UNITED STATES of America v. Michael FREE, Appellant
No. 15-2939
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
October 6, 2016
Argued July 12, 2016
I do, however, join the majority in its holding in Part II B that the allegations of the RFRA violation survive a motion to dismiss and that that claim should be remanded to the District Court. I also join the majority in its holding in Part II C and D that the District Court‘s dismissal of the First Amendment Free Exercise claim and the RLUIPA claim be affirmed.
Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq., Laura S. Irwin, Esq. [ARGUED], Office of the United States Attorney, 700 Grant Street, Suite 4000, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before: FUENTES,* SHWARTZ, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
This case raises the question of how to calculate “loss” under the Sentencing Guidelines when a defendant commits bankruptcy fraud but all of his creditors receive payment in full.
The defendant, Michael Free, made the bizarre decision to file for bankruptcy even though he had more than sufficient assets to pay his debts. He then, having filed for bankruptcy unnecessarily, hid assets worth hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Bankruptcy Court. Free‘s actions eventually led to criminal charges and convictions for multiple counts of bankruptcy fraud. The oddity of this entire situation is best summarized by the fact that, despite all of Free‘s prevarications, his creditors received 100 cents on the dollar from Free‘s bankruptcy estate.
The Sentencing Guidelines increase a fraudster‘s recommended sentence based on the amount of loss he causes, or intends to cause, to his victims. The District Court therefore had to decide whether Free caused or intended to cause any loss at all. Recognizing the novelty of the situation, the District Court chose to treat the estimated value of the assets that Free concealed from the Bankruptcy Court and the amount of debt sought to be discharged as the relevant “loss” under the Guidelines.1 In doing so, the District Court did not clearly find whether Free intended to deprive his creditors of this, or of any, amount. While we appreciate the District Court‘s reasoning, we ultimately conclude that treating the value of Free‘s concealed assets as “loss,” at least on the rationale articulated by the District Court, is out-of-step with the structure of the Guidelines and inconsistent with our own precedent. Instead, the District Court must determine whether Free intended to cause a loss to his creditors or what he sought to gain from committing the crime, per United States v. Feldman, 338 F.3d 212, 221-23 (3d Cir. 2003). A loss amount triggering enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines on resentencing must reflect a loss amount incurred or which Free intended to be incurred.2 However, even if the District Court finds no such intended loss, this is not to say that Free would necessarily receive a lower sentence on remand. Free‘s repeated lying to the
For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand this case for resentencing.
I. Background
A. Free‘s Bankruptcy Proceedings
Free filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in July of 2010 in his capacity as the sole proprietor of Electra Lighting & Electric Company, one of the businesses he owns. He also owns Freedom Firearms, a company that specializes in the sale of rare WWII-era guns. After Free fell behind on payments on two business-related properties, the lender purchased them in foreclosure, and Free purportedly filed for bankruptcy in an effort to “stay” the sale and “possibly to work out an agreement with” the lender.3
Filing a bankruptcy petition requires a debtor to complete several forms. These include “Schedule A,” which requires an accounting of the debtor‘s real estate assets, and “Schedule B,” which requires an accounting of the debtor‘s personal property. A debtor certifies that both documents are correct under penalty of perjury. On Free‘s Schedule A, he disclosed over $1.3 million in real estate assets.4 On Free‘s Schedule B, he listed $368,990 worth of personal property, including 27 firearms collectively valued at $250,000.5 The District Court later concluded that, at the time he filed for bankruptcy, Free had liabilities of approximately $671,166, meaning that his disclosed assets exceeded his debts by several hundred thousand dollars.6
Free initially filed for bankruptcy under
One of the events that occurs early in a
Trustee Walsh: You can‘t sell them, they‘re now the bankruptcy estate‘s and only I can sell them with the court approval. So do not, under any circumstances, sell any of these weapons. Don‘t sell any of the real estate, don‘t sell any of the inventory. It‘s all within the control of the court at this point in time.
Michael J. Free: Ok, at least at this point, from my understanding though, is [sic] a moot point because none of the firearms have been sold as of yet.
Trustee Walsh: Yeah, but I‘m just ...
Michael J. Free: I understand[.]
Trustee Walsh: So there‘s no misunderstanding of “I didn‘t know“, nothing can be sold or transferred without court approval brought on a motion by myself. Ok?
Michael J. Free: Alright[.] 14
Over the course of the ensuing months, Free became increasingly uncooperative with Walsh and progressively more disrespectful towards the Bankruptcy Court. Less than a month after the creditors’ meeting, Walsh asked the Bankruptcy Court to compel Free to turn over certain assets and to cease operation of his businesses, both of which Free had refused to do.15 On another occasion, Free raised suspicions by purchasing several of his own assets during a court-supervised auction, falsely claiming that he had the money to do so through the generosity of friends and relatives. In fact, Free actually made such purchases with the proceeds of his surreptitious sales of weapons, after he had specifically been told he could not sell his weapons.16 Free also refused to cooper
Convinced that Free had concealed assets and violated court orders, Walsh filed a motion for sanctions in October of 2011.18 The Bankruptcy Court granted Walsh‘s motion in February of 2012, ordering Free to provide a full accounting of his assets or face monetary penalties.19 The Bankruptcy Court also threatened to incarcerate Free if he failed to comply.20 In doing so, it expressed its profound frustration with Free‘s conduct:
[Free] has acted willfully, vexatiously, wantonly, and in bad faith. His inappropriate conduct has negatively impacted the entire bankruptcy case.... [He] has persisted in his willful misconduct despite the attempts of three bankruptcy judges to dissuade him from future misconduct. The failure to cooperate and comply while [Free] is facing sanctions for civil contempt is shocking to the Court.21
Events finally came to a head a few weeks later when Walsh filed an emergency motion for civil contempt.22 Walsh claimed that Free had, in various ways, failed to comply with the Bankruptcy Court‘s February 2012 orders. In particular, Walsh said that he had recently been contacted by a man who had tried to purchase a WWII-era firearm from Free for a price of $13,500. The man told Walsh that Free had sold other firearms since entering
The Bankruptcy Court convened a hearing on the matter, after which it entered an order directing the local sheriff “to take possession of all of [Free‘s] firearms.” 25 A few days later, on March 26, 2012, Free filed a declaration with the Bankruptcy Court in which he claimed, again under penalty of perjury, that he had not “sold or transferred” any estate assets—including firearms—since his bankruptcy case was converted into a
Local sheriff‘s deputies, acting on the Bankruptcy Court‘s order, searched Free‘s house on March 27, 2012—the day after Free filed his declaration with the Bankruptcy Court. They found 49 guns in various locations throughout the home.28 When they questioned Free, he said he had no additional firearms in his possession.29 Later that afternoon, Free filed a revised declaration with the Bankruptcy Court that included a handwritten list of dozens of firearms, along with a copy of the Schedule B from his original bankruptcy petition.30 Because Free did not list any serial numbers in these two documents, Walsh was unable to determine the degree of overlap between the two lists.31
The depth of Free‘s fraud on the Bankruptcy Court became increasingly apparent in the ensuing months. In April of 2012, Walsh filed a status report in which he informed the Bankruptcy Court that Free “ha[d] received at least $90,000.00 in funds from third parties whom he offered to sell firearms which constitute property of the estate during the pendency of this Chapter 7 proceeding.” 32 The day after Walsh filed his status report, the Bank
It was around this time that the FBI became involved. Having reviewed certain firearms registration records, FBI agents came to believe that Free was continuing to conceal firearms from the Bankruptcy Court.34 The FBI obtained a warrant to search Free‘s residence a second time. During that search, which took place in March of 2013, federal agents discovered an additional 55 firearms.35
B. Free‘s Criminal Prosecution
Federal prosecutors eventually initiated a criminal case against Free for committing bankruptcy fraud. The grand jury returned an indictment in January of 2014 that charged Free with six counts relating to (i) false statements in Free‘s Schedule A relating to real property; (ii) false statements in Free‘s Schedule B relating to his ownership of firearms; (iii) false statements in Free‘s declaration of March 26, 2012; (iv) false statements in Free‘s supplemental declaration of March 27, 2012; (v) concealment of additional assets from the Bankruptcy Court, including real property, motor vehicles, farm implements, and cash; and (vi) false statements that Free made under oath at the March 2011 creditors’ meeting.36
Counts I through IV arose under
After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Free on all counts.
C. Free‘s Sentencing Hearing
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a bankruptcy fraudster‘s recommended term of imprisonment depends on a number of factors.39 “Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines governs the calculation of the offense level for crimes involving, among other things, fraud and deceit.” 40 Subsection (a) of that provision “provides the base offense level, which is either seven, if the offense has a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years or more, or six.” 41 Subsection (b) “provides an extensive list of adjustments for offense-specific characteristics,” including “the adjustment for the amount of loss.” 42 As the loss amount increases, so too does the defendant‘s offense level.
At Free‘s sentencing hearing, the District Court therefore needed to make a determination as to the amount of loss caused by Free‘s crimes. The issue here is that, by the time of Free‘s sentencing, it had become clear that Free had (and perhaps always had) sufficient assets to pay off his creditors in full. Given this odd factual posture, the parties disputed the correct loss amount under the Guidelines.
The government argued that the District Court should take at least three numbers into account to calculate loss, all relating to the value of Free‘s concealed guns.
Free‘s counsel objected to the $833,000 figure on the ground that the government produced its appraisal estimate at the last minute and he had not yet had a chance to investigate the appraiser‘s credentials. The District Court sustained the objection and discounted the $833,000 figure in its calculations.
Even so, the government argued that Free should have 16 levels added to his offense level. It derived this figure from the Sentencing Guidelines’ stepwise scheme for calculating loss. If a fraudster‘s conduct causes over $400,000 but less than $1 million in loss, the Guidelines add 14 levels to his offense level.44 If the fraudster‘s conduct causes over $1 million but less than $2.5 million in loss, the Guidelines add 16 levels to his offense level.45 Thus, even if the District Court were disinclined to credit the $833,000 figure as the correct valuation for Free‘s as-of-yet-unsold guns, the value of the first two groups of guns was $997,460. The government asserted that, whatever its value, the third lot of guns was worth enough to push Free‘s loss figure past the $1 million threshold necessary to trigger a 16-level increase in his offense level.46
Free‘s position, by contrast, was that he “should only be held accountable for a loss amount that‘s consistent with what he could have deprived creditors of receiving back during the bankruptcy.” 47 Since all of Free‘s creditors were paid back in full, Free asserted that the loss amount in his case was, in fact, $0.
In a colloquy with Free‘s counsel, the District Court challenged Free‘s arguments in favor of a $0 loss calculation. It pointed out that courts rely on honesty from litigants:
But then, as I thought about it, read Feldman, one of the things that we rely on people doing is, when they come to Court, whether it‘s this Court or the Bankruptcy, particularly, the Bankruptcy Court, they have to deal the cards faced up, because we don‘t have a cavalry of investigators to go out snooping around everyone that runs through the tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases just filed here in Pittsburgh, let alone around the country. We absolutely rely
on people telling the truth because we can‘t ferret it out any other way.48
In addition, the District Court expressed the view that, under the Guidelines, there is a difference between a debtor who conceals $100 in assets and a debtor who conceals $1 million in assets. According to the District Court, the Guidelines reflect a policy judgment that the second debtor should receive a harsher sentence than the first.49 Free‘s counsel disagreed. He argued that the Guidelines are concerned primarily with the amount of harm inflicted or intended to be inflicted on victims of crime. And here, the only conceivable victims were Free‘s creditors—who, it turned out, sustained no loss at all.50
Walsh, the bankruptcy trustee, also testified at Free‘s sentencing hearing. He said that Free‘s dishonesty was the worst he had ever seen in his more than 37 years of practice in the bankruptcy courts.51 In his view, “at virtually every single step of the way ... Free has been an obstructionist.” 52 But Walsh also testified that, once Free‘s bankruptcy proceedings had concluded, there would likely be more than enough assets to satisfy all creditors’ claims.53
Free also spoke on his own behalf. He claimed that he filed for bankruptcy in order to “stay [a] sheriff sale” on one of his properties, not to discharge any debts.54 He also said that his bankruptcy attorney told him that it would be acceptable not to disclose all of his firearms on his bankruptcy schedules.55
The District Court made two key statements regarding its loss calculation. First, it concluded that “it was certainly Mr. Free‘s intention to conceal from the United States Bankruptcy Court and to cause a loss, to the extent that it was needed, materially in excess of a million dollars.” 56 The District Court did not, however, explicitly state that Free intended to cause pecuniary harm to his creditors. Nor did the District Court clarify its understanding of Free‘s intent at the time he filed for bankruptcy. Instead, the District Court made the following statement:
The Court draws the inference that Mr. Free had his reasons for both filing and persisting in the bankruptcy proceeding, [and] that Mr. Free had his reasons that were of value to him in not causing any of his lawyers to attempt to resolve the matter earlier. ... But all of the testimony at the trial ... demonstrates that Mr. Free knew and wanted to be in the bankruptcy proceeding, that he, he viewed assets that he needed to protect from the bankruptcy proceeding, and combined with those that he did disclose in the bankruptcy proceeding were well north of a million dollars.57
In explaining its loss calculation, the District Court stated that it “found ... none of [Free‘s testimony] to be credible at all,” and said that Free‘s answers were “evasive” and “non-sensible.” 58 The District Court underscored its view that the Guidelines reflect the commonsense proposition “that there would be a higher loss calculation when there is a significantly higher amount of assets that are concealed from the Bankruptcy Court, even if on reflection it could have been completely unnecessary from a logical and a common sense standpoint to conceal [them].” 59 The District Court also characterized the victim of Free‘s fraud as “the judicial system of the United States,” not his creditors.60
Somewhat curiously, even though the District Court concluded that the loss amount in Free‘s case was more than $1 million, it only added 14 levels to Free‘s base offense level of 6. That 14-level enhancement is consistent with a loss amount of between $400,000 and $1 million,61 whereas a loss amount greater than $1 million normally triggers a 16-level enhancement.62 The discrepancy appears to have arisen because the Presentence Investigation Report only recommended a 14-level enhancement, and the District Court tentatively adopted that recommendation before Free‘s sentencing hearing63 and then adhered to its prior decision at the hearing itself.64
Combining Free‘s base offense level of 6, his loss causation enhancement of 14, and his 2-level enhancement for bankruptcy fraud, Free‘s total offense level was 22. This resulted in a Guidelines Range of 41-51 months’ imprisonment on each count.67 The District Court then varied downward, concluding that an offense level of 16 was “more appropriate” given the facts of Free‘s case.68 This led to a Guidelines range of 21-27 months’ imprisonment.69 The District Court ultimately sentenced Free to 24 months’ incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, and to a term of supervised release of three years.70
D. Free‘s Motion for Bail Pending Appeal
About a month after his sentencing, Free filed a motion for bail pending appeal. Free argued that bail was appropriate because our Court might ultimately agree with his view of how to calculate loss under the Guidelines. The District Court granted the motion three months later, concluding that Free had raised a “significant” question of law.71
Importantly, the District Court concluded that the loss calculation issue could alter Free‘s sentence. It noted that, without the 14-level increase in Free‘s offense triggered by its prior loss calculation, Free‘s offense level would have been 10, “lead[ing] to an advisory Guideline range of 6-12 months.” 75 Even though this Guidelines range would not be binding, the District Court stated that it was entitled to “due and serious consideration.” 76 And, while the District Court was “hesitant to engage in any concrete forecast of what would actually happen at a resentencing,” it also stated that it was “likely ... that a new sentence [would] be shorter than 11-13 months if Mr. Free‘s ‘zero’ loss theory [were to] carr[y] the day.” 77
Accordingly, Free has been out on bail pending resolution of this appeal.
II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review
This is a direct appeal from a criminal conviction and sentence. Free timely filed a notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction under
Free brings both a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and a challenge to his sentence. “In reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, we ‘must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and affirm the judgment if there is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 78
III. Discussion
Free challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the District Court‘s subsequent sentence. We will consider each issue in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, Free‘s primary contention is that, since his creditors received full payment as a result of his bankruptcy proceedings, he cannot properly be said to have devised or participated in any fraudulent scheme. While Free admits that his dishonesty may have been “potentially contemptible conduct in the bankruptcy matter,” he insists that his repeated lying does not necessarily “establish [the] requisite mens rea [to show] that he devised a scheme to defraud or intended to defraud anyone.” 83 This argument is too clever by half.
Free was convicted of four counts under
Likewise, counts V and VI involve violations of
More generally, Free‘s argument depends on the proposition that debtors have blanket immunity to lie to the Bankruptcy Court so long as there are no creditors
B. The Proper Loss Calculation in the Present Case
We turn next to Free‘s challenge to his sentence, and in particular to his contention that the District Court erred in its calculation of “loss” under the Sentencing Guidelines.
There are essentially two ways to think about loss in this case. Under one view, the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is to calibrate a fraudster‘s punishment so that it reflects the extent of the economic harm inflicted or intended to be inflicted on the fraudster‘s victims. This is Free‘s position. Free argues that there were no victims here because Free‘s creditors received 100 cents on the dollar in Free‘s bankruptcy proceeding.
Under the alternative view proffered by the government, the Guidelines provide district courts with broad discretion to conceptualize the harm caused by a defendant based on the facts of any particular case. In the context of bankruptcy fraud, then, it is appropriate to think about harm in terms of the value of any assets that a debtor conceals from the bankruptcy court—not only because concealing assets can harm creditors, but also because it harms the integrity of the judicial system itself. The District Court ultimately embraced this view.89
We begin with the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, which we think favor Free‘s argument. The application notes define the following key terms:
- Actual loss: “Actual loss” means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.
- Intended Loss: “Intended loss” (I) means the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense; and (II) includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a government sting operation, or an insurance fraud in which the claim exceeded the insured value).
- Pecuniary harm: “Pecuniary harm” means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money. Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm.90
In our view, the application notes to § 2B1.1, which discuss these definitions in further detail, suggest that the District Court‘s rationale for Free‘s sentence was inconsistent with the structure of the Guidelines.91 The notes focus extensively
Our Court‘s leading case regarding loss calculation and bankruptcy fraud is United States v. Feldman, 338 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003).93 The defendant there, like Free, committed fraud on the bankruptcy court by concealing large quantities of assets.94 His main argument on appeal, like Free‘s, focused on the lack of any concrete harm or intended pecuniary harm to his creditors. Feldman claimed that because most of his concealed assets consisted of property he owned jointly with his wife that, by operation of law, was not subject to execution by his creditors, his decision to hide those properties from the bankruptcy court inflicted little or no actual loss within the meaning of the Guidelines.95
The Feldman Court began its analysis by observing that loss calculations under the Guidelines can turn on either actual loss or intended loss. Thus, “even if Feldman could not have caused any loss by concealing exempt assets, he could still be subject to a sentencing enhancement if he thought he would cause a loss by concealing the assets.” 96 The government, by contrast, urged the Feldman Court to go even further by adopting “a bright line rule that ‘[i]ntended loss includes the value of assets concealed from creditors and the bankruptcy court.’ ” 97 We declined to do so, stating that the key question in these cases is not the value of the assets concealed, but rather “what [a defendant] sought to gain from committing the crime.” 98
The Feldman Court recognized that a reasonable sentencing court could credit Feldman‘s argument that he “did not intend any monetary loss to his creditors.” 99 But Feldman also stated that it would be “appropriate for the District Court to consider the reason why most people would conceal assets and determine that it is simply unbelievable that Feldman would hide over a million dollars in assets only
Importantly, however, we did not say in Feldman that the concealment of large quantities of assets always proves a fraudster‘s intent to short-change his creditors. Instead, we emphasized that there were other facts tending to show that Feldman in particular intended to inflict such a loss. We emphasized that, in addition to the real estate he owned with his wife, Feldman concealed two Jaguar vehicles “that were not even arguably exempt from bankruptcy.” 103 In our view, this conduct supported the conclusion “that Feldman intended to inflict a loss in the amount of the entire debt from which he sought to be discharged.” 104
The parties disagree over how Feldman applies to the facts at hand. Free contends that Feldman supports him because it focuses on a debtor‘s intended pecuniary harm to creditors. The government, by contrast, says that Feldman supports its view that district courts have wide discretion to consider “the many permutations of facts that arise when loss is at issue” and to assess “what the defendant ‘sought to gain from committing the crime.’ ” 105 The government argues that, “[h]ad Free truly not intended a loss to any creditor, he had many opportunities to come forward, admit to his fraud and deceit, and set the record straight.” 106 The government therefore urges us to interpret Free‘s continued dishonesty as evidence that, as a matter of law, supports the conclusion that Free intended loss equal to the amount of debt that he sought to conceal.
The District Court, however, seemed to select a different approach and thus did not make a factual finding regarding the government‘s view. The government, both in its briefing and at oral argument, argues that the District Court drew the explicit inference that Free intended to cause pecuniary harm to his creditors, among other victims.107 Reviewing the record on appeal, we simply disagree. The District Court relied primarily on the notion that Free harmed the judicial system by concealing assets. We believe that rationale is inconsistent with the Guidelines and incompatible with Feldman. Thus, we disagree with the District Court‘s view that the concept of “loss” under the Guidelines is broad enough to cover injuries like abstract harm to the judiciary. In our view, “loss” has a narrower meaning—i.e., pecuniary harm suffered by or intended to be suffered by victims.
Instead, we draw guidance from our colleagues in the Seventh Circuit. That court recently recognized that “the guidelines do not require a loss calculation greater than zero.” 110 Rather, “[t]he loss determination is a special offense characteristic that increases the guidelines offense level” through “bonus punishment points, which express a reasonable estimation of the victim‘s financial loss.” 111 We agree with the proposition that the government is not entitled to a punitive loss calculation, even in cases involving fraud, absent evidence of actual or intended pecuniary loss.
It is true that the District Court stated at Free‘s sentencing hearing “that it was certainly Mr. Free‘s intention to conceal from the United States Bankruptcy Court and to cause a loss, to the extent that it was needed, materially in excess of a million dollars.” 112 However, the District Court also stated, somewhat cryptically, that “Free had his reasons for both filing and persisting in the bankruptcy proceeding, [and] that Mr. Free had his reasons that were of value to him in not causing any of his lawyers to attempt to resolve the matter earlier.” 113
In our view, this is something short of an explicit factual finding that Free intended to harm his creditors by concealing assets. It is, at most, a finding that Free wanted to protect certain assets—especially his firearms—from the bankruptcy process. In any event, we do not think that the District Court actually made an explicit factual finding as to whom Free intended to harm or the gain he intended to secure by committing the offense.114 Any ambiguity on this point is clarified by the District Court‘s opinion regarding Free‘s motion for bail pending appeal. The District Court there said that “the principal basis for the sentence [it] imposed” was “harm[] [to] the integrity of the judicial process“—not pecuniary harm, actual or intended, to Free‘s creditors, or what he sought to gain from committing the crime.115 Feldman requires such a factual finding, and we thus remand to allow the District Court to determine what, if any, loss to creditors Free intended, or the gain he sought by committing the crime.116
This is not to say that Free will necessarily receive a lower sentence on remand. It is true that the District Court has already calculated that, if it were to apply a zero-dollar loss figure, the Guidelines range on remand would be 6-12 months on each count.117 But as we have already noted, the Guidelines embrace the view that an upward departure or variance may be appropriate when a defendant‘s conduct results in extensive, albeit non-pecuniary, harm.118 We appreciate that the notes speak of non-pecuniary harm in terms of injury to actual victims, such as “physical harm, psychological harm, or severe emotional trauma.” 119 Free‘s flouting of the bankruptcy system, his blatant disrespect for judicial authority, and his repeated dissembling while under oath are not analogous to these kinds of injuries. But even at the most general level, the statutory sentencing factors require district courts to consider, among other things, “the need for the sentence imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just pun
We leave it to the District Court to consider these issues on remand and to determine an appropriate sentence consistent with the statutory sentencing factors and the applicable Sentencing Guidelines.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand this case for resentencing.