a required showing for a conviction under
But Sergeant Burke‘s testimony was that there were no firearm manufacturers in the Virgin Islands. That alone would justify a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Trant‘s firearm traveled in interstate commerce. This Court has previously held that the testimony of Virgin Islands police officers can be sufficient to establish that, because particular goods were not manufactured in the Virgin Islands, their presence on the islands meant that they had been transported in interstate commerce. See United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 1998). Those holdings are applicable here. Sergeant Burke‘s testimony tracks that of Virgin Islands police officers in earlier cases in which we have deemed such testimony sufficient to establish that a particular good or product moved in interstate commerce. Given Sergeant Burke‘s testimony, a rational trier of fact would not need to examine Trant‘s gun or its characteristics to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun traveled in interstate commerce. See United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that the gun was not produced at trial or that the witnesses did not have an oppоrtunity to examine closely the
IV.
We will affirm the judgment because sufficient evidence supports Trant‘s conviction, and because the District Court did not err in either permitting the Government to reopen its case-in-chief or restricting Trant‘s cross examination of Ashby.