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United States v. Hilton A. Lake, Hilton A. Lake
150 F.3d 269
3rd Cir.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 parent examined the role of the in the operations subsidiary, particularly

regard pollution nearby to the issue of

waters and actions that have resolved

it.

Although Dairy Dean any contends that

evaluation of its financial condition would

show that it lost over one million dollars

between 1992 and there was also evi-

dence that it twenty had over million dollars year assets in fiscal 1995. at 586-88.

In light of the discretion afforded district in determining penalty, we conclude

that the court’s parent’s examination of the

assets, done, the basis for which it was

the manner in which the information was

used was neither clear error nor an abuse of

discretion.

III. reasons,

For the foregoing the order of the

district court will be affirmed.

UNITED STATES of America LAKE,

Hilton A. Lake, Appellant.

Hilton A.

No. 97-7462. Appeals, Court

Third Circuit.

Argued March July

Decided *2 Hurd, Jr., Attor- A.

James (Argued), Assistant Kim L. Chisholm ney, Amalie, VI, Ap- for Attorney, Charlotte pellee. COWEN, BECKER, Judge, Chief

Before: ALITO, Judges Circuit and THE COURT OF OPINION ALITO, Judge Circuit in a judgment appeal from is an This trial, . the defen- After case. criminal Lake, dant, A. was convicted Hilton carrying a using U.S.C. a crime of in relation during and firearm (see violence, namely, a 2119). on challenges his Lake conviction most substantial grounds, the numerous he did not violate is that because, not take he did argues, he statute per- question “from motor vehicle reject of the victim. presence” son or we arguments, and Lake’s other this and affirm. therefore I. to Lake’s events that led

The Bay in Thom- Magen’s St. at Little occurred road as, Virgin Islands. The States United Bay ends at Magen’s at Little to the beach steep path There is a top of a hill. that leads by vegetation and rocks bordered beach, and the the road down from from the beach. cannot seen road day in Lake hitchhiked question, theOn Milton Bay encountered Magen’s and Little reading Clarke, sitting beach who was asked Clarke newspaper. whether Lake up on the road. parked a white car owned did, initially and said Clarke However, returned a away. walked borrow and asked to moments later few refused, Lake stated car. When Clarke refused, again emergency. Clarke anwas returned walked off. When Lake yet again, Clarke said: up to [Ljisten, If I it. think walked about McKelvin, De- Federal Public T. Thurston your I you, can borrow asked you and fender, (Argued), Patricia Schrader-Cooke to me? Of lend it car[,] you going Defender, [a]re Christianst- Asst. Federal Public n you leave me the why So don’t not. VI, ed, course Appellant. responded hell alone. I’m here to have a nice time. that he “would think about it.” someplace gun Just chill. Go else. was never recovered. Lake was carjacking, indicted for in viola-

App. 140A. tion of 18 using and for rock, off and on a Lake walked sat while carrying a during firearm relation to a *3 anxiously watched him out Clarke of the (the crime of violence carjacking), in violation eye, corner of his but Lake soon returned 924(c)(1). § of 18 U.S.C. At the close of the request. with the same When Clarke swore trial, his'jury evidence in Lake moved unsuc- again, Lake if he a asked could have drink cessfully judgment for a acquittal. of from Clarke’s cooler. Clarke said: “[DJon’t jury subsequently returned a verdict of not you get App. it? Leave me alone.” 141A. guilty charge guilty but shirt, up Lake then lifted his Clarke showed the firearms offense. Lake was to sentenced gun, of a the handle and said: know “[Y]ou imprisonment plus for 60 months a three- App. what that is?” 141A. up Clarke stood year supervised term of release. He then backing away, pulled and started but Lake appeal. took this band, gun put the from against his waist face, keys. Clarke’s and demanded the car II. App. 142A. Clarke said that he did not have begin We will argument Lake’s keys walking the and started toward the that support the evidence was insufficient to following. water with Lake Clarke waded his conviction § under 18 U.S.C. water, waist-deep into and Lake walked out because the evidence did not show that he promontory a overlooking onto the water. used or a carried “firearm” within the mean App. 143A-48A. 921(a)(3). § ing of 18 U.S.C. Lake contends water, friend, While Clarke was in the his that the evidence failed to establish that the Croaker, appeared Pamela on the beach. gun toy. Appellant’s was not a Br. at 18. warning, Clarke a prompting shouted Lake initially Lake notes that he told Officer Grif approach to Lake Croaker.' demanded that fin gun toy, that the was a that Croaker and keys, Croaker surrender her car and Croak- gun Clarke both said that the looked like the you. Why er said:“I don’t even know would type Westerns, gun by cowboys used I give you keys App. the to ear?” 183A. and that Clarke said that he was not able to grabbed keys, Lake then and the two gun tell whether the was real. Id. possession keys. wrestled When recently argument addressed a similar gun, Croaker saw the she surrendered the (3d Beverly, in United States v. keys keep keys. but asked to her house Cir.1996), Beverly and under the evidence App. up steep 184A-86A. Lake went here was sufficient. Both Clarke and Croak- where area Croaker had gun er that stated Lake had a and described parked sight her car out of of the beach. 141A-42A, App. it in some detail. See 184A. away Lake then drove Croaker’s car after descriptions Lake does not contend that their leaving keys her house on the hood were inconsistent with that of gun. a real App. ear. Clarke’s 192A. As we will discuss Both they Clarke and Croaker testified detail, later more both Croaker and Clarke fear, 151A, 184A, experienced great App. path, followed him they but when 186A, and Croaker manifested sufficient fear arrived, driving away. he was Moreover, gun keys. to surrender her day, police apprehended Later although originally Lake told the authorities Lake in the stolen car at gun toy a McDonald’s res- was a and that he had questioned by police taurant. When swamp, thrown it in a he refused to reveal its an FBI agent, location, Lake stated that he had used and when later asked whether he toy a gun and that he had gun thrown it a would tell the truth about whether the real, swamp. He to take responded refused the officers to was that he would allegedly disposed the site where he had light “think about it.” 171A-72A. In gun, evidence, to when asked tell the truth of all of this a rational gun really toy, gun about whether the he find that the was real. Appel- gun her. pulling before her

III. agree that these facts lant’s Br. at 16. We the evidence was argues that next Lake was at least reluctant suggest that the car- that he to show insufficient violated gun, agree fire his but we do statute, and thus jacking compelled to infer that jury was rational predicate offense committed gun in the end would not have fired 924(e)(1) support his 18 U.S.C. needed keys. On given had not Croaker statute, 18 Under the conviction. evidence am- contrary, we hold that .the prove must finding that Lake supported jury’s ply (1) intent to cause “with the defendant requisite conditional intent possessed the (2) bodily harm” took or serious death bodily injury. or serious cause death “transported, that had been motor vehicle foreign in interstate or shipped, received *4 person presence or B. From the (4) person presence “from the or commerce” the evidence maintains that another. Lake by “by violence or force and another” he took Croaker’s car not show that did that the Lake contends evi- intimidation.” person presence,” as 18 U.S.C. “from or [her] prove insufficient to in this case was dence argues that he took 2119 demands. Lake one, three, reviewing In and four. elements car, person her or keys, not her from her evidence, we sufficiency of the must de- the not in presence and that the car was Croak- rationally jury the could have cide whether took it because she presence er’s when he challenged elements found that each of the car at that mo not see or touch the could beyond a reasonable been established had ment. Carr, 1194, 25 v. F.3d doubt. United States requirement that (3d Cir.1994). statute’s 1201 person taken “from the or the vehicle be serious, death or A. Intent to cause language presence of the “tracks the victim” in Lake’s bodily injury. see no merit We statutes,” robbery in other federal used was insufficient contention that the evidence 102-851(1), (1992),reprint H.R.Rep. No. at 5 to show that he to cause death intended 2829, 2834, such as in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. ed bodily injury. previously As dis serious 2113, 2111, §§ and 2118. See cussed, sufficient to show the evidence was Perez-Garcia, v. F.3d addition, gun real. In the that Lake’s was (1st Cir.1995). statutes, “prop these Under Croaker, victim, testified jacking ear Pamela erty presence person of a if it is ‘so is the in front of her and gun that Lake waved the reach, control, that observation or within his keys give him the to her car. ordered her to by pre he could if not overcome violence testified, hesitated, App. 184A.When she she ” fear, possession by. retain his of it.’ vented placed close to her head and gun Lake the Burns, v. keys. App. again told her to surrender Cir.1983). (9th See also United States testimony, a rational 185A. Based on this (8th Cir.1986); W.T.T., 780, 782 800 F.2d jury had the intent to that Lake find Scott, Criminal LaFave and Substantive injury bodily kill or cause serious to Croaker (1986) (“ ‘Presence’ in this Law 8.11 at 443 demands, and comply if she did not with his eye so much a matter of connection is not previously that such a condi we have held proximity control: sight as it is one of satisfy car tional intent sufficient to is robbery must be property taken Anderson, jacking statute. United States sufficiently enough the victim and close to (3d Cir.), cert. de 481-85 that, not his control had the latter —nied, -, 118 S.Ct. by subjected been to violence intimidation L.Ed.2d 74 robber, prevented have the tak he could was arguing proof of intent ing”). insufficient, notes, among things, other Lake described, Here, previously keys as several he “asked Clarke’s gunpoint keys ear at on gun placed took Croaker’s displayed times before he ran and drove against initially beach and then and that he Clarke’s face” pursued Lake but away in her car. Croaker keys asked for Croaker’s and wrestled stop area in time to commerce. The sought did reach to estab lish this Applying “presence” testimony by po the definition of element based on him. Griffin, above, lice officer Curtis life-long conclude that a rational resident noted we Islands, Virgin that no motor vehicles could have found that Croaker could have are manufactured in the Virgin Islands prevented taking of her car she had not that all motor vehicles shipped have fearful that Lake shoot or other- been would App. the islands. 194A-195A. argues, harm her. wise Croaker testified however, that was not qualified “Griffin sight gun great of Lake’s caused her fear. testify regarding this simply element because gun She stated that when she first saw the long he was a life Virgin resident of the going go she“felt like to let of [her] [she] Islands” and that “[n]o foundation was laid App. Although faint.” [and] bowels 184A. testimony.” Appellant’s for this Br. at 19. say many in so Croaker did words that this, reject argument. Under Fed. pursuing she hesitated for some time before R.Evid. Officer Griffin’s testimony was path, sequence of events laid proper if there was sufficient “to evidence testimony supports out her the inference support finding personal [he had] that this what occurred. Croaker stated knowledge of the matter.” This foundation point when she surrendered the may by testimony be “furnished keys, struggling through Clarke “was back Advisory witness himself.” Fed R. Evid. 602 back,” 185A, the water to come but that Committee Proposed Note the 1972 *5 Rules. she did not start to run the until “The district court exercises its discretion in emerged App. Clarke from the water. 186A. determining proponent whether the of the that, Clarke testified when Lake ran the evidence has met burden.” S [this] Wein- path, “pulling together was Croaker herself steins’s Federal Evidence at 602.03[1][b] App. of.” kind 150A. Clarke related that he (2d Ed.1998). 602-11 “caught up to at the bottom of the [Croaker] paved driveway” and that the two of them There was no abuse of discretion proceeded up path together. App. the 150A. judicial take here. We notice of the fact that They parking reached the area in time for Virgin the United States Islands consist of driving away Croaker to see Lake in her car islands, closely grouped three main which are stop App. but not in time to him. 186A.Both only and have an area square of 136 miles. point Croaker and Clarke stated that at this police Times Atlas the A World of 151A, they very App. were scared. 186A. lifelong place officer and resident of a of this testimony, jury Based on this a rational could type testify has a sufficient basis to as to pursuing infer that Croaker hesitated before any manufacturing whether motor vehicle fa Lake due to fear and that she had not cilities are located there. We therefore con hesitated she could have reached the proved, clude adequately that the prevent in taking area time to Lake from her requires, as U.S.C. that the motor force, violence, car employing without further in question transported vehicle had been in or intimidation. suggest We do not this in- foreign interstate or commerce.1 compelled, ference was but because such an sum, In we hold that the evidence was rational, inference was we hold that the evi- sufficient to establish all of the elements of dence was sufficient. carjacking statute. foreign C. Interstate or commerce. IV. Lake also contends that the evidence was not sufficient to show that reject Croaker’s car had Lake’s contention that transported been in foreign interstate or court district committed reversible error -, question 1. Lake has not raised the whether Con 118 S.Ct. 140 L.Ed.2d 644 gress possessed authority under the Com (1998)(limiting questions presented); United Cir.1995)(statute carjacking merce Clause to enact the federal (3d constitutional), Bishop, Oliver, statute. See United States v. ied, cert. U.S. den (9th Cir.1995)(statute constitutional), 549-50 (1995); 116 S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d 529 id. at States, granted cert. sub nom. Jones v. United J., (statute unconstitutional)(Becker, 590-91 dis -, U.S. (1998), 118 S.Ct. 140 L.Ed.2d 509 senting). cert, - amended, granting order stiletto, dangerous or knife, any other or the 18 respect to jury with instructing the deadly weapon shall— court charge because $1,000 im- (A) or of the more than all not point reiterate be fined did (2) years, or than carjacking offense. more two prisoned not predicate elements both; elements all of the set or out The district when instructed offense of carjacking (B) convicted previously been if he has I) (count count bears, has, trans- jury possesses, on’ felony, or later turned the court When proximate the indictment. has under his or ports, carries the court told charge, during com- control, weapon the firearms any to such proof required this offense attempted commission mission carjacking as (as the crime “committed section defined of violence crime in Count I.” hereof) 2253(d)(1) in the indictment charged not more shall be fined accurate, and al was instruction than $2,000 This not more imprisoned 351A. than re give Lake’s to both, though penalty the court refused shall years, or five of the ele reiterating all provided for quested penalty instruction to addition offense, the court’s commit, of, attempt ments of commission A justify reversal. clearly does not refusal crime of violence. instruction give an judge’s refusal trial Charles, defen- held that the our court In requested only when reversal requires under subsection not be sentenced could dant correct, substantially “was instruction (B) not been because he had this statute so given, was by the instructions covered qualified as any offense convicted give the refusal consequential statutory defi- of violence” “crime to the defendant.” prejudicial instruction Edwards, again held our court nition. 1187, 1191 Phillips, defendant, been con- had not that the who Cir.1992). instruc (3d Here, requested violence, not be crime of of a victed elsewhere substantially covered tion was (B). Although under subsection sentenced *6 risk of instructions, perceive we little findings that “specific judge trial made trial from the to the defendant prejudice weapon during possessed defendant] [the of the elements to reiterate court’s refusal violence,” our a crime of of the commission carjacking. act as findings cannot that wrote “those court of defen- jury’s conviction a for the substitute 24- 750 F.2d at of of a crime violence.” dant V. that significant” it “deem[ed] 25. alsoWe court argues that district 2251(a)(2) § 14 V.I.C. on the the instruction sentencing under 18 him erred in jury to find that merely required charge dur carrying a firearm using or dangerous knife possessed a the defendant acquitted on he was a since ing unlawfully using it purpose of with indictment, him charged which I of the count require and did against the victim argu making this carjacking. with the 2251(a)(2)(B) find, § de- 14 jury to as V.I.C. ment, Vir on Lake relies Government of manded, weapon dur- possessed the (3d Edwards, F.2d 23 750 v. gin Islands of violence. of a crime ing the commission Cir.1984), relied turn Govern which footnote, the observed In a Id. at Charles, 590 Virgin v. Islands ment of or opinion on whether “expressed] no (3d Cir.1979). Both Edwards F.2d 82 any conviction what circumstances under statute, Virgin a Islands concerned Charles 2251(a)(2) subject to enhancement § could be 2251(a)(2), per provides § 14 V.I.C. predi- 2251(a)(2)(B) no if there were as follows: part tinent 750 for a' crime of violence.” conviction cate n. 1. at 25 Whoever— F.2d involved and Edwards unlawfully Charles Because the same intent to with use they statute, bears, do not believe another, has, we possesses, different against The federal here. argument Lake’s proxi- support has under his carries or transports, case, 18 U.S.C. in this at issue dirk, control, dangerous statute a dagger, mate 275 924(c)(4), sentencing is not enhancement VII. provision independent sets out an crimi- but reasons, For judgment these we affirm the Nelson, nal offense. United States v. 27 of the district court. (6th Cir.1994). 199, F.3d 200 See also Unit- Jenkins, (3d 814, BECKER,

ed States v. 90 F.3d 821 Judge, dissenting. Chief Cir.1996). provi- In a under this keys When defendant took the’ car sion, government prove must victim, Croaker, from his Pamela Ms. Croak- qualifying predicate defendant committed a was, terms, er’s car city away, up a block Jenkins, offense, 821, see 90 F.3d at but it is hill, sight. out of Under these circum- necessary sepa- the defendant be stances, join I opinion would an upholding rately charged or convicted such an Lake’s “keyjacking,” conviction for or for Nelson, 200; offense. 27 F.3d United key robbery grand both larceny. I can- Wilson, (5th 174, v. States 884 F.2d 176 not, however, agree guilty that he is of car- Cir.1989); Hill, v. 971 United States F.2d jacking. majority upon The draws federal (10th 1461, Cir.1992); 1464 robbery explicate statutes to how the vehicle (6th Cir.1994); Ospina, 18 F.3d (as opposed keys) may to its be considered to Wilkins, F.2d “person pres- have been taken from the or (9th Cir.1990); n. 1 United States v. Robert- ence Disciples juris- of the victim.” son, (9th Cir.1990); 901 F.2d United prudence pure may, analytic reason Munoz-Fabela, 911 terms, approach convincing. find this As I (5th Cir.1990); Hunter, United States v. below, explain events, will I do not. At all (9th Cir.1989). Although my polestar plain words, meaning apparently Charles and Edwards stand for lexicon, my and in Ms. Croaker’s car cannot proposition defendant either al- fairly be said to have been taken from her ways generally separately must be con- person presence, I respectfully hence dis- victed of a crime of violence in order to be sent. 2251(a)(2)(B), sentenced under 14 V.I.C. robbery upon statutes which the car importing we see no basis for that rule into a jacking statute is based do not themselves different, involving entirely case an federal phrase person define the “from pres statute. ence the victim.” New Interna Webster’s Dictionary presence tional defines as “the

VI. of, vicinity immediately or area near one.” *7 However, argument Lake’s final is that he enti- relying plain was rather than on the suppression meaning, majority tled to a new trial or to the turns to a construction testimony regarding phrase his “person presence” adopted statement to the police rough by by because notes taken a detec- in Ninth Circuit United States v. (9th Burns, Cir.1983), during pre- where, tive Lake’s not interview were in statute, construing robbery served after the interview was reduced to a federal writing by FBI agent. “property an We have admon- pres reasoned that is government reach, agents preserve rough person ished ence of a if it is ‘so within his control, prospective inspection, notes of interviews with trial wit- observation or nesses, by prevent but we have also held that if the could not overcome violence or ” ”2 destroyed fear, “Brady by possession notes do not contain ed retain his of it.’ Id. Act, 2500, definition, majority Jencks material 843. Based on this faith, good were discarded retrial is unnec- concludes that a rational “could infer essary testimony even if the pursuing of the officer that Croaker hesitated before who took the notes is not stricken. United due to fear and that if she had not hesitated Ramos, (3d Cir.1994). 65, she could have reached the area Ramos, ground prevent Under we see no time taking reversal Lake from her car force, employing violence, here. without further 1194, (1963). Brady Maryland, 2. v. 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d 215 enterprise in which part of an economic proves as Maj. Op. at 273. This intimidation.” of stolen profit from the resale is derived true that had Croaker If it is much. too contrast, parts.1 In almost vehicles or their have fear she could followed out of hesitated that I have seen or every carjacking case path leading from the steep up the years last several road, in the equally then it is read about beach secluded —and limitations) robbery many a violent there have been that she (barring physical true —-is perpetrator has even in which up him have followed ring or a to a car theft fact remotest connection Thomas. The halfway across St. then interstate com- chop shop.2 The “effect on nearby is thus not ear was that Croaker’s carjacking stat- underpinning of the relevant; merce” could have followed if she chimera, hope I that the any- ute is thus a hill, him could have followed she before aware, course, Supreme will take this issue craft Court that the I am where. long.3 line-drawing, but I sim- too judging requires can be how that endeavor ply do not see open- predicated it is

principled when key statutory terms, es-

ended definitions plain those terms admit of

pecially where

meaning. robbery majority’s reliance on a car

The sufficient that the evidence was

case to show particular carjacking is of to convict Lake of JOHNSON; Jeffrey Bruce Howard E. since, typical coupled with the interest to me 97-3581, Shore, Appellants in No. cases, it pattern in federal fact v. my strengthens my view that dissent Raymond HORN; Sobina, Martin F. J. (3d. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 United States Appellants in No. 97-3582. Cir.1995), correct when reasoned eaqacking statute should be de- the federal 97-3581, Nos. 97-3582. authority of under the clared unconstitutional Appeals, Court of Lopez, 514 Third Circuit. The 131 L.Ed.2d 626 S.Ct. majority Bishop

principal basis on which the Argued June 1998. carjacking statute to be valid found the July Decided 1998. power interstate commerce exercise of the adjunct is an was the belief 16, 1998. As Amended Oct. theft, of auto in which the interstate business “chop for a the stolen destined vehicle

shop.” majority adverted to references history labeling carjacking legislative

in the Indeed, are appeals the facts of the instant case have cited as additional 1.Other courts of *8 egregious amongst that I have seen concluding the least 2119 is within Con bases for probably carjacking, alleged. is where because, That gress' power regulate automo commerce that explained, as I have this case does not of interstate com biles instrumentalities are nor, matter, a car "jurisdictional involve robbery. and that the statute has a merce (i.e., only applies to the forcible hook” that it transported, taking of a car "that has been foreign shipped, view, received in interstate or com my local cases are crimes Romero, merce.”). e.g., in, See belong courts. state courts not federal (10th Cir.1997); States, F.3d the United See Judicial Conference of (6th Cir.1996); (Dec. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125 United Long Range Courts 24 Plan for the Federal Oliver, (9th Cir.1995), 1995) (Congress encouraged 'd should to allo- aff (9th Cir.1997), resentencing, jurisdiction federal courts cate criminal —States, nom., situations; only granted a situation is not cert. sub Jones v. United in limited such -, activity present criminal has "some minor S.Ct. 140 L.Ed.2d where com- my and effect on interstate out in dissent in connection with For the reasons set ). Bishop, unconvincing. justifications merce”. I find these

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Hilton A. Lake, Hilton A. Lake
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Jul 21, 1998
Citation: 150 F.3d 269
Docket Number: 97-7462
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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